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Too blue for logic
My axioms were so clean-hewn,
The joins of ‘thus’ and ‘therefore’ neat
But, I admit
Life would not fit
Between straight lines
And all the cornflowers said was ‘blue,’
All summer long, so blue.
So when the sea came in and with one wave
Threatened to wash my edifice away -
I let it.
Marianne Jones
iii
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the following people for discussions, comments and sugges-
tions relating to the SP project: Mike Anderson, Peter Apostoli, Jim Baldwin,
Horace Barlow, Manos Batsis, Dorrit Billman, Geof Bishop, Howard Bloom,
Erik Borgers, Bob Borsley, Alan Bundy, John Winston Bush, Gordon Brown,
John Campbell, Chuck Carlson, Nick Chater, Andy Chipperfield, Frans Co-
enen, James Crook, Jim Cunningham, Alain Cymm, Louise Dennis, Colin de
la Higuera, Lorraine Dodd, David Dowe, Dave Elliman, Nick Ellis, Michael
Flor, Richard Forsyth, Michele Friend, Alex Gammerman, Antony Galton,
Ross Gayler, Felix Goldberg, Frank Gooding, Pat Hayes, Adrian Hopgood,
John Hornsby, Geoffrey Hunter, Jason Hutchens, Alan Hutchinson, Christian
Huyck, Miguel Jimenez-Montano, Bob Jones, Phil Jones, Simon Jones, Mark
Lawson, Vahe Karamian, Krishna Krishnamurthy, Lucy Kuncheva, Pat Lan-
gley, Bill Majoros, Paul Mather, Adrian Mathias, Jim Maxwell Legg, Will
McKee, Chris Mellish, Peter Milner, Detlef Morganstern, Stephen Muggle-
ton, Ajit Narayanan, Sergio Navega, Craig Nevill-Manning, Freddy Offenga,
Thomas Packer, Alex Paseau, John Pickering, Tim Porter, Emmanuel Pothos,
Friedemann Pulvermu¨ller, Theofaris Raptis, Edward Remler, Steve Robertshaw,
Stephen Schmidt, Oliver Schulte, Derek Sleeman, Mathew Smith, Rod Smith,
Ray Solomonoff, Graham Stephen, Heiner Stuckenschmidt, Simon Tait, Ti-
chomir Tenev, Guillaume Thierry, Robert Thomas, Chris Thornton, Menno
van Zaanen, Chris Wallace, Hong Wang, Chris Wensley, Rob Whetter, Chris
Whitaker, Peter Willett, Richard Young, Roger Young.
Special thanks to Simon Tait for his interest and for very useful discus-
sions right at the beginning, to Chuck Carlson for setting up the computing-as-
compression mailing list (www.sanna.com/casc/), and to Emmanuel Pothos for
his interest and major contribution in relating the SP ideas to current thinking
in psychology (the basis for Chapter 12).
Special thanks too to Ticho Tenev for taking the trouble to read the whole
book in draft and give me detailed comments and suggestions, to Peter Mil-
ner for detailed comments on Chapter 11, to David MacKay for several useful
suggestions, and to Colin de la Higuera for raising some interesting questions
that led to some rewriting. The responsibility for all errors and oversights is, of
course, my own.
The work has also benefitted from lively discussions on the computing-as-
compression mailing list, including contributions from: David Cary, Chuck Carl-
son, Nate Cull, Chris Ferguson, Phil Goetz, Max Little, James Luberda, Pabitra
Mitra, Detlef Morgenstern, Brendan Macmillan, Sergio Navega, Remy Nonnen-
macher, Freddy Offenga, Andrew Seaca, Andrew Stanworth, Robert Toews,
Ravi Venkatesan.
I am very grateful to Martin Taylor for allowing me the use of an office
and facilities in the School of Informatics, University of Wales Bangor, and—for
other support and assistance—to Tim Porter, Chris Wensley, Chris Whitaker,
Lucy Kuncheva, John Owen, Dave Whitehead and Matthew Williams in the
School, and Dafydd Roberts and Paul Rolfe in Information Services.
iv
Two research grants have assisted this work: a Personal Research Grant
from the UK Social Science Research Council (HRP8240/1(A), 1982-3) and
a Research Grant from the UK Science and Engineering Research Council
(GR/G51565, 1992-4).
Last, but very far from least, I am very much indebted to Marianne for her
love and support at home, and to my two grown-up children, Daniel and Esther,
for their love and continued interest in the project as it has slowly matured.
Many apologies to anyone whose contribution I may have failed to mention.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Goals of the research and potential benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Creating a good theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 The SP theory and related research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Computing, Cognition and IC 14
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Information, redundancy, compression of information and prob-
abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Coding for reduced redundancy in computing and cognition . . . 32
2.4 Searching for redundancy in computing and cognition . . . . . . 45
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 The SP Theory 55
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 The overall framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Representation of knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Multiple alignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5 Coding and the evaluation of an alignment in terms of compression 70
3.6 Realisation of the three compression techniques in SP . . . . . . 75
3.7 Calculation of probabilities associated with alignments . . . . . . 76
3.8 Decompression by compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.9 Outline of computer models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.10 Detailed description of SP61 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4 The SP Theory as a Theory of Computing 94
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2 Universal Turing machine and Post canonical system . . . . . . . 95
4.3 SP and the operation of a Post canonical system . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
v
CONTENTS vi
5 Natural Language Processing 110
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Ambiguities and recursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3 Syntactic dependencies in French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 Dependencies in the syntax of English auxiliary verbs . . . . . . 120
5.5 Cross serial dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.6 The integration of syntax with semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6 Recognition and Retrieval 137
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.2 Scene analysis, fuzzy pattern recognition, best-match information
retrieval and multiple alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3 Best-match information retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.4 Class-inclusion relations, part-whole relations and inheritance of
attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.5 Medical diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7 Probabilistic Reasoning 154
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2 Probabilistic reasoning, multiple alignment and information com-
pression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3 One-step ‘deductive’ reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.4 Abductive reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.5 Reasoning with probabilistic decision networks and decision trees 161
7.6 Reasoning with ‘rules’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
7.7 Nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with default values . . . 169
7.8 Explaining away ‘explaining away’: the SP system as an alterna-
tive to Bayesian networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7.9 Causal diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.10 Reasoning which is not supported by evidence . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8 Planning and Problem Solving 189
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.3 Solving geometric analogy problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9 Unsupervised Learning 197
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9.2 SP70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3 Evaluation of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
9.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
9.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
CONTENTS vii
9.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
10 Mathematics and Logic 223
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
10.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10.3 Information compression and structures in mathematics and logic 228
10.4 Information compression and processes in mathematics and logic 237
10.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
10.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
11 Neural Mechanisms 252
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
11.2 Global considerations: arguments from biology and engineering . 253
11.3 Neural mechanisms for the SP framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
11.4 Representation of knowledge in the brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
11.5 Neural processes for building multiple alignments . . . . . . . . . 265
11.6 Neural mechanisms for learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
11.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
11.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
12 SP and Cognitive Psychology 281
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
12.2 Recognition and Categorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
12.3 Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
12.4 Associative Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
12.5 ‘Rules’, ‘Similarity’ and Artificial Grammar Learning . . . . . . . 296
12.6 Language Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
12.7 Analogy and Structure Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
12.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
13 Future Developments and Applications 310
13.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
13.2 Development of the theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
13.3 Development of an ‘SP’ machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
13.4 Applications of the SP theory and machine . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
13.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
14 Conclusion 336
14.1 Is the SP Theory a Good Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
A Finding Good Matches 339
A.1 The hit structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
A.2 Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
A.3 Discussion of the search technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
A.4 Computational complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
B The SP Theory and Physics 348
Chapter 1
Introduction
“Fascinating idea! All that mental work I’ve done over the years,
and what have I got to show for it? A goddamned zipfile! Well, why
not, after all?” John Winston Bush, 1996.
In the world of computing, the term “information compression” (or “data com-
pression”) is normally associated with slightly dull utilities like WinZip or PkZip
or the Lempel-Ziv algorithms on which they are based. Information compression
is useful if you want to economise on disk space or save time in transmitting a
file but otherwise it does not seem to have any great significance.
In this book I aim to show that there is much more to information compres-
sion than this. The book describes ways in which information compression can
illuminate concepts and issues in artificial intelligence and human cognition and,
indeed, the nature of ‘computing’ itself. More specifically, the book describes
the concept of information compression by multiple alignment, unification and
search and the ways in which this framework can be used to model the workings
of a Turing machine and such things as parsing and production of language,
‘fuzzy’ pattern recognition and information retrieval, probabilistic reasoning,
planning and problem solving, unsupervised learning, and a range of concepts
in mathematics and logic.
Information compression may be interpreted as a process of trying to max-
imise Simplicity in information (by removing ‘redundancy’) whilst retaining as
much as possible of its non-redundant, descriptive Power. Hence the name ‘SP’
that has been adopted for these proposals. They will normally be referred to as
the ‘SP theory’ but they may also be referred to as the ‘SP system’ because the
concepts are developed as an abstract working model. Equivalent expressions
are ‘SP framework’, ‘SP model’, ‘SP scheme’ and ‘SP concepts’.
A relatively brief overview of the SP theory and its applications is available
in Wolff (2003).
1
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1.1 Beginnings
My interest in these kinds of ideas was sparked originally by fascinating lecturers
about economical coding in the nervous system given by Horace Barlow when I
was an undergraduate at Cambridge University.
Some time later, I developed two computer models of language learning:
MK10 which demonstrates how a knowledge of the segmental structure of lan-
guage (words, phrases etc) can be bootstrapped from unsegmented text with-
out error-correction or ‘supervision’ by a ‘teacher’, and SNPR—an augmented
version of MK10—that demonstrates how grammars can be learned without
external supervision (see Wolff, 1988, and earlier papers cited there). In the
course of developing these models, the importance of economical coding became
increasingly clear.
At about that time, I became acquainted with Prolog and I was struck by
the parallels that seemed to exist between that system, designed originally for
theorem proving, and my computer models of language learning. A prominent
feature of my learning models is a process of information compression by search-
ing for patterns that match each other together with a process of merging or
‘unifying’ patterns that are the same. Although information compression is not
a recognised feature of Prolog, a process of searching for patterns that match
each other is prominent in that system and the merging of matching patterns is
an important part of ‘unification’ as that term is understood in logic. It seemed
possible that information compression might have the same fundamental impor-
tance in logic as it has in inductive learning.
These observations led to the thought that it might be possible to integrate
inductive learning and logical inference within a single system, dedicated to
information compression by pattern matching, unification and search. Further
thinking suggested that the scope of this integrated system might be expanded
to include such things as information retrieval, pattern recognition, parsing and
production of language, and probabilistic inference.
Development of these ideas has been underway since 1987. It was evident
quite early that the new system would need to be organised in a way that
was rather different from the organisation of the MK10 and SNPR models.
And, notwithstanding the development of Inductive Logic Programming, it
seemed that Prolog, in itself, was not suitable as a vehicle for the proposed
developments—largely because of unwanted complexity in the system and be-
cause of the relative inflexibility of the search processes in Prolog. It seemed
necessary to build the proposed new integrated system from new and ‘deeper’
foundations.
Initial efforts focussed on the development of an improved version of ‘dy-
namic programming’ for finding full matches and good partial matches between
pairs of patterns. About 1994, it became apparent that the scope of the sys-
tem could be greatly enhanced by replacing the concept of ‘pattern matching’
with the more specific concept of ‘multiple alignment’, similar to that concept
in bioinformatics but with important differences.
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1.2 Goals of the research and potential benefits
The main aim of the research has been to develop a theory of information
processing in computers and in brains that integrates and simplifies concepts
and observations in those domains, as discussed in the next section. A subsidiary
aim has been to develop a new kind of computing system, based on the theory,
with potential advantages over the current generation of computers, especially
in artificial intelligence.
Like any good theory, the SP theory should simplify our ideas, provide new
insights, make predictions and suggest new avenues for research. These aspects
of the theory are discussed at appropriate points throughout the book. Potential
applications of the proposed new computing system will be evident from exam-
ples and discussion throughout the book. There is a summary and discussion
of the anticipated applications and benefits in Chapter 13.
1.3 Creating a good theory
The SP theory originated in research on human psychology but its scope now
extends to information processing in any kind of system, either natural or artifi-
cial. How should such a theory be constructed and how should it be evaluated?
At the risk of doing great violence to some complex and subtle issues in the phi-
losophy of science, I discuss those questions briefly in the following subsections,
and describe how the SP theory has been developed.
Breadth and depth
Some time ago, Allen Newell wrote that:
“Psychology, in its current style of operation, deals with phe-
nomena. ... Every time we find a new phenomenon—every time
we find PI release, or marking, or linear search, or what-not—we
produce a flurry of experiments to investigate it. We explore what
it is a function of, and the combinatorial variations flow from our
experimental laboratories. ... [These] phenomena form a veritable
horn of plenty for our experimental life—the spiral of the horn itself
growing all the while it pours forth the requirements for secondary
experiments. ...
“Psychology also attempts to conceptualize what it is doing, as a
guide to investigating these phenomena. How do we do that? Mostly,
so it seems to me, by the construction of oppositions—usually binary
ones. We worry about nature versus nurture, about central versus
peripheral, about serial versus parallel, and so on. ... Suppose that
in the next thirty years we continued as we are now going. Another
hundred phenomena, give or take a few dozen, will have been discov-
ered and explored. Another forty oppositions will have been posited
and their resolution initiated. Will psychology then have come of
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age? Will it provide the kind of encompassing of its subject matter
... that we all posit as a characteristic of a mature science? ...
“As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those al-
ready in existence as a guide to how they fare and shape the course
of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters
simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time.
Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology
gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads
rather to an every increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or
become diverted from, but never really settle.” (Newell, 1973, pp.
284–289).
The gist of Newell’s critique, in these quotes and elsewhere in that paper, is:
• That researchers were focussing too narrowly on single phenomena or ‘op-
positions’ between classes of possible mechanisms. This echoes Neisser’s
earlier critique of ‘microtheories’ in psychology (1967).
• That boxes and arrows or similar sketchy descriptions of possible mech-
anisms are not sufficiently precise to know whether or not the proposed
mechanisms would work as anticipated.
As a remedy, he suggested that processing models should be ‘complete’
rather than partial (which really means that they should be working computer
programs), that any one model should deal with a complex task (“a genuine
slab of human behaviour” (p. 303)) or that it should provide an integrated view
of a range of smaller tasks. In short, he saw a need to increase both the breadth
and the depth of theories in psychology.
Falsifiability and the making of predictions
Since the publication of Karl Popper’sThe Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper,
2002) it has been widely accepted that a scientific theory cannot be ‘good’ unless
it is falsifiable—meaning that one can conceive of empirical evidence that would
cause one to discard the theory or at least revise it (although there may be
ethical or methodological hurdles that might make it difficult to obtain that
evidence).
Marching hand-in-hand with this principle is the idea that good theories
should make predictions that can be subject to empirical test. A classic example
is the way Einstein’s prediction that light is bent when it passes close to a heavy
body like the sun was dramatically confirmed in 1919 by Arthur Eddington’s
observations of stars and their apparent positions, made in the island of Principe
off the west coast of Africa at the time of a solar eclipse.
Although falsifiability is widely accepted as a necessary feature of any good
theory, it is also recognised that falsifiability can only be achieved in an informal
sense. When a piece of evidence appears to falsify a given theory, it is always
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possible to find alternative explanations: the instruments were faulty, the mate-
rials were not in the right condition, and so on. To cut a long discussion short,
our judgement of whether or not a given theory is supported by the evidence
has a probabilistic character. If we say that a given theory is falsifiable, we are,
in effect, saying that there are kinds of evidence that would cause us to judge
that there is a low probability of the theory being correct.
Simplicity and power
Although the medieval English philosopher and Franciscan monk William of
Ockham lived long before the age of science, his dictum that “entities should
not be multiplied unnecessarily” is often quoted in support of the idea that
scientific theories should be simple or, more precisely, any one theory should be
as simple as possible, consistent with the set of observations which the theory
is designed to explain. An adjunct to this idea, which is less often articulated
but is, nevertheless, widely accepted by people working in science, is that if
two theories are equally simple, then the one that explains the widest range of
observations is to be preferred. In summary, it is generally acknowledged that
a ‘good’ scientific theory should combine ‘simplicity’ with explanatory range or
‘power’.
These ideas are rather similar to principles of minimum length encoding,
developed in connection with grammar induction (grammar discovery or gram-
matical inference) and themselves part of the foundations of the SP theory. To
anticipate Section 2.2, where minimum length encoding principles are described
more fully, a ‘good’ grammar for a given language is one that combines sim-
plicity with an ability to describe the language in an economical manner. If
‘explanation’ in terms of a given scientific theory is understood to be economi-
cal description of the world (or aspects of it) in terms of that theory, then the
analogy is good:
• Some theories are weak ‘catch-all’ theories like ‘because God wills it’ or
the over-enthusiastic use of the concept of ‘instinct’ to explain any kind
of human behaviour. These theories are like the ‘promiscuous’ grammars
described in Section 2.2 that are too simple to be able to describe anything
in an economical way.
• Other theories are weak because they merely redescribe a set of observa-
tions in other terms. These theories are like over-large ‘ad hoc’ grammars
(ibid.) that repeat the original data.
As we shall see in Section 2.2, minimum length encoding principles actually
boil down to a rather simple idea: “Given a sample of language or other body of
data, compress it as much as possible in a lossless manner”.1 Likewise, science
may be seen as a process of compressing raw data as much as possible. As John
Barrow has written: “Science is, at root, just the search for compression in the
world” (Barrow, 1992, p. 247).
1Lossless compression will be explained in Section 2.2.
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Although the analogy seems good, it is not yet possible to evaluate scientific
theories with the mathematical precision with which minimum length encoding
principles can be applied in grammar induction (and in the SP theory). Our
assessments of scientific theories currently depend on informal judgements of
simplicity and power and it seems likely that this will be true for some time to
come.
Integration
The six criteria that have been described may be reduced to two: simplicity and
power.
The need for breadth of scope of scientific theories may be equated with
power. A good theory (in psychology and elsewhere) should describe or explain
a significant range of phenomena (“a genuine slab of human behaviour”) rather
than one or two details.
The criterion of depth may be subsumed by both simplicity and power be-
cause a theory that is so simple that it cannot even explain its target range of
observations is no theory at all. “Entities should not be multiplied unnecessar-
ily” but, equally, they should not be reduced past the point where they are not
up to the job.
Falsifiability may be seen as a manifestation of explanatory power. If a
theory, like Freud’s theory of dreams, can always be twisted to ‘explain’ any
conceivable observation within its domain of application, then we sense that its
ability to describe the world in an economical way is weaker than theories that
cannot be manipulated in this way. Such theories are ‘catch-all’ theories like
those mentioned above.
The idea that a theory should make empirical predictions may also be seen to
derive from the concept of power: if a prediction of a given theory is confirmed by
observation or experiment, then the power of the theory (its explanatory range)
is increased without any change in simplicity—thus increasing the rating of the
theory in terms of simplicity and power. As with Eddington’s confirmation of
Einstein’s prediction, this kind of evidence can be compelling.
In principle, a theory may combine simplicity with an ability to explain a
wide range of existing observations without predicting the kinds of observations,
yet to be made, that Eddington confirmed on his expedition to Principe. And
most people working in science would acknowledge that such a theory would be
useful, if, perhaps, not quite as exciting as when predictions coincide with later
observations. But the intimate connection that exists between information com-
pression and inductive inference (to be discussed in Section 2.2) means that it is
difficult to construct a theory that compresses a significant range of observations
without, at the same time, making predictions of one kind or another.
Theories in computing, mathematics and logic
Most of the foregoing discussion is about theories in empirical sciences like psy-
chology, biology or chemistry where the aim is to provide explanations of things
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observed in the world. Although disciplines like computing, mathematics and
logic deal with abstractions rather than empirical phenomena, similar principles
apply. In these cases, a ‘good’ theory is one that combines simplicity with an
ability to integrate or unify a range of pre-existing concepts. In these domains, a
theory may be regarded as ‘falsified’ if it fails to accommodate a pre-established
construct or operation.
Artificial intelligence—which is an important topic throughout this book—is
something of a half-way house. It has empirical content—because it aims for
human-like capabilities—but it is not necessary that the imitation should be
achieved by human-like means. Of course, many researchers in artificial intel-
ligence borrow extensively from psychology and vice versa. Apart from being
as simple as possible, a ‘good’ theory in artificial intelligence should explain a
wide range of phenomena or integrate a wide range of concepts or both these
things.
Orientation
It would be nice to report that principles like those described in the preceding
subsections had all been fully articulated before work began on developing the
SP theory. The reality was that, like most people working in science, I had only
an informal, intuitive sense of the kind of theory I was aiming for. That said,
I believe the SP theory meets the criteria well: it is not a vacuous catch-all
‘theory’ that explains everything and nothing, and it is not a ‘theory’ that is
merely a redescription of the data it purports to ‘explain’.
When I was working on language learning, I had been persuaded by Neisser’s
(1967) criticism of ‘microtheories’ in psychology to aim for something with rel-
atively wide scope. In the SP programme, this prejudice was reinforced by
Newell’s later writings in the same vein (some of which were quoted above). As
things have turned out, the scope of the theory is much wider than was envis-
aged originally, with things to say about aspects of human cognition, artificial
intelligence, computing, mathematics and logic.
In the research on language learning and in the SP programme, computer
models have been an invaluable tool. Attempting to express one’s embryonic
thoughts in the form of a computer program forces explicitness where vague-
ness might otherwise prevail, and the process of running a computer model on
appropriate data allows one to see very clearly whether or not the often com-
plex implications of a simple idea actually work out as anticipated. Countless
armchair speculations have been dumped as a result of this kind of testing.
Computer models help to provide the kind of precision and explicitness that
Newell (and others) have called for but the same can also be said of mathe-
matical equations. As readers will see in chapters that follow, the SP theory
is founded on well-established concepts from information theory, combinatorics
and probability theory, and it incorporates mathematical equations from those
areas at appropriate points. But many of the concepts in the SP theory, espe-
cially the version of the multiple alignment concept that has been adopted in
the theory, are best described and developed in the form of computer models,
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not mathematical equations.
Making haste slowly
Apart from the unexpected similarities between Prolog and my language learn-
ing models, a germinal thought was the goal of finding a ‘universal’ format
for different kinds of knowledge. Originally, the focus was on finding a sin-
gle format for the syntax and semantics of natural languages—to facilitate the
development of a uniform learning process for natural language syntax and se-
mantics and their integration (see Wolff, 1987). Interestingly enough, Prolog
proved relevant again as one of the strongest candidates, although it is not well
suited to the representation of class hierarchies with inheritance of attributes.
The problem of integrating different kinds of knowledge surfaced again when
I was working at Praxis Systems on an ‘integrated project support environment’
for the development of software. In this case, the need was to find a way of or-
ganising all the different kinds of knowledge involved in software development—
specification of requirements, high-level design, low-level design, source code,
object-code, project plans, budgets, and so on—bearing in mind that each ‘doc-
ument’ or ‘object’ is likely to be divided into a hierarchy of parts and sub-parts,
that for each part there may be a hierarchy of versions and sub-versions, and
that tight control is needed over associations between specific versions of differ-
ent parts across the range of different kinds of knowledge.
Given that the notion of a ‘version’ is rather similar to the concept of ‘class’
in object-oriented design, it seemed natural to represent a hierarchy of versions
as a hierarchy of classes in an object-oriented language like Simula, Smalltalk or
C++. An attraction of this idea is that one could exploit the idea of ‘inheritance
of attributes’ to avoid repeating information unnecessarily: anything that was
true of a major version would also be true of all the versions and sub-versions
below it, without the need to repeat the information in each of those subsidiary
versions individually. Since object-oriented languages also allow one to represent
any object using a hierarchy of parts and sub-parts, things were looking good.
But, of course, there is a snag! Although an ‘attribute’ (data structure or
method) is a part of a class, and attributes can themselves be divided into parts
and sub-parts, an attribute cannot be part of an individual object and a part of
an object cannot serve as an attribute of a class. In C++ (and all other object-
oriented languages that I am familiar with), the attributes of a class are defined
in the source code whereas part-whole hierarchies of individual objects are built
at run time. This makes it impossible to achieve a full integration of class-
hierarchies with part-whole hierarchies or to eliminate the artificial distinction
between ‘attribute’ and ‘part’. An implication of that integration would be that
the concept of ‘class’ and the concept of ‘object’ should be merged.
The ‘SP’ language was one of my first attempts at solving this problem and
creating a system that could represent and integrate diverse kinds of knowledge.
As can be seen from the syntax of the language (Wolff, 1990), shown in Figure
1.1, knowledge was conceived as ‘objects’ comprising a combination of ordered
and unordered AND relationships, together with (inclusive) OR relationships.
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It was envisaged that ‘objects’ would also serve as ‘classes’ so that the system
could be used to define a range of different kinds of knowledge, with complete
integration amongst part-whole hierarchies and class-inclusion hierarchies. It
was also envisaged that the system would be driven by information compression,
achieved by the matching and unification of patterns.
Object → Ordered-AND-object |
Unordered-AND-object |
OR-object | Simple-object;
Ordered-AND-object → ‘(’, body, ‘)’;
Unordered-AND-object → ‘[’, body, ‘]’;
OR-object → ‘{’, body, ‘}’;
body → b | NULL;
b → Object, body;
Simple-object → symbol | ‘ ’;
symbol → character, s;
s → symbol | NULL;
character → ‘a’ | ... | ‘z’ | ‘0’ | ... | ‘9’;
Figure 1.1: The syntax of an early version of the ‘SP’ language (Wolff, 1990).
From these early beginnings, the current system—described in Chapter 3—
has slowly evolved. The strengths and weaknesses of each version of the system
have been explored using computer models. At all stages, I have tried to avoid
introducing any new constructs into the system without compelling reasons.
At the same time, I have looked for opportunities to eliminate constructs if at
all possible, and I have looked for ways in which the explanatory range of the
system might be increased.
Although the syntax shown in Figure 1.1 is quite simple, it is significantly
more complicated than the format for knowledge in the current system:
• ‘Ordered-AND-objects’ are now the patterns described in Chapter 3.
• ‘Unordered-AND-objects’ have been dropped because groupings that have
no intrinsic order can be modelled with ordinary patterns (as will be de-
scribed in Section 3.4).
• There is no need for ‘OR-objects’ because the notion of alternatives in
the representation of knowledge is implicit in the way the current system
works.
• The concept of a ‘variable’ (shown as ‘ ’ in Figure 1.1) is not needed as
a primitive element of the system because the effect of a variable—and
‘values’ for a variable—can be modelled in the system using symbols and
patterns (see Section 10.3).
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• The concept of a ‘NULL’ entity has been dropped although there may be
a case for re-introducing it, as suggested in Section 9.2.
• Although the syntax in Figure 1.1 does not contain a construct for ‘nega-
tion’, there was quite a long period when I thought it would be necessary
to introduce one. In the end, it became apparent that negation could be
modelled by the use of appropriate patterns in the knowledge supplied to
the system, without the need to provide for negation in the system itself
(see Section 10.4).
• There is no explicit provision in the system for repetition or looping, like
repeat ... until, for ... or while .... This is because repetition can be
modelled with recursion using only symbols and patterns.
• There is no need for inbuilt types or a dedicated mechanism for the cre-
ation of user-defined types because the same effect can be achieved using
only symbols and patterns (see Section 10.3).
Apart from the progressive simplification of the syntax, the main develop-
ments have been in the processing that provides the ‘semantics’ of the system:
• First it was necessary to develop a version of ‘dynamic programming’ for
finding full matches and good partial matches between patterns, without
the shortcomings of traditional algorithms (see Section 3.10). The result
is described in Appendix A (see also Wolff, 1994a).
• As mentioned above, a major insight was that the explanatory scope of
the system could be dramatically increased by generalising the concept of
‘pattern matching’ to a version of the concept of ‘multiple alignment’.
Because the SP version of the multiple alignment concept is different from
the bioinformatics version, it seemed necessary to develop a new algorithm for
building multiple alignments, different from any of those that had been devel-
oped in bioinformatics. The result was a waste of two years trying to develop
a technique that ultimately proved abortive! Another 18 months was needed
to develop a working model using a modified version of one of the techniques
already established in bioinformatics. Happily, the system now works well and
has remained stable for some time.
1.4 The SP theory and related research
As an attempt to integrate ideas across several areas, the SP theory naturally
has many connections with other research. In the main, connections of that kind
are noted or discussed at appropriate points in the chapters that follow. This
section first makes a few brief remarks about how the SP theory compares with
other attempts at integration and then there is a summary of key features that
serve to distinguish the SP theory and research programme from other research
in computing, artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
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Unified theories of cognition
As a theory of human cognition, the theory belongs in the tradition of Unified
Theories of Cognition, pioneered by Allen Newell (1990; 1992) and others, and
motivated by the kinds of concerns about cognitive psychology that were quoted
above (Section 1.3). No attempt will be made to make a detailed comparison
with other unified theories but I will highlight the main similarities and differ-
ences between the SP theory and two of the best-known ones: Soar (Newell,
1990; Rosenbloom et al., 1993) and ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).
The main differences between the SP theory and the other two theories are:
• The SP theory is not primarily a theory of human cognition: it is a theory
of information processing in any kind of system, either natural or artificial.
• The SP theory is founded on minimum length encoding principles but
these are not recognised as central organising principles in the other unified
theories of cognition.
• The concept of multiple alignment as it has been developed in the SP
framework has no counterpart in the other theories.
Like Soar and ACT-R, the SP system is an architecture for cognition, not a
model of any specific piece of behaviour. Like the other models—or, indeed, a
new-born child—its detailed behaviour will depend on knowledge that it is given
or that it acquires by learning. A process of matching patterns is prominent in
all three systems, although dynamic programming in the SP system appears to
provide for more flexibility than in the other two systems.
Soar stores its permanent knowledge as ‘production rules’ (like ACT-R) and
its temporary knowledge as ‘objects’ with ‘attributes’ and ‘values’. By contrast,
the SP system stores all knowledge as arrays of symbols in one or two dimensions
called patterns. Unlike Soar, the SP system has no explicit concept of ‘goal’ or
‘subgoal’ (it is anticipated that concepts of that kind may be modelled with
patterns). In Soar, all learning is achieved by ‘chunking’, whereas learning
in the SP framework derives from the process of forming multiple alignments
and achieves chunking—and other kinds of learning—as a by-product of that
process.
In the SP theory, there are no ‘modules’ or ‘buffers’ as there are in the ACT-
R theory and there is no formal distinction between ‘declarative memory’ and
‘procedural memory’ (see Section 3.3).
Key features of the SP theory and research programme
As we have noted, the SP theory has many connections with other research.
As a guide through the maze, readers may find it useful to keep in mind the
following points which, together, serve to distinguish the SP theory and research
programme from parallel and connected lines of research:
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1. As previously mentioned, the SP theory is a theory of information pro-
cessing in any system, either natural or artificial.
2. As such, it is also a theory of computing. As a theory of computing, the SP
theory is ‘Turing equivalent’ in the sense that it can model the operation
of a universal Turing machine—but it is distinct from the universal Turing
machine and equivalent models such as Lamda Calculus (Church, 1941)
or Post’s Canonical System (Post, 1943) because it is built from different
foundations, it has much more to say about the nature of intelligence, and
it has other advantages described in Chapter 4.
3. A central idea in the SP theory is that all kinds of computing or infor-
mation processing is achieved by information compression in accordance
with minimum length encoding principles, as described in Section 2.2. The
apparent paradox of ‘decompression by compression’ and how it may be
resolved is discussed in Section 3.8.
4. The SP theory is distinct from Kolmogorov complexity theory, minimum
length encoding and algorithmic information theory (Li and Vita´nyi, 1997)
because the latter three inter-related areas of thinking are founded on
the Turing model of computing whereas the SP theory is itself a new
model of computing, built from new foundations. The SP theory is also
distinguished from these areas by the two points that follow.
5. Another important idea in the SP theory is the conjecture that all kinds
of information compression may be understood in terms of the matching
and unification of patterns coupled with the creation and use of ‘code’
symbols to encode information economically.
6. More specifically, it is proposed that matching and unification of patterns
and economical encoding of information is achieved via a process of mul-
tiple alignment that is similar to that concept in bioinformatics but with
important differences.
1.5 Presentation
Chapter 2, next, describes ideas and observations on which the SP theory is
founded, or that have provided motivation for the development of the theory,
or are simply part of the background thinking that has influenced the ways in
which theory has developed.
Chapter 3 describes the theory itself and one of the main computer models
in which the theory is embodied. After that, Chapter 4 shows how the SP
theory can model the operation of a universal Turing machine and explains the
advantages of the theory compared with earlier theories of computing.
In Chapters that follow, applications of the SP theory are explored: in the
processing of natural languages (Chapter 5), in pattern recognition and infor-
mation retrieval (Chapter 6), probabilistic reasoning (Chapter 7), planning and
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problem solving (Chapter 8), learning of new knowledge (Chapter 9), and in the
interpretation of concepts in mathematics and logic (Chapter 10).
In Chapter 11 I describe how the SP theory may be realised with known
mechanisms and processes in the brain. Constructs in the theory map quite
neatly onto a revised version of Hebb’s (1949) concept of a ‘cell assembly’ and
the revised version overcomes several weaknesses of the original concept.
Chapter 12 considers how the SP theory relates to some current themes in
cognitive psychology and Chapter 13 outlines possibilities in the future devel-
opment of the SP theory and in its applications.
Chapter 2
Computing, Cognition and
Information Compression1
2.1 Introduction
The purposes of this chapter are two-fold:
• To consider the nature of ‘information’, ‘redundancy’, ‘information com-
pression’, ‘probabilities’—and their inter-relations. These ideas, discussed
in the next section, are centre-stage in the SP theory and throughout this
book.
• The rest of the chapter provides a broad perspective on the several ways
in which information compression may be seen in diverse areas of both
computing and cognition. This chapter aims to show how a variety of
established ideas may be seen as information compression and to illustrate
the broad scope of this perspective in information systems of all kinds,
both natural and artificial.
2.2 Information, redundancy, compression of
information and probabilities
The development of ‘information theory’ (originally called ‘communication the-
ory’) in the first half of the 20th century gave mathematical precision to a con-
cept that had, hitherto, been rather vague. Although this precision was and is
very useful for calculating the bandwidth of communication channels and other
applications, a presentation of the concepts purely in terms of the mathematics
can have the effect of obscuring important underlying concepts. In this section,
I shall focus mainly on what I perceive as the concepts behind the mathematics.
1Based on Wolff (1993).
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There are many excellent sources that provide the mathematical details (see,
for example, Cover and Thomas, 1991).
Information
Anything that contains recognisable variations may be seen as information. This
includes light waves, sound waves, pictures (both static and moving), diagrams,
written or spoken language, music, mathematical or logical formulae, Morse
code, the bar code on a tin of baked beans, non-verbal nods, winks and smiles,
and so on.
In this book, it is assumed that any continuously-varying ‘analogue’ form of
information (any kind of wave for example) can be converted into digital form
with any desired level of precision, as described in Section 2.2, below. The focus
will be mainly on information in digital form.
To be more specific, it is assumed that any kind of information may be rep-
resented as an array of ‘symbols’ in one or more dimensions, where a symbol
is some kind of ‘mark’ that can be seen to be the ‘same’ as another symbol or
‘different’ from it—but nothing in between. Within any given body of infor-
mation, I, each symbol may be seen to belong to a symbol type comprising all
other symbols within I that are the same as the given symbol.2 Associated with
every I is an alphabet of the symbol types that appear in I.
In this book, the main focus is on arrays of symbols in one dimension. How-
ever, it is anticipated that the SP ideas will generalise to arrays of symbols in
two dimensions and possibly more. For this reason, the relatively general term
pattern is normally used to describe arrays of symbols in one or two dimensions
rather than more specific terms such as ‘string’ or ‘sequence’.
‘Direct’ and ‘encoded’ kinds of digitisation
Analogue information such as speech or music is normally digitised as a sequence
of numbers, each one representing the amplitude of the wave at a given moment.
This is represented schematically by the sequence of numbers immediately below
the sin wave in Figure 2.1.
Given our familiarity with numbers, this system may seem simple and nat-
ural. But it should not be forgotten that, even if these numbers are represented
in binary code, the way in which they represent the original analogue infor-
mation requires a knowledge of the number system and it requires a process
of interpretation in terms of that knowledge. Understanding the nature of the
interpretative process—with any kind of knowledge—is one of the main themes
of this book.
An alternative to this ‘encoded’ form of digitisation is represented schemat-
ically at the bottom of Figure 2.1. Here, the amplitude of the original analogue
wave is represented by the density of the digital symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’. This kind
of digitisation, which is similar to the way in which the density of black dots
2Here and throughout this book, the phrase “(the or a) given body of information” will be
abbreviated as ‘I’.
CHAPTER 2. COMPUTING, COGNITION AND IC 16
Figure 2.1: Digitisation of an analogue wave as numbers or as densities of ‘0’s
and ‘1’s.
is used to represent different shades of grey in a newspaper photograph, does
not require a knowledge of the number system or a process of interpretation in
terms of that system. It is a relatively ‘direct’ form of digitisation which does
not depend on numbers or any comparable form of encoding.
Randomness, redundancy, structure and compression
Patterns of information may be random and, in those cases, we perceive the in-
formation to be totally lacking in ‘structure’—like ‘snow’ on a television screen.
Most of the information we encounter in practical applications is not random
but is structured in some way. This means that the information contains redun-
dancy, a term whose technical meaning is quite close to the everyday meaning
of ‘something that is surplus to requirements’. If there is redundancy in I, there
is, in effect, repetition of information. And information that is repeated is, in
terms of communication, unnecessary. Of course, redundancy can be useful in
other ways such as guarding against catastrophic loss of information (as in the
use of backup copies or mirror disks in computing), or in speeding up processing
in databases that are distributed over a wide area, or in aiding the correction
of errors when information is corrupted (as in error-correcting codes).
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Schematically, any body of information, I, may be seen to comprise
mutually-exclusive non-redundant information and redundant information and
nothing else, as shown in Figure 2.2. Of course, the redundant and non-
redundant parts of I are normally intermingled, not arranged in two blocks
as shown in the figure.
Figure 2.2: A schematic representation of any body of information, I, showing
mutually-exclusive non-redundant information and redundant information.
Information compression means reducing the size of I by removing informa-
tion from it. If the only information to be removed is redundant information
then in principle and usually in practice it is possible to restore I to its original
state with complete fidelity. This is lossless compression. If some non-redundant
information is removed as well as redundant information, this is lossy compres-
sion. Lossy compression can be beneficial in some applications—by speeding up
the compression process or increasing the level of compression—but the penalty
is that, when non-redundant information has been discarded, it is never possible
to restore I exactly to its original form.
In principle, lossy compression could be achieved by discarding non-
redundant information and preserving all redundant information. But in prac-
tice, lossy techniques, like lossless techniques, are designed to remove as much
redundant information as is practically possible. In general, it will be assumed
that all techniques for information compression are designed with the primary
emphasis on reducing redundancy in information.
The foregoing remarks give a broad view of randomness, redundancy and
information compression but we need to be more precise about the nature these
concepts. They are considered in more detail in the subsections that follow.
Shannon’s information theory
Building on earlier work by Boltzmann, Hartley and others, Claude Shannon
(1949) developed the idea that the communicative value of a symbol or other
‘event’ is related to its probability: “It will rain tomorrow” is more informative
than “It will rain some time in the coming year”. In this theory, the average
quantity of information conveyed by one symbol in a sequence is:
H = −
i=n∑
i=1
pi log pi, (2.1)
where pi is the probability of the ith symbol type in the set of n available symbol
CHAPTER 2. COMPUTING, COGNITION AND IC 18
types. If the base for the logarithm is 2, then the information is measured in
‘bits’.
If the probabilities of all the symbol types in I are equal, I contains the
maximum possible information for the given alphabet of symbol types. In this
case, I is random and contains no redundancy. If some symbols are more prob-
able than others, I is not random and it contains redundancy. If the redundant
information is removed, the size of I can be reduced without sacrificing any of
its communicative value.
This analysis of the nature of information, randomness and redundancy was
a major advance when it was first described and remains very useful for many
purposes. However, it suffers from three main problems:
• Probabilities of symbols include both absolute probabilities and condi-
tional probabilities. The absolute probability of each symbol type can be
derived straightforwardly as a normalised measure of the frequency of oc-
currence of that symbol type in I but conditional probabilities are more
problematic. The difficulty arises in defining the condition or context for
each conditional probability. Should it be the symbol immediately preced-
ing the target symbol or the symbol immediately following—or both these
things? Should it be some string of two or more symbols before or after
the target symbol (or both these things)? If so, how long should those
strings be? Should there be a gap of one or more symbols between the
context and the target symbol or should there be gaps within the context
string? If so, how big or numerous should those gaps be? Should the tar-
get symbol be a pair of symbols, or three or four ...? In general, there is
an explosion of possibilities and it is not obvious what the ‘correct’ answer
should be or if, indeed, there is any ‘correct’ answer.
• In Shannon’s theory, any I of finite size is regarded as a sample of the
world and probabilities derived from that I are regarded as estimates of
probabilities in the world. If I is large, these estimates may be regarded
as being tolerably accurate. But if I is small, the probabilities derived
from it may be regarded as too unreliable to be trusted.
• There are some kinds of data that appear to be random in terms of abso-
lute and conditional probabilities of symbols but are, nevertheless, known
to have underlying regularities. One example is the decimal expansion
of π where the seemingly random sequence of digits conforms to a sim-
ple formula. Another example is the apparently random stream of digits
generated by the kind of random() function provided in most computer
systems. Again, there is an underlying regularity defined by a simple for-
mula. These kinds of redundancy will be referred to as covert forms of
redundancy.
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Algorithmic information theory
An interesting alternative to Shannon’s information theory is algorithmic in-
formation theory, developed by Gregory Chaitin and others (see, for example,
Chaitin, 1987, 1988; Li and Vita´nyi, 1997). The key idea here is that, if I can be
generated by a computer program that is shorter than I then the information
is not random and contains redundancy. If no such program can be found then
the information is regarded as random and contains no redundancy.
This approach to understanding randomness, redundancy and information
compression neatly sidesteps the second of the two problems associated with
Shannon’s theory, described above. Each I is regarded as complete in itself and
not merely a sample of something larger. If some algorithm can be discovered
or invented that is smaller than I but can create I, then I is not random.
Otherwise, it is. This is true no matter how small I may be.
Another advantage of algorithmic information theory is that it accommo-
dates the covert kinds of redundancy found in the decimal expansions of π or
the output of a typical random() function. In each such case, the relevant for-
mula represents an algorithmic compression of the data.
An implication of algorithmic information theory is that, while it may be
possible to prove that I is not random in particular cases, it is not possible to
prove the converse, except when I is very small. Although a lot of effort may
have been expended unsuccessfully in trying to find a means of compressing I,
there is, for any I of realistic size, always the possibility that a little extra effort
would yield a positive result.
Another implication of this view of randomness and redundancy is that, if I
has been as fully compressed as is practicable then, with due allowance for the
possibility that more resources may allow more compression to be achieved, we
may regard I as random.
Redundancy as repetition of patterns and information
compression by the unification of patterns
In Shannon’s theory, redundancy is seen in terms of unbalanced probabilities of
symbols while algorithmic information theory sees it in terms of the length of
a computer program relative to raw data. A third possibility, discussed here, is
redundancy as repetition of patterns.
If, for example, I is the pattern ‘I N F O R M A T I O N I N F O R M A
T I O N’, it is clear that it contains a redundant copy of the pattern ‘I N F O
R M A T I O N’. A little less clearly, the same is true if I is ‘I X Y Z N F O
R M A I J K T I O N I N F L M N O R M A T P Q R I O N’. Thus, any
instance of a pattern that repeats within I may be a coherent substring of I or it
may be a subsequence of I in which the constituent symbols are not necessarily
contiguous within I, and the gaps within the subsequence may occur at varying
positions from one instance to another. A substring or subsequence that repeats
in different contexts is sometimes called a chunk of information (see Section 2.2,
below).
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A natural adjunct to redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns is that redun-
dancy can be reduced—and I can be compressed—by the merging or unification
of two or more patterns so that they are reduced to one. To avoid misunder-
standing, the meaning of the term ‘unification’ as it has been used here is
different from and simpler than the meaning of that term in logic, although
there are recognisable similarities. Unless otherwise indicated, the meaning of
the term throughout this book will be a simple merging of identical patterns.
Preserving non-redundant information by the use of ‘identifiers’ and
‘references’
If two or more instances of a pattern within I are reduced, by unification,
to a single instance then some non-redundant information is lost, namely the
position within I of every one of the original instances, except the one instance
that remains—assuming that it has kept its original position within I and has
not itself been moved to some other location external to I.
For some applications, it may not matter that this non-redundant informa-
tion has been lost. But if lossless compression is required, it is necessary to
preserve the information about the positions of the instances that have been
removed from I. This can be achieved by attaching some kind of relatively
short ‘name’, ‘label’, ‘tag’ or identifier to the single ‘unified’ instance of the
repeating pattern and then inserting a copy of that identifier in the position of
each instance that has been removed. Each such copy will be termed a reference
to the unified pattern. Identifiers and references will be referred to collectively
as codes.
This basic mechanism, illustrated in Figure 2.3, is most straightforward when
each instance of the repeating pattern is a coherent substring within I but
the technique can be generalised for fragments that repeat as discontinuous
subsequences within I. Examples will be seen in Chapter 9.
Huffman coding and related techniques
An important point about the use of codes is that information compression can
be optimised if frequently-occurring patterns are given shorter identifiers than
patterns that occur rarely. This basic idea can be made mathematically precise
by using the well-known Huffman coding method or the slightly less efficient
Shannon-Fano-Elias coding (both these techniques are described in Cover and
Thomas (1991)).
Redundancy, frequency and size
In the redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns view, it is clear that the amount of
redundancy represented by a repeating pattern—and the amount of compression
that can be achieved by unification—depends on the frequency of occurrence of
the pattern within I and also on its size. Patterns that are both large and
frequent represent more redundancy and yield more compression than patterns
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Figure 2.3: A schematic representation of the way two instances of the pattern
‘INFORMATION’ in a body of raw data may be unified to form a single ‘unified
pattern’, with ‘w62’ as an identifier assigned by the system. The lower part of
the figure shows how the raw data may be compressed by replacing each instance
of ‘INFORMATION’ with a copy of the corresponding identifer.
that are small and rare. This follows directly from the compression that can be
achieved by the unification of repeating patterns and is only indirectly related
to the use of Huffman coding or similar techniques.
A key point in this connection is that, for any given frequency of occurrence
of a given pattern, there is aminimum size below which no (lossless) compression
can be achieved. This is because allowance has to be made for the information
‘cost’ of the identifiers and references that are needed for lossless compression.
A table of random numbers contains many repeating patterns but none of them
are large enough or frequent enough to support lossless compression.
The minimum size required for compression varies with the frequency of the
pattern: patterns that occur rarely have a larger minimum size than patterns
that occur more frequently. Conversely, useful compression can be achieved with
large patterns even if their frequency of occurrence is quite low, whereas small
patterns need to be more frequent to yield lossless compression by unification.
Searching for repeating patterns and the need for constraints
A question about repeating patterns that has been glossed over so far is how
they are to be discovered. At first sight, this is simply a matter of comparing
one pattern with another to see whether they match each other or not. But
there are, typically, many alternative ways in which patterns within I may be
compared—and some are better than others. We are interested in finding those
matches between patterns that, via unification, yield most compression—and a
little reflection shows that this is not a trivial problem.
Maximising the amount of redundancy found means maximising R where:
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R =
i=n∑
i=1
(fi − 1) · si, (2.2)
fi is the frequency of the ith member of a set of n patterns and s is its size in
bits. As previously noted, patterns that are both big and frequent are best. This
equation applies irrespective of whether the patterns are coherent substrings or
patterns that are discontinuous within I.
Maximising R means searching the space of possible unifications for the set
of big, frequent patterns that gives the best value. For a sequence containing
N symbols, the number of possible subsequences (including single symbols and
all composite patterns, both coherent and fragmented) is:
P = 2N − 1. (2.3)
The number of possible comparisons is the number of possible pairings of
subsequences which is:
C = P (P − 1)/2. (2.4)
For all except the very smallest values of N the value of P is very large and
the corresponding value of C is huge. In short, the abstract space of possible
comparisons between patterns and thus the space of possible unifications is, in
the great majority of cases, astronomically large. Since the space is normally
so large, it is not feasible to search it exhaustively. For that reason, we can-
not normally guarantee to find the theoretically ideal answer and normally we
cannot know whether or not we have found the theoretically ideal answer. In
general, we must be content with answers that are “good enough”.
In all practical methods for searching for ‘good’ matches between patterns,
there is a need for constraints that reduce the amount of searching that needs
to be done. These constraints come it two main forms:
• Absolute Constraints. Search costs may be kept within bounds by search-
ing only within a pre-defined sub-set of the set of possible comparisons.
For example, comparisons may be made only between coherent substrings;
or the maximum size of patterns may be restricted; or some other arbitrary
constraint may be imposed.
• Heuristic Constraints. The costs of searching may be reduced without
undue sacrifices in effectiveness by applying a measure of redundancy to
guide the search. In ‘heuristic’ search techniques (which include ‘hill climb-
ing’ (or ‘descent’), ‘beam search’, ‘best-first search’, ‘branch-and-bound
search’, ‘simulated annealing’, ‘genetic algorithms’ and others), the search
is conducted in stages and, at each stage, searching is curtailed in those
parts of the search space that have proved sterile and it is concentrated in
areas that are indicated by the metric.3 With this kind of constraint, it is
3For this reason, these kinds of search technique are sometimes also called ‘metrics-guided
search’.
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possible in principle to reach any part of the search space. Nevertheless,
this kind of constraint can reduce dramatically the amount of searching
that needs to be done to achieve acceptable results.
Either or both of these two kinds of constraint may be used.
In general, there is a trade-off between accuracy and speed. A search that is
heavily constrained can be achieved quite quickly but—for the kinds of problems
that are the focus of interest in artificial intelligence—the results may not be
very good. Better results can normally be obtained by relaxing the constraints
and taking more time.
As a rough generalisation, conventional computing systems use absolute
constraints whereas artificial intelligence applications use heuristic constraints.
With certain kinds of problem, conventional systems can produce results rela-
tively fast but they lack the flexibility needed in artificial intelligence applica-
tions.
Can all kinds of redundancy be seen as repeating patterns?
Another question that arises in connection with redundancy-as-repetition-of-
patterns is whether all kinds of redundancy can be seen in these terms or whether
there is a distinction to be drawn between some kinds of redundancy that can
be seen as repeating patterns and others that cannot.
At first sight, the answer to this question is clear. Kinds of data such as
the previously-mentioned decimal expansions of π or the output of random()
functions, do not contain repeating patterns of the kind we have been discussing
but they are known to have underlying regularities. And there are techniques for
information compression—such as ‘arithmetic coding’—that work well without
any apparent need to search for repeating patterns or to unify patterns that are
the same. In short, it seems that, while some kinds of redundancy may be seen
as repeating patterns, there are other kinds of redundancy that cannot be seen
in these terms.
Notwithstanding the kinds of counter-examples just mentioned, a working
hypothesis in this programme of research is that:
All kinds of redundancy may be understood as repeating patterns and
compression of information by the reduction of redundancy may al-
ways be understood in terms of the unification of patterns that match
each other.
This working hypothesis will be referred to as the redundancy-as-repetition-of-
patterns conjecture. According to this conjecture, all the several methods for
compressing information—ZIP programs, linear predictive coding, arithmetic
coding, Huffman coding, fractal compression, JPEG, MPEG, and so on—may
at the most fundamental level be understood in terms of the matching and
unification of patterns.
Now that the SP framework is relatively mature, it provides fairly strong
evidence in favour of the hypothesis. The main steps in the argument are as
follows:
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1. The SP framework is dedicated to the reduction of redundancy by the
matching and unification of patterns. There is no other mechanism or
process in the framework for reducing redundancy.
2. It is possible to model the operation of a universal Turing machine within
the SP framework. This is explained in some detail in Chapter 4.
3. In keeping with the key idea in algorithmic information theory (de-
scribed in Section 2.2), it seems reasonable to assume that any kind
of redundancy—including the covert kinds of redundancy mentioned
earlier—can be expressed algorithmically and that any technique for re-
ducing redundancy can be implemented as a program to run on a universal
Turing machine.
4. If the foregoing points are accepted, it follows that any kind of redundancy
and any technique for compressing information by reducing redundancy
may be understood in terms of the matching and unification of patterns.
Another argument in support of the redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns
conjecture is based on the observation that all methods for information compres-
sion depend on measures of the frequency or probability of symbols or patterns.
Given that ‘probability’ in this context is a normalised measure of frequency
and that frequency implies a process of counting, it is clear that all methods for
information compression depend on counting. As will be argued in Section 10.3,
counting implies recognition of the things to be counted and their assimilation
to a single concept—and this means compression of information by the match-
ing and unification of patterns. Hence, all methods for information compression
depend on the matching and unification of patterns.
Redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns compared with Shannon’s the-
ory and algorithmic information theory
Before leaving the subject of redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns, a few words
are in order about how this concept of redundancy compares with the way in
which redundancy is treated in Shannon’s theory and in algorithmic information
theory.
In ‘classical’ treatments of Shannon’s theory, the main focus is on the proba-
bilities of symbol types. It is recognised that symbols do not exist in isolation so
conditional probabilities are brought into the picture as well as absolute proba-
bilities. But, as we saw earlier, this leads to difficulties in defining the relevant
context or contexts for each symbol type.
In principle, Shannon’s theory may be applied to redundancy-as-repetition-
of-patterns if the concept of ‘symbol’ is generalised to include sequences of two
or more symbols. But any such generalisation of Shannon’s theory would need
to take account of the way in which subsequences within I may overlap each
other (unlike individual symbols) and the analysis would also need to recognise
that the sizes of patterns are at least as important as their frequencies. None
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of this would overcome the difficulty arising from the fact that probabilities
derived from I are regarded as estimates and these estimates are unreliable if I
is small.
Another difficulty with Shannon’s theory—that may be described as
‘psychological’—is that the emphasis on the probability of individual symbols
or smallish sequences of fixed size (‘n-grams’), coupled with the apparent need
to derive these probabilities from samples that are as large as possible, seems
to have led some researchers to overlook the importance of the sizes of patterns
and the way in which an increase in the size of repeating patterns can bring
down the minimum frequency or probability required for lossless compression.
It is sometimes assumed that high frequencies are needed before redundancy
can be detected, despite the fact that lossless compression can be achieved by
the unification of patterns of quite modest size even though their frequency of
occurrence in I may be as low as 2.
One difference between algorithmic information theory and redundancy-as-
repetition-of-patterns is that algorithmic information theory is based on the con-
cept of a universal Turing machine but that concept has no place in redundancy-
as-repetition-of-patterns. However, since a universal Turing machine can be
modelled within the SP framework, redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns can
borrow the elegant idea that I contains redundancy if it can be compressed,
and adapt it in terms of the matching and unification of patterns within the SP
framework. Redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns can also accommodate the
covert kinds of redundancy mentioned earlier.
The simple, intuitive idea that information can be compressed by the unifica-
tion of matching patterns is an obvious implication of redundancy-as-repetition-
of-patterns. Neither Shannon’s theory nor algorithmic information theory recog-
nise this idea.
Techniques for compressing information
There are many techniques for information compression including lossy tech-
niques such as JPEG, MPEG and fractal compression and also lossless tech-
niques such as arithmetic coding and Lempel-Ziv algorithms used in the popular
‘ZIP’ programs for information compression.
As was argued above (Section 2.2), it seems possible that all these techniques
may be understood in terms of the matching and unification of patterns but in
some this is more obvious than in others. As previously noted, this mechanism
is relatively obscure in techniques like arithmetic coding but in Lempel-Ziv
algorithms and some other related techniques (see, for example, Storer, 1988)
the reduction of redundancy by the matching and unification of patterns is clear
to see.
Three main variants of the technique can be recognised:
• Chunking-With-Codes. This is the basic technique as described in Section
2.2, above. Two or more instances of a coherent substring or ‘chunk’ of
information are reduced to a single instance. The unified chunk has an
CHAPTER 2. COMPUTING, COGNITION AND IC 26
identifier and the positions of the original instances may be marked with
copies of the identifier (‘references’), as described earlier.
This chunking-with-codes technique is so widespread and ‘natural’ that
we hardly notice it: we often use the abbreviation ‘PC’ as a short sub-
stitute for the relatively long pattern ‘personal computer’; a citation like
‘Storer (1988)’ may be seen as a reference to the relatively long biblio-
graphic details of the book given in the references section of the article;
in everyday speaking and writing, names of people, places and so on may
all be regarded as relatively short references to concepts where the full
description in each case represents a relatively large body of information.
No doubt, readers can think of many other examples.
• Schema-Plus-Correction. A variant of the basic chunking-with-codes tech-
nique is another technique that is often called schema-plus-correction. In
this case, the unified pattern is not a monolithic chunk but is a chunk
containing gaps or holes within which a variety of other patterns may ap-
pear on different occasions. In this case, the unified pattern is the schema
and the other patterns that fill the gaps are corrections to or completions
of the schema. Identifiers and references are used to connect each such
correction with its proper place in the schema.
In everyday life, a common example is a menu in a restaurant. In this
case the schema is the basic framework of the menu, e.g., ‘Starter ... main
course ... sweet course ...’ and the corrections or completions are the
dishes chosen to fill the gaps. Another example is any kind of form with
fields that will be filled with specific information each time the form is
completed.
• Run-Length Coding. If a sequence of symbols contains a pattern that
repeats in a sequence of instances that are contiguous, one with the next,
then information compression can be achieved by reducing the repeating
series to one instance with something to mark the repetition or, for fully
lossless compression, with something to show the number of repetitions.
For example, the pattern ‘a x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x y z x
y z x y z x y z b’ may be reduced to something like ‘a (x y z)* b’ in the
case of lossy compression or, for lossless compression, something like ‘a (x
y z)[10] b’.
In programming terms, this kind of run-length coding can always be ex-
pressed using a ‘recursive’ function—one that contains one or more calls
to itself, either directly or via calls to other functions. And, as explained
in Section 2.3, below, functions can themselves be understood as examples
of chunking-with-codes or schema-plus-correction.
Minimum length encoding
Another topic to be described in connection with information compression is
sometimes known as minimum message length encoding or minimum descrip-
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tion length encoding. An umbrella term that embraces both those variants is
minimum length encoding, the term that will be used throughout this book.
This area of thinking was pioneered by Solomonoff (1964) and also by Wal-
lace and Boulton (1968) and by Rissanen (1978) (see Li and Vita´nyi, 1997).
The principle arose in connection with the problem of trying to discover, infer
or induce a grammar (or similar knowledge structure) from a sample of ‘raw’
data. The grammar is a set of rules that are intended to describe the raw data
but for any given body of data (let us call it I) there are infinitely many different
grammars that will do.
Describing the discovery of minimum length encoding principles, Solomonoff
(1997) writes:
“I was trying to find an algorithm for the discovery of the ‘best’
grammar for a given set of acceptable sentences. One of the things
I sought was: Given a set of positive cases of acceptable sentences
and several grammars, any of which is able to generate all the sen-
tences, what goodness of fit criterion should be used? It is clear that
the ‘ad hoc grammar’, that lists all of the sentences in the corpus,
fits perfectly. The ‘promiscuous grammar’ that accepts any con-
ceivable sentence, also fits perfectly. The first grammar has a long
description; the second has a short description. It seemed that some
grammar half-way between these, was ‘correct’—but what criterion
should be used?”
If I is an alphabetic text, the ‘promiscuous grammar’ is:
S → char S
char → A
char → B
...
char → Z
In other words, construct the text from letters chosen from the alphabet, one
character at a time, at random. This grammar will describe I but it will also
describe many other alphabetic texts as well.
The ad hoc grammar is one that contains just one rule:
S → a copy of I
This grammar describes I but it cannot describe anything else.
Between these two extremes are many other grammars, including those that
contain any amount of ‘garbage’ in addition to the information needed to de-
scribe I. As Solomonoff says, some kind of criterion is needed for choosing one
or more ‘good’ grammars and avoiding the ‘bad’ ones.
The minimum length encoding principle depends on the idea that a grammar
may be used to encode I succinctly. Using the grammar, a ‘program’ may be
constructed that describes I in an economical manner. More concretely, each
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rule in a grammar may be seen as a pattern with a relatively short identifier
as described in Section 2.2. I may be coded economically in terms of those
short identifiers, much as was described earlier. The technique needs to be
generalised to take account of high-level abstract rules in the grammar but the
basic principle is the same as in Section 2.2 (see also Sections 2.3 and 3.5).
The key idea in minimum length encoding is that, in grammar induction
and related kinds of processing, one should seek to minimise (G+E), where G
is the size (in bits) of the ‘grammar’ (or comparable knowledge structure) that
is under development and E is the size (in bits) of the raw data (I) when it
has been encoded in terms of the grammar. This principle guards against the
induction of trivially small ‘promiscuous’ grammars (where a very small G is
offset by a relatively large E) and over-large or ‘ad hoc’ grammars (where E
may be small4 but this is offset by a relatively large G).
Bearing in mind that a complete description of I includes both the ‘grammar’
and ‘the raw data in its encoded form’, then minimum length encoding boils
down to a very simple idea: “Given a sample of language or other body of data,
compress it as much as possible in a lossless manner”. As we shall see in Section
2.2, below, lossless compression as just described is entirely compatible with
the kind of lossy compression needed to achieve generalisations and inductive
predictions.
Minimum length encoding, algorithmic information theory and Kol-
mogorov complexity theory
Ideas that have been developed under the minimum length encoding banner
are closely related to algorithmic information theory (Section 2.2) and these
two areas are also closely related to ‘Kolmogorov complexity theory’ (Li and
Vita´nyi, 1997). There is much common ground amongst these three areas but
there are also differences in emphasis and focus.
As was noted in Chapter 1, Kolmogorov complexity theory takes the Turing
model of computing as ‘given’. The same is true of minimum length encoding
and algorithmic information theory. By contrast, the SP theory is itself a new
theory of computing built on foundations of pattern-matching, unification, and
multiple alignment.
The SP theory has adopted the central principle in minimum length
encoding—the goal of minimising (G + E) as described in the previous
subsection—but it has not adopted the assumption that the Turing model is
the reference model of computing. Hence, it is more accurate to say that the SP
theory is based on ‘minimum length encoding principles’ than that it is based
on ‘the minimum length encoding theory’ or ‘minimum length encoding’.
Optimisation and ‘learnability’ theory
The idea that learning is a process of optimisation, guided by minimum length
encoding principles, differs sharply from others such as ‘language identification
4If the grammar is very poor it may not even achieve a small E.
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in the limit’ (Gold, 1967) or ‘probably approximately correct learning’ (see Li
and Vita´nyi, 1997, pp. 339–350) because there is no pre-defined ‘target’ gram-
mar or equivalent structure against which the correctness of learning may be
judged. The aim of learning is simply to minimise (G + E) (abbreviated here-
inafter as T ), as far as that can be achieved in practice.
One might suppose that the grammar with the smallest possible value for T
constitutes the target grammar. But, unlike target grammars in Gold’s frame-
work or in probably-approximately-correct learning, this grammar is not pre-
defined and, in most cases, it can never be known. The reason it cannot nor-
mally be known is that the abstract space of alternative grammars is normally
too large to be searched exhaustively. Any practical system must necessarily
use heuristic techniques to prune the search tree and this means that, in most
cases, we can never be sure that we have found the smallest possible value for T
and we can thus never know what the grammar with the smallest possible value
for T would be. In minimum length encoding learning, we can compare one
grammar with another in terms of T but we have no means of knowing what
the ‘correct’ grammar should be.
Information, compression of information, inductive
inference and probabilities
Solomonoff (1964) seems to have been one of the first people to recognise the
close connection that exists between information compression and inductive in-
ference: predicting the future from the past. The connection between them—
which may at first sight seem obscure—lies in the redundancy-as-repetition-of-
patterns view of redundancy and information compression:
• Patterns that repeat within I represent redundancy in I, and information
compression can be achieved by reducing multiple instances of any pattern
to one.
• When we make inductive predictions about the future, we do so on the
basis of repeating patterns. For example, the repeating pattern ‘Spring,
Summer, Autumn, Winter’ enables us to predict that, if it is Spring time
now, Summer will follow.
Thus information compression and inductive inference are closely related to
concepts of frequency and probability. Here are some of the ways in which these
concepts are related:
• Probability has a key roˆle in Shannon’s concept of information (Section
2.2).
• Measures of frequency or probability are central in techniques for eco-
nomical coding such as the Huffman method or the Shannon-Fano-Elias
method (see Cover and Thomas, 1991).
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• In the redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns view of redundancy and in-
formation compression, the frequencies of occurrence of patterns in I is a
main factor (with the sizes of patterns) that determines how much com-
pression can be achieved (Section 2.2).
• Given a body of (binary) data that has been ‘fully’ compressed (so that
it may be regarded as random or nearly so, as described in Section 2.2),
its absolute probability may be calculated as pABS = 2
−L, where L is the
length (in bits) of the compressed data.
Probability and information compression may be regarded as two sides of
the same coin. That said, they provide different perspectives on a range of prob-
lems and, in this work, I have found the information compression perspective—
with redundancy-as-repetition-of-patterns—to be more fruitful than viewing the
same problems through the lens of probability.
Grammatical inference and generalisation
An important example of inductive inference is the kinds of predictions that are
implicit in a grammar that has been inferred from a finite sample (‘corpus’) of
some language but that is more general than the original sample. It is abun-
dantly clear that this kind of generalisation is involved when we learn our native
language or languages. As Chomsky (1965) and others have argued cogently, an
adult’s knowledge of his or her native language is much more general than the
large but finite sample that he or she has heard during childhood. From an early
age children show signs of creating general rules such ‘Add ed to a verb to give
it a past tense’ or ‘Add s to a noun to make it plural’ and, in the early stages,
they often overgeneralise such rules and say such things as “Mummy buyed it”,
“There are some sheeps” and so on. Interestingly, they learn to correct such
overgeneralisations, apparently without the need for explicit error correction by
adults or older children (see Section 12.6).
The learning problem may be represented schematically as shown in Figure
2.4. The smallest envelope shows the set of ‘utterances’ that constitute the finite
sample of utterances from which a grammar is to be inferred. The middle-sized
envelope represents the (infinite) set of utterances in the language being learned.
And the largest envelope represents the (infinite) set of all possible utterances.
Children also have to cope with ‘dirty data’ meaning ‘wrong’ utterances that
are part of the sample from which they learn (see Section 12.6).
The generalisation problem is how, without negative examples or correction
by a ‘teacher’ or grading of language samples (cf. Gold (1967)), to infer a
grammar that generates utterances in the middle envelope without creating a
grammar that overgeneralises by generating utterances that are outside that
envelope.
Solomonoff’s solution is very neat: minimise (G+E) as described in Section
2.2 and then discard the encoding of the sample corresponding to E. Minimis-
ing (G + E) achieves lossless compression of the sample (as described above)
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Figure 2.4: Categories of utterances involved in language learning, as described
in the text.
but the grammar itself, without the encoding of the sample, represents a lossy
compression of the sample and, correspondingly, a generalisation beyond the
sample. This compromise between the ad hoc grammar and the promiscuous
grammar seems to represent a theoretical ideal in inductive inference.
The question that naturally arises is whether or not this principle applies
to human learning and, in particular, the way children learn to talk. There is
good evidence that it does (see Section 12.6 and Wolff (1988)) but it remains
an open question. It seems likely that motivation and emotion have a bearing
on what we learn and this may lead us to depart from Solomonoff’s ideal (see
Section 9.5).
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2.3 Coding for reduced redundancy in
computing and cognition
In this section, I describe a variety of observations and ideas from the fields of
artificial computing and natural cognition that can plausibly be seen as examples
of information compression. Concepts from cognate fields such as theoretical
linguistics are included in the discussion.
Earlier examples relate mainly to the brain and nervous system while later
examples come mainly from computing. But the separation is not rigid because
similar ideas appear in both areas.
Useful reviews of some of the evidence relating information compression to
human perception and learning may be found in (Chater, 1999, 1996).
Adaptation and inhibition in the nervous system
A familiar observation is that we are more sensitive to changes in stimula-
tion than to constant stimulation. We notice a sound which is new in our
environment—e.g., the hum of a motor when it is first switched on—but then,
as the sound continues, we adapt and cease being aware of it. Later, when
the motor is switched off, we notice the change and are conscious of the new
quietness for a while until we adapt again and stop giving it attention.
This kind of adaptation at the level of our conscious awareness can be seen
also at a much lower level in the way individual nerve cells respond to stimu-
lation. The two studies to be described are of nerve cells in a horseshoe crab
(Limulus) but the kinds of effects that have been observed in this creature
have also been observed in single neuron studies of mammals and appear to be
widespread amongst many kinds of animal, including humans. There are more
complex modes of responding but their existence does not invalidate the general
proposition that nervous tissue is relatively sensitive to changes in stimulation
and is relatively insensitive to constant stimulation.
Figure 2.5 shows how the rate of firing of a single receptor (ommatidium) in
the eye of Limulus changes with the onset and offset of a light (Ratliff et al.,
1963). The receptor responds with a burst of spike potentials when the light
is first switched on. Although the light stays bright for some time, the rate of
firing quickly settles down to a background rate. When the light is switched
off, there is a brief dip in the rate of firing followed by a resumption of the
background rate.
This relative sensitivity to changes in stimulation and relative insensitivity
to constant stimulation can be seen also in the spatial dimension. Figure 2.6
shows two sets of recordings from a single ommatidium of Limulus (Ratliff and
Hartline, 1959). In both sets of recordings, the eye of the crab was illuminated
in a rectangular area bordered by a dark rectangle of the same size. In both
cases, successive recordings were taken with the pair of rectangles in successive
positions across the eye along a line which is at right angles to the boundary
between light and bright areas. This achieves the same effect as—but is eas-
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Figure 2.5: Variation in the rate of firing of a single ommatidium of Limulus in
response to changing levels of illumination (Ratliff et al., 1963, , p. 118).
ier to implement than—keeping the two rectangles in one position and taking
recordings from a range of receptors across the bright and dark areas.
Figure 2.6: Two sets of recordings from a single ommatidium of Limulus (Ratliff
and Hartline, 1959, p. 1248).
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In the top set of recordings (triangles) all the ommatidia except the one
from which recordings were being taken were masked from receiving any light.
In this case, the target receptor responds with frequent impulses when the light
is bright and at a sharply lower rate when the light is dark.
In the bottom set of recordings (circles) the mask was removed so that all the
ommatidia were exposed to the pattern of bright and dark rectangles. In this
situation, the target receptor fires at or near a background rate in areas which
are evenly illuminated (either bright or dark) but, near the border between
bright and dark areas, positive and negative responses are exaggerated. In the
spatial dimension, as with the temporal dimension, changes in stimulation are
more significant than constant stimulation.
The kinds of effects, just described, that have been recorded in Limulus
have also been observed in the retina and other parts of the visual pathway
in mammals (see, for example, Nicholls et al., 2001). Similar effects occur in
sensory nerves associated with the skin and the Basilar membrane (von Be´ke´sy,
1967).
It is now widely recognised that this sensitivity to temporal and spatial
discontinuities in stimulation is due to the action of inhibitory pathways in the
nervous system which counteract the excitation of nerve cells. The way in which
‘lateral inhibition’ and other kinds of inhibition may explain the observations
which have just been described and a range of other phenomena (Mach bands,
simultaneous contrast, motion sensitivity) is well described and discussed by
von Be´ke´sy (1967) (see also Lindsay and Norman (1975, pp. 65–75)).5
It has also been recognised for some time that these phenomena may be
understood in terms of principles of economy in neural functioning (Barlow,
1959, 1969; von Be´ke´sy, 1967). In the terms discussed earlier, adaptation and
inhibition in nervous functioning have an effect which is similar to that of the
run-length coding technique for data compression. Economy is achieved in all
these cases by coding changes in information and reducing or eliminating the
redundancy represented by sequences or areas that are uniform (Barlow, 1959,
1969; von Be´ke´sy, 1967) (but see Barlow (2001b, p. 245) for further thoughts
on that idea).
5In the eye of the horseshoe crab Limulus, each receptor cell has an excitatory connection to
a ganglion cell which then transmits to the brain. In itself, this arrangement of nerve cells and
fibres would mean that a pattern of bright and dark illumination on the eye would be mirrored
by a corresponding pattern of excitation in the ganglion cells. However, each receptor cell has
an inhibitory connection to one or more of the neighboring ganglion cells. This means that in
an area of the eye that is brightly illuminated, the excitation of each ganglion cell is largely
cancelled by the inhibitory signals from neighbouring receptor cells, bringing the overall level
of excitation down to much the same ‘background’ rate of firing as ganglion cells in the dark
regions. However, ganglion cells around the boundary of each bright region receive relatively
few inhibitory signals from the neigbouring dark region which means their level of excitation
is higher. And the rate of firing of ganglion cells around the boundary of each dark region is
lower than those in the body of the dark region due to the inhibitory effect of receptors in the
neighbouring bright region. The overall effect is to emphasise boundaries between bright and
dark regions, with only a ‘background’ rate of firing in areas that are uniformly illuminated
(either light or dark). Similar mechanisms operate in the mammalian retina.
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Perceptual constancies
It has been recognised for a long time that, in our perceptions of the world,
we can abstract invariance or ‘constancies’ from the variability of our sensory
inputs:
• Size constancy. We can recognise an object despite wide variations in the
size of its image on the retina—and we judge its size to be constant despite
these variations.
• Brightness constancy. We can recognise something despite wide variations
in the absolute brightness of the image on our retina (and, likewise, we
judge its intrinsic brightness to be constant).
• Colour constancy. In recognising the intrinsic colour of an object, we can
make allowances for wide variations in the colour of the light that falls on
the object and the consequent effect on the colour of the light that leaves
the object and enters our eyes.
By concentrating on aspects of the world that remain constant and discard-
ing the variations that surround them, we can drastically reduce the amount of
information that we need to deal with.
‘Neural’ computing
The idea that principles of economy may apply to neural functioning is recog-
nised in some of the theory associated with artificial ‘neural’ computing, e.g.,
‘Hopfield nets’ (Hopfield, 1982) and ‘simulated annealing’ (Hinton and Se-
jnowski, 1986). But with some notable exceptions (e.g., Mahowald and Mead,
1991), there seems to have been little attempt in the development of artificial
neural networks to exploit the kinds of mechanisms that real nervous systems
apparently use to achieve information compression.
Objects and classes in perception and cognition
Seeing the world as objects
Some things in our everyday experiences are so familiar that we often do not
realise how remarkable they are. One of these is the automatic and unconscious
way we see the world as composed of discrete objects. Imagine a film taken with
a fixed camera of a tennis ball crossing the field of view. Successive frames show
the ball in a sequence of positions across a constant background. Taken together,
these frames contain a very large proportion of redundancy: the background
repeats in every frame (apart from that part of the background that is hidden
behind the ball) and the ball repeats in every frame (let’s assume that it is not
spinning). Uniform areas within each frame also represent redundancy.
Any simple record of this information—on cinema film or digitised images—
is insensitive to the redundancy between frames or within frames and has no
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concept of ‘ball’ or ‘background’. But people automatically collapse the several
images of the ball into one coherent concept and, likewise, see the background
as the ‘same’ throughout the sequence of frames.
This is a remarkable piece of information compression, especially since it is
performed in real time by nerve cells that are, by electronic standards, exceed-
ingly slow. On this last point, Mahowald and Mead’s (1991) work throws useful
light on how this kind of compressionmay be achieved in a simulated mammalian
retina and how the necessary speed can be achieved with slow components. In
keeping with what was said earlier about neural functioning, inhibitory path-
ways and processes are significant.
Of course, the concepts we have of real-world objects are normally more
complicated than this example suggests. The appearance of a typical object
varies significantly depending on orientation or view point. In cases like this,
each concept that we form must accommodate several distinct but related views.
What we normally think of as a unitary entity should, perhaps, be regarded more
accurately as a class of inter-related snapshots or views (more about classes
below).
Notwithstanding these complexities, our everyday notion of an object is
similar to the previously-described concept of a chunk. Like chunks, objects
often have names or tags but again, as with chunks, not every object has a
name. An object (with or without a name) may, like a chunk, be seen as the
product of processes for extracting redundancy from information.
Stereoscopic vision and random dot stereograms
“In an animal in which the visual fields of the two eyes overlap extensively, as
in the cat, monkey, and man, one obvious type of redundancy in the messages
reaching the brain is the very nearly exact reduplication of one eye’s message
by the other eye.” (Barlow, 1969, p. 213).
Stereoscopic vision and the phenomenon of random dot stereograms provides
further evidence of information compression by our nervous systems. It also
provides a striking illustration of the connection between redundancy extraction
and our tendency to see the world as discrete objects. Each of the two images
in Figure 2.7 is a random pattern of black and white pixels. Each image, in
itself, contains little or no redundancy. But when the two images are taken
together, there is substantial redundancy because they have been designed so
that they are almost, but not quite, the same. The difference is that a square
area in the left image has been shifted a few pixels to the right compared with
a corresponding square area in the right image, as is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
When the images are viewed through a stereoscope—so that the left image
is seen by the left eye and the right image by the right eye—one’s brain fuses
the two images so that the two areas around the squares are seen as the ‘same’
and the two square areas are merged into a single square object which appears
to stand out vividly in front of its background.
A similar effect can be achieved without the need for a stereoscope by com-
bining the two images in the kind of ‘magic eye’ picture that was popular a few
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Figure 2.7: A random-dot stereogram (from Julesz, 1971, p. 21).
Figure 2.8: Diagram to show the relationship between the left and right images
in Figure 2.7 (based on Julesz, 1971, p. 21).
years ago
Random dot stereograms are normally used to illustrate and study human
abilities to perceive depth using stereoscopic vision. But they are also good
examples of our ability to extract redundancy from information by merging
matching patterns.
In Figure 2.7, the central square, and its background, are chunks in the sense
described earlier, each of which owes its perceptual existence to the merging of
matching patterns. It is the redundancy that exists between the two images,
coupled with our ability to find it, that gives coherence to the objects that we
see. The vivid boundary that we can see between the square and its background
is the product of search processes that successfully find the maximum possible
unification between the two images.
In everyday vision (e.g., the tennis ball example discussed above), recognition
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of an object may owe something to redundancy within each frame. Since each
of the two images in a random dot stereogram contains little or no redundancy,
our ability to see coherent objects in such stereograms demonstrates that we do
not depend on redundancy within each image but can derive an object concept
exclusively from redundancy between images.
Classes, sub-classes and inheritance
It is commonly recognised that objects may be grouped into classes and classes
may themselves be grouped into higher level classes. Cross-classification with
overlapping classes (e.g., ‘woman’ and ‘doctor’) is also seen.
A class may be defined extensionally by listing its constituent objects or
classes. It may also be defined intensionally in terms of attributes which mem-
bers of the class have in common. Although many commonly-used classes are
‘polythetic’—no single attribute need necessarily be shared by all members of
the class and any given attribute may be associated with more than one class—it
is similarity amongst members of a class—some degree of sharing of attributes—
that gives ‘natural’ classes their coherence.
Grouping things by their similarity gives us a means of compressing the in-
formation which describes them. An attribute which is shared by all members
of a class (or, in the case of polythesis, a set of alternative attributes which is
shared by members of a class) need be recorded only once and not repeated
for every member. In the jargon of object-oriented design, each member of a
class ‘inherits’ the attributes of the class. Those shared attributes constitute a
‘schema’ in the sense discussed earlier, that may be ‘corrected’ for each individ-
ual member by the addition of more specific information about that member.
The widespread use of classes and subclasses in our thinking and in language,
coupled with their obvious value in compressing information, strongly suggests
that we do store classes and attributes in this way. But it is difficult to obtain
direct confirmation of this idea. Attempts to verify the idea experimentally (e.g.,
Collins and Quillian, 1969, 1972) have proved inconclusive. This is probably
more to do with the difficulties of making valid inferences from experimental
studies of human cognition than any intrinsic defect in the idea.
Natural languages
Samples of natural language—English, French etc—are normally about 50%
redundant (Miller and Friedman, 1958). This redundancy often serves a useful
purpose in helping listeners or readers to correct errors and to compensate for
noise in communication—and this is almost certainly the reason why natural
languages have developed in this way.
Despite the existence of redundancy in natural languages, they provide a
further example of economical coding in cognition. Every ‘content’ word in a
natural language (e.g., noun, verb, adjective or adverb) may be regarded as a
reference to the relatively complex chunk of information that is the meaning of
the word.
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Without a convenient brief label like ‘table’, the concept of ‘a horizontal
platform with four, sometimes three, vertical supports, normally about three
feet high, normally used for ...’ would have to be long-windedly repeated in
every relevant context rather like the slow language of the Ents in Tolkien’s
The Lord of the Rings. A sentence is normally a highly ‘coded’ and compressed
representation of its meanings.
An even more obvious example of identifiers and references in natural lan-
guage is the use of citations, as described in connection with the chunking-with-
codes technique in Section 2.2. Each citation is a reference to the bibliographic
details of a given book or article and these details may themselves be seen as a
code for that publication. Like other kinds of reference, citations can circum-
vent the need to repeat information redundantly in two or more contexts. But
it is sometimes convenient to use this device for reasons of consistency and style
when a given citation appears only once in a given book or article.
Before leaving this section on natural language, it is relevant to comment
on Zipf’s extensive studies of the distribution of words in natural languages
(Zipf, 1935) and the Principle of Least Effort (Zipf, 1949) that he proposed
to explain these observations and others. Zipf’s arguments are interesting and
quite persuasive but, as Mandelbrot (1957) and others have pointed out, the
phenomena described by ‘Zipf’s law’ could be due to nothing more profound
than a random process for creating words and the boundaries between words in
natural languages. However, in George Miller’s words (1935), “It is impossible
to believe that nothing more is at work to guide our choice of letter sequences
than whatever random processes might control a monkey’s choice, or that the
highly plausible arguments Zipf puts forward have not relevance at all.” (p.
vii). The jury is still out!
Grammars
As indicated in Section 2.2, a grammar provides a means of encoding data in
an economical form. More accurately, the notational conventions that are used
in grammars may be regarded as a set of devices that may be used to encode
information in an economical form. They are not necessarily used to good effect
in any one grammar.
Consider a grammar like the one shown in Figure 2.9. Each rule in the
grammar may be seen as a ‘chunk’ of information as described in Section 2.2
and the symbols to the left of the re-write arrows may be seen as identifiers, as
described in Section 2.2.
Notice that each of the symbols ‘D’, ‘N’, ‘V’ and ‘ADV’ do not identify any
one chunk uniquely and so, in themselves, they can only achieve lossy compres-
sion. However, with the addition of symbols to identify each rule uniquely, a
grammar like the one shown can be used for lossless compression of appropriate
data. Details of how this kind of encoding may be done are described in Section
3.5.
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S → NP V ADV
NP → D N
D → t h i s
D → s o m e
N → t r a i n
N → a e r o p l a n e
V → g o e s
V → t r a v e l s
ADV → s l o w l y
ADV → f a s t
Figure 2.9: A context-free phrase-structure grammar.
Recursion in grammars and run-length coding
Since grammars incorporate the ‘chunking-with-codes’ device for information
compression, they can express recursion—which is itself a form of run-length
coding. The fragment of grammar shown in Figure 2.10 generates phrases like
the very very very tall girl, a very very short boy etc. Notice that the number of
instances of very in any one phrase is not specified: recursion like this represents
lossy compression of any finite set of terminal strings.
NP → D V A N
D → the
D → a
V → NULL
V → very V
A → tall
A → short
N → boy
N → girl
Figure 2.10: A cf psg with recursion.
More powerful grammars
It has been recognised for some time (and pointed out most notably by Chomsky
(1957)) that context-free phrase-structure grammars are not ‘powerful’ enough
to represent the structure of natural languages effectively. As shown by the ex-
amples just given, context-free phrase-structure grammars can be used to rep-
resent simple sub-sets of English in a succinct form. But the full complexity of
English or other natural language can only be accommodated by a context-free
phrase-structure grammar, if at all, at the cost of large amounts of redundancy
in the grammatical description.
The phenomenon of ‘discontinuous dependencies’ highlights the shortcom-
ings of context-free phrase-structure grammars. In a sentence like The winds
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from the West are strong, there is a ‘number’ dependency between winds and
are: the plural noun must be followed by a plural verb and likewise for singular
forms. The dependency is ‘discontinuous’ because it jumps over the intervening
structure (from the West in the example) and this intervening structure can be
arbitrarily large.
To represent this kind of dependency with a context-free phrase-structure
grammar requires one set of rules for singular sentences and another set of rules
for plurals—and the two sets of rules are very similar. The resulting redundancy
in the grammar can multiply substantially when other dependencies of this kind
are included.
This problem can be largely overcome by using a more ‘powerful’ kind of
grammatical system like a definite clause grammar (Pereira and Warren, 1980)
or a transformational grammar (see, for example, Radford, 1988). This kind of
system may be seen as a superset of a context-free phrase-structure grammar
with additional mechanisms that, amongst other things, allow discontinuous
dependencies to be represented without undue redundancy.
Grammatical systems like these can be seen as variations on the ‘schema-
plus-correction’ idea that was described above. They provide the means of
representing sentence structure as a ‘schema’ that may, in the example given
earlier, be ‘corrected’ by the addition of singular or plural components at ap-
propriate points in the structure.
Computer programs
Functions in computing and mathematics are often defined ‘intensionally’ in
terms of rules or operations required to perform the function. But functions are
also defined ‘extensionally’ by specifying one or more outputs for every input or
combination of inputs (Sudkamp, 1988). This idea applies to functions of vari-
ous kinds (‘total’, ‘partial’ and ’multi’) and also to ‘programs’ and information
systems in general.
Elsewhere (Wolff, 1994b) I have discussed how a computer program or math-
ematical function may be seen as a compressed representation of its inputs and
its outputs, how the process of designing programs and functions may be seen
to be largely a process of information compression, and how the execution of
programs or functions may also be seen in terms of information compression
(see also Chapter 10).
In this section, I view computer programs more conventionally as a set of
‘operations’ and discuss how principles of compression may be seen in the way
programs are organised. In the same way that the notational conventions used in
grammars may be regarded as a means of compressing linguistic information, the
conventions used in computer programs may be seen as devices for representing
computing operations in a succinct form. As with grammars, the provision of
these facilities does not in itself guarantee that they will be used to best effect.
Compression techniques may be seen in ‘functional’, ‘structured’ and ‘logic’
programming and, a fortiori in ‘object-oriented’ programming.
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Functional and structured programming
Chunking-with-codes. If a set of statements is repeated in two or more parts of
a program then it is natural to declare them once as a ‘function’, ‘procedure’ or
‘sub-routine’ within the program and to replace each sequence with a ‘call’ to
the function from each part of the program where the sequence occurred. This
is an example of compression: the function may be regarded as a chunk and the
name of the function is its identifier.
Whether or not a programmer chooses to create a function in a situation
like this—or to leave repeated sequences as ‘macros’—depends, amongst other
things, on whether the sequence is big enough to justify the ‘cost’ of giving it
a name and whether the run-time overhead which is typically associated with
the use of functions in conventional computers is acceptable for the application
in hand.
Run-length coding. If a body of code is repeated in one location within
the program then it may be declared as a function or marked as a ‘block’ and
the fact of repetition may be marked with one of the familiar conventions for
showing iteration: repeat ... until, while ... do, for ... do. Each of these is a
form of run-length coding.
Recursion, which is available in most procedural programming languages, is
another means of showing repetition of program operations. It is essentially the
same as recursion in grammars.
Schema-plus-correction. It often happens in software design that two or more
sets of statements are similar but not identical. In these cases, it is natural to
merge the parts that are the same and to provide conditional statements (if
... then ... else statements or case statements) to select alternative ‘paths’
within the software. The complete set of statements, including the conditional
statements, may be regarded as a ‘schema’ describing a set of behaviours for
the program, much as a grammar describes a set of terminal strings.
To specify a particular path through the program, it is necessary to supply
the information needed in the conditional statements so that all the relevant
choices can be made. This additional information is the ‘correction’ to the
schema represented by the program code. If the program statements have been
encapsulated in a function then these corrections to the program schema will
normally be supplied as arguments or parameters to the function.
Logic programming
Similar ideas appear in logic programming languages like Prolog. For example,
the chunking-with-codes idea can be seen in the structure of a Prolog Horn
clause. The predicate in the head of the clause may be seen as an identifier
while the body of the clause may be seen as the chunk that it labels. Copies
of the identifier that appear in other Horn clauses may be seen as references to
the given clause.
As with functional and structured programs, a Prolog program may be seen
as a schema that represents the set of possible behaviours of the program. The
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information supplied in a Prolog query serves as a correction to the schema
which reduces the range of possible behaviours of the program.
Repetition in Prolog programs is coded using recursion.
Object-oriented programming
Object-oriented programming, as it was originated in Simula and has been de-
veloped in Smalltalk, C++ and several other languages, embraces the kinds of
mechanisms just described but includes an additional set of ideas that may also
be understood in terms of information compression.
One important idea in object-oriented programming, that was introduced in
Simula, is that there should be a one-for-one correspondence between objects
in the real world and ‘objects’ in the software. For example, an object-oriented
program for managing a warehouse will have a software object for each person
employed in the warehouse, a software object for each shelf or bay, a software
object for each item stored, and so on. In object-oriented terms, a software
object is a discrete piece of program: procedural code and associated data
structures, or either one of these without the other. For example, an object for
a ‘person’ would be a program that can respond to ‘messages’ such as a request
for the person’s name, an instruction to move an item from one location to
another, and so on.
Superficially, this is an extravagant—and redundant—way to design software
because it seems to mean that the same code is repeated in every object of a
given type. But, of course, this is not how things are done. As with ‘real world’
objects, economy can be achieved by the use of classes and sub-classes.
In object-oriented programming languages, every object belongs to a class
(in some object-oriented languages an object can be assigned to more than one
class), the code for that class is stored only once within the program and it is
inherited by each instance of the class. There can be a hierarchy of two or more
classes with inheritance of code from any level down to individual objects.
As with individual objects, a recognised principle of object-oriented pro-
gramming is that the classes that are defined in an object-oriented program
should correspond, one for one, with the classes that we recognise in the real
world. In the warehouse example, there would be a class for ‘person’, a class
for ‘shelf’ and a class for ‘item’. Each class—‘person’, for example—may be
divided into sub-classes like ‘manager’, ‘foreman’, ‘operative’ etc.
The ideas that have been described—software objects, classes and
inheritance—are further examples of the way in which information compres-
sion pervades the organization of computer programs:
• As discussed earlier, objects and classes as we see them in the real world
may be understood in terms of our subjective compression of perceptual
information received from the world. By using similar devices in software
design we can make the structure of software reflect patterns of redun-
dancy in the real world which our brains are apparently so efficient at
exploiting.
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• Within the program code itself, class hierarchies with inheritance of code
are powerful mechanisms for information compression. Instances of a class
may be multiplied without creating any corresponding redundancy be-
cause all the data structures and procedural code which they have in com-
mon can be inherited from the class definition. Likewise, sets of classes
which have common attributes may inherit these attributes from a higher
level class.
• As was mentioned in connection with natural classes, the mechanisms
of class hierarchies with inheritance may be seen as an example of the
schema-plus-correction technique for information compression: a class def-
inition is a ‘schema’ and information which is supplied when a new instance
of the class is created (e.g., the name of that object) is a ‘correction’ to
the schema. In a similar way, a high level class may be seen as a rela-
tively abstract schema which is refined or ‘corrected’ by the more specific
information contained in lower level classes.
It is perhaps pertinent to comment, in passing, on the advantages of design-
ing software in this way:
• One advantage is psychological: software that reflects the structure of our
established concepts is easier to understand than software that does not.
• A more subtle, but nonetheless important, advantage is that software
designed in this way will normally be easier to modify than otherwise: the
fact that the structures reflected in the software are persistent (repeating)
patterns in the world means that new versions of software are more likely
to be refinements or rearrangements of already established objects and
classes than radical reorganizations of the code.
• There is a third advantage for software designers in using these mecha-
nisms for information compression: if any given piece of information is
recorded only once within a program then any change to that information
needs be made only once and there is no need to check that it is correctly
repeated in other parts of the program.
Other aspects of computing
We have already seen several uses for identifiers and references in computing—
as the names of functions, procedures or sub-routines, as the names for object-
oriented programming objects and classes of objects and as names for rules in
grammars. Some other examples of codes in computing include:
• Names of tables or records in databases.
• Names of fields in tuples or records.
• Names of files.
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• Names of variables, arrays and other data structures used in computer
programs.
• Labels for program statements (for use with the now shunned ‘go to’
statements).
The names of directories (folders) in Unix, MS-DOS and similar operating
systems are also identifiers in the sense of this chapter. But an hierarchical
directory structure may also be seen as a simple form of class hierarchy and, as
such, it may be seen as a restricted form of schema plus correction. The name
of a directory is a name that applies to all the files and sub-directories within
that directory and to all files and sub-directories at lower levels. Rather than
redundantly repeat the name for every file and sub-directory to which it applies,
the name is recorded once and, in effect, ‘inherited’ by all the objects at lower
levels.
The uses of redundancy in computing and cognition
Although information compression has an undoubted roˆle in computing, it is also
true that redundancy can be and often is exploited to reduce errors in processing,
to speed up processing and to guard against the risk of losing information. It
seems likely that the same can be said of brains and nervous systems although
this aspect of their workings seems not to have received much attention.
Any user of a computer system knows that it is very unwise to run the sys-
tem without keeping backup copies of critical information to reduce the risk of
catastrophic loss of that information. Since backup copies repeat the original
information, they represent redundancy in the system. Redundancy in the form
of mirror web sites or replicated databases is also exploited to speed up process-
ing in systems that are distributed across a network. And redundancy provides
the key to all computational techniques for reducing errors in the processing or
transmission of information.
Despite the apparent conflict between the idea that information compression
has an important roˆle in information processing and the uses of redundancy for
the purposes just described, they are really independent and can be reconciled
very easily. For example, it is entirely possible for a database to be designed
to minimise internal redundancies and, at the same time, for redundancies to
be used in backup copies or mirror copies of the database or in error-correction
techniques when the database is transmitted across a network. Paradoxical as
it may sound, knowledge can be compressed and redundant at the same time.
2.4 Searching for redundancy in computing
and cognition
So far, we have reviewed a variety of ways in which redundancy extraction
appears in computing and cognition, focusing mainly on the ways in which
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coding techniques relate to these two fields. Now we shall look at the dynamic
side of the coin—the things in computing and cognition that may be understood
as searching for the redundancy which may then be removed by the use of coding
techniques.
As we have seen, searching for redundancy can be understood as a search
for patterns that match each other and, as we have seen (Section 2.2), there is
normally a need to constrain the search by restricting the search space or guiding
the search using some measure of redundancy, or both. The sections which follow
describe some of the ways in which this kind of search appears in computing
and cognition. As with the section on coding, earlier examples are mainly from
natural information processing with later examples from computing.
Random dot stereograms
A particularly clear example of this search problem is what the brain has to do
to enable one to see the figure in the kinds of random dot stereogram described
earlier (Section 2.3).
In this case, assuming the left image has the same number of pixels as the
right image, the size of the search space is P 2 where P is the number of possible
patterns in each image, calculated in the same way as was described in Section
2.2. (The fact that the images are two dimensional needs no special provision
because the original formula covers all combinations of atomic symbols.)
For any stereogram with a realistic number of pixels, this space is very large.
Even with the very large processing power represented by the 1011 neurons in
the brain, it is inconceivable that this space can be searched in a few seconds
and to such good effect without the use of metrics-guided searching of the kind
described earlier and probably also with some restriction on what comparisons
between patterns will be made.
David Marr (1982, Chapter 3) describes two algorithms that solve this prob-
lem. In line with what has just been said, both algorithms rely on constraints
on the search space and both may be seen as incremental search guided by
redundancy-related metrics.
Recognition of objects and patterns
As we saw in Section 2.3, perceptual objects can be understood as ‘chunks’ that
promote economy in the storage and processing of perceptual information. We
not only create such chunks out of our perceptual experience but we have a very
flexible and efficient ability to recognise objects and other patterns which have
already been stored.
How we recognise objects and other patterns is, of course, the subject of
much research and is certainly not yet well understood. Amongst the complex-
ities of the subject is the problem, mentioned earlier, of how we can recognise
objects despite variations in their appearance due to variations in orientation.
Likewise, we can recognise patterns such as handwriting despite many variations
of style.
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Despite these complexities, it is reasonably clear that, in general terms,
the phenomenon of recognition can be understood as information compression
(Watanabe, 1972). Recognition of an object or a pattern means the partial or
complete unification of perceptual input with a corresponding pattern already
in memory—and thus an overall reduction in the information that they jointly
contain.
By assimilating new information to previously-stored information (with or
without variations) we can drastically reduce the huge quantities of redundancy
that exists in normal sensory inputs. It is hard to imagine how we could survive
if we did not merge new percepts with old ones in this kind of way. Shutting
one’s eyes and opening them again would result in a complete new record of what
we had been looking at, without any relation to the previous record. Merging
successive percepts is essential if we are to maintain a reasonably coherent view
of the world.
Objects in motion
A closely-related idea is that the concept of motion implies compression of in-
formation (Barlow, 1961). Encoding a sequence of images in terms of entities
that move requires much less information than simply storing the raw images.
The waterfall illusion shows that one’s perception of motion can conflict with
one’s perception of position and this suggests that there are neural mechanisms
dedicated to the perception of motion that are distinct from mechanisms that
detect position. There is evidence for such motion detectors in the neurons
of the ‘magnocellular’ layers of the lateral geniculate body and in neurons to
which they project in areas V1, V2 and V5 of the cortex (Nicholls et al., 2001,
434–435).
Grammar discovery, language learning and other kinds of
learning
If, as was suggested earlier, we view a grammar as a compressed version of its
terminal strings, then it is natural to see the process of discovering or inferring a
grammar from examples as being largely a matter of discovering the redundancy
in those examples and building a stochastic grammar in accordance with mini-
mum length encoding principles (Section 2.2). In line with these expectations,
practical techniques for grammar discovery are largely a search for repeating
patterns in data with unification of repeating patterns, the assignment of iden-
tifiers and, quite often, the discarding of some portion of the non-redundant
information in the samples (Wolff, 1982, 1988).
The learning of a first language by children is clearly a richer and more
complex process than grammar discovery as it is normally understood. But
computer models of language learning that I have developed in earlier research,
which are based on principles of information compression, show remarkable
correspondences in their learning behaviour to well-documented phenomena in
the way children learn a first language (Wolff, 1988):
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• The unsupervised induction of grammatical structure, including segmental
structures such as words (Wolff, 1977) and phrases (Wolff, 1980), and
disjunctive structures such as parts of speech (Wolff, 1982).
• Generalisation of rules and correction of overgeneralisations without ex-
ternal error correction (Wolff, 1982).
• The way the rate of acquisition of words and other structures varies as
learning proceeds.
• The order in which words are acquired.
• Brown’s (1973) “Law of Cumulative Complexity”.
• The S-P/episodic-semantic shift.
• The learning of semantic structures and their integration with syntax.
• The word frequency effect.
The fact that these phenomena can be seen as emergent properties of models
that are largely mechanisms for achieving information compression lends sup-
port to the proposition that language learning by children may be understood,
in large measure, as information compression.
Other kinds of learning have also been analysed in terms of economical cod-
ing. Pioneering work on the learning of classifications (Wallace and Boulton,
1968) has been followed by related work on economical description of data (e.g.,
Wallace and Freeman (1987); Rissanen (1987); Cheeseman (1990); Pednault
(1991); Forsyth (1992).
Query-by-example
This section and those that follow discuss areas of computing where pattern
matching and search of the kinds described earlier can be seen. Unification,
with corresponding compression of information is less obvious but can still be
recognised in most cases.
A commonly-used technique for retrieving records from a database is to
provide a query in the form of an incomplete record—an ‘example’ of the kind
of complete record which is to be retrieved. This is illustrated in Figure 2.11
where the query ‘example’ has the general form of the complete records but
contains asterisks (‘*’) where information is missing. The search mechanisms in
the database match the query with records in the database to retrieve the zero
or more records which fit.
Most systems of this kind are driven by some kind of redundancy-related
metric. In Figure 2.11, there is some degree of matching between the query and
the first three of the records shown. But John Jones of 4 New Street, Edinburgh
is the preferred choice because it gives a better fit than the other records.
Retrieval of a record may be seen as ‘unification’ between the record and
the query and a corresponding extraction of the redundancy between them.
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An ‘example’ used as a query:
Name: John *
Address: * New Street *
Some records in a database:
Name: Susan Smith
Address: 8 New Street, Chicago
Name: John Jones
Address: 4 New Street, Edinburgh
Name: John Black
Address: 20 Long Street, London
Name: David Baker
Address: 41 Avenue des Pins, Paris
...
Figure 2.11: A database query with records in the same format, illustrating
query-by-example.
However, this compression is normally evanescent, appearing only temporarily
on the operator’s screen. When a query operation has been completed, the
records in the database are normally preserved in their original form, while the
unification and the query are normally discarded.
De-referencing of identifiers in computing
Identifiers, names, labels or tags of the kinds described earlier—names of func-
tions, procedures or sub-routines, names of object-oriented programming objects
and classes of objects, names of directories or files etc—have a psychological
function providing us with a convenient handle on these objects in our thinking
or in talking or writing. But a name is at least as important in computing
systems as an aid to finding a particular information object amongst the many
objects in a typical system.
Finding an object by means of its name—‘de-referencing’ the identifier—
means searching for a match between the ‘reference’ as it appears without its
associated object (e.g., a ‘call’ to a program function) and the same pattern
as it appears attached to the object which it identifies (e.g., a function name
together with the function declaration).
Finding an object by means of its name is like a simple form of query-by-
example. The name by itself is the incomplete record which constitutes the
query, while the object to be found, together with its name, corresponds with
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the complete record which is to be retrieved.
As with query-by-example, there is normally some kind of redundancy-
related metric applied to the search. In conventional computing systems, a ‘full’
match (including the termination marker) is accepted while all partial matches
are rejected. A character-by-character search algorithm may be seen as a simple
form of hill-climbing search. The seemingly ‘direct’ technique of hash coding
exploits memory access mechanisms which, as is described below, may also be
understood in terms of metrics-guided search.
As with query-by-example, unification and compression are less obvious than
pattern matching and search. Certainly, a computer program is not normally
modified by de-referencing of the identifiers it contains. Unification and com-
pression are confined to the evanescent data structures created in the course of
program execution.
Memory access in computing systems
The mechanisms for accessing and retrieving information from computer mem-
ory, which operate at a ‘lower’ level in most computing systems, may also be
seen in similar terms.
Information contained in a computer memory—‘data’ or statements of a
program—can be accessed by sending an ‘address’ from the central processing
unit to the computer memory along an address bus. The address is a bit pattern
which is ‘decoded’ by logic circuits in the computer memory. These have the
effect of directing the pattern to the part of the memory where the required
information is stored.
The logic circuits in memory which are used to decode a bit pattern of this
kind have the effect of labelling the several parts of memory with their individual
addresses. Accessing a part of memory by means of its address may be seen
as a process of finding a match between the access pattern and the address as
it is represented in computer memory—together with a unification of the two
patterns. The search process is driven by a metric which leads to a full match
via successively improving partial matches.
Logical deduction
Logical deduction, as it appears in systems like Prolog, is based on Robinson’s
(1965) ‘resolution’ principle. The key to resolution is ‘unification’ in a sense
which means giving values to the variables in two structures which will make
them the same. However, it also embraces the simpler sense of the word as it
has been used in this chapter because it includes the comparison or matching
of patterns and their effective merging or ‘unification’ to make one. The wide
scope of unification (in both senses) is recognised in a useful review by Knight
(1989).
As was the case in query-by-example, de-referencing of identifiers and mem-
ory access, systems for resolution theorem proving normally look for a full match
between patterns and reject all partial matches. This feature may be seen as a
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crude but effective way of constraining the search to reduce its computational
demands (Section 2.2).
Modus ponens
Similar ideas may be seen in more traditional treatments of logic (e.g., Copi,
1986). Consider, for example, the modus ponens form of logical deduction which
may be represented in abstract terms like this:
1. p⇒ q.
2. p.
3. ∴ q.
Here is an example in ordinary language:
1. If today is Tuesday then tomorrow will be Wednesday.
2. Today is Tuesday.
3. Therefore, tomorrow will be Wednesday.
The implication ‘p⇒ q’ (today being Tuesday implies that tomorrow will be
Wednesday) may be seen as a ‘pattern’, much like a record in a database. The
proposition p (‘today is Tuesday’) may be seen as an incomplete pattern, rather
like the kind of database query which was discussed earlier. Logical deduction
may be seen as a unification of the incomplete pattern, ‘p’, with the larger
pattern, ‘p⇒ q’, with a consequent ‘marking’ of the conclusion, ‘q’ (‘tomorrow
will be Wednesday’).
Inductive reasoning and probabilistic inference
Logicians and philosophers have traditionally made a sharp distinction between
deductive reasoning, where conclusions seem to follow with certainty from the
premises, and inductive reasoning, where inferences are uncertain and the ap-
parent clockwork certainty of deduction is missing.
A popular example of inductive reasoning is the way (in low latitudes) we
expect the sun to rise in the morning because it has always done so in our
experience in the past. Past experience, together with the proposition that it
is night time now, are the ‘premises’ which lead us to conclude that the sun is
very likely to rise within a few hours. Our expectation is strong but there is
always a possibility that we may be proved wrong.
There are countless examples like this where our expectations are governed
by experience. We expect buds to ‘spring’ every Spring and leaves to ‘fall’ every
Fall. We expect fire where we see smoke. We expect water to freeze at low
temperatures. And we expect to be broke after Christmas!
The way we mentally merge the repeating instances of each pattern in our
experience may be seen as further evidence of chunking in human cognition and,
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as such, further evidence of how human cognition is geared to the extraction of
redundancy from information.
Like query-by-example, de-referencing of identifiers, memory access and log-
ical deduction, inductive reasoning may be seen as the matching and unification
of a pattern with a larger pattern of which it is a part. Our experience of day
following night is a sequential pattern: ‘night sunrise’. The observation that
it is night time now is another pattern: ‘night’. The second pattern will unify
with the first part of the first pattern and, in effect, ‘mark’ the remainder of
that pattern as an expectation or conclusion.
As was noted earlier, there is a significant body of work on economical de-
scription and its connection with probabilistic inference. But the connection
between these two topics and the topics of pattern matching and the unification
of patterns is not yet properly recognised.
The possible integration of deductive and inductive reasoning
That deductive and inductive reasoning may both be seen as the matching and
unification of a pattern with a larger pattern that contains it suggests that they
are not as distinct as has traditionally been thought. The example of modus
ponens deductive reasoning given earlier may also be seen as inductive reasoning:
the way Wednesday always follows Tuesday is a (frequently repeated) pattern in
our experience and the observation that today is Tuesday leads to an inductive
expectation that tomorrow will be Wednesday.
Normalisation of databases
The process of ‘normalisation’ which is applied in the design of relational
databases is essentially a process of removing redundancy from the framework
of tables and columns in the database (Date, 1986).
If, for example, a database contains tables for ‘buildings’ and for ‘sites’ both
containing columns such as ‘location’, ‘value’, ‘date-acquired’, ‘date-of-disposal’,
then these columns (perhaps with others) may be extracted and placed in a
table for ‘property’. With suitable provision for linkage between tables, this
information may be ‘inherited’ by the tables for ‘buildings’ and ‘sites’ (and
other sub-classes of property), much in the manner of object-oriented design.
Parsing
The process of parsing a string—the kind of analysis of a computer program
which is done by the front end of a compiler, or the syntactic analysis of a
natural language text—is a process of relating a grammar to the text which is
being analysed. To a large extent, this means searching for a match between
each of the terminal elements in the grammar and corresponding patterns in
the text, and the unification of patterns which are the same. It also means de-
referencing of the identifiers of the rules in the grammar which, as was discussed
above, also means matching, unification and search.
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That parsing must be guided by some kind of redundancy-related metric
is most apparent with the ambiguous grammars and relatively sophisticated
parsers associated with natural language processing (see, for example, Spa¨rck-
Jones and Wilkes, 1985). In these cases, alternative analyses may be graded
according to how well the grammar fits the text. But even with the supposedly
unambiguous grammars and simple parsing techniques associated with computer
languages, there is an implicit metric in the distinction between a ‘successful’,
complete parse of the text and all failed alternatives—much like the all-or-
nothing way in which identifiers are normally recognised in computing.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show that information compression is a pervasive
feature of information systems, both natural and artificial. But, even if this
is accepted, it is still pertinent to ask whether the observation is significant or
merely an incidental feature of these systems?
The significance of information compression
Since natural and artificial mechanisms for the storage and processing of infor-
mation are not ‘free’, we should expect to find principles of economy at work
to maximise the ratio of benefits to costs. It may be argued that information
compression in information systems is nothing more than a reasonable response
to the need to get the most out of these systems.
Other considerations suggest that information compression is much more
significant than that:
• We gather information and store it in brains and computers because we
expect it to be useful to us in the future. Natural and artificial information
processing is founded on the inductive reasoning principle that the past is
a guide to the future.
• But stored information is only useful if new information can be related to
it. To make use of stored patterns of information it must be possible to
recognize these patterns in new information. Recognition means matching
stored patterns with new information and unification of patterns which are
the same. And this means information compression in the ways that have
been discussed.
• The inductive principle that the past is a guide to the future may be
stated more precisely as the expectation that patterns which have occurred
relatively frequently in the past will tend to recur in the future. But
‘relatively frequent repetition of patterns’ means redundancy! It is only
possible to see a pattern as having repeated relatively frequently in the
past by the implicit unification of its several instances—and this means
extraction of redundancy and compression of information in the ways that
have been discussed.
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These arguments point to the conclusion that information compression is
not an incidental feature of information systems. It is intimately related to
the principle of inductive reasoning which itself provides a foundation or raison
d’eˆtre for all kinds of system for the storage and processing information.
Implications
Readers with a pragmatic turn of mind may say “So what?”. What benefits
may there be, now or in the future, from an interpretation of phenomena in
information processing which puts information compression centre stage?
In the rest of this book, I describe how this view may be developed into a
general theory of computing and cognition that provides a radical simplification,
rationalisation and integration of many concepts in these fields. The theory
offers new insights and suggests new directions for research. A simplified view
of computing can mean benefits for everyone concerned with the application
of computers or the development of computer-based systems. It can also be a
substantial benefit in the teaching of computer skills.
In more concrete terms, the view which has been described can mean new
and better kinds of computer. The chapters that follow describe how logical
deduction, probabilistic inference, inductive learning, information retrieval and
other capabilities may be derived from information compression. Chapter 13
describes a vision of how the SP system may be developed and applied in the
future.
Chapter 3
The SP Theory1
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a fairly comprehensive description of the SP theory, except
for its development for unsupervised learning which is described in Chapter 9.
The overall structure of the system is described first, followed by a descrip-
tion of the simple but versatile format for representing knowledge that is used in
the system. The way in which the concept of multiple alignment has been devel-
oped for the SP theory is described followed by an account of the way in which
multiple alignments are evaluated in terms of information compression and the
way in which absolute and relative probabilities may be calculated for multi-
ple alignments and associated structures. The way in which the system may
achieve the apparent paradox of ‘decompression by compression’ is explained.
The chapter finishes with an outline description of the two main computer mod-
els that have been developed (SP61 and SP70) followed by a detailed description
of SP61 (a full description of the SP70 model is given in Chapter 9).
3.2 The overall framework
The SP theory is intended as an abstract model of any kind of system for
processing information, either natural or artificial. It is a development of the
conjecture that all kinds of information processing in brains or computers—
including ‘thinking’, ‘reasoning’, ‘computing’, and so on—may be understood as
information compression by multiple alignment, unification and search.
In its most general form, the theory is envisaged as a system for the unsu-
pervised inductive learning of grammar-like structures that works like this:
• Starting with little or no knowledge of the ‘world’, the system receives raw
data from the world via its ‘senses’. These data are designated New.
1The work reported in this chapter was supported in part by a grant from the UK Science
and Engineering Research Council (GR/G51565).
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• As it is received, New information is transferred to a repository of stored
information called Old. At the same time, the system tries to compress
the information as much as possible by finding patterns (or parts of pat-
terns) that match each other and unifying them, introducing new identi-
fiers where appropriate or using existing identifiers to encode the informa-
tion in an economical manner (as described in Section 2.2).
• In the process of searching for matching patterns, the system builds mul-
tiple alignments of the kind described below.
• The entire process is based on minimum length encoding principles, de-
scribed in Section 2.2.
In broad terms, this incremental scheme is similar to the well-known and
widely-used Lempel-Ziv algorithms for information compression (‘ZIP’ pro-
grams). What is different about the SP scheme is an emphasis on thoroughness
of searching rather than speed of processing and the way the concept of multiple
alignment has been developed to support the encoding of New information in a
hierarchy of ‘levels’.
As we saw in Section 2.2, the process of searching for ‘good’ matches between
patterns is not practical unless the process is constrained in some way. This
is especially true for the formation of multiple alignments, where all practical
methods use heuristic techniques or arbitrary constraints of one kind or another.
New and Old in relation to established concepts
The possible ways in which the concepts of New information and Old informa-
tion may relate to established concepts in computing and cognition are shown
in Table 3.1.
Computer models
During the development of the SP theory, computer models have been developed
as a means of testing the ideas and also as a means of demonstrating what can
be done with the system.
Two main models have been developed to date:
• SP61 realises the building of multiple alignments and the encoding of New
information in terms of user-defined Old information but without any
attempt to add to or modify the information in Old. SP61 also contains
procedures for calculating probabilities of inferences that may be drawn
by the system, as described below. Although SP61 is largely a subset
of SP70 (next), it is convenient to run it as a separate model for many
applications. This model, which is relatively robust and mature, provides
most of the examples of multiple alignments in this book.
• SP70 realises all the elements of the framework, including the building
of the repository of Old information in accordance with minimum length
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Area of New Old
application
Unsupervised ‘Raw’ data Grammar or other
inductive learning knowledge structure
created by learning
Parsing The sentence The grammar used for
to be parsed. parsing.
Pattern A pattern to be The stored knowledge
recognition recognised used to recognise
and scene or scene to be one pattern or several
analysis analysed. within a scene.
Databases A ‘query’ in SQL or Records stored
other query language. in the database.
Expert A ‘query’ in the The ‘rules’ or other
system query language for knowledge stored in
the expert system. the expert system.
Computer The ‘data’ or The computer program
program ‘parameters’ itself.
supplied to the
program on each run.
Table 3.1: The way in which the concepts of ‘New’ and ‘Old’ in this research
appear to relate to established concepts in computing.
encoding principles. This model demonstrates the unsupervised learning
of grammar-like structures from appropriate data but requires further de-
velopment to realise its full potential.
Both models are described in outline later in the chapter. SP61 is also
described in more detail at the end of this chapter. A relatively full description
of SP70 is given in Chapter 9 where unsupervised learning is the main focus of
interest.
3.3 Representation of knowledge
Given the intended wide scope of the theory, a goal of the research has been
to devise a ‘universal’ scheme for the representation of knowledge, capable of
representing many different kinds of knowledge succinctly and integrating them
seamlessly. Naturally, the scheme should be compatible with the various uses
to which the knowledge will be put.
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What has emerged is almost the simplest conceivable format for knowledge:
arrays or patterns of atomic symbols in one or two dimensions and possibly
more. One-dimensional patterns have many applications and have, to date,
been the main focus in this research programme. However, it is envisaged that
the ideas will at some stage be generalised to patterns in two dimensions, with
potential for the representation and processing of pictures, maps and diagrams
(see Chapter 13). To avoid pre-judging whether arrays of symbols are in one
or two dimensions, the relatively general term pattern is normally used, rather
than ‘sequence’ or ‘string’.
Despite the extreme simplicity of this format for representing knowledge,
the way it is processed within the SP system means that it can model a variety
of established representational schemes including context-free phrase-structure
grammars, context-sensitive grammars, class-inclusion hierarchies, part-whole
hierarchies, if-then rules, discrimination networks, and other schemes. Many
examples will be found in the chapters that follow.
As a working hypothesis in this research, it is assumed that principles of
information compression provide the key both to the succinct representation
of diverse kinds of knowledge and to the manipulation of that knowledge for
purposes of learning, reasoning, inference, calculation and the like.
Patterns and the neural basis of knowledge
Part of the inspiration for the idea of representing all kinds of knowledge with
patterns was the observation that, in the brain and nervous system, information
is often mapped into ‘sheets’ of neurons as, for example, in the retina and in
the layers of the lateral geniculate body and the cortex. It seems plausible to
suppose that the way in which sensory information is mapped to sensory tissue
would have provided a basis in evolution for the storage and processing of all
empirical knowledge. The way in which the SP concepts may be realised in
terms of neural mechanisms is discussed quite fully in Chapter 11.
Syntax and semantics
An important feature of the concept of a symbol, as it is used in this research,
is that, with one qualification, it has no hidden meaning. As described below,
a symbol is simply a mark that can be matched with other symbols in a yes/no
manner. Symbols such as ‘6’, ‘22’, ‘+’, ‘-’, ‘×’ and ‘/’ may be used in the SP
framework but each one, in itself, does not have the meaning that it would have
in a mathematical equation (but see Section 3.3, below).
Any meanings that may attach to symbols within a given body of knowledge
are to be expressed in the form of other symbols and patterns within that
knowledge. In accordance with the goal of providing a universal format for
diverse kinds of knowledge, there is no formal distinction between ‘syntax’ and
‘semantics’. Any pattern, or part of a pattern, may serve either roˆle, in a flexible
manner according to need.
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The one qualification to the slogan “no hidden meaning” is that, within each
pattern, there is a distinction between symbols that serve as ‘identifiers’ for that
pattern and symbols that represent the ‘contents’ of the pattern (Section 3.4,
below). Labels like ‘identifier’ or ‘contents’ reflect the workings of the system
itself and may therefore be regarded as distinct from ‘user-oriented’ meanings
that are intrinsic to the material being processed.
Declarative and procedural knowledge
In the SP system, there is no formal distinction between declarative knowledge
and procedural knowledge as there is in ACT-R (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).
Furthermore, a given body of knowledge may be seen as ‘declarative’ in some
contexts and as ‘procedural’ in others. For example, patterns that describe the
structure of a sentence (like those that will be seen in Section 3.4 and Chapter 5)
may be seen to be ‘declarative’ if they are used to describe the static structure
of a sentence on a printed page but they may be seen as ‘procedural’ if they are
used in the dynamic process of speaking the sentence. Likewise, patterns that
represent a map of some geographical area may be seen as a static statement
of the arrangement of roads, towns and other things in the given area but they
may also serve as a procedural guide if one is travelling through that area.
Mathematics and the SP framework
In Chapter 4 it is argued that, while there are important differences between
the SP theory and the Turing concept of computing, the computational scope
of the SP system is the same as a universal Turing machine: anything that can
be computed with a universal Turing machine can also be computed in the SP
system and both systems are subject to the same limitations (see Section 4.4).
Thus the representation and use of mathematical constructs should be possible
within the SP system, as it is with a universal Turing machine. Chapter 10
provides relevant examples and discussion.
In order to perform arithmetic and other kinds of calculation in the SP
system it would be necessary to define relevant concepts with appropriate pat-
terns. The mathematical meanings of symbols such as ‘6’, ‘22’, ‘+’, ‘-’, ‘×’ and
‘/’ would need to be defined. There is probably also a need for constraints that
are optimised for mathematical operations (Section 2.2). Given appropriate
definitions and constraints, the system should be good for mathematics.
That said, this aspect of the system has not yet received detailed attention.
Pending further work in this area, the main strengths of the SP system are in
non-mathematical kinds of symbolic manipulation such as pattern recognition,
information retrieval, reasoning and so on.
Terms
This section summarises the meanings of terms associated with the main con-
cepts introduced so far.
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‘Symbol’
A symbol is some kind of mark that can be compared with any other symbol to
decide whether it is the ‘same’ or ‘different’. No other result is permitted. In the
context of pattern matching, a symbol is the smallest unit that can participate
in matching.
‘Pattern’
A pattern is an array of symbols in one, two or more dimensions. In this book,
one dimensional patterns (sequences or strings of symbols) are the main focus
of attention.
‘Symbol type’ and ‘alphabet’
If two symbols match, we say that they belong to the same symbol type. In any
set of patterns, we normally recognise an alphabet of symbol types such that
every symbol in the system belongs in one and only one of the symbol types in
the alphabet, and every symbol type is represented at least once in the set of
patterns.
‘Substring’
A substring is a sequence of symbols of length n within a sequence of length m,
where n 6 m and where the constituent symbols in the substring are contiguous
within the sequence which contains the substring.
‘Subsequence’
A subsequence is a sequence of symbols of length n within a sequence of length
m, where n 6 m and where the constituent symbols in the subsequence may
not be contiguous within the sequence which contains the subsequence. The
set of all subsequences of a given sequence includes all the substrings of that
sequence.
‘Chunk’
A substring or subsequence that repeats two or more times within a given se-
quence is sometimes described informally as a chunk of information.
3.4 Multiple alignments
The term multiple alignment has been borrowed from bioinformatics where it
means the arrangement of two or more sequences of symbols in rows (or columns)
so that, by judicious ‘stretching’ of sequences where necessary, symbols that
match each other from one sequence to another can be brought into alignment
in columns (or rows).
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Multiple alignments like these are normally used in the computational anal-
ysis of (symbolic representations of) sequences of DNA bases or sequences of
amino acid residues as part of the process of elucidating the structure, functions
or evolution of the corresponding molecules. An example of this kind of multiple
alignment is shown in Figure 3.1.
G G A G C A G G G A G G A T G G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G | G G C C C A G G G A G G A | G G C G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
A | G A C T G C C C A G G G | G G | G C T G G A | G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G A A | A G G G A G G A | A G G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G C A C A G G G A G G C G G G G A
Figure 3.1: A ‘good’ alignment amongst five DNA sequences.
A ‘good’ alignment is, in general, one where there is a relatively large number
of hits (positive matches between symbols) and where any gaps (sequences of
unmatched symbols between hits) are relatively few and relatively short. As we
shall see (Section 3.5), it also possible to evaluate multiple alignments in terms
of minimum length encoding principles. Multiple alignments that are good in
those terms are normally good in terms of numbers of hits and the numbers
and sizes of gaps. A symbol that participates in a hit may be described as a hit
symbol.
Multiple alignments in the SP framework
As in bioinformatics, a multiple alignment in the SP system is an arrangement
of two or more patterns in rows (or columns), with one pattern in each row (or
column). However, in the SP system, the multiple alignment concept has been
modified in the following way:
• One or more of the patterns to be aligned represents New information.
All other patterns are Old information.
• A ‘good’ multiple alignment is one which, through the unification of sym-
bols in New with symbols in Old, and through unifications amongst the
symbols in Old, leads to a relatively large amount of compression of New
in terms of the sequences in Old. How this may be done is explained in
Section 3.5, below.
• By contrast with ‘multiple alignment’ as normally understood in bioinfor-
matics, any given pattern in Old may appear two or more times in any one
multiple alignment and, in these cases, it is possible for the given sequence
to be aligned with itself. As explained below (Section 3.4), two or more
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appearances of a pattern within one multiple alignment is not the same as
including two or more copies of a pattern in a multiple alignment.
• Between any two Old patterns in a multiple alignment, there must not be
any mismatches, as described in Section 3.4, below.
• Any symbol in one pattern may be aligned with any other symbol from
the same pattern or another pattern, providing order constraints are not
violated (Section 3.4, below).
• It is envisaged that, at some point in the future, the concept of multiple
alignment as it is understood here will be generalised to alignments of
patterns with two dimensions and possibly more.
Examples
A good introduction to the nature of the current system and its capabilities
is the way it can be used for parsing a sentence. The examples of multiple
alignment shown here will be referred to in later explanations and discussion.
Like the examples shown here, many of the other multiple alignments shown
in this book are relatively simple. This is because simple examples are easier to
understand than complicated examples and because large multiple alignments
are often too big to fit on one page unless fonts are made so small that they
are unreadable. It should be emphasised that small examples do not reflect
limitations of the SP system or computer models. The system is quite capa-
ble of producing much larger examples. The computational complexity of the
system—which is polynomial—is described in Sections A.4, 3.10 and 9.3.
In the same vein, it should be emphasised that these first examples do not
show the full power of the SP system for representing the structure of natu-
ral languages. These examples reproduce the effects of a context-free phrase-
structure grammar and it is well-known (since Chomsky’s (1957) Syntactic
Structures) that such grammars are not fully adequate for representing the struc-
ture of natural languages like English. However, in Chapter 5 it will be seen that
the system can represent ‘context sensitive’ aspects of language structure such
as number or gender dependencies that bridge arbitrary amounts of interven-
ing structure and the subtle structure of inter-locking dependencies in English
auxiliary verbs. The system also supports the integration of natural language
syntax and semantics.
Figure 3.2 shows a simple context-free phrase-structure grammar—similar
to the one shown in Figure 2.9—describing a fragment of the syntax of English.
This grammar generates sentences like ‘t h i s b o y l o v e s t h a t g i r l’, ‘t
h a t b o y h a t e s t h i s g i r l’, and so on. Any of these sentences may be
parsed in terms of the grammar giving a labelled bracketing like this:
(S(NP(D t h i s)(N b o y))(V l o v e s)(NP(D t h a t)(N g i r l)))
or an equivalent representation in the form of a tree.
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S → NP V NP
NP → D N
D → t h i s
D → t h a t
N → g i r l
N → b o y
V → l o v e s
V → h a t e s
Figure 3.2: A context-free phrase-structure grammar describing a fragment of
English syntax.
Figure 3.3 shows the grammar from Figure 3.2 expressed as a set of SP
patterns, in two versions. Each pattern in either version is like a re-write rule
in the context-free phrase-structure grammar notation except that the rewrite
arrow has been removed, some other symbols have been introduced and there
is a number shown in brackets to the right of each rule. Incidentally, the term
‘grammar’ will be used in this book to describe any set of patterns (like those
shown in Figure 3.3 (a) or (b)) that has a roˆle comparable to that of a grammar
expressed in more traditional style.
For any given rule, the number in brackets on the right is a frequency of
occurrence of the rule in a (‘good’) parsing of a notional sample of the language.
These frequencies have a roˆle in the evaluation of multiple alignments in terms
of information compression (Section 3.5) and in the calculation of probabilities
associated with multiple alignments (Section 3.7).
In examples shown later in the book, patterns are often shown without
associated numbers. Unless otherwise indicated, readers may assume in those
cases that each pattern has the default frequency of 1.
Parsing as an alignment of a sentence and rules in a
grammar
Figure 3.4 (a) shows how a parsing of the sentence ‘t h i s b o y l o v e s t h a t
g i r l’ may be seen as an alignment of patterns which includes the sentence and
relevant rules from the grammar shown in Figure 3.3 (a). Figure 3.4 (b) is the
corresponding multiple alignment using the grammar shown in Figure 3.3 (b).
In multiple alignments like these, the sentence or other sequence of symbols
to be parsed is the New pattern, while the patterns representing rules of the
grammar are Old. By convention, the New pattern is always shown at the top
of a multiple alignment like the one shown here with the Old patterns in the
rows underneath, one pattern per row. Apart from this constraint, the order of
the patterns across the rows is entirely arbitrary, without any significance.
As we shall see, it can be convenient to show multiple alignments rotated
through 90o. In these cases, the New pattern is shown in the left-most column,
with Old patterns—in any order—in columns to the right. Of course, when
a multiple alignment has been rotated in this way, the meaning of ‘row’ and
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!S NP #NP V #V NP #NP !#S (500)
!NP D #D N #N !#NP (1000)
!D !0 t h i s !#D (600)
!D !1 t h a t !#D (400)
!N !0 g i r l !#N (300)
!N !1 b o y !#N (700)
!V !0 l o v e s !#V (650)
!V !1 h a t e s !#V (350)
(a)
!< !S < NP > < V > < NP > !> (500)
!< !NP < D > < N > !> (1000)
!< !D !0 t h i s !> (600)
!< !D !1 t h a t !> (400)
!< !N !0 g i r l !> (300)
!< !N !1 b o y !> (700)
!< !V !0 l o v e s !> (650)
!< !V !1 h a t e s !> (350)
(b)
Figure 3.3: The grammar from Figure 3.2 recast as patterns of symbols. In ver-
sion (a), each pattern starts and ends with symbols representing a grammatical
category. In version (b), angle brackets are used to mark the beginning and end
of each pattern and the grammatical category is shown with a symbol following
the initial left bracket. The character ‘!’ in both versions serves to mark a
symbol as being an ‘ID-symbol’, as explained in Section 3.4, below.
‘column’ changes. To avoid introducing clumsy new terms to generalise these
concepts across both arrangements of a multiple alignment, the rest of this
chapter will refer to rows and columns of a multiple alignment on the assumption
that multiple alignments are arranged as shown in Figure 3.4 with patterns in
the rows and alignments of symbols shown in columns.
The similarity between the first multiple alignment and the conventional
parsing may be seen if matching symbols in the multiple alignment are unified
so that, in effect, the multiple alignment is ‘projected’ on to a single sequence,
thus:
S NP D 0 t h i s #D N 1 b o y #N #NP V 0 l o v e s #V
NP D 1 t h a t #D N 0 g i r l #N #NP #S
In this projection, the two instances of ‘NP’ in the second column of the multiple
alignment have been merged or ‘unified’ and likewise for the two instances of
‘D’ in the third column and so on wherever there are two or more instances of
a symbol in any column.
This projection is the same as the conventional parsing except that ‘0’ and
‘1’ symbols are included, right bracket symbols (‘)’) are replaced by symbols
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0 t h i s b o y l o v e s t h a t g i r l 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | N 0 g i r l #N 1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | | | | | | | | | | NP D | | | | #D N #N #NP 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | D 1 t h a t #D | 3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
4 | | | | | | | V 0 l o v e s #V | | 4
| | | | | | | | | | |
5 S NP | | | | | | | #NP V #V NP #NP #S 5
| | | | | | | | |
6 | D 0 t h i s #D | | | | 6
| | | | | | |
7 NP D #D N | | | #N #NP 7
| | | | |
8 N 1 b o y #N 8
(a)
0 t h i s b o y l o v e s t h a t g i r l 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | < V 0 l o v e s > | | | | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
2 < S < NP | | | | | | | > < V > < NP | | | | | | | | > > 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | < N 0 g i r l > | 3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
4 | | | | | | | | | | < NP < D | | | | > < N > > 4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
5 | | < D 0 t h i s > | | | | | | | | | | | 5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
6 < NP < D > < N | | | > > | | | | | | | 6
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
7 < N 1 b o y > | | | | | | | 7
| | | | | | |
8 < D 1 t h a t > 8
(b)
Figure 3.4: (a) The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘t h i s b o y l
o v e s t h a t g i r l’ in New and the grammar from Figure 3.3 (a) in Old. (b)
The best multiple alignment found using the grammar in Figure 3.3 (b).
such as ‘#D’, ‘#N’ and ‘#NP’, and each of the upper-case symbols is regarded
both as a ‘label’ for a structure and as a left bracket for that structure.
The similarity with a conventional parsing can be seen even more clearly in
the multiple alignment shown Figure 3.4 (b) which projects to a single sequence,
thus:
< S < NP < D 0 t h i s > < N 1 b o y > > < V 0 l o v e s >
< NP < D 1 t h a t > < N 0 g i r l > > >
Apart from the use of angle brackets instead of round brackets and the addition
of symbols like ‘0’ and ‘1’, the projection is exactly the same as an ordinary
labelled bracketing.
Identification symbols and contents symbols
Any one symbol in an SP pattern is either a contents symbol (C-symbol) or it
is an identification symbol (ID-symbol). In general, the former represents the
contents or substance of knowledge stored in the pattern while the latter serve
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to define how a pattern relates to other patterns in a given set of patterns as
described below.
In Figure 3.3, each symbol that is preceded by ‘!’ is an ID-symbol and all
other symbols are C-symbols. The ‘!’ character is simply a marker for ID-
symbols and is not part of the symbol itself. Notice that any given symbol
type (e.g., ‘NP’) may be an ID-symbol in some contexts and a C-symbol in
others. As a general rule, ID-symbols appear at or near the beginning and end
of each pattern (e.g., ‘!D’ ‘!0’ and ‘!#D’ in the pattern ‘!D !0 t h i s !#D’) while
corresponding C-symbols appear within the body of a pattern (e.g., the pair
of symbols ‘D #D’ within the pattern ‘!NP D #D N #N !#NP’). Within each
pattern, it is normally reasonably clear which symbols are ID-symbols and which
ones are C-symbols—so in most of the examples in this book, the ‘!’ marker for
ID-symbols is omitted.
An ID-symbol may have either or both of two main functions:
• It may serve to represent the left or right boundary of a pattern. In
Figure 3.3 (a), examples include ‘S’ and ‘#S’ at the left and right of the
first pattern, ‘NP’ and ‘#NP’ at the left and right of the second pattern,
and so on. In Figure 3.3 (b), left and right angle brackets play the same
roˆle. It is sometimes convenient to refer to symbols like these as (left or
right) ‘boundary markers’ and to refer to symbols like ‘#S’, ‘#NP’ and ‘>’
at the right ends of patterns as ‘termination markers’—but these concepts
have no formal status in the system.
In the multiple alignments shown in Figure 3.4, the boundary markers
are aligned with matching C-symbols in other patterns. For example, ‘N’
and ‘#N’ in ‘N 1 b o y #N’ are aligned with ‘N #N’ in ‘NP D #D N
#N #NP’. It is these alignments of symbols that ensure that a coherent
multiple alignment can be formed.
In conventional computing, it may seem as if termination markers are not
needed but they are often hidden from view, e.g., ‘EOF’ at the end of a
file or the invisible ‘LF’ character at the end of a line, or space characters
marking the ends of non-space strings of characters.
In some applications of the SP system, some or all of the patterns do not
need to have boundary markers. Examples will be seen later in the book.
The provision of this kind of symbol is not an essential part of the system.
• As its name implies, an ID-symbol—either singly or in combination with
other ID-symbols—may serve to distinguish a pattern from other patterns
and thus identify it within a given set of patterns. In Figure 3.3 (a),
examples include ‘S’ at the beginning of ‘S NP #NP V #V NP #NP
#S’, ‘D’ and ‘0’ at the beginning of ‘D 0 t h i s #D’, ‘N’ and ‘1’ at the
beginning of ‘N 1 b o y #N’ and likewise for the other patterns. In these
examples, ‘S’, ‘D’ and ‘N’ also serve as left boundary markers. In Figure
3.3 (b), patterns are identified with the same symbols but the boundary
marking roˆle is been delegated to left and right angle brackets.
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ID-symbols like ‘S’, ‘D’ or ‘N’ near the beginnings of patterns are some-
times called ‘class’ symbols because they represent grammatical categories
or other kinds of class. Since ID-symbols like ‘D’ or ‘N’ appear in more
than one pattern, they need to be combined with symbols like ‘0’ and ‘1’
in order to identify a pattern uniquely. The latter symbols are sometimes
referred to as ‘discrimination’ symbols because they enable one to distin-
guish one member of a class from another. Neither of these terms has any
formal status in the system.
A pair of C-symbols like ‘NP #NP’ in Figure 3.3 (a) or a triplet like ‘<
NP >’ in Figure 3.3 (b) is a means of referring to one other pattern in
the set of patterns or to two or more patterns in the set. Consequently,
this kind of combination of C-symbols is sometimes called a ‘reference’ to
a pattern or a class. Again, this term has no formal status in the system.
The only distinction amongst symbols with any formal status within the SP
system is the distinction between ID-symbols and C-symbols. Otherwise, every
symbol has the same status as any other symbol and it makes no difference
whether they are written with letters or digits, with upper-case or lower-case
letters, with an initial ‘#’ character or without, and so on.
Any one pattern may appear two or more times in one
alignment
As was noted in Section 3.4, any one pattern may appear two or more times
in one multiple alignment. Thus, for example, the pattern ‘NP D #D N #N
#NP’ appears twice in the multiple alignment shown in Figure 3.4 (a).
It should be stressed that two or more appearances of a pattern in a multiple
alignment is not the same as having two or more copies of a given pattern in
the multiple alignment. In the former case, it is not permissible to align a
given symbol in one appearance of a pattern with the corresponding symbol in
another appearance—because this would mean aligning the given symbol with
itself and it is obvious that any such match would be meaningless in terms of
the identification of redundancy. In the latter case, it is permissible to align a
given symbol in one copy of a pattern with the corresponding symbol in another
copy. However, in most applications, the repository of Old patterns would not
normally contain multiple copies of any one pattern.
In addition to the constraint that any given symbol must not be aligned with
itself, it is also necessary to ensure that order constraints are preserved. This
means that the following statement is always true:
For any two rows in a multiple alignment, A and B, and any four
symbols, A1 and A2 in A, and B1 and B2 in B, if A1 is in the same
column as B1, and if A2 is in the same column as B2, and if A2 in
A follows A1 in A, then B2 in B must follow B1 in B.
This condition applies when the two rows contain two appearances of one pattern
and also when the two rows contain different patterns.
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‘Mismatches’
A mismatch between a pair of patterns in a multiple alignment occurs when,
between one pair of aligned symbols and another, or between one pair of aligned
symbols and the beginnings or ends of the two patterns, there are no other
aligned pairs of symbols and there are unmatched symbols in each of the two
patterns.
In the SP61 model and also the SP70 model, multiple alignments are rejected
if they contain mismatches between Old patterns in the multiple alignment but
mismatches between the New pattern and any Old pattern are accepted. Thus,
for example, a multiple alignment like this:
0 a c 0
| |
1 a x c 1
| |
2 a y c 2
or this:
0 a b 0
| |
1 a b x 1
| |
2 a b y 2
would be rejected. But multiple alignments like this:
0 a b c 0
| |
1 a x c 1
or this:
0 a b c 0
| |
1 a b x 1
would be accepted. (In any multiple alignment, row 0 contains the New pattern
and all other rows contain Old patterns.)
The rejection of multiple alignments that contain mismatches between Old
patterns ensures that all ‘legal’ multiple alignments can be unified to form a
single sequence as shown in Section 3.4. This is true even if there is a mismatch
between the New pattern in a multiple alignment and one or more of the Old
patterns. Thus, for example, the first of the two multiple alignments just shown
would unify to form the sequence ‘a x c’ and the second one would unify to
form the sequence ‘a b x’. In cases like these, the New pattern in the unified
sequence is a subsequence of the New pattern that was originally supplied. The
symbols in that subsequence are those that form hits with symbols in the Old
patterns. In SP61, the unmatched symbols in the original New pattern are, in
effect, ignored. In SP70, unmatched symbols in the New pattern in a multiple
alignment provide a basis for learning.
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The process of searching for good multiple alignments and
the need for constraints
As we saw in Section 2.2, the number of possible ways in which two sequences of
symbols may be matched is normally huge. For example, the number of possible
subsequences in a sequence of 100 symbols is 1.26 × 1030 and the number of
possible comparisons between the subsequences in one such sequence and the
subsequences in another is 8.034 × 1059. For three or more sequences, this
number would be even larger.
In work on multiple alignments, it is widely recognised that, with the excep-
tion of alignments of patterns that are very small and very few, the number of
possible alignments of symbols is too large to be searched exhaustively. For any
set of patterns of realistic size, a search which has acceptable speed and accept-
able scaling properties can only be achieved if the search is constrained so that
(large) parts of the search space are excluded from the search. As discussed in
Section 2.2, constraints may absolute or heuristic or a combination of the two.
There is now a fairly large literature about methods for finding good align-
ments amongst two or more sequences of symbols. All practical methods use
one or more forms of heuristic search. Some of them are reviewed in Taylor
(1988); Barton (1990); Chan et al. (1992); Day and McMorris (1992). The ways
in which constraints are applied in the SP61 model are described in Section
3.10, below.
Ordering of symbols and patterns
One-dimensional patterns in the SP scheme are ordered sequences of symbols,
not unordered sets of symbols and, in the building of multiple alignments, the
order of symbols matters. For many applications, such as the parsing of natural
language (Section 3.4 and Chapter 5), this is entirely appropriate. However, in
some applications, it is useful to be able to treat New information as unordered
or partially-ordered sets of symbols.
In order to ensure that ‘A’ and ‘B’ in one pattern can be matched with ‘B’
and ‘A’ in another pattern, we can provide a framework pattern that defines an
arbitrary order for disjunctive classes of symbol that may be found amongst the
patterns in Old. Examples will be seen in Sections 6.5 and 7.6 and elsewhere
in the book. Provided that classes of symbol are always specified in the defined
order, appropriate multiple alignments can be built.
An alternative method for unordered sets of patterns or symbols
At the time of writing, another method for accommodating unordered sets of
patterns or symbols is being considered. Instead of specifying the New infor-
mation as a single pattern, it is possible to specify it as a set of patterns. In
many applications, it is likely that many of the patterns would contain only
one symbol but there is no reason to exclude patterns containing two or more
symbols.
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The SP61 model would need to be modified so that it could build multiple
alignments where any one multiple alignment might contain two or more New
patterns. It is envisaged that, in any such multiple alignment, the New patterns
would normally be arranged in a sequence and they would normally be displayed
in row 0 of the multiple alignment. That said, the possibility of overlap amongst
the New patterns—shown in two or more rows of the multiple alignment—
has not been ruled out. Either way, the formation of a multiple alignment
would ensure that the symbols in the New patterns would project into a single
sequence.
Although the New patterns in any one multiple alignment would project
into a single sequence, the ordering of the patterns could vary from one multiple
alignment to another. The only constraint would be that the order of symbols
within any one pattern would be preserved. Given a system in which multiple
alignments are built in this way then it should be possible to accommodate
applications in which New information needs to be treated as an unordered set
of patterns or an unordered or partially-ordered set of symbols.
3.5 Coding and the evaluation of an alignment
in terms of compression
The first subsection here describes in outline how multiple alignments are evalu-
ated in the SP system and, more specifically, in SP61 and SP70. This description
should be sufficient for many readers but a more detailed description is given in
the next subsection with some of the rationale of the method and some of the
practicalities.
Outline
Associated with each symbol type is a notional code or bit pattern that serves
to distinguish the given symbol type from all the others. This is only notional
because the bit patterns are not actually constructed. All that is needed for the
purpose of evaluating multiple alignments is the size of the notional bit pattern
associated with each symbol type.
The sizes of the codes are calculated (as described below) so that frequently-
occurring symbols have shorter codes than symbols that occur more rarely.
Notice that these bit patterns and their sizes are totally independent of the names
for symbols used in written accounts like this one and chosen purely for their
mnemonic value.
Given a multiple alignment like the one shown in Figure 3.4, one can derive
a code pattern from the multiple alignment in the following way:
1. Scan the multiple alignment from left to right looking for columns that
contain an ID-symbol by itself, not aligned with any other symbol.
2. Copy these symbols into a code pattern in the same order that they appear
in the multiple alignment.
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The code pattern derived in this way from the multiple alignment shown in
Figure 3.4 (a) is ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’. This is, in effect, a compressed representation
of those symbols in the New pattern that form hits with Old symbols in the
multiple alignment. In this case, the code pattern is a compressed representation
of all the symbols in the New pattern.
Given a code pattern derived in this way, we may calculate a ‘compression
difference’ as:
CD = BN −BE (3.1)
or a ‘compression ratio’ as:
CR = BN/BE . (3.2)
Each of these measures is an indication of how effectively the New pattern
(or parts of it) may be compressed in terms of the Old patterns that appear
in the given multiple alignment. The CD of a multiple alignment—which has
been found to be more useful than CR—is often called the compression score
of the multiple alignment.
In each of these equations, BN is calculated as:
BN =
h∑
i=1
Ci, (3.3)
where Ci is the size of the code for ith symbol in a sequence, H1...Hh, comprising
those symbols within the New pattern that form hits with Old symbols within
the multiple alignment.
BE is calculated as:
BE =
s∑
i=1
Ci, (3.4)
where Ci is the size of the code for ith symbol in the sequence of s symbols in
the code pattern derived from the multiple alignment.
Details and rationale
This section presents a relatively detailed description of the method for evalu-
ating multiple alignments in terms of compression and describes the reasoning
behind the method.
Encoding individual symbols
The simplest way to encode individual symbols in the New pattern and the
set of Old patterns is with a ‘block’ code using a fixed number of bits for each
symbol. In the New pattern shown in Figure 3.4 together with the grammar
shown in Figure 3.3 (a), there are 24 symbol types so the minimum number of
bits required for each symbol is ⌈log2 24⌉ = 5 bits per symbol.
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In fact, the SP61 model uses variable-length codes for symbols, assigned in
accordance with the Shannon-Fano-Elias coding scheme (described by Cover and
Thomas (1991)) so that the shortest codes represent the most frequent symbol
types and vice versa. Although this scheme is slightly less efficient than the
well-known Huffman scheme, it has been adopted because the Huffman scheme
can give anomalous results when probabilities are calculated (Section 3.7).
For the Shannon-Fano-Elias calculation, the frequency of each symbol type
(fst) is calculated as:
fst =
P∑
i=1
(fi × oi) (3.5)
where fi is the (notional) frequency of the ith pattern in the grammar (illus-
trated by the numbers on the right of Figure 3.3) (a), oi is the number of
occurrences of the given symbol in the ith pattern and P is the number of
patterns in the grammar.
When the code sizes of symbol types have been calculated, each symbol
in the New pattern and each symbol in the set of Old patterns is assigned
the code size corresponding to its type. An important point to stress is that,
when this process has been completed, the code size of each symbol in the
New pattern is multiplied by a cost factor, normally about 2 or larger. This
means that, in effect, each New symbol represents a relatively large chunk of
information. When a New symbol is aligned with a matching Old symbol,
it may be encoded with the smaller code associated with the Old symbol, in
much the same way that ‘GMT’ may be used as an abbreviation for ‘Greenwich
Mean Time’ or ‘WWW’ is short for ‘World Wide Web’ in ordinary writing.
This arrangement means that compression can occur at the level of individual
symbols as well at the level of patterns. This has a bearing on the apparent
paradox of ‘decompression by compression’, discussed in Section 3.8, below.
There are many variations and refinements that may be made at the symbol
level but, in general, the choice of coding system for individual symbols is not
critical for the principles to be described below where the focus of interest is
the exploitation of redundancy that may be attributed to sequences of two or
more symbols rather than any redundancy attributed to individual symbols.
Encoding words
In Figure 3.4 (a), the word ‘t h i s’ in the New pattern is aligned with the
corresponding symbols in the Old pattern ‘D 0 t h i s #D’. From this multiple
alignment, we derive a code pattern for ‘t h i s’ from the ID-symbols in the Old
pattern. The result is the pattern ‘D 0 #D’.
In terms of numbers of symbols, this code is only slightly smaller than the
original symbols in New. However, owing to the application of the cost factor
each New symbol is, in effect, much larger than any of the Old symbols, including
the ID-symbols used to create the code pattern. So the size of the code pattern
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in terms of bits is substantially smaller than the size of the New symbols that
it represents.
The other words in the New pattern in Figure 3.4 (a)—‘b o y’, ‘l o v e s’, ‘t
h a t’ and ‘g i r l’—may be encoded in a similar way.
Encoding phrases
Consider the phrase ‘t h i s b o y’. If this were encoded with a code pattern
for each word, the result would be ‘D 0 #D N 1 #N’ which is only one symbol
smaller than the original. However, we can encode the phrase with fewer symbols
by taking advantage of the fact that the sequence ‘D 0 #D N 1 #N’ has a
subsequence, ‘D #D N #N’, which is a substring within the pattern ‘NP D
#D N #N #NP’ in the grammar. Notice that the sequence ‘D #D N #N’ is
discontinuous within the sequence ‘D 0 #D N 1 #N’.
Since the ‘noun phrase’ pattern ‘NP D #D N #N #NP’ is in the grammar,
we may replace the substring, ‘D #D N #N’, by the ‘code’ sequence ‘NP #NP’.
But then, to encode the two words within the noun phrase (‘t h i s’ and ‘b o
y’), we must add the symbols, ‘0’ and ‘1’ from ‘D 0 #D N 1 #N’ so that the
final coded sequence is ‘NP 0 1 #NP’.
Notice how the symbols ‘NP’ and ‘#NP’ in the code pattern ‘NP 0 1 #NP’
serve as a disambiguating context so that the symbol ‘0’ identifies the pattern
‘D 0 t h i s #D’ and the symbol ‘1’ identifies the pattern ‘N 1 b o y #N’. The
overall cost of the code pattern ‘NP 0 1 #NP’ is 4 symbols compared with the
original 7 symbols in ‘t h i s b o y’—a saving of 3 symbols. In a similar way,
the phrase ‘t h a t g i r l’ may be encoded as ‘NP 1 0 #NP’ which is 4 symbols
smaller than the original. In terms of the numbers of bits required, the savings
are even greater.
Encoding the sentence
Given the two noun phrases in their encoded forms (‘NP 0 1 #NP’ for ‘t h i s
b o y’ and ‘NP 1 0 #NP’ for ‘t h a t g i r l’) and the encoding of ‘l o v e s’ as
‘V 0 #V’, the whole sentence may be encoded as ‘NP 0 1 #NP V 0 #V NP 1
0 #NP’.
However, this sequence contains the subsequence ‘NP #NP V #V NP #NP’
and this sequence is a substring within the ‘sentence’ pattern ‘S NP #NP V
#V NP #NP #S’—and this pattern is in the grammar. So we may replace
the sequence ‘NP #NP V #V NP #NP’ by the ‘code’ sequence ‘S #S’. To
discriminate the words in this sentence we must add the symbols ‘0 1 0 1 0’
from the sequence ‘NP 0 1 #NP V 0 #V NP 1 0 #NP’. The overall result is an
encoded representation of the sentence as:
S 0 1 0 1 0 #S.
The 7 symbols in this encoding of the sentence represents a substantial
compression compared with the 20 symbols in the unencoded sentence. As
before, the saving in terms of bits is even greater.
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In general, the procedure for deriving a code for a multiple alignment is
exactly as described in Section 3.5, above: scan the multiple alignment from
left to right looking for ID-symbols that are not aligned with any other symbol
and copy those symbols into a code pattern in the same order as they appear
in the multiple alignment.
Discussion
Each pattern expresses sequential redundancy in the data to be encoded and
this sequential redundancy can be exploited to reduce the number of symbols
which need to be written out explicitly. In the grammar shown in Figure 3.3,
each pattern for an individual word expresses the sequential redundancy of the
letters within that word; the pattern for a noun phrase expresses the sequential
redundancy of ‘determiner’ followed by ‘noun’; and the pattern for a sentence
expresses the sequential redundancy of the pattern: ‘noun phrase’ followed by
‘verb’ followed by ‘noun phrase’.
Since this principle operates at all levels in the ‘hierarchy’ of patterns, many
of the symbols at intermediate levels may be omitted completely. A sentence
may be specified with symbols marking the start and end of the sentence pattern
together with interpolated symbols which discriminate amongst alternatives at
lower levels.
Notice that these ideas are only applicable to multiple alignments without
any ‘mismatches’ between Old patterns (as described in Section 3.4, above).
Multiple alignments with mismatches between Old patterns are rejected by the
system.
The method that has been described illustrates the role of context in the
encoding of information. Any one symbol like ‘0’ or ‘1’ is ambiguous in terms
of the patterns in the grammar in Figure 3.3 (a). But in the context of the
pattern ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’ and the same grammar, it is possible to assign each
instance of ‘0’ or ‘1’ unambiguously to one of the words in the grammar, giving
the sequence of words in the original sentence. As we shall see in Section 3.8, the
encoded form of a New pattern may be used within the SP system to recreate
that New pattern using exactly the same processes as were used to create the
code in the first place.
An approximate method
The foregoing describes how multiple alignments are evaluated in SP61 once
they have been completed. However, in the course of building multiple align-
ments, the program uses an approximate method for evaluating partial align-
ments that is relatively quick and ‘cheap’ to compute.
As we shall see in Sections 3.9 and 3.10, the SP61 model builds multiple
alignments by searching for full and partial matches between sequences, taken
two at a time. For any alignment between two sequences, it creates a measure
of how good the alignment is from the number of hits in the alignment and the
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number and sizes of the gaps between hits. The term compression score may
also be used to describe this approximate measure.
The method of allowing for gaps is based on an analogy with the rolling of
two A-sided dice, where A is the size of the alphabet used in New and Old. The
sequence of rolls of one die corresponds with the sequence of symbols in one
pattern and the sequence of rolls of the other die corresponds with the sequence
of symbols in the other pattern. The method is based closely on the method
described in Lowry (1989) for calculating probabilities of various contingencies
in problems of this type. The method, as it has been adapted for the matching of
two patterns, is described in Appendix A which is itself based on Wolff (1994a).
Critique of technique for evaluating alignments in terms
of compression
The method for evaluating alignments described in the first parts of this section
makes good sense for any alignment in which there are few gaps between hit
symbols in the New pattern and few unmatched C-symbols in the Old patterns,
but it is less satisfactory for any alignment in which there are many gaps, espe-
cially if they are amongst the C-symbols in the Old patterns of the alignment.
This is because the ID-symbols of each Old pattern represent all the C-symbols
of the pattern, not some subset that happens to be matched to the symbols
in New. In some respects, the approximate method described in the previous
subsection is better for alignments containing gaps, because the method does
take account of the numbers of gaps and their sizes.
Despite this apparent weakness, the coding method seems to work quite well
in practice, as will be seen in examples shown in the next chapter (e.g., Section
6.2) and later.
It is envisaged that the problem of gaps and how they should be allowed
for will be resolved when the system is fully developed for learning. As will be
seen in Chapter 9, the learning process is driven by gaps in hit sequences and
each gap leads to the creation of system-generated ID-symbols. When this has
been fully worked out, the additional ‘cost’ of newly-created ID-symbols should
create a bias against gaps in alignments, in accordance with our intuitions.
3.6 Realisation of the three compression
techniques in SP
The examples of multiple alignment that we have seen so far give us a prelim-
inary view of the way in which the three compression techniques described in
Section 2.2 may be modelled in the SP framework.
Chunking-with-codes
In Figure 3.4 (a), a pattern like ‘N 0 j o h n #N’ may be seen as a chunk of
information (‘j o h n’) together with its ‘code’ (‘N 0 #N’). In this case, the code
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has a dual function of providing a unique identifier for the chunk and marking
the beginning and end of the chunk.
Superficially, the code in this example appears to be only slightly smaller
than the chunk and there does not seem to be much advantage in terms of
information compression in recognising the chunk. If ‘j o h n’ had been replaced
by ‘j i m’, there would appear to be no compression at all. But it must be
born in mind that each symbol has its own code and calculations of information
compression are based on symbol sizes in bits not simple counts of numbers of
symbols.
Sometimes a chunk is smaller than its corresponding code. Although this
seems nonsensical, there may be an overall economy within a larger structure,
as we shall see in the next subsection.
Schema-plus-correction
In Figure 3.4 (a), it should be clear that a pattern like ‘S N #N V #V #S’ is
taking the role of a schema that may be corrected or completed by the addition
of a noun pattern and a verb pattern. Although sentence patterns in a language
like English are relatively abstract concepts, they are patterns that repeat very
often in the language and thus represent, in compressed form, relatively large
amounts of redundancy.
Given a schema like ‘S N #N V #V #S’, it may make perfect sense in terms
of economy to use ‘corrections’ to that schema such as ‘N 23 I #N’, where ‘I’
is the small ‘chunk’ to be encoded and ‘N 23 #N’ are the ID-symbols used to
encode it. The number of bits in the ID-symbols may be larger than the number
of bits in the C-symbol used to represent ‘I’ but, in any reasonably large body
of text, there is an overall compression because ‘S N #N V #V #S’ (and other
sentence patterns) are such powerful schemata and they need small patterns like
‘N 23 I #N’ in order to function properly.
Run-length coding
In the SP framework, there is no explicit mechanism for representing iterated
structures as there is in computer programming (e.g., the while loop, the for
loop, or the repeat ... until loop). The sole mechanism is recursion in the
sense of computer programming. Examples will be seen in Sections 4.3, 5.2 and
elsewhere in the book.
3.7 Calculation of probabilities associated with
alignments
As we shall see in Chapter 7, the formation of multiple alignments in the SP
framework supports a variety of kinds of probabilistic reasoning. The core idea
is that any Old symbol in a multiple alignment that is not aligned with a New
symbol represents an inference that may be drawn from the multiple alignment.
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This section describes how absolute and relative probabilities for such infer-
ences may be calculated.
Absolute probabilities
Any sequence of L symbols, drawn from an alphabet of |A| symbol types, rep-
resents one point in a set of N points where N is calculated as:
N = |A|L. (3.6)
If we assume that the sequence is random or nearly so, which means that the N
points are equi-probable or nearly so, the probability of any one point (which
represents a sequence of length L) is close to:
pABS = |A|
−L. (3.7)
This formula can be used to calculate the absolute probability of the code, C,
derived from the multiple alignment as described in Section 3.5. In SP61, the
value of |A| is 2. pABS may be regarded as the probability of any inferences
that may be drawn from the multiple alignment.
Is it reasonable to assume that new in encoded form is random or
nearly so?
Why should we assume that the code for a multiple alignment is a random
sequence or nearly so? In accordance with algorithmic information theory (Sec-
tion 2.2), a sequence is random if it is incompressible. If we have reason to
believe that a sequence is incompressible or nearly so, then we may regard it as
random or nearly so.
As noted previously, we cannot prove that no further compression of I is
possible (unless I is very small). But we may say that, for a given set of methods
and a given amount of computational resources that have been applied, no
further compression can be achieved. In short, the assumption that the code for
a multiple alignment is random or nearly so only applies to the best encodings
found for a given body of information in New and must be qualified by the
quality and thoroughness of the search methods which have been used to create
the code.
Relative probabilities
The absolute probabilities of multiple alignments, calculated as described in the
last subsection, are normally very small and not very interesting in themselves.
From the standpoint of practical applications, we are normally interested in the
relative values of probabilities, not their absolute values.
A point we may note in passing is that the calculation of relative probabilities
from pABS will tend to cancel out any general tendency for values of pABS to
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be too high or too low. Any systematic bias in values of pABS should not have
much effect on the values which are of most interest to us.
If we are to compare one multiple alignment and its probability to another
multiple alignment and its probability, we need to compare like with like. An
multiple alignment can have a high value for pABS because it encodes only one or
two symbols from New. It is not reasonable to compare a multiple alignment like
that to another multiple alignment which has a lower value for pABS but which
encodes more symbols from New. Consequently, the procedure for calculating
relative values for probabilities (pREL) is as follows:
1. For the multiple alignment which has the highest CD (which we shall call
the reference multiple alignment), identify the symbols from New which
are encoded by the multiple alignment. We will call these symbols the
reference set of symbols in New.
2. Compile a reference set of multiple alignments which includes the multiple
alignment with the highest CD and all other multiple alignments (if any)
which encode exactly the reference set of symbols from New, neither more
nor less.2
3. The multiple alignments in the reference set are examined to find and
remove any rows which are redundant in the sense that all the symbols
appearing in a given row also appear in another row in the same order.3
Any multiple alignment which, after editing, matches another multiple
alignment in the set is removed from the set.
4. Calculate the sum of the values for pABS in the reference set of multiple
alignments:
pA SUM =
i=R∑
i=1
pABSi (3.8)
where R is the size of the reference set of multiple alignments and pABSi
is the value of pABS for the ith multiple alignment in the reference set.
5. For each multiple alignment in the reference set, calculate its relative
probability as:
pRELi = pABSi/pA SUM . (3.9)
The values of pREL calculated as just described seem to provide an effective
means of comparing the multiple alignments in the reference set (normally, this
2There may be a case for defining the reference set of multiple alignments as those multiple
alignments which encode the reference set of symbols or any super-set of that set. It is not
clear at present which of those two definitions is to be preferred.
3If Old is well compressed, this kind of redundancy amongst the rows of a multiple align-
ment should not appear very often.
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will be those multiple alignments which encode the same set of symbols from
New as the multiple alignment which has the best overall CD).
It is not necessary always to use the multiple alignment with the best CD as
the basis of the reference set of symbols. It may happen that some other set of
symbols from New is the focus of interest. In this case a different reference set
of multiple alignments may be constructed and relative values for those multiple
alignments may be calculated as described above.
Relative probabilities of patterns and symbols
It often happens that a given pattern from Old or a given symbol type within
patterns from Old appears in more than one of the multiple alignments in the
reference set. In cases like these, one would expect the relative probability of
the pattern or symbol type to be higher than if it appeared in only one multiple
alignment. To take account of this kind of situation, SP61 calculates relative
probabilities for individual patterns and symbol types in the following way:
1. Compile a set of patterns from Old, each of which appears at least once
in the reference set of multiple alignments. No single pattern from Old
should appear more than once in the set.
2. For each pattern, calculate a value for its relative probability as the sum
of the pREL values for the multiple alignments in which it appears. If a
pattern appears more than once in a multiple alignment, it is only counted
once for that multiple alignment.
3. Compile a set of symbol types which appear anywhere in the patterns
identified in step 2.
4. For each symbol type identified in step 3, calculate its relative probability
as the sum of the relative probabilities of the patterns in which it appears.
If it appears more than once in a given pattern, it is only counted once.
With regard to symbol types, the foregoing applies only to symbol types
which do not appear in New. Any symbol type which appears in New
necessarily has a probability of 1.0—because it has been observed, not
inferred.
Comparison of alignments that do not encode the same
symbols from new
It is true that, when we compare multiple alignments, we should compare like
with like in terms of the symbols from New which are encoded by the multiple
alignment. But, nevertheless, there may be occasions when we wish to compare
multiple alignments that do not encode the same symbols from New.
In cases like that, CD or CR can be used. It may be possible to develop
a principled method for calculating probabilities of multiple alignments that
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occur different subsets of the symbols in New but this has not, so far, been
investigated.
3.8 Decompression by compression
As was described in Section 3.5, a ‘good’ multiple alignment in the SP system
is one in which the New pattern may be encoded economically in terms of the
Old patterns in the multiple alignment.4 Given a good multiple alignment like
the one shown in Figure 3.4 (a), the sentence ‘t h i s b o y l o v e s t h a t g i r
l’ may be encoded by the relatively short pattern ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’. The saving
is even more pronounced if the lengths of these patterns are measured in bits
rather than numbers of symbols.
Despite the fact that the SP system is dedicated to information compression,
it provides a means of decompressing a code like ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’ so that the
original uncompressed sentence is recreated. Although this may seem like a
paradox, there is no inconsistency or contradiction at all.
If Old contains the grammar shown in Figure 3.3 (a) (the same grammar as
was used to create the multiple alignment shown in Figure 3.4 (a)) and if New
contains the code sequence ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’, then the best multiple alignment
found by the system is the one shown in Figure 3.5. This multiple alignment
contains the same words as the original sentence, in the same order as the
original. In effect, it recreates the original sentence. This can be seen even
more clearly if the patterns in the multiple alignment are unified to create a
single sequence like this:
S NP D 0 t h i s #D N 1 b o y #N #NP V 0 l o v e s #V
NP D 1 t h a t #D N 0 g i r l #N #NP #S
This is the same as the unified sequence derived from Figure 3.4 (a). If we strip
out the symbols that represent grammatical categories, the sequence is exactly
the same as the original sentence. Readers who are familiar with Prolog, will
recognise that this process of recreating the original sentence is similar in some
respects to the way in which an appropriately-constructed Prolog program may
be run ‘backwards’, deriving ‘data’ from ‘results’.
How is it possible to decompress the compressed code for the original sen-
tence by using information compression? How is the apparent paradox to be
resolved or explained? The answer is that when a code pattern such as ‘S 0
1 0 1 0 #S’ is introduced as New information, with the original grammar as
Old information, there is normally a small but usable amount of redundancy
between the New pattern and the Old patterns and it is the detection and ex-
traction of this small amount of redundancy that allows the system to construct
a multiple alignment that is the same as the original, except for the first row.
4As applied to multiple alignments and patterns, the words ‘bad’ and ‘good’ are shorthand
for “bad/good in terms of minimum length encoding principles and perhaps also in terms of
one’s intuitions about what is or is not an appropriate grammar for the data”. Quote marks
will be dropped in the remainder of the book.
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0 S 0 1 0 1 0 #S 0
| | | | | | |
1 S NP | | #NP V | #V NP | | #NP #S 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | | V 0 l o v e s #V | | | | 2
| | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | | N 0 g i r l #N | 3
| | | | | | | | |
4 | | | | NP D | #D N #N #NP 4
| | | | | | |
5 | | | | D 1 t h a t #D 5
| | | |
6 | D 0 t h i s #D | | 6
| | | | |
7 NP D #D N | #N #NP 7
| | |
8 N 1 b o y #N 8
Figure 3.5: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’
in New and the grammar from Figure 3.3 in Old.
If there was no detectable redundancy in the body of information represented
by the combination of the New pattern with the Old patterns, then that body
of information would be totally random and the process would not work.
Why should there be any redundancy between the code pattern and the Old
patterns? If the Old patterns were fully compressed and if the original sentence
were fully compressed in terms of the Old patterns then there should not be any
redundancy in the body of information represented by code pattern and the Old
patterns combined.
However, it is normally difficult to achieve such perfect compression. There
are normally approximations and inefficiencies which mean that compression is
less than perfect. And if the system is to be used in ‘reverse’—as in Figure
3.5—it is important that there should be residual redundancies to allow the
system to work.
Evaluation of alignments and the cost factor
If the multiple alignment shown in Figure 3.5 is evaluated using the method
described in Section 3.5 we arrive at a curious result: the code derived from
the multiple alignment contains no symbols and the value of BE calculated by
Equation 3.4 is 0!
At first sight, this is entirely reasonable. The original sentence was com-
pressed to produce the relatively small code ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’ and then, in the
process of retrieval, the residual redundancy is further reduced to zero. But
without any code from a multiple alignment like the one shown in Figure 3.5,
we have no record of the structure of the multiple alignment.
In the SP61 and SP70 models, a partial answer has been provided by the
provision of the ‘cost factor’ described in Section 3.5, above. This causes sym-
bols in the New pattern to behave as if they were relatively large chunks of
information, each with its own relatively small code. It is rather as if ‘S 0 1 ...’
had been converted into ‘Sentence nought one ...’ with corresponding patterns
added to Old such as ‘< S Sentence >’, ‘< 0 nought >’, ‘< 1 one >’, and ad-
justments to the original Old patterns so that ‘D 0 t h i s #D’ becomes ‘D < 0
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> t h i s #D’, and so on.
If the effective sizes of New symbols are boosted in this way, then it would
make sense for the multiple alignment in Figure 3.5 to yield ‘S 0 1 0 1 0 #S’ as
the code for the boosted version of that pattern in New. So far, there has been
no pressing need to make provision for this in the SP models but this would be
a relatively simple thing to do, if required.
Although there is not currently any particular need for the cost factor in
this connection, the facility has been retained in both models because there are
other situations where it is useful to be able to treat New symbols as if they
were relatively large chunks of information.
3.9 Outline of computer models
This section describes the SP61 model and the SP70 model in outline and the
next section describes SP61 in more detail. A full description of SP70 is given
in Chapter 9.
Outline of SP61
The SP61 model requires the user to supply a set of Old patterns and one New
pattern. After these have been read in, the model builds multiple alignments in
a pairwise manner, starting with the original patterns. At each stage, multiple
alignments that contain mismatches between Old patterns are rejected. This
means that each of the multiple alignments that are not rejected can be treated
as if it was a single sequence of symbols, as described in Section 3.4, above.
On each cycle, the operations are as follows:
1. Identify a set of ‘driving’ patterns and a set of ‘target’ patterns. On the
first cycle, the New pattern is the sole driving pattern and the Old patterns
are the target patterns. On all subsequent cycles, the best of the multiple
alignments formed so far (in terms of their CD scores) are chosen to be
driving patterns and the target patterns are the Old patterns together
with a larger selection of the best multiple alignments formed so far that
includes all of those that are driving patterns.
2. Compare each driving pattern with each of the target patterns to find full
matches and good partial matches between patterns. This is done with
a process that is essentially a form of ‘dynamic programming’ (see, for
example, Sankoff and Kruskall, 1983). A fairly full description of how the
process works is given in Appendix A.
3. From the best of the matches found in the current cycle, create corre-
sponding multiple alignments and add them to the repository of multiple
alignments created by the program.
This process of matching driving patterns against target patterns and build-
ing multiple alignments is repeated until no more multiple alignments can be
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found. The best of the multiple alignments created since the start of processing
are printed out and probabilities are calculated, as described in Section 3.7.
Outline of SP70
The SP70 model realises all elements of the SP system, as described in Section
3.2. Initially, the repository of Old patterns is empty and New contains a set of
patterns representing ‘raw’ data about the world.
The New patterns are processed one at a time in the following way:
1. Using the same processes as in SP61, a set of multiple alignments is built,
each one containing the current pattern from New and one or more pat-
terns from Old.
2. At the same time, the New pattern is transferred to Old and ID-symbols
are added to it. The transfer is done in such a way that the New pattern
can be aligned with itself with the restrictions described in Section 3.4.
3. From amongst the best multiple alignments formed, derive new patterns
as described below and add them to Old.
To clarify the last point, SP70 processes a multiple alignment like this:
0 t h e t a l l t r e e 0
| | | | | | |
1 < %1 0 t h e b i g t r e e > 1
to create Old patterns like these:
< %2 0 t h e >
< %3 0 t r e e >
< %4 0 b i g >
< %4 1 t a l l >
< %5 0 < %2 > < %4 > < %3 > >.
The first four of these patterns correspond to coherent substrings of matched
symbols or unmatched symbols in the multiple alignment, each substring with
ID-symbols that are added by the system. The last pattern is created by the
system to represent the sequence of substrings in the multiple alignment. Notice
that ‘b i g’ and ‘t a l l’ are alternatives in this sequence because they have the
same ‘class’ symbol (‘%4’).
Many of the good multiple alignments are not as tidy as the one just shown
and many of the patterns derived from those multiple alignments do not coincide
neatly with words or other ‘correct’ grammatical structures. However, SP70
continues to process all the patterns from New in this way and accumulates a
relatively large collection of Old patterns, some of them good and many of them
bad.
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At this stage, the program performs a heuristic search through the space of
possible subsets of the patterns in Old, aiming to discover subsets that min-
imise T in accordance with minimum length encoding principles as described in
Section 2.2. The best subset or the best few subsets may be retained and all
the other bad patterns may be discarded. It is envisaged that the program will
be developed so that New patterns are processed in batches, with a purging of
bad patterns at the end of each batch.
3.10 Detailed description of SP61
This section describes the SP61 model in more detail, starting with its overall
organisation.
Organisation of the SP61 model
Figure 3.6 presents a high-level view of the organisation of the SP61 model
using pseudocode while Figure 3.7 shows the compress() function within the
model. The text below describes how the model works together with details of
its organisation that are not included in the pseudocode.
SP61()
{
1 Read the ’New’ pattern and store it in New.
2 Read the set of ’Old’ patterns, each one with a frequency
of occurrence in a notional sample of the world.
Store the patterns with their frequencies in Old.
3 Derive a frequency for each symbol type in New and Old and
calculate a code size for each symbol type.
4 To each symbol in New and Old, assign the code size of its
symbol type. For each symbol in New, multiply the code
size by the ’cost factor’.
5 Select the New pattern and add it as the first
’driving pattern’ to an otherwise empty set of
driving patterns. Assign the Old patterns to
an initial set of ’target patterns’.
6 while (new multiple alignments are being formed)
COMPRESS()
7 Out of all the multiple alignments that have been formed,
print the ones with the best CDs. Calculate
and print relative probabilities of multiple alignments,
patterns and symbols.
}
Figure 3.6: A high level view of the organisation of the SP61 model.
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COMPRESS()
{
1 Clear the ’hit structure’ (described in the text).
2 while (there are driving patterns that have not yet been processed)
{
2.1 Select the first or next driving pattern in the set of
driving patterns.
2.2 while (there are more symbols in the current driving pattern)
{
2.2.1 Working left to right through the current driving
pattern, select the first or next symbol in the pattern.
2.2.2 ’Broadcast’ this symbol to make a yes/no match with
every symbol in the set of ’target patterns’.
2.2.3 Record each positive match (hit) in the hit structure.
As more symbols are broadcast, the hit structure builds
up a record of sequences of hits between the driving
pattern and the several target patterns. As each hit
sequence is extended, the compression score of the
corresponding multiple alignment is estimated using a
‘cheap to compute’ method of estimation.
2.2.4 If the space allocated for the hit structure is filled
at any time, the system ’purges’ the worst 50% of the
hit sequences from the hit structure to release more
space. The selection uses the estimates of compression
scores assigned to each hit sequence in Step 2.2.3.
}
}
3 For each hit sequences that has an estimated compression score above
some threshold value and which will ’project’ into a single
sequence (as described in the text), convert the hit sequence
into the corresponding multiple alignment. Discard this multiple alignment
if it is identical with any multiple alignment already in Old. Otherwise,
compute the CD value for the multiple alignment and its absolute probability.
If no new multiple alignments are formed, quit the COMPRESS() function.
4 Examine all the multiple alignments that have been created since the beginning
of processing and choose a subset of these multiple alignments using the
method described in the text. Discard all the multiple alignments that have
not been selected.
5 Clear the list of driving patterns and then, using the same method as
is used in 4 but (usually) with a more restrictive parameter,
select a subset of the multiple alignments chosen in 4 to be the new list
of driving patterns.
}
Figure 3.7: The organisation of the compress() function of the SP61 model.
Preliminary processing
Calculating the information cost of each symbol
Each pattern in Old has an associated frequency of occurrence in some domain.
In Step 3 of SP61() in Figure 3.6, the model derives the frequency of occurrence
of each symbol type as described in Appendix 3.5.
These frequencies are then used (in Step 3 of SP61()) to calculate the mini-
mum number of bits needed to represent each symbol type using the Shannon-
Fano-Elias coding scheme (see Cover and Thomas (1991)), as described in Sec-
tion 3.5. The resulting sizes for each symbol type are then assigned to the
corresponding symbols in New and Old. The code size of each symbol in New
is multiplied by the ‘cost factor’, as discussed in Section 3.8.
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Building the hit structure
The compress() function shown in Figure 3.7 is the heart of the SP61 model.
This subsection and the ones that follow supplement the description in the
figure.
As can be seen from the figure and the outline description in Section 3.9,
the compress() function is applied iteratively. On the first cycle, the ‘driving’
pattern is simply the New pattern. On subsequent cycles, the list of driving pat-
terns is a subset of the multiple alignments formed in preceding cycles. Iteration
stops when no new multiple alignments can be found that satisfy conditions de-
scribed below.
Fuzzy matching of one pattern with another
Step 2 of the compress() function is based on the central process in SP21. It
is a form of dynamic programming (Wagner and Fischer, 1974; Sankoff and
Kruskall, 1983) designed, like other dynamic programming algorithms, to find
full matches and good partial matches between one sequence of symbols and
another. This process, described in Appendix A and Wolff (1994a), has three
main advantages compared with ‘standard’ forms of dynamic programming:
• It can match arbitrarily long sequences without excessive demands on
memory.
• For any two sequences, it can find a set of alternative matches (each with
a measure of how good it is) instead of a single ‘best’ match.
• The ‘depth’ or thoroughness of the searching can be controlled by param-
eters.
Taking the driving patterns one by one, the process ‘broadcasts’ each symbol
in each driving pattern to make a ‘same’ or ‘different’ match with each symbol
in the set of target patterns. Single hits and sequences of hits are recorded in
a hit structure. Each hit sequence represents a multiple alignment between the
driving pattern and one of the target patterns.
As is described in Appendix A and Wolff (1994a), the hit structure has the
form of a list-processing tree with each node representing a hit and each path
from the root to a leaf node representing a hit sequence.
No one instance of a symbol should ever be matched with itself
Since any driving pattern can also be a target pattern, any one pattern may be
aligned with itself. That being so, a check is made to ensure that no instance
of a symbol is ever matched against itself (Section 3.4).
Since any symbol in the driving pattern and any symbol in the target pattern
may have been derived by the unification of two or more other symbols, a check
is also made to exclude all hits where the set of symbols from which one of
the hit symbols was derived has one or more symbols in common with the set
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of symbols from which the other hit symbol was derived. In short, while any
given pattern from the grammar may appear two or more times in one multiple
alignment, no symbol in any of the original patterns in Old ever appears in the
same column as itself in any multiple alignment.
The order of symbols in new must be preserved
As the matching process has been described so far, it would be entirely possible
for the system to align a pattern like ‘NP D 1 t h a t #D N 1 g i r l #N #NP’ in
the example considered in Section 3.4, with the first ‘NP #NP’ in the ‘sentence
pattern, ‘S NP #NP V 0 l o v e s #V NP #NP #S’, and to align ‘NP D 0 t
h i s #D N 0 b o y #D #NP’ with the second ‘NP #NP’ in that pattern. To
avoid the formation of multiple alignments like this which violate the order of
the symbols in New, the system makes checks to ensure that, at all stages, the
order of the symbols in New is honoured.
Estimation of compression scores
While the hit structure is being built, the compression score for the multiple
alignment corresponding to each hit sequence may be calculated at every stage
but only at the cost of a lot of processing which would slow the model down.
Consequently, a simple method of estimating the compression score is used in
Step 2.2.3 of Figure 3.7 which is computationally ‘cheap’. Although it gives
results that do not correspond exactly with the values calculated using the
method described in Section 3.5, the differences appear not to be critical for
the purposes of purging the hit structure (Step 2.2.4 in Figure 3.7 and Section
3.10) or determining the threshold for converting hit sequences into multiple
alignments (Step 3 in Figure 3.7 and Section 3.10).
Purging the hit structure
If the space allocated to the hit structure is exhausted at any time, the hit struc-
ture is ‘purged’ or, more literally, ‘pruned’ to remove branches corresponding to
the worst 50% of the hit sequences (where the meaning of ‘worst’ is determined
using the estimates of compression scores calculated in Step 2.2.3 of the com-
press() function). In this way, space is released in which new sequences of hits
can be stored.
Building, scoring and selecting alignments
Building alignments and scoring them
When the hit structure for a set of driving patterns has been built, the best hit
sequences are converted into the corresponding multiple alignments, excluding
all multiple alignments which will not ‘project’ on to a single sequence (as
described in Section 3.9).
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The process of converting a hit sequence into a multiple alignment achieves
two things: it creates a one-dimensional sequence of symbols which is a unifi-
cation of the driving pattern or patterns with the target pattern and it creates
a list structure in two dimensions representing the multiple alignment itself.
For each multiple alignment, the structure occupies a portion of memory of ex-
actly the right size, allocated dynamically at the time the multiple alignment is
formed.
The one-dimensional sequence may enter into matching and unification in
later iterations of the compress() function, while the two-dimensional list struc-
ture allows the full structure of the multiple alignment to be seen. This structure
can be used in later checks to ensure that no instance of a symbol is ever matched
with itself (Section 3.10) and to ensure that the order of symbols in New is not
violated (Section 3.10).
From time to time, identical multiple alignments are formed via different
routes. The program checks each of the newly-formed multiple alignments
against multiple alignments already formed. Any multiple alignment which
duplicates one already formed is discarded. The process of comparing multiple
alignments is indifferent to the order (from top to bottom) in which patterns
appear in the multiple alignment (cf. Section 3.4, above).
Every new multiple alignment which survives the several hurdles is added
to a store of multiple alignments and its CD score is computed as described in
Section 3.5.
Selection of alignments: a quota for each hit symbol in New
Apart from purging the hit structure when space is exhausted, the main way in
which the SP61 model narrows its search space is a two-fold selection of multiple
alignments at the end of every cycle of the compress() function:
• The program examines the multiple alignments created since the start of
processing and selects a subset by a method to be described. All the other
multiple alignments are discarded.
• Using the same method, the program selects a subset of the remaining
multiple alignments to be used as driving patterns on the next cycle.
These multiple alignments also function as target patterns.
At first sight it seems natural to select multiple alignments purely on the
basis of their compression scores. However, it can easily happen that, at inter-
mediate stages in processing, the best multiple alignments are trivial variations
of each other and involve the same subset of the symbols from New. If selection
is made by choosing multiple alignments with a CD above a certain threshold,
the multiple alignments which are chosen may all involve the same subset of
the symbols in New, while other multiple alignments, containing symbols from
other parts of New, may be lost. If this happens, the model cannot ever build
a multiple alignment which contains all or most the symbols in New and may
thus never find the ‘correct’ answer.
CHAPTER 3. THE SP THEORY 89
A solution to this problem which seems to work well is to make selections
in relation to the symbols in New which appear in the multiple alignments.
Each symbol in New is assigned a quota (the same for all symbols) and, for
each symbol, the best multiple alignments up to the quota are identified. Any
multiple alignment which appears in one or more of the quotas is preserved.
All other multiple alignments are purged. The merit of this technique is that
it can ‘protect’ any multiple alignment which is the best multiple alignment for
a given subsequence of the symbols in New (or is second or third best etc) but
which may, nevertheless, have a relatively low CD compared with other multiple
alignments in Old.
Processing New in stages
A feature of the SP61 model that has been omitted from Figure 3.6 (to avoid
clutter) is that New may be divided into ‘windows’ of any fixed size (determined
by the user) and the model can be set to process New in stages, one window
at a time, from left to right. This feature of the model was introduced for two
reasons:
• It seems to bring the model closer to the way people seem to operate,
processing sentences stage by stage as they are heard or read, not waiting
until the whole of a sentence has been seen before attempting to analyse
it.
• Since it is possible to discard all but the best intermediate results at
the end of each window, this mode of processing has the advantage of
reducing peak demands for storage of information and it also has the
effect of reducing the size of the search space.
Calculation of probabilities
As indicated in Figure 3.7 (step 3), SP61 calculates an absolute probability
for each multiple alignment; the method of calculation is described in Section
3.7. When no more multiple alignments can be found, the program derives a
reference set of best multiple alignments and calculates relative probabilities
and probabilities for symbols and patterns as described in Sections 3.7 and 3.7
(step 7 of Figure 3.6).
Computational complexity
Given that many of the examples in this book are fairly small, and given the
well-known computational demands of multiple alignment problems, readers
may reasonably ask whether the SP61 model (and the SP70 model) would scale
up to handle realistically large amounts of knowledge. This section considers
the time complexity and space complexity of the SP61 model and Section 9.3
considers the same aspects of the SP70 model.
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Matching patterns
The critical operation at the heart of the SP61 model is the process of com-
paring one pattern with another to find full matches and good partial matches
(Appendix A). As described in Section A.4, the time complexity of this process
in a serial processing environment is estimated to be O(n ·m), where n is the
number of symbols in one pattern and m is the number of symbols in the other.
In a parallel processing environment, the time complexity may approach O(n),
depending on how well the parallelism is applied. In serial or parallel processing
environments, the space complexity is estimated to be O(m).
It appears that the big O values just given will also apply when a set of one
or more patterns is to be compared with another set of one or more patterns. In
this case, n is the number of symbols in the first set and m is the total number
of symbols in the second.
The complete process
In SP61, multiple alignments are built by pairwise alignment of patterns and
multiple alignments. The number of such pairings required to build a multiple
alignment for a whole sentence appears to be approximately:
P = log2(sN/c), (3.10)
where sN is the number of symbols in the New pattern and c is a constant.
At any given stage of processing, the value of n is the total number of symbols
in the driving patterns and the value of m is:
m = sO + sA, (3.11)
where sO is the total number of symbols in the Old patterns and sA is the total
number of symbols in the repository of multiple alignments, assuming that each
multiple alignment is treated as a single sequence of symbols.
The values of n and m for successive pairings will both vary as processing
proceeds. At the beginning, when the New pattern is the sole driving pattern,
n = sN , but the value of n will increase at later stages when there are two or
more driving patterns. Likewise, the value of m will increase when multiple
alignments have been created, with a corresponding increase in sA. However,
the selection process described in Section 3.10 ensures that, after the initial
growth, the sizes of n and m will remain relatively constant. It is true that
multiple alignments in the later stages are longer than in the early stages but
there are fewer of them. For the purpose of assessing computational complexity,
it seems reasonable to assume that variations in the sizes of n and m from the
start to finish of processing will be approximately constant and can therefore
be discounted.
Overall, the time complexity of SP61 in a serial processing environment
should be approximately O(log2 sN ×sNsO), where, as before, sN is the number
of symbols in the New pattern and sO is the total number of symbols in the
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patterns in Old. In a parallel processing environment, the time complexity
may approach O(log2 sN × sN ), depending on how well the parallel processing
is applied. The space complexity in serial or parallel environments should be
O(sO).
For most applications, there will normally be a relatively small maximum
value of sN . If we regard this as a constant, then the value of sN may be
discounted. Accordingly, the time complexity of SP61 in a serial processing
environment will be O(sO) and its time complexity in a parallel processing
environment may approach O(1). The space complexity will be unchanged as
O(sO).
In summary, the time complexity of SP61 in serial and parallel processing
environments is polynomial and well within acceptable limits.
The use of angle brackets in Old patterns
An aspect of SP61 that has not so far been mentioned is that, if angle brackets
(‘<’ and ‘>’)are used in any of the Old patterns supplied to the model, they are
always treated as ID-symbols and, more importantly, the model is constrained
to accept only ‘legal’ matches between brackets—meaning that, if two left angle
brackets have been matched then their corresponding right angle brackets must
be matched, and vice versa.
Without this constraint, the program can waste a lot of time forming multiple
alignments that will not ultimately yield economical encodings of New. The
constraint may be justified on the grounds that, in the fully-developed SP system
(and the SP70 model), angle brackets (with other ID-symbols) are supplied by
the system as part of the process of encoding raw data so there is no need to
consider possible multiple alignments that are not consistent with that encoding.
When angle brackets are used in Old patterns, this constraint speeds up
processing. But, given the current design of the hit structure and the way it is
updated, the application of the constraint consumes computational resources.
This means that the program runs even faster if knowledge is represented in the
style shown in Figure 3.3 (a) and angle brackets are not used at all.
Searching and constraints in SP61
So far, SP61 has been described in relatively concrete terms without much
reference to the way it realises the principles of search and constraint described
earlier in Sections 2.2 and 3.4.
Searching in the model is embodied in the way it matches patterns (Appendix
A and step 2 of the compress() function in Figure 3.7) and builds alternative
multiple alignments (step 3 of Figure 3.7).
Heuristic constraints are applied as follows:
• If the memory available for the hit structure is filled at any time, hit
sequences are sorted by their compression score and the worst 50% are
discarded thus making space for more hit sequences (Step 2.2.4 in Figure
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3.7 and Section 3.10). This purging of memory, which may be repeated
many times as the program runs, is a simple but effective way of pruning
away large parts of the search space.
The amount of memory available for storing the hit structure can be set as
a parameter for the program. If the amount of memory available is small,
the program will normally run faster but it may fail to find some good
alignments of patterns. With more memory available, a ‘deeper’ search
can be performed but this normally takes more time.
• In Step 4 of the compress() function, a selection of the multiple alignments
formed since the start of processing are chosen to be target patterns for
the next cycle, as described in Section 3.10. The size of the quota for
target patterns (described in Section 3.10) is set as a parameter to the
program. It is normally about 10 or 20.
• In Step 5, a subset of the multiple alignments chosen in Step 4 are selected
by the same method as driving patterns for the next cycle. The size of
the quota for driving patterns is set as a parameter to the program and it
is normally about 3 or 5.
Absolute constraints that always operate in the model are these:
• As described in Section 3.10, the matching of angle brackets must be ‘le-
gal’. Multiple alignments containing angle brackets that are not matched
correctly are discarded.
• All multiple alignments containing mismatches between Old patterns are
always discarded (Section 3.4).
Absolute constraints that may be applied optionally are these:
• As described in Section 3.10, it is possible to process the New pattern in
a succession of windows. This reduces the range of alternative alignments
that need to be considered at any one time. The size of the window may
be set as a parameter to the program. Normally, this value is set to be
large so that the New pattern is processed in a single window.
• It is possible to limit the size of any unmatched gap between two hit
symbols in a New pattern, and to set similar maxima for unmatched gaps
in Old patterns, driving patterns and target patterns. These parameters
of the program are almost always set to be very large so that, in effect,
there is no constraint at all.
• With certain combinations of New and Old patterns, compression scores
for multiple alignments may rise to a maximum as processing proceeds
and then gradually fall while the program continues to produce multiple
alignments that are worse than ones that it has already created. In cases
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like this, it is convenient to set a maximum of about 5 or 10 for the num-
ber of cycles of the compress() function that produce multiple alignments
with compression scores that are lower than those of the best multiple
alignments produced since the program was started.
• With certain kinds of application, the program may be constrained so that
ID-symbols are only ever matched with C-symbols and vice versa. This
can speed up processing but it does not normally make any difference to
the final ‘best’ multiple alignments delivered by the program.
• There is a limit to the number of multiple alignments produced on any
one cycle of the compress() function. Normally, this parameter is given a
high value so that, in effect, there is no limit at all.
3.11 Conclusion
This completes the description of the SP system, except for the description
of how the system has been developed for unsupervised learning, described in
Chapter 9. Apart from that chapter, most of the examples and discussion in
this book will relate to the SP system as it has been realised in the SP61 model.
Chapter 4
The SP Theory as a Theory
of Computing1
4.1 Introduction
The nature of ‘computing’ was the focus of much interest in the 1930s and
early ’40s but, since then, it has been widely accepted that the essentials of this
concept have been captured in Alan Turing’s ‘Universal Turing Machine’ Turing
(1936) and that other models of computing (such as ‘Lambda Calculus’ (Church
and Kleene, see Rosser (1984)), ‘Recursive Function’ (Kleene, 1936), ‘Normal
Algorithm’ (Markov and Nagorny, 1988) and Post’s ‘Canonical System’ (Post,
1943)) are equivalent.
In this chapter I will show that the operation of a Post canonical system—
and, consequently, the operation of a universal Turing machine—may be in-
terpreted within the SP system, and I will argue that the SP theory is not
merely another variant on ideas that were developed 60 or more years ago but
that it provides new insights into the nature of computing and artificial intel-
ligence, and new opportunities for rationalisation and integration in the design
of computing systems.
In what follows, Section 4.2 describes, briefly, the concept of a universal
Turing machine and, more fully, the equivalent concept of a Post canonical
system; Section 4.3 shows how the operation of a Post canonical system may
be modelled within the SP system; and Section 4.4 discusses the relationship
between the SP theory and earlier models of computing, the scope of the theory,
and its implications for the design of practical computing systems.
1Based on Wolff (1999a).
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4.2 Universal Turing machine and Post
canonical system
In its standard form, a universal Turing machine comprises a ‘tape’ on which
symbols may appear in sequence, a ‘read-write head’ and a ‘transition function’
(Turing, 1936). In each of a sequence of steps, a symbol is read from the tape
at the current position of the head and then, depending on that symbol, on the
transition function and the current ‘state’ of the head, a new symbol is written
on the tape, the state of the head is changed, and the head moves one position
left or right.
A more detailed description of universal Turing machines is not needed here
because the arguments to be presented take advantage of the fact (Minsky,
1967, chapters 10 to 14) that the operation of any universal Turing machine
can be modelled with a Post canonical system (Post, 1943). In this section, I
shall describe the workings of a Post canonical system and then, in Section 4.3,
I shall try to show how the operation of a Post canonical system, and thus a
universal Turing machine, may be understood in terms of the SP theory.
The structure of a Post canonical system
A Post canonical system comprises:
• An alphabet of primitive symbols (‘letters’ in Post’s terminology),
• One or more primitive assertions or axioms. These can often be regarded
as ‘input’.
• One or more productions which can often be regarded as a ‘program’.
• Although this is not normally included in formal definitions of the Post
canonical system concept, it is clear from how the system is intended to
work (see Section 4.2 below), that the Post canonical system also includes
mechanisms for matching patterns and for searching for matches between
leading substrings in the input pattern and the left-hand ends of the pro-
ductions.
Each production has this general form:2
g0 $1 g1 $2 ... $n gn → h0 $
′
1 h1 $
′
2 ... $
′
m hm
where “Each gi and hi is a certain fixed string; g0 and gn are often null, and
some of the h’s can be null. Each $i is an ‘arbitrary’ or ‘variable’ string, which
can be null. Each $′i is to be replaced by a certain one of the $i.” (Minsky,
1967, pp. 230–231).
2Spaces between symbols here and in other examples have been inserted for the sake of
readability and because it allows us to use atomic symbols where each one comprises a string
of two or more characters (with spaces showing the start and finish of each string). Otherwise,
spaces may be ignored.
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In its simplest ‘normal’ form, a Post canonical system has one primitive
assertion and each production has the form:
g $→ $ h
where g and h each represent a string of zero or more symbols, and both in-
stances of ‘$’ represent a single ‘variable’ which may have a ‘value’ comprising
a string of zero or more symbols.
It has been proved (Post, 1943) that any kind of Post canonical system can
be reduced to a Post canonical system in normal form (see also chapter 13 in
Minsky, 1967). That being so, a Post canonical system in this form will be the
main (but not exclusive) focus of our attention.
How the Post canonical system works
When a Post canonical system (in normal form) processes an ‘input’ string, the
first step is to find a match between that string and the left-hand side of one
of the productions in the given set. The input string matches the left hand
side of a production if a match can be found between leading symbols of the
input string and the fixed string (if any) at the start of that left-hand side, with
the assignment of any trailing substring within the input string to the variable
within the left-hand side of the production.
Consider, for example, a Post canonical system comprising the alphabet ‘a
... z’, an axiom or input string ‘a b c b t’, and productions in normal form like
this:
a $ → $ a
b $ → $ b
c $ → $ c
In this example, the first symbol of the input string matches the first symbol
in the first production, while the trailing ‘b c b t’ is considered to match the
variable which takes that string as its value. The result of a successful match like
this is that a new string is created in accordance with the configuration on the
right hand side of the production which has been matched. In the example, the
new string would have the form ‘b c b t a’, derived from ‘b c b t’ in the variable
and ‘a’ which follows the variable on the right hand side of the production.
After the first step, the new string is treated as new input which is processed
in exactly the same way as before. In this example, the first symbol of ‘b c d
t a’ matches the first symbol of the second production, the variable in that
production takes ‘c d t a’ as its value and the result is the string ‘c b t a b’.
This cycle is repeated until matching fails. It should be clear from this
example that the effect would be to ‘rotate’ the original string until it has the
form ‘t a b c b’. The ‘t’ which was at the end of the string when processing
started has been brought round to the front of the string. This is an example of
the “rotation trick” used by (Minsky, 1967, Chapter 13) in demonstrating how
CHAPTER 4. THE SP THEORY AS A THEORY OF COMPUTING 97
a Post canonical system in normal form can model any kind of Post canonical
system.
With some combinations of alphabet, input and productions, the process of
matching strings to productions never terminates. With some combinations of
alphabet, input and productions, the system may follow two or more ‘paths’
to two or more different ‘conclusions’ or may reach a given conclusion by two
or more different routes. The ‘output’ of the computation is the set of strings
created as the process proceeds.
Other examples
For readers unfamiliar with this kind of system, two other examples are included
here to show more clearly how a Post canonical system may achieve ‘computing’.
These examples are based on examples in (Minsky, 1967, Chapter 12). Other
examples may be found in the same chapter.
Creation and recognition of numbers in unary notation
In the unary number system, 0 = 0, 1 = 01, 2 = 011, 3 = 0111, and so on.
The nature of the unary number system can be described with a Post canonical
system like this:
• Alphabet: the symbols 0 and 1.
• Axiom: 0.
• Production: If any string ‘$’ is a number, then so is the string ‘$ 1’. This
can be expressed with the production:
$→ $ 1
It should be clear from the description of how Post canonical systems work,
above, that this Post canonical system is recursive and that it can be used to
create the infinite series of unary strings: ‘0’, ‘0 1’, ‘0 1 1’, ‘0 1 1 1’, ‘0 1 1 1 1’
etc, as far as resources allow.
Slightly less obviously, the Post canonical system can also be used to recog-
nise a string of symbols as being an example of a unary number. This is done
by using the production in ‘reverse’, matching a character string to the right
hand side of the production, taking the left hand side as the ‘output’ and then
repeating the right-to-left process until only the axiom will match.
Creation and recognition of palindromes
To quote Minsky (1967, p. 228): “The ‘palindromes’ are the strings that read
the same backwards and forwards, like cabac or abcbbcba. Clearly, if we have a
string that is already a palindrome, it will remain so if we add the same letter to
the beginning and end. Also, clearly, we can obtain all palindromes by building
in this way out from the middle.” Here is his example:
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• Alphabet: a, b, c.
• Axioms: a, b, c, aa, bb, cc.
• Productions:
$ → a $ a
$ → b $ b
$ → c $ b
Although this example is not in normal form, it should be clear how it
generates all the palindromes for the given alphabet.3 As with the previous
example, this Post canonical system may be used to produce a palindrome and
it may also be used to recognise whether or not a string of characters is a
palindrome by using the productions in ‘reverse’.
4.3 SP and the operation of a Post canonical
system
It is not hard to see that a successful match between a leading substring in an
input string and the leading substring in a Post canonical system production
may be interpreted in terms of the alignment and unification of patterns, as
described in Chapter 3. What is less obvious is how concepts of alignment and
unification might be applied to the processes of matching a trailing string of
symbols to the variable, assigning it as a value to the variable and incorporating
it in an output string.
Modelling one step of the ‘rotation trick’
In the SP system, the first Post canonical system described above (for the
‘rotation’ of a string) may be modelled using the patterns shown in Figure 4.1.
Regarding these patterns:
• The one under the heading ‘New’ corresponds to the axiom or ‘input’ in
the Post canonical system.
• The four patterns on the left under the heading ‘Old’ may be seen as a
representation of the Post canonical system alphabet.
• The first three patterns on the right correspond to the three productions
of the Post canonical system. As we shall see, the pair of symbols, ‘X #X’,
in each pattern function as if they were a ‘variable’. There is no rewrite
arrow (‘→’) and only one instance of the ‘variable’.
3Here and elsewhere in this book, the word generate will normally be used in its ‘linguistic’
sense to mean “define precisely” rather than “create” or “produce”. A generative definition
is or should be neutral between the production or recognition of patterns of symbols.
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New
a b c b t
Old
L a #L P a X #X a #P
L b #L P b X #X b #P
L c #L P c X #X c #P
L t #L X L #L X #X #X
Figure 4.1: SP patterns modelling the first example of a Post canonical system
described in Section 4.2. An interpretation of these patterns is given in the text.
• As we shall see, the last pattern on the right (‘X L #L X #X #X’) is, in
effect, a recursive definition of the concept of ‘any string of the letters in
the given alphabet’. This is comparable with the production shown in the
example in Section 4.2 which expresses the recursive nature of the unary
number system. It is, in effect, a ‘type definition’ for the variable defining
the infinite set of alternative strings (composed from the given alphabet)
which the variable may take.4
In accordance with what was said about symbols in Section 3.3, none of the
symbols in Figure 4.1 have any ‘hidden’ meaning. In particular, the symbols ‘X’,
‘#X’, ‘L’, ‘#L’, ‘P’ and ‘#P’ (which may be described, informally, as ‘service’
symbols) have exactly the same formal status as other symbols (‘a’, ‘b’ etc) and
enter into matching and unification in the same way.
One step
Figure 4.2 shows the best multiple alignment (in terms of information compres-
sion) found by SP61 with the ‘input’ pattern in New and the other patterns in
Old. In the figure, the repeated appearances of the pattern ‘X L #L X #X #X’
represent a single instance of that pattern in accordance with the generalisation
of the multiple alignment problem described in Section 3.4. The same is true of
the two appearances of the pattern ‘L b #L’.
Unification of the matching symbols in Figure 4.2 has the effect of ‘project-
ing’ the multiple alignment into a single sequence, thus:
P a X L b #L X L c #L X L b #L X L t #L X #X #X #X #X #X a #P.
Notwithstanding the interpolation of instances of ‘service’ symbols like ‘P’, ‘X’,
‘L’, ‘#L’ etc, this sequence contains the subsequence ‘a b c b t’ corresponding
to the ‘input’ and also the subsequence ‘b c b t a’ corresponding to the ‘output’
of the first step of our first example of a Post canonical system.
4Readers will note that the pattern ‘X L #L X #X #X’ contains two ‘variables’: the pair
of symbols ‘X #X’, already considered, and also the pair of symbols ‘L #L’ which can take
any of ‘a’, ‘b’ or ‘c’ as its ‘value’.
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0 a b c b t 0
| | | | |
1 P a X | | | | #X a #P 1
| | | | | |
2 X L | #L X | | | #X #X 2
| | | | | | | |
3 L b #L | | | | | 3
| | | | |
4 X L | #L X | | #X #X 4
| | | | | | |
5 L c #L | | | | 5
| | | |
6 X L | #L X | #X #X 6
| | | | | |
7 L b #L | | | 7
| | |
8 X L | #L X #X #X 8
| | |
9 L t #L 9
Figure 4.2: The best multiple alignment (in terms of information compression)
found by SP61 using the patterns shown in Figure 4.1 as described in the text.
In this example, the subsequence ‘b c b t’ corresponding to the contents of
the ‘variable’ is shared by the input and the output thus removing the need for
the rewrite arrow in the Post canonical system. An analogy for this idea is the
way Welsh and English are sometimes conflated in bilingual signs in Wales. The
phrase ‘Cyngor Gwynedd’ in Welsh means ‘Gwynedd Council’ in English. So it
is natural, in bilingual signs put up by Gwynedd Council, to represent both the
Welsh and the English forms of the name using the words ‘Cyngor Gwynedd
Council’. In this example, the word ‘Gwynedd’ serves both the Welsh version
of the name and the English version in much the same manner that, in our
example above, the contents of the variable serves both the input string and the
output string.
Repetition of steps
The second and subsequent steps may proceed in the same way. At the end of
each step, we may suppose that the ‘service’ symbols are stripped out and the
sequence from the contents of the ‘variable’ onwards is presented to the system
again as New. When ‘t’ reaches the front of the string, there is no production
with a leading ‘t’ which means that New at that stage cannot be fully matched.
In this example, this may be taken as a signal that the rotation is complete.
In Minsky’s example (which takes too much space to reproduce here), the
presence at the beginning of the string of ‘T1’ (which may be equated with ‘t’
in our example) causes other productions to ‘fire’, leading the processing into
other paths.
CHAPTER 4. THE SP THEORY AS A THEORY OF COMPUTING 101
New
0 (Other options for New are described in the text)
Old
X a 0 #X
X b X #X 1 #X
Figure 4.3: SP patterns corresponding to a Post canonical system for the cre-
ation or recognition of unary numbers (Section 4.2).
Other examples
This subsection shows how the second and third examples of a Post canonical
system which were described above may be modelled by the SP system.
Unary numbers and the SP system
Figure 4.3 shows a New pattern and two Old patterns to model the example of a
Post canonical system for the creation or recognition of unary numbers (Section
4.2, above).
The New pattern corresponds to the axiom in the Post canonical system
while the pattern ‘X b X #X 1 #X’ is equivalent to the production. The pattern
‘X a 0 #X’ represents the number ‘0’ corresponding to ‘0’ in the alphabet of
the Post canonical system (‘1’ is implicit in ‘X b X #X 1 #X’). Incidentally, ‘a’
and ‘b’ in the two Old patterns are needed merely to accommodate the scoring
system in SP61 and may otherwise be ignored.
The pair of symbols ‘X #X’ in the pattern ‘X b X #X 1 #X’ may be read
as “any unary number” and the whole pattern may be read as “a unary number
is any unary number followed by ‘1”’, a recursive description much like the
production ‘$→ $ 1’.
Given the pattern ‘0’ in New and the other two patterns in Old, SP61 creates
a succession of good multiple alignments, one example of which is shown in
Figure 4.4 (a). If it is not stopped, the program will continue producing multiple
alignments like this until the memory of the machine is exhausted.
If we project the multiple alignment in Figure 4.4 (a) into a single sequence
and then ignore the ‘service’ symbols (‘a’, ‘b’, ‘X’ and ‘#X’), we can see that
the system has, in effect, generated the unary number ‘0 1 1 1 1’. We can see
from this example how the multiple alignment has captured the recursive nature
of the unary number definition.
Figure 4.4 (b) shows the best multiple alignment produced by SP61 when
‘0’ in New is replaced by the ‘axiom’ or ‘input’ string ‘0 1 1 1 1’. This multi-
ple alignment is, in effect, a recognition of the fact that ‘0 1 1 1 1’ is a unary
number. It corresponds to the way a Post canonical system may be run ‘back-
wards’ to recognise input patterns but, since there is no left-to-right arrow in the
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0 0 0
|
1 X a 0 #X 1
| |
2 X b X #X 1 #X 2
| |
3 X b X #X 1 #X 3
| |
4 X b X #X 1 #X 4
| |
5 X b X #X 1 #X 5
(a)
0 0 1 1 1 1 0
| | | | |
1 X a 0 #X | | | | 1
| | | | | |
2 X b X #X 1 #X | | | 2
| | | | |
3 X b X #X 1 #X | | 3
| | | |
4 X b X #X 1 #X | 4
| | |
5 X b X #X 1 #X 5
(b)
Figure 4.4: (a) One of many good multiple alignments produced by SP61 with
the pattern ‘0’ in New and the ‘Old’ patterns from Figure 4.3 in Old. (b) The
best multiple alignment produced by SP61 with ‘0 1 1 1 1’ in New and the same
patterns in Old.
SP scheme, the notion of ‘backwards’ processing does not apply. Other unary
numbers may be recognised in a similar way.
Palindromes and the SP system
Figure 4.5 shows patterns that may be used with SP61 to model the Post canon-
ical system described in Section 4.2. The first six patterns in Old may be seen
as analogues of the six axioms in the Post canonical system. The last pattern in
Old expresses the recursive nature of palindromes. The pattern above it serves
to link the single letter patterns (the first three in Old) to the recursive pattern.
Figure 4.6 shows the best multiple alignment produced by SP61 with ‘a c b
a b a b c a’ in New and, in Old, the patterns under the heading ‘Old’ in Figure
4.5. The multiple alignment may be seen as a recognition that the pattern in
New is indeed a palindrome. Other palindromes (using the same alphabet) may
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New
a c b a b a b c a
(Other options for New are described in the text)
Old
L a #L
L b #L
L c #L
L1 a #L1 L2 a #L2
L1 b #L1 L2 b #L2
L1 c #L1 L2 c #L2
X L #L #X
X L1 #L1 X #X L2 #L2 #X
Figure 4.5: Patterns for processing by SP61 to model a Post canonical system
to produce or recognise palindromes (Section 4.2).
be recognised in a similar way.
As with the example of unary numbers, the same patterns from Old may be
used to generate palindromes. In this case, some kind of ‘seed’ is required in
New like a single letter (‘a’, ‘b’ or ‘c’) or a pair of letters (‘a a’, ‘b b’ or ‘c c’).
Given one of these ‘seeds’ in New, the system can generate palindromes until
the memory of the machine is exhausted.
Readers may wonder whether the patterns from Old in Figure 4.5 might be
simplified. Would it not be possible to substitute ‘X a #X’ for ‘L a #L’ (and
likewise for the other single letter ‘axioms’) and to replace ‘L1 a #L1 L2 a #L2’
with ‘X a X #X a #X’ (and likewise for the other pairs) and then remove ‘X L
#L #X’ and ‘X L1 #L1 X #X L2 #L2 #X’? This is possible but the penalty
is that, for reasons that would take too much space to explain, searching for the
best multiple alignments takes very much longer and leads along many more
‘false trails’.
4.4 Discussion
Section 4.3 has described, with examples, how the operation of a Post canonical
system in normal form may be understood in terms of the SP theory. Since it
is known that any Post canonical system may be modelled by a Post canoni-
cal system in normal form (Post (1943), Minsky (1967), Chapter 13), we may
conclude that the operation of any Post canonical system may be interpreted in
terms of the SP theory. Since we also know that any universal Turing machine
may be modelled by a Post canonical system (Minsky, 1967, Chapter 14) we
may also conclude that the operation of any universal Turing machine may be
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0 a c b a b a b c a 0
| | | | | | | | |
1 | | | L1 a #L1 | L2 a #L2 | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | X L1 #L1 X | #X L2 #L2 #X | | | 2
| | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | L1 b #L1 | | | | | L2 b #L2 | | 3
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
4 | | X L1 #L1 X | | | #X L2 #L2 #X | | 4
| | | | | | | | |
5 | L1 c #L1 | | | | | L2 c #L2 | 5
| | | | | | | | | | |
6 | X L1 #L1 X | | | #X L2 #L2 #X | 6
| | | | | | |
7 L1 a #L1 | | | | | L2 a #L2 7
| | | | | | | | |
8 X L1 #L1 X | | | #X L2 #L2 #X 8
| | |
9 | L b #L | 9
| | | |
10 X L #L #X 10
Figure 4.6: The best multiple alignment (in terms of compression) produced
by SP61 with the patterns from Figure 4.5 in New and Old, as shown in that
figure.
interpreted in terms of the SP theory.
What then is the relationship between the SP theory and earlier models of
computing—the universal Turing machine, Post canonical system, lamda cal-
culus and others? Is the SP theory subject to the same limitations as earlier
models? What are the implications for the design of practical computing sys-
tems? These and related questions are discussed in the subsections that follow.
In this discussion, earlier models of computing will be referred to collectively as
the ‘universal Turing machine’ since they are known to be equivalent to each
other, and the universal Turing machine is the best known of those models.
The SP theory in relation to earlier models of computing
A slightly inaccurate view of the relationship between the SP theory and the
universal Turing machine is that:
SP = universal Turing machine + X,
where ‘X’ is software that makes the universal Turing machine behave like an
SP system. If a conventional computer is seen as being roughly equivalent to
a universal Turing machine, then ‘SP = universal Turing machine + X’ is a
description of the SP61 and SP70 models of the SP system.
These models have been constructed in that way because, with current tech-
nology, this is the only practical option for creating working models. However,
the SP theory itself—distinct from the SP models—is a new theory of com-
puting that is built from foundations that are different from any of the earlier
theories. None of those theories are incorporated within the SP theory. Con-
cepts such as the matching and unification of patterns, and the SP version of
multiple alignment, are bedrock in the SP theory whereas such concepts are, at
best, only implicit in the other theories. Perhaps more importantly, information
compression and minimum length encoding principles are fundamental in the
SP theory but these concepts have no counterpart in any of the earlier theories.
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While it may be accepted that the SP theory is indeed different from any
earlier theory of computing, a sceptic may object that the theory is merely
another variant on ideas that were developed 60 or more years ago and that
it contributes nothing to our understanding that had not already been learned
from earlier theories.
In answer to this possible objection, a key difference between the SP theory
and earlier theories is that the former has a lot to say about the nature of
intelligence (Chapters 5 to 9), and it provides a novel interpretation for a range
of concepts in logic and mathematics (Chapter 10), while the universal Turing
machine is largely silent in these areas. Notwithstanding Alan Turing’s own
vision of the possibility of artificial intelligence (Turing, 1950), a ‘raw’ universal
Turing machine, without any software, can do very little.
It may be argued that, while a universal Turing machine is not intelligent
in itself, it can be programmed to behave intelligently. But a universal Turing
machine that has been programmed is not a universal Turing machine! The
addition of software to a universal Turing machine makes it into a new and
different system:
SP = universal Turing machine + Y,
where ‘Y’ is non-SP software needed to make the universal Turing machine
behave with the same kind of intelligence as an SP system. If this point is
accepted, the further question arises: “Is there anything to choose between the
SP theory and ‘universal Turing machine + Y’?”
In answer to this question, the SP system appears to be very much simpler,
at least with respect to alternatives that are currently available. As described
in Section 4.4, below, the SP theory is more complex than the core universal
Turing machine model but, when we take account of the software that is needed
to do anything useful, an overall reduction in complexity may be achieved. In
keeping with the minimum length encoding principles on which the theory is
founded, the SP theory is a rationalisation and simplification of concepts that
combines conceptual Simplicity with explanatory or descriptive Power.
The scope of the SP theory
It is natural to ask whether the SP theory, as a new theory of computing, might
be free from some or all of the limitations of existing systems. Is it possible that
an SP system might be able to compute things that are not computable with
a universal Turing machine, by-passing the conclusions of Go¨del’s theorems or
computational complexity theory?
Although no formal proofs have been attempted in this area, the answer
to such questions is almost certainly “No”. Computation in the SP system is,
almost certainly, subject to the same limitations as other systems.
However, we can say with some confidence that the scope of the SP system
is no less than a universal Turing machine. Anything that is computable with
a universal Turing machine is also computable in the SP system. This follows
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from the fact that any universal Turing machine can be modelled in the SP
system, as described above.
Constraints and alternative styles of computation
The SP theory is a theory of computation of any kind, in any kind of system,
either natural or artificial. In terms of the theory, all computations may be
understood as a process of searching for patterns that match each other, with
compression of information by the unification of patterns that are the same.
The generality of the theory provides scope for alternative ‘styles’ of com-
putation. As we have seen (Sections 2.2 and 3.4), it is not feasible to conduct
an exhaustive search of the space of possible matches between patterns within
I, unless I is very small. In any practical system for computation, there is a
need for constraints—and the choice of constraints can influence the style of
computation:
• In ‘conventional’ kinds of computing—arithmetic, compilers, accounts pro-
grams and so on—the process of searching for matches between patterns
is heavily constrained. In the main, this takes the form of absolute con-
straints, the most prominent of which is that, normally, patterns must
match each other exactly and all kinds of partial matching are excluded.
This kind of constraint speeds up processing dramatically but the penalty
is the notoriously unforgiving and ‘brittle’ nature of conventional com-
puter systems. It seems likely that this style of computing was adopted
in the early days of computing because early machines were not powerful
enough for anything more ambitious.
• In ‘artificial intelligence’ kinds of computing—fuzzy pattern recognition,
unsupervised learning, probabilistic reasoning and so on—the process of
searching is less heavily constrained and ‘heuristic’ kinds of constraint are
favoured so that no part of the search space is ruled out a priori. This
kind of searching is more demanding than the more heavily constrained
searching of conventional computing because larger areas of the search
space is examined. However, the benefit is a more flexible, human-like ‘in-
telligence’, and ‘graceful’ failure with less of the brittleness of conventional
systems.
Rationalisation and simplification of computing systems
In the words of Kurt Lewin, “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”5
Rationalisation and simplification of concepts in the SP theory should translate
into corresponding benefits in the design of computing systems.
Figure 4.7 shows a schematic representation of a conventional computer and
the proposed ‘SP’ computer, based on the SP theory. The computational ‘core’
5Field Theory in Social Science, 1951, p. 20.
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of the computer (the central processing unit with its associated mechanisms) is
shown to the left of the vertical line in each representation, while software for a
range of applications is shown on the right. Data to be processed is not shown
in either figure because it is assumed to be the same in both cases.
Figure 4.7: Schematic representation of a conventional computer and the pro-
posed ‘SP’ computer, as discussed in the text.
In the conventional computer, relatively restricted or constrained forms of
the mechanisms for information-compression-by-multiple-alignment-unification-
and-search (represented as ‘ICMAUS’ in small letters in a box) may be seen in
the core of the computer. For example, although the process of finding a location
in computer memory is normally described in terms of the operation of logic
circuits, it may also be seen in more abstract terms as a process of comparing
the required address with actual addresses until an exact match is found. In a
similar way, the operation of an ‘arithmetic and logical unit’ may be understood
in terms of pattern matching although it is normally described more concretely
in terms of logic gates.
Software in a conventional computing system may be seen as domain-specific
knowledge (shown in the figure as ‘knowledge’) combined with SP mechanisms
(shown as three instances of ‘ICMAUS’ in a box). SP mechanisms range from
the relatively constrained kinds of searching and matching which is done in a
typical compiler or database management system to the more ambitious kinds
of searching and matching performed by artificial intelligence programs. Knowl-
edge about some domain of application such as accountancy or gardening may
be integrated with other software, or it may take the form of rules or records
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loaded into a pre-existing expert-system shell or database management system.
The key point here is that, although the core of a conventional computer is
relatively simple, the complete system, including software for a range of applica-
tions, is relatively complex. This is because software systems are unnecessarily
complex. Notwithstanding the existence of suites of programs that are designed
to work together, there is very poor integration amongst software systems. In
particular, mechanisms for comparing patterns and searching for good matches
between patterns appear repeatedly and redundantly in many different applica-
tions.
What is envisaged for the proposed SP computer is that a single, relatively
sophisticated SP mechanism would be developed for the core of the computer.
This is shown in Figure 4.7 as ‘ICMAUS’ in large letters in a box. It is antici-
pated that this would eliminate the need for any SP mechanisms in the software.
All that would be necessary would be to supply the system with the knowledge
that is needed for each domain of application. This is shown as ‘knowledge’ in
the right-hand part of the schematic representation of the SP system.
Although the core of the proposed new system would be more complex than
the computational core of a conventional system, there would be an overall
simplification of the system owing to the elimination of complexity arising from
the redundant programming of SP mechanisms in diverse applications, especially
in artificial intelligence. In the figure, this can be seen as the relatively small
size of the SP system compared with the conventional computer.
A single SP mechanism does not preclude alternative styles of computing.
The mechanism would be designed so that it could operate in ‘Rolls Royce’
mode for artificial intelligence applications but it should also be possible to
apply constraints so that it would operate more like a conventional system,
trading flexibility for speed.
Generalisation of computing systems
The kind of rationalisation and simplification of computing systems that has
been described is not a new idea. In the early days of computing, each new
database was written from scratch. But then computer scientists realised that
every database needs mechanisms for storing knowledge and editing it, and
every database needs a mechanism for finding knowledge in the store. A lot
of effort could be saved by writing a generalised database management system
that could be loaded with different kinds of knowledge according to need.
The SP project extends this idea. Instead of creating a generalised frame-
work for databases alone, the aim has been to create a generalised framework
for things like learning, reasoning, information storage and retrieval, pattern
recognition, and so on.
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4.5 Conclusion
The SP theory is a new theory of computing, built from new foundations and
distinct from any of the earlier theories. Its computational scope is almost
certainly the same as earlier theories, neither more nor less. However, it has
much more to say about the nature of intelligence than any of the earlier theories,
it provides a novel interpretation for concepts in logic and mathematics, and it
offers opportunities for the rationalisation and simplification of the design of
computing systems.
These aspects of the theory are developed in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 5
Natural Language
Processing1
5.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the linguistic theme of the examples presented in Chapter
3. By contrast with those introductory examples, this chapter shows how the SP
system can model more subtle aspects of language such as recursive structures,
ambiguity in parsing, and ‘context sensitive’ features of syntax.
The main emphasis in this chapter is on the representation and processing
of syntax in natural language. The ways in which the system can model non-
syntactic, ‘semantic’ kinds of knowledge such as class-inclusion hierarchies, part-
whole hierarchies, if-then rules and so on are described and discussed in several
of the chapters that follow. However, this chapter does contain an example
showing how syntax and semantics may be integrated within the system.
Novelty of the proposals
Aspects of these proposals that appear to be novel—compared with other sys-
tems for natural language processing—are described in the following subsections.
Representing syntax with patterns
As we saw in Section 3.4, the SP system allows the rules of a context-free phrase-
structure grammar to be represented with patterns in a manner that is distinct
from ordinary re-write rules but with recognisable similarities. However, as we
shall see, patterns can also be used to represent discontinuous dependencies in
syntax in a manner which is rather different from the way in which this aspect
of syntax is handled in other systems. Arguably, it is more direct and more
transparent than alternative systems.
1Based on Wolff (2000).
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Parsing (with choices at many levels) as multiple alignment
Perhaps the most novel feature of the present proposals appears to be the idea
that parsing, in the sense understood in theoretical and computational linguis-
tics and natural language processing, may be understood as multiple alignment.
A concept of parsing is already well-established in the literature on data
compression (see, for example, Storer, 1988). In that context, it means a pro-
cess of analysing data into segments corresponding to those in a pre-defined
dictionary of segments.
But this kind of parsing is simpler than ‘linguistic’ kinds of parsing. In the
first case, alternatives can be chosen only at one level (although segments may
have internal hierarchical structure). In the second kind of parsing, which is the
focus of interest in this chapter, sets of alternatives (from which selections must
be made) may appear at arbitrarily many levels in the grammar which is used
to guide the parsing.
Parsing as information compression
Research on parsing and related topics within computational linguistics and AI
does not normally consider these topics in terms of information compression (but
see, for example, Berger et al., 1996; Hu et al., 1997). However, there is a well-
developed tradition of parsing and linguistic analysis in terms of probabilities,
with associated concepts such as ‘stochastic grammars’, ‘maximum-likelihood’,
‘Bayesian inference’ and ‘statistical analysis’ (see, for example, Abney, 1997;
Black et al., 1993; Dreuth and Ruber, 1997; Garside et al., 1987; Takahashi and
Sagayama, 1997; Wu, 1997; Lucke, 1995) and, as we saw in Section 2.2, there is
a close connection between probabilities and information compression.
Production of language in the SP framework
As we saw in Section 3.8, a sentence may be constructed within the SP system
by compression of information in exactly the same way as a sentence may be
parsed. This is a novel feature of the system, not shared by other systems for
natural language processing, although it is similar in some respects to the way
in which an appropriately-constructed Prolog program may be run ‘forwards’
or ‘backwards’ according to need.
As a system for natural language production, the system contrasts with other
systems in much the same way as it does for parsing: in the representation of
syntax with patterns, in the use of the multiple alignment concept, and in the
focus on compression.
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5.2 Ambiguities and recursion
Ambiguities in parsing
Natural languages are notoriously ambiguous, not only in their meanings but
also in their syntax. An example which includes syntactic ambiguity is the
second sentence in Groucho Marks’s “Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a
banana”.
Figure 5.1 shows how SP61 can accommodate the ambiguity of that example,
given an appropriate grammar.2 In this example, the two parsings shown have
CDs that are close in value and higher than the compression scores of other
alignments formed for the same sentence.
0 fruit flies like a banana 0
| | | | |
1 | | | | < N 1 banana > 1
| | | | | | |
2 | | | < NP 1 < D | > < N > > 2
| | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | < D 1 a > | 3
| | | | | |
4 | | < ADV 0 like > | | | 4
| | | | | | | |
5 | | < ADP < ADV > < NP > > 5
| | | | |
6 < N 2 fruit > | | | | 6
| | | | | | |
7 S 0 < N > < V | > < ADP > 7
| | | |
8 < V 0 flies > 8
(a)
0 fruit flies like a banana 0
| | | | |
1 | | | | < N 1 banana > 1
| | | | | | |
2 | | | < NP 1 < D | > < N > > 2
| | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | < D 1 a > | 3
| | | | | |
4 | | < V 1 like > | | | 4
| | | | | | | |
5 S 1 < NP | | > < V > < NP > 5
| | | | |
6 | | < A 0 fruit > | | 6
| | | | | | |
7 < NP 0 < A > < N | > > 7
| | | |
8 < N 0 flies > 8
(b)
Figure 5.1: The two best alignments found by SP61 with patterns in Old repre-
senting grammatical rules and the ambiguous sentence ‘fruit flies like a banana’
in New.
2By contrast with the alignments shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, the alignment in Figure 5.1
shows words and word stems as single symbols, not divided into letters. This change has been
made to save space and improve readability. It makes no difference to the overall structure
created by the program.
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Another example
As a further example, consider the phoneme sequence ‘ae i s k r ee m’ (which
can be read as “ice cream” or “I scream”).3 A grammar that relates to this
example is shown in Figure 5.2.
S 0 NP #NP V #V ADV #ADV #S (100)
S 1 NP #NP VB #VB A #A #S (200)
NP 0 w ee #NP (100)
NP 1 ae i #NP (50)
NP 2 A #A N #N #NP (150)
A 0 ae i s #A (100)
A 1 h o t #A (80)
A 2 k o l d #A (70)
N 0 k r ee m #N (30)
N 1 m i l k #N (20)
V 0 s k r ee m #V (150)
V 1 sh ae w t #V (50)
VB 0 i z #VB (200)
ADV 0 l ae w d l i #ADV (40)
ADV 1 k w ae i e t l i #ADV (60)
Figure 5.2: A simple grammar for phoneme patterns which allows two main
parsings for the phoneme sequence ‘ae i s k r ee m’.
Figure 5.3 shows the two best alignments obtained by SP61 with ‘ae i s k r
ee m’ in New and the grammar from Figure 5.2 in Old. These two alignments,
which are the two ‘correct’ parsings of the sample, have compression scores
which are close in value and higher than any others.
Disambiguating context
If something is ambiguous, we normally look for some kind of context to resolve
the ambiguity. This effect of context fits neatly into the SP system as can be
seen from the example shown here.
Figure 5.4 (a) shows the best alignment found by SP61 with ‘ae i s k r ee
m l ae w d l i’ in New and the grammar from Figure 5.2 in Old. The addition
of ‘l ae w d l i’ (“loudly”) to the ambiguous pattern ‘ae i s k r ee m’ shifts the
balance in favour of “I scream” rather than “ice cream”.
In a similar way, the addition of ‘i z k o l d’ (“is cold”) to the same ambiguous
pattern yields the alignment shown in Figure 5.4, shifting the balance in the
other direction.
3The symbols used are an alphabetic adaptation of the International Phonetic Alphabet
phoneme symbols.
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0 ae i s k r ee m 0
| | | | | | |
1 | | | N 0 k r ee m #N 1
| | | | |
2 NP 2 A | | | #A N #N #NP 2
| | | | |
3 A 0 ae i s #A 3
(a)
0 ae i s k r ee m 0
| | | | | | |
1 | | V 0 s k r ee m #V 1
| | | |
2 S 0 NP | | #NP V #V ADV #ADV #S 2
| | | |
3 NP 1 ae i #NP 3
(b)
Figure 5.3: An alignment showing the two ‘best’ parsings of the phoneme se-
quence ‘ae i s k r ee m’ created by SP52 using the grammar shown in Figure
5.2.
Recursion
Recursion is a prominent feature of natural languages, illustrated classically
by the traditional nursery rhyme The House that Jack Built whose last verse
begins: “This is the farmer sowing his corn, That kept the cock that crowed in
the morn, That waked the priest all shaven and shorn, That married the man
all tattered and torn, ...” and so on.4
In all the diverse manifestations of recursion (so brilliantly described by
Douglas Hofstadter (1980)), the key feature is that there is at least one structure
which contains a reference to itself, either immediately or at some lower ‘level’
within its (hierarchically organised) constituents.
Examples showing how the system can handle recursive structures outside
the realm of natural language may be found in Chapter 4. Here, Figure 5.5
shows an SP grammar for a fragment of English where the second pattern ‘S 1
PN #PN V #V DPN #DPN S #S #S’ contains a recursive reference to itself
(near the end of the pattern) via the left and right boundary symbols ‘S #S’.
Figure 5.6 shows how the recursive sentence “We think he said that it goes
fast” may be parsed by multiple alignment, using the grammar shown in Figure
5.5.5 The fact that any pattern in the grammar may appear one or more times
4From Mother Goose Nursery Rhymes, London: Heinemann, 1994.
5This alignment is the first example in this book of alignments rotated by 90o compared
with the examples shown in Chapter 3. In the majority of cases, alignments are shown like
this because they fit more easily onto the page. In accordance with the convention that has
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0 ae i s k r ee m l ae w d l i 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | ADV 0 l ae w d l i #ADV 1
| | | | | | | | |
2 S 0 NP | | #NP V | | | | | #V ADV #ADV #S 2
| | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | V 0 s k r ee m #V 3
| | | |
4 NP 1 ae i #NP 4
(a)
0 ae i s k r ee m i z k o l d 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | | | A 2 k o l d #A 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 S 1 NP | | | | | | | #NP VB | | #VB A #A #S 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | N 0 k r ee m #N | | | | | 3
| | | | | | | | | | |
4 NP 2 A | | | #A N #N #NP | | | | 4
| | | | | | | | |
5 A 0 ae i s #A | | | | 5
| | | |
6 VB 0 i z #VB 6
(b)
Figure 5.4: (a) An alignment showing the best parsing found by SP61 for the
phoneme sequence ‘ae i s k r ee m’ when it is included within the larger sequence
‘ae i s k r ee m l ae w d l i’—using the grammar shown in Figure 5.2. (b) An
alignment showing the best parsing of the phoneme sequence ‘ae i s k r ee m’
when it is included within the larger sequence ‘ae i s k r ee m i z k o l d’—using
the same grammar as for (a).
in an alignment (Section 3.4) means that the second pattern in the grammar
may provide a framework for the whole sentence (in column 9 of the alignment)
and may also provide a framework for the embedded sentence “he said that ...”.
Within this second sentence is the sentence “it goes fast” which is modelled on
the pattern in the first line in the grammar.
5.3 Syntactic dependencies in French
The examples considered up to now may have given the impression that the SP
system is merely a trivial variation on context-free phrase-structure grammar.
This section and the one that follows presents alignments from two areas of
syntax showing how the SP system as it is realised in the SP61 model may
accommodate ‘context sensitive’ aspects of syntax.
been adopted, column 0 contains the pattern from New while the one or more other columns
in each alignment show patterns from Old, one pattern per column, in an arbitrary order.
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S 0 PN #PN V #V ADV #ADV #S (1000)
S 1 PN #PN V #V DPN #DPN S #S #S (700)
DPN that #DPN (300)
PN 0 we #PN (400)
PN 1 you #PN (700)
PN 2 he #PN (350)
PN 3 it #PN (250)
V 0 says #V (200)
V 1 say #V (210)
V 2 said #V (300)
V 3 thinks #V (250)
V 4 think #V (200)
V 5 goes #V (300)
V 6 go #V (240)
ADV 0 fast #ADV (400)
ADV 1 away #ADV (250)
ADV 2 later #ADV (350)
Figure 5.5: A fragment of English grammar with recursion.
It often happens in natural languages that there are syntactic dependencies
between one part of a sentence and another. For example, there is usually a
‘number’ dependency between the subject of a sentence and the main verb of
the sentence: if the subject has a singular form then the main verb must have
a singular form and likewise for plural forms of subject and main verb.
A prominent feature of these kinds of dependency is that they are often ‘dis-
continuous’ in the sense that the elements of the dependency can be separated,
one from the next, by arbitrarily large amounts of intervening structure. For
example, the subject and main verb of a sentence must have the same number
(singular or plural) regardless of the size of qualifying phrases or subordinate
clauses that may come between them.
Another interesting feature of syntactic dependencies is that one kind of
dependency (e.g., number dependency) can overlap other kinds of dependency
(e.g., gender (masculine/feminine) dependency), as can be seen in the following
example.
In the French sentence Les plumes sont vertes (“The feathers are green”)
there are two sets of overlapping syntactic dependencies like this:
P P P P Number dependencies
Les plume s sont vert e s
F F Gender dependencies
In this example, there is a number dependency, which is plural (‘P’) in this
case, between the subject of the sentence, the main verb and the following
adjective: the subject is expressed with a plural determiner (Les) and a noun
(plume) which is marked as plural with the suffix (s); the main verb (sont) has
a plural form and the following adjective (vert) is marked as plural by the suffix
CHAPTER 5. NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 117
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
S
1
PN --- PN
0
we ------------------------------------------------------------------ we
#PN -- #PN
V ----- V
4
think ------------------------------------------------ think
#V ---- #V
DPN
#DPN
S ------------------------- S
1
PN ---------- PN
2
he --------------------------------------------- he
#PN --------- #PN
V ---- V
2
said ---------------------- said
#V --- #V
DPN -- DPN
that ------------------------------------ that
#DPN - #DPN
S ------------------ S
0
PN -- PN
3
it ---- it
#PN - #PN
V ---- V
5
goes --------------- goes
#V --- #V
ADV --------------------------------------------------------- ADV
0
fast ---------------------------------------------------------------------- fast
#ADV -------------------------------------------------------- #ADV
#S ----------------- #S
#S ------------------------ #S
#S
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Figure 5.6: The best alignment created by SP61 with ‘we think he said that it
goes fast’ in New and the grammar shown in Figure 5.5 in Old.
(s). Cutting right across these number dependencies is the gender dependency,
which is feminine (‘F’) in this case, between the feminine noun (plume) and the
adjective (vert) which has a feminine suffix (e).
For many years, linguists puzzled about how these kinds of syntactic de-
pendency could be represented succinctly in grammars for natural languages.
But then elegant solutions were found in transformational grammar (Chomsky,
1957) and, later, in systems like definite clause grammars (Pereira and Warren,
1980, , based on Prolog) (see also Gazdar and Mellish, 1989).
The solution proposed here is different from any established system and is
arguably simpler and more transparent than other systems. It will be described
and illustrated with a fragment of the grammar of French which can generate
the example sentence just shown. This fragment of French grammar, shown in
Figure 5.7, is expressed with ‘patterns’ in the same manner as the grammar in
Figure 3.3 and others in this article.
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S NP #NP VP #VP #S (500)
NP D #D N #N #NP (700)
VP 0 V #V A #A #VP (300)
VP 1 V #V P #P NP #NP #VP (200)
P 0 sur #P (50)
P 1 sous #P (150)
V SNG est #V (250)
V PL sont #V (250)
D SNG M 0 le #D (90)
D SNG M 1 un #D (120)
D SNG F 0 la #D (130)
D SNG F 1 une #D (110)
D PL 0 les #D (125)
D PL 1 des #D (125)
N NR #NR NS1 #NS1 #N (450)
NS1 SNG - #NS1 (250)
NS1 PL s #NS1 (200)
NR M papier #NR (300)
NR F plume #NR (400)
A AR #AR AS1 #AS1 AS2 #AS2 #A (300)
AS1 F e #AS1 (100)
AS1 M - #AS1 (200)
AS2 SNG - #AS2 (175)
AS2 PL s #AS2 (125)
AR 0 noir #AR (100)
AR 1 vert #AR (200)
NP SNG SNG #NP (450)
NP PL PL #NP (250)
NP M M #NP (450)
NP F F #NP (250)
N SNG V SNG A SNG (250)
N PL V PL A PL (250)
N M V A M (300)
N F V A F (400)
Figure 5.7: A fragment of French grammar with patterns for number dependen-
cies and gender dependencies.
Apart from the use of patterns as the medium of expression, this grammar
differs from systems like transformational grammar or definite clause grammars
because the parts of the grammar which express the forms of ‘high level’ struc-
tures like sentences, noun phrases and verb phrases (represented by the first
four patterns in Figure 5.7) do not contain any reference to number or gender.
Instead, the grammar contains patterns like ‘NP SNG SNG #NP’ and ‘N M
V A M’ (the last eight patterns in Figure 5.7). The first of these says, in effect,
that between the symbols ‘NP’ and ‘#NP’ there are two structures marked
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as singular (‘SNG’). In this simple grammar, there is no ambiguity about what
those two structures are: they can only be a determiner (‘D’) followed by a noun
(‘N’). In a more complex grammar, there would need to be disambiguating
context to establish the ‘correct’ alignments of symbols. The second pattern
says, in effect, that in a sentence which contains the (discontinuous) sequence
of symbols ‘N V A’, the noun (‘N’) is masculine (‘M’) and the adjective (‘A’) is
also masculine.
An alignment
The alignment in Figure 5.8 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with our
example sentence in New and the grammar from Figure 5.7 in Old. The main
constituents of the sentence are marked in an appropriate manner and depen-
dencies for number and gender are marked by patterns appearing in columns
13, 14 and 15 of the alignment.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S
NP -- NP --------- NP
D --- D
PL --------------------- PL
0
les ----------------------------------------------------------- les
#D -- #D
N ------------------ N ---------------------- N - N
NR --- NR
F ------------------------------------ F
plume ------------------------------------------------- plume
#NR -- #NR
NS1 -- NS1
PL ------------------------------------------- PL ------ PL
s --------------------------------------- s
#NS1 - #NS1
#N ----------------- #N
#NP - #NP -------- #NP
VP ------------------------------------ VP
0
V ---- V -------------------------------------------------------- V - V
PL ------------------------------------------------------------------ PL
sont ----------------------- sont
#V --- #V
A ------------------ A -------------------------------------------------------- A - A
AR --- AR
1
vert ---------------- vert
#AR -- #AR
AS1 -- AS1
F ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ F
e ----- e
#AS1 - #AS1
AS2 -------------------------------------------------------------- AS2
PL ------------- PL
s ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- s
#AS2 ------------------------------------------------------------- #AS2
#A ----------------- #A
#VP ----------------------------------- #VP
#S
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Figure 5.8: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘les plume s sont vert e s’
in New and the grammar from Figure 5.7 in Old.
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Discussion
Readers may wonder why, in the example just shown, the pattern ‘NP PL
PL #NP’ is separate from the pattern ‘N PL V PL A PL’. Why not simply
merge them into something like ‘NP PL N PL #NP V PL A PL’. The reason
for separating the number dependencies in noun phrases (‘NP’) from the other
number dependencies is that they do no always occur together. For example,
noun phrases may be found within one of the two verb-phrase (‘VP’) patterns
shown in Figure 5.7 (the fourth pattern in the grammar) and this context does
not contain the ‘N ... V ... A ...’ pattern.
Another question that may come to mind is what happens when there are
one or more subordinate clauses between the subject of a sentence and the
corresponding verb, given that each such subordinate clause has its own subject
and verb? In a sentence such as “Those that we like win”, it is possible that the
number dependency (plural) between ‘those’ and ‘win’ could become confused
with the number dependency (also plural) between ‘we’ and ‘like’.
If patterns representing long-range dependencies are completely separated
from the syntactic patterns to which they apply—as in Figures 5.7 and 5.8—this
can indeed be a problem. A solution is to mark dependencies within the patterns
to which they apply, as shown in Figure 5.9. Here, the number dependency
between ‘those’ and ‘win’ is distinct from the dependency between ‘we’ and
‘like’, despite the fact that both these dependencies are plural.
This method of showing dependencies within the SP system overcomes the
problem of subordinate clauses but it loses some of the apparent elegance of the
earlier scheme. It is necessary to maintain singular and plural versions of each
main structure with corresponding redundancy owing to the similarities amongst
these patterns. And this redundancy is compounded if gender dependencies are
integrated with main syntactic structures in a similar way.
5.4 Dependencies in the syntax of English
auxiliary verbs
This section presents a grammar and examples showing how the syntax of En-
glish auxiliary verbs may be described in the SP system. Before the grammar
and examples are presented, the syntax of this part of English is described and
alternative formalisms for describing the syntax are briefly discussed.
In English, the syntax for main verbs and the ‘auxiliary’ verbs which may
accompany them follows two quasi-independent patterns of constraint which
interact in an interesting way.
The primary pattern of constraint may be expressed with this sequence of
symbols,
M H B B V,
which should be interpreted in the following way:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
S
NP -- NP
1
PN ---- PN
PL ---------- PL
2
those - those
#PN --- #PN
#NP - #NP
QL --------- QL
0
DPN -- DPN
0
that ---------------------- that
#DPN - #DPN
S ---------------- S
NP -- NP
1
PN -- PN
PL -------- PL
0
we -------------------------------------- we
#PN - #PN
#NP - #NP
QL
#QL
V ---------- V
PL --------- PL
0
VR --- VR
2
like ------------------------------------------------------ like
#VR -- #VR
#V --------- #V
#S --------------- #S
#QL -------- #QL
V ------------------------------------------------------ V
PL ----------------------------------------------------- PL
0
VR -- VR
0
win -------------------------------------------------------------------- win
#VR - #VR
#V ----------------------------------------------------- #V
#S
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure 5.9: An alignment showing how number dependencies in a sentence may
be distinguished from number dependencies in a subordinate clause.
• Each letter represents a category for a single word:
– ‘M’ stands for ‘modal’ verbs like ‘will’, ‘can’, ‘would’ etc.
– ‘H’ stands for one of the various forms of the verb ‘to have’.
– Each of the two instances of ‘B’ stands for one of the various forms
of the verb ‘to be’.
– ‘V’ stands for the main verb which can be any verb except a modal
verb.
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• The words occur in the order shown but any of the words may be omitted.
• Questions of ‘standard’ form follow exactly the same pattern as statements
except that the first verb, whatever it happens to be (‘M’, ‘H’, the first
‘B’, the second ‘B’ or ‘V’), precedes the subject noun phrase instead of
following it.
Here are two examples of the primary pattern with all of the words included:
It will have been being washed
M H H B V
Will it have been being washed?
M H H B V
The secondary constraints are these:
• Apart from the modals, which always have the same form, the first verb
in the sequence, whatever it happens to be (‘H’, the first ‘B’, the second
‘B’ or ‘V’), always has a ‘finite’ form (the form it would take if it were
used by itself with the subject).
• If an ‘M’ auxiliary verb is chosen, then whatever follows it (‘H’, first ‘B’,
second ‘B’, or ‘V’) must have an ‘infinitive’ form (i.e., the ‘standard’ form
of the verb as it occurs in the context ‘to ...’, but without the word ‘to’).
• If an ‘H’ auxiliary verb is chosen, then whatever follows it (the first ‘B’,
the second ‘B’ or ‘V’) must have a past tense form such as ‘been’, ‘seen’,
‘gone’, ‘slept’, ‘wanted’ etc. In Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957),
these forms were characterised as en forms and the same convention has
been adopted here.
• If the first of the two ‘B’ auxiliary verbs is chosen, then whatever follows
it (the second ‘B’ or ‘V’) must have an ing form,e.g., ‘singing’, ‘eating’,
‘having’, ‘being’ etc.
• If the second of the two ‘B’ auxiliary verbs is chosen, then whatever fol-
lows it (only the main verb is possible now) must have a past tense form
(marked with en as above).
• The constraints apply to questions in exactly the same way as they do to
statements.
Figure 5.10 shows a selection of examples with the dependencies marked.
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H------en B2---------en
---- -- -- --
It will have been being washed
---- ---- -- --- ----
M----inf B1------ing V
B1------ing
-- ---
Will he be talking?
---- -- ----
M-------inf V
V
------
They have finished
---- --
H----------en
fin
Are they gone?
--- ----
B2----------en
fin V
B1--------ing
-- ---
Has he been working?
--- -- ----
H---------en V
fin
Figure 5.10: A selection of example sentences in English with markings of de-
pendencies between the verbs. Key: M = modal, H = forms of the verb ‘have’,
B1 = first instance of a form of the verb ‘be’, B2 = second instance of a form
of the verb ‘be’, V = main verb, fin = a finite form, inf = an infinitive form, en
= a past tense form, ing = a verb ending in ‘ing’.
Transformational grammar and English auxiliary verbs
In Figure 5.10 it can be seen that in many cases but not all, the dependencies
which have been described may be regarded as discontinuous because they con-
nect one word in the sequence to the suffix of the following word thus bridging
the stem of the following word. Dependencies that are discontinuous can be
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seen most clearly in questions (e.g., the second, fourth and fifth sentences in
Figure 5.10) where the verb before the subject influences the form of the verb
that follows immediately after the subject.
In Syntactic Structures, Chomsky (1957) showed that this kind of regularity
in the syntax of English auxiliary verbs could be described using transforma-
tional grammar. For each pair of symbols linked by a dependency (‘M inf’, ‘H
en’, ‘B1 ing’, ‘B2 en’) the two symbols could be shown together in the ‘deep
structure’ of a sentence and then moved into their proper position or modified
in form (or both) using ‘transformational rules’.
This elegant demonstration argued persuasively in favour of TG compared
with alternatives which were available at that time. However, later research
has shown that the same kinds of regularities in the syntax of English auxiliary
verbs can be described quite well without recourse to transformational rules,
using definite clause grammars or other systems which do not use that type of
rule (see, for example, Pereira and Warren, 1980; Gazdar and Mellish, 1989).
An example showing how English auxiliary verbs may be described using the
definite clause grammar formalism may be found in Wolff (1987, pp. 183-184)).
English auxiliary verbs in the SP system
Figure 5.11 shows an ‘SP’ grammar for English auxiliary verbs which exploits
several of the ideas described earlier in this article. Figures 5.12, 5.13 and Figure
5.14 show the best alignments in terms of information compression for three
different sentences produced by the SP61 model using this grammar. In the
following paragraphs, aspects of the grammar and of the examples are described
and discussed.
The primary constraints
The first line in the grammar is a sentence pattern for a statement (marked
with the symbol ‘ST’) and the second line is a sentence pattern for a question
(marked with the symbol ‘Q’). Apart from these markers, the only difference
between the two patterns is that, in the statement pattern, the symbols ‘X1
#X1’ follow the noun phrase symbols (‘NP #NP’), whereas in the question
pattern they precede the noun phrase symbols. As can be seen in the examples
in Figures 5.12, 5.13 and Figure 5.14, the pair of symbols, ‘X1 #X1’, has the
effect of selecting the first verb in the sequence of auxiliary verbs and ensuring
its correct position with respect to the noun phrase. In Figure 5.12 it follows
the noun phrase, while in Figures 5.13 and Figure 5.14 it precedes the noun
phrase.
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S ST NP #NP X1 #X1 XR #S (3000)
S Q X1 #X1 NP #NP XR #S (2000)
NP SNG it #NP (4000)
NP PL they #NP (1000)
X1 0 V M #V #X1 XR XH XB XB XV #S (1000)
X1 1 XH FIN #XH #X1 XR XB XB XV #S (900)
X1 2 XB1 FIN #XB1 #X1 XR XB XV #S (1900)
X1 3 V FIN #V #X1 XR #S (900)
XH V H #V #XH XB #S (200)
XB XB1 #XB1 XB #S (300)
XB XB1 #XB1 XV #S (300)
XB1 V B #V #XB1 (500)
XV V #V #S (5000)
M INF (2000)
H EN (2400)
B XB ING (2000)
B XV EN (700)
SNG SNG (2500)
PL PL (2500)
V M 0 will #V (2500)
V M 1 would #V (1000)
V M 2 could #V (500)
V H INF have #V (600)
V H PL FIN have #V (400)
V H SNG FIN has #V (200)
V H EN had #V (500)
V H FIN had #V (300)
V H ING hav ING1 #ING1 #V (400)
V B SNG FIN 0 is #V (500)
V B SNG FIN 1 was #V (400)
V B INF be #V (400)
V B EN be EN1 #EN1 #V (600)
V B ING be ING1 #ING1 #V (700)
V B PL FIN 0 are #V (300)
V B PL FIN 1 were #V (500)
V FIN wrote #V (166)
V INF 0 write #V (254)
V INF 1 chew #V (138)
V INF 2 walk #V (318)
V INF 3 wash #V (99)
V ING 0 chew ING1 #ING1 #V (623)
V ING 1 walk ING1 #ING1 #V (58)
V ING 2 wash ING1 #ING1 #V (102)
V EN 0 made #V (155)
V EN 1 brok EN1 #EN1 #V (254)
V EN 2 tak EN1 #EN1 #V (326)
V EN 3 lash ED #ED #V (160)
V EN 4 clasp ED #ED #V (635)
V EN 5 wash ED #ED #V (23)
ING1 ing #ING1 (1883)
EN1 en #EN1 (1180)
ED ed #ED (818)
Figure 5.11: A grammar for the syntax of English auxiliary verbs.
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R
5
.
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
L
A
N
G
U
A
G
E
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
IN
G
1
2
6
0 it is wash ed 0
| | | |
1 | | V EN 5 wash ED | #ED #V 1
| | | | | | | |
2 | | | | ED ed #ED | 2
| | | | |
3 | | XV V | #V #S 3
| | | | |
4 | B | XV EN | 4
| | | | |
5 | V B SNG FIN 0 is #V | | 5
| | | | | | | |
6 | XB1 V B | | #V #XB1 | | 6
| | | | | | |
7 | X1 2 XB1 | FIN #XB1 #X1 XR XB XV #S 7
| | | | | |
8 NP SNG it #NP | | | | | 8
| | | | | | | |
9 S ST NP | #NP X1 | #X1 XR #S 9
| |
10 SNG SNG 10
Figure 5.12: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘it is wash ed’ in New and the grammar from Figures 5.11 in Old.
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
5
.
N
A
T
U
R
A
L
L
A
N
G
U
A
G
E
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
IN
G
1
2
7
0 will it have be en brok en 0
| | | | | | |
1 | | | | EN1 en #EN1 | | 1
| | | | | | | |
2 | | | V B EN be EN1 #EN1 #V | | 2
| | | | | | | | |
3 | | | XB1 V B | #V #XB1 | | 3
| | | | | | | | |
4 | | | | | | | V EN 1 brok EN1 | #EN1 #V 4
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
5 | | | | | | | XV V | | | | #V #S 5
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
6 | | | XB XB1 | | #XB1 XV | | | | #S 6
| | | | | | | | | | | |
7 V M 0 will #V | | | | | | | | | | | 7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
8 X1 0 V M #V #X1 | XR XH | XB XB | | XV | | | | #S 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
9 | | | NP SNG it #NP | | | | | | | | | | | | 9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
10 S Q X1 | #X1 NP #NP XR | | | | | | | | | | #S 10
| | | | | | | | | | | |
11 | | V H INF have #V | | | | | | | | | 11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
12 | XH V H | #V #XH XB | | | | | | | #S 12
| | | | | | | | | |
13 | | | | | | | EN1 en #EN1 13
| | | | | | |
14 M | INF | | | | 14
| | | | |
15 H | EN | | 15
| | |
16 B XV EN 16
Figure 5.13: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘will it have be en brok en’ in New and the grammar from Figures 5.11
in Old (Part 1).
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0 are they walk ing 0
| | | |
1 | | V ING 1 walk ING1 | #ING1 #V 1
| | | | | | | |
2 | | | | ING1 ing #ING1 | 2
| | | | |
3 | | XV V | #V #S 3
| | | | |
4 | NP PL they #NP | | | 4
| | | | | | |
5 S Q X1 | #X1 NP | #NP XR | | #S 5
| | | | | | | |
6 X1 2 XB1 FIN | #XB1 #X1 | XR XB XV | #S 6
| | | | | | |
7 | V B PL FIN 0 are #V | | | | 7
| | | | | | | | |
8 XB1 V B | #V #XB1 | | | 8
| | | | |
9 | PL PL | | 9
| | |
10 B XB ING
Figure 5.14: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘are they walk ing’ in New and the grammar from Figures 5.11 in Old.
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Each of the next four patterns in the grammar have the form ‘X1 ... #X1
XR ... #S’. The symbols ‘X1’ and ‘#X1’ align with the same pair of symbols
in the sentence pattern. The symbols ‘XR ... #S’ encode the remainder of the
sequence of verbs.
The first ‘X1’ pattern encodes verb sequences which start with a modal verb
(‘M’), the second one is for verb sequences beginning with a finite form of the
verb ‘have’ (‘H’), the third is for sequences beginning with either of the two
‘B’ verbs in the primary sequence (see below), and the last ‘X1’ pattern is for
sentences which contain a main verb without any auxiliaries.
In the first of the ‘X1’ patterns, the subsequence ‘XR ... #S’ encodes the
remainder of the sequence of auxiliary verbs using the symbols ‘XH XB XB
XV’. In a similar way, the subsequence ‘XR ... #S’ within each of the other
‘X1’ patterns encodes the verbs which follow the first verb in the sequence.
Notice that the pattern ‘X1 2 XB1 FIN #XB1 #X1 XR XB XV #S’ can
encode sentences which start with the first ‘B’ verb and also contains the second
‘B’ verb. And it also serves for any sentence which starts with the first or the
second ‘B’ verb with the omission of the other ‘B’ verb. In the latter two
cases, the ‘slot’ between the symbols ‘XB’ and ‘XV’ is left vacant. Figure 5.12
illustrates the case where the verb sequence starts with the first ‘B’ verb with
the omission of the second ‘B’ verb. Figure 5.14 illustrates the case where the
verb sequence starts with the second ‘B’ verb (and the first ‘B’ verb has been
omitted).
The secondary constraints
The secondary constraints are represented using the patterns ‘M INF’, ‘H EN’,
‘B XB ING’ and ‘B XV EN’. Singular and plural dependencies are marked in a
similar way using the patterns ‘SNG SNG’ and ‘PL PL’.
Examples appear in all three alignments in Figures 5.12, 5.13 and Figure
5.14. In every case except one (row 4 in Figure 5.12), the patterns representing
secondary constraints appear in the bottom rows of the alignment. These ex-
amples show how dependencies bridging arbitrarily large amounts of structure,
and dependencies that overlap each other, can be represented with simplicity
and transparency in the medium of multiple alignments.
Notice, for example, how dependencies between the first and second verb
in a sequence of auxiliary verbs are expressed in the same way regardless of
whether the two verbs lie side by side (e.g., the statement in Figure 5.12) or
whether they are separated from each other by the subject noun-phrase (e.g.,
the question in Figure 5.13 and in Figure 5.14). Notice, again, how the overlap-
ping dependencies in Figure 5.13 and their independence from each other are
expressed with simplicity and clarity in the SP system.
Readers may wonder why the two patterns representing dependencies be-
tween a ‘B’ verb and whatever follows it (‘B XB ING’ and ‘B XV EN’) contain
three symbols rather than two. One reason is that, when two (or more) patterns
begin with the same symbol (or sequence of symbols), the scoring method for
evaluating alignments requires that the two patterns can be distinguished from
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each other by one (or more) symbols in each pattern which does not include the
terminal symbol in each pattern. A second reason is that the second symbol
in each pattern helps to determine whether the ‘B’ at the start of the pattern
corresponds to the first or the second ‘B’ verb in the primary sequence:
• ‘B XB ING’. The inclusion of ‘XB’ in this pattern means that the ‘B’ verb
is the first of the two ‘B’ verbs in the primary sequence and the following
verb must be ‘ING’.
• ‘B XV EN’. The inclusion of ‘XV’ in this pattern means that the ‘B’ verb
may be the first or the second of the two ‘B’ verbs. However, since the first
case is already covered by ’B XB ING’, this pattern covers the constraint
between the second ‘B’ verb and verbs of the category ‘EN’.
5.5 Cross serial dependencies
Recursion appears again in a syntactic phenomenon—‘cross-serial
dependency’—found in languages like Swiss German and Dutch. This
kind of dependency is difficult or impossible to represent using a basic context-
free phrase-structure grammar although it can be expressed in a reasonably
straightforward manner with augmented forms of phrase-structure grammar
that provide Prolog-like facilities for carrying information from one part of a
structure to another and the construction of Lisp-like lists.
The example shown here is an attempt to represent cross-serial dependencies
in the SP system. It is not correct but it has been included in this chapter
because the problem is interesting and may suggest the need for changes in the
SP system. An alternative possibility is that I have simply failed to see how
this kind of structure should be represented in the SP system. I would be very
pleased to hear any insights that readers may have.
In Swiss German, a sentence which means “We let the children help Hans
paint the house” may be expressed as Mer d’chind em Hans es huus lond halfed
aastriiche. This corresponds approximately with the following sequence of words
in English: “We the children Hans the house let help paint” (see Borsley, 1996,
section 2.3). In the standard English form, this type of sentence is clearly
recursive because it is easily extended, without limit, to become “We let the
children help Hans help Jim help Mary ... paint the house”, and so on. The
same appears to be true of the cross-serial form.
In this type of structure, the dependencies between verbs and their subjects
and between the verbs and their objects are discontinuous and they overlap each
other as can be seen schematically in Figure 5.15.
In both the English form and the cross-serial form, the relationship between
one sentence and the next in the recursive sequence is curious because the object
of every sentence except the last becomes the subject of the next.
Figure 5.16 shows a grammar for sentences like “We the children Hans the
house let help paint” except that “the children” has been replaced by “them”
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Figure 5.15: A schematic representation of cross-serial dependencies in the sen-
tence “We the children Hans the house let help paint”. Dependencies between
subjects and verbs are shown below the sentence and dependencies between
objects and verbs are shown above.
and “the house” has been replaced by “it”. These substitutions have been made
so that alignments are more easily displayed within the confines of one page.
Figure 5.17 shows one of the best alignments created by the SP61 model with
‘we them hans it let help paint’ in New and the grammar in Figure 5.16 in Old.
S NP #NP S NP #NP : : #S V #V #S (1000)
NP 0 him #NP (500)
NP 1 hans #NP (200)
NP 2 them #NP (300)
NP 3 we #NP (150)
NP 4 it #NP (250)
V 0 help #V (200)
V 1 let #V (100)
V 2 encourage #V (300)
V 3 run #V (100)
V 4 paint #V (125)
V 5 walk #V (175)
Figure 5.16: A grammar for cross-serial dependencies.
This alignment expresses the recursive nature of the structure but it fails to
capture the ‘subject object ... verb’ dependency that exists between ‘we, ‘them’
and ‘let’, between ‘them’, ‘hans’ and ‘help’ or between ‘hans’, ‘it’ and ‘paint’.
5.6 The integration of syntax with semantics
In keeping with the remarks in Section 3.3, it has been anticipated that the SP
system would not only support the representation of syntactic and non-syntactic
(‘semantic’) kinds of knowledge but that it would facilitate their integration. A
preliminary example of how this might be done is shown in Figure 5.18. This is
the best alignment produced by SP61 with ‘john kissed mary’ as the New pattern
and a grammar in Old that contains patterns representing syntax, ‘semantics’
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S
NP
#NP
S ------------------------------------------------------------------- S
NP ------------------------------------------------------------------ NP
#NP ----------------------------------------------------------------- #NP
S --------- S
NP -- NP -- NP
3
we ---------------- we
#NP - #NP - #NP
S ------------------------ S
NP ----------------------- NP --------------------------------------- NP
2
them ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ them
#NP ---------------------- #NP -------------------------------------- #NP
S ---------- S
NP --------- NP
#NP -------- #NP
S ----------------------- S
NP --------------- NP --- NP
1
hans ----------------------------------------------------- hans
#NP -------------- #NP -- #NP
S --------- S
NP -- NP -- NP
4
it -------------------------------------------------------------------- it
#NP - #NP - #NP
S --------- S
NP -------- NP
#NP ------- #NP
S
NP
#NP
:
: --------- :
: --------- :
: ----------------------- :
: ---------- :
: ------------------------ :
: --------- :
: ------------------------------------------------------------------- :
:
#S
V
#V
#S ------------------------------------------------------------------ #S
V --- V
1
let --- let
#V -- #V
#S -------- #S
V
#V
#S ----------------------- #S
V ---- V
0
help ---------------------------------------- help
#V --- #V
#S --------- #S
V ----- V
4
paint ------------------------- paint
#V ---- #V
#S ---------------------- #S
V
#V
#S -------- #S
V
#V
#S -------- #S
V
#V
#S
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Figure 5.17: One of the best alignments produced by the SP61 model with ‘we
them hans it let help paint’ in New and the grammar in Figure 5.16 in Old.
and the connections between them. The scare quotes are intended to indicate
that the representations of semantic structures in this example are, at best,
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crude. That point made, the quote marks for ‘semantics’ or ‘meanings’ will be
dropped in the remainder of this section.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
SM
S -------------------------- S
AR -------------------------------------------------------------------------- AR
NP --- NP
1 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
john ----------------- john
#NP -- #NP
#AR ------------------------------------------------------------------------- #AR
AN -------------------------------------------------------------------- AN
V1 ------------------- V1
V ------ V
0 ------------------------------------------------------- 0
kissed ---------------------- kissed
#V ----- #V
#V1 ------------------ #V1
#AN ------------------------------------------------------------------- #AN
OBJ -------------------------------------------- OBJ
NP --- NP
2 ----------------------------------------------------- 2
mary --- mary
#NP -- #NP
#OBJ ------------------------------------------- #OBJ
#S ------------------------- #S
A --- A
X ---------------------------------- X
an ----------------- an
0 ------------- 0
KISSED
#an ---------------- #an
#X --------------------------------- #X
Y ----------- Y
obj -- obj
1 ---- 1
MARY
#obj - #obj
#Y ---------- #Y
Z ---------------------------------------- Z
ar -------------------------- ar
0 ---------- 0
JOHN
#ar ------------------------- #ar
#Z --------------------------------------- #Z
#A -- #A
#SM
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Figure 5.18: The best alignment created by SP61 with the sentence ‘john kissed
mary’ in New and a grammar in Old that represents natural language syntax,
semantics and their integration.
In the alignment, the sentence appears in column 0. In the remaining
columns, Old patterns with the main roˆles are as follows:
• The pattern in column 2 represents the overall syntactic structure of the
sentence: ‘S AR NP #NP #AR AN V1 #V1 #AN OBJ NP #NP #OBJ
#S’. Notice that this pattern differs from comparable patterns shown in
previous examples because each constituent within the pattern is marked
with its semantic roˆle. Thus the first noun phrase (‘NP #NP’) is enclosed
by the pair of symbols ‘AR ... #AR’ (representing the ‘actor’ roˆle), the
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verb (‘V1 #V1’) is marked as an ‘action’ with the symbols ‘AN ... #AN’,
and the second noun phrase is marked as an ‘object’ (‘OBJ ... #OBJ’).
• In column 7, the pattern ‘A X an #an #X Y obj #obj #Y Z ar #ar #Z
#A’ may be seen as a generalised description of the association between an
‘action’ (‘an #an’), the ‘object’ of the action (‘obj #obj’) and the ‘actor’
or performer of the action (‘ar #ar’). Notice that the order in which these
concepts are specified is different from the order of the corresponding
markers in the syntax pattern. Notice also that these three slots are also
marked, in order, as ‘X ... #X’, ‘Y ... #Y’ and ‘Z ... #Z’. The reason for
this marking will be seen shortly.
• In column 6, the pattern ‘SM S #S A #A #SM’ provides a link between
the pattern in column 2 representing the syntactic structure of the sentence
(‘S ... #S’) and the action-object-actor pattern in column 7 (‘A ... #A’).
• In columns 9, 12 and 13 are three more patterns that link the syntax with
the semantics. In column 9, the pattern ‘OBJ 2 #OBJ Y 1 #Y’ connects
‘NP 2 mary #NP’ in the object position of the syntax with ‘MARY’ in
the ‘obj #obj’ slot of the semantic structure. Here, ‘MARY’ is intended
to represent some kind of conceptual structure that is the meaning of the
word ‘mary’. More precisely, it is intended to represent a ‘code’ for that
structure (see Section 5.6, below). In a similar way, the pattern in column
12 connects ‘kissed’ with ‘KISSED’ in the ‘an #an’ semantic slot; and the
pattern in column 13 connects ‘john’ with ‘JOHN’ in the ‘ar #ar’ semantic
slot.
The key idea in this example is that the SP system allows information to be
carried from the syntactic part of the knowledge structure to the semantic part
and it allows the ordering of information to change from one part to the other.
There seems no reason to suppose that this basic capability could not also be
applied to examples in which the syntax and the semantics are more elaborate
and more realistic.
Codes, meanings and the production of language from
meanings
In Section 3.8, we saw how the SP system could be used to produce a sentence,
given a short code for that sentence supplied as New. That example shows in
general terms how the system may be used for language production as well as
language analysis but it seems unlikely that there would be many applications
where there would be a requirement for the production of sentences purely in
terms of their syntax and encodings of that syntax. In practice, it is more likely
that one would wish to create sentences on the basis of intended meanings.
One possibility is that meanings might serve as codes for syntax and be used
for language production in the way described in Section 3.8. In support of this
view, we seem to remember what people have said in terms of meanings that
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were expressed rather than the words that were used to express them. And
we can often reconstruct the words that people have used from the meanings
that we remember—although there may be an element of lossy compression here
because the reconstruction is not always accurate.
Although this view has attractions, it conflicts with the idea described in
Section 2.3 that many words in natural language, especially ‘content’ words
like ‘table’, ‘house’ etc, may be seen as relatively short identifiers for relatively
complex semantic concepts and that a sentence may be seen as a compressed
representation of its meanings.
How might these two views be reconciled? A working hypothesis in this pro-
gramme of research is that there are internal codes for non-syntactic semantic
concepts that are distinct from the words and other surface forms of natural
language that serve as external codes for meanings in written or spoken com-
munication. In this view, when we remember what someone has said in terms
of meanings, we remember internal codes for those meanings, distinct from the
concepts themselves. If someone tells us that “The horse is in the field”, it is
unlikely that we copy our entire knowledge of ‘the horse’ into association with
our knowledge of ‘the field’. It is much more likely that we construct a repre-
sentation of that situation in terms of codes for those concepts, not the concepts
themselves. And, by hypothesis, those codes are distinct from the verbal ‘codes’
used in the original sentence.
Figure 5.19 shows how, via the building of an multiple alignment, a sen-
tence may be derived from the pattern ‘KISSED MARY JOHN’, representing
an ‘internal’ code for the meaning to be expressed. The alignment is the best
alignment created by SP61 with that pattern in New and the same grammar in
Old as was used for the example in Figure 5.18. In the top part of the alignment,
the words ‘john’, ‘kissed’, and ‘mary’ appear, in that order. If we strip out the
‘service’ symbols in the alignment, we have the sentence corresponding to the
semantic representation in column 0.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the SP system may be applied to the representa-
tion of natural language structures and the processing of those structures in the
analysis and production of sentences. The framework can accommodate recur-
sion, ambiguity and context-sensitive aspects of natural language syntax and it
shows promise for the integration of syntax with semantics.
Outstanding questions include how best to represent discontinuous depen-
dencies in syntax, and whether or how the system may handle cross-serial de-
pendencies in syntax.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
SM
S --- S
AR ---------------- AR
NP --- NP
1 ---------- 1
john
#NP -- #NP
#AR --------------- #AR
AN ------------------------------- AN
V1 ---------- V1
V --------- V
0 ------ 0
kissed
#V -------- #V
#V1 --------- #V1
#AN ------------------------------ #AN
OBJ ------------------------------------------- OBJ
NP ------------------------------------- NP
2 ---- 2
mary
#NP ------------------------------------ #NP
#OBJ ------------------------------------------ #OBJ
#S -- #S
A ------------------ A
X ----------------------------------------------------------- X
an ----- an
0 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 0
KISSED - KISSED
#an ---- #an
#X ---------------------------------------------------------- #X
Y ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Y
obj --------- obj
1 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1
MARY -------------------------- MARY
#obj -------- #obj
#Y ----------------------------------------------------------------------- #Y
Z -------------------------------------------- Z
ar --- ar
0 ------------------------------------- 0
JOHN ------------------- JOHN
#ar -- #ar
#Z ------------------------------------------- #Z
#A ----------------- #A
#SM
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Figure 5.19: The best alignment created by SP61 with ‘KISSED MARY JOHN’
in New and the same grammar in Old as was used for the example shown in
Figure 5.18.
Chapter 6
Pattern Recognition and
Information Retrieval
6.1 Introduction
From at least as far back as the 1970s, it has been recognised that pattern
recognition may be understood as information compression (Watanabe, 1972).
At first sight, pattern recognition and information compression may seem un-
related but a little reflection shows the connection. In order to recognise some-
thing, incoming sensory data must be matched with a stored ‘engram’ or record
of the thing to be recognised. It is possible, of course, that the incoming data is
stored independently of the record with which it has been matched. However,
it seems much more likely that we merge or unify the sensory data with the
stored record and encode it in terms of that record. This achieves information
compression as described in Section 2.2.
This chapter includes a (shortish) section on information retrieval because
there are many similarities between pattern recognition and information re-
trieval. When we recognise something, we necessarily retrieve stored informa-
tion about the thing that we have recognised. Any kind of ‘query’ must make a
connection with stored information in much the same way that a pattern to be
recognised must connect with stored records of things that may be recognised.
This can be seen most clearly in the case of ‘query-by-example’ in which the
query has the same general form as the stored records but with gaps where
information is needed.
As we shall see in this chapter and the one that follows, recognition and
retrieval are intimately related to (probabilistic) reasoning. This three-way con-
nection may be referred to as ‘recognition-retrieval-and-reasoning’.
The chapter presents a selection of examples of the ways in which pattern
recognition and information retrieval may be modelled in the SP system, in-
cluding simple ‘fuzzy’ pattern recognition, best-match information retrieval,
and indirection in information retrieval, recognition with class-inclusion rela-
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tions and part-whole relations, polythetic (family resemblance) concepts, and
medical diagnosis.
6.2 Scene analysis, fuzzy pattern recognition,
best-match information retrieval and
multiple alignment
A prominent feature of human perception is our ability to recognise things
despite distortions or ‘noise’ of various kinds. Consider, for example, how we
perceive a typical scene. We may see a tree, behind which is parked a car which
is itself in front of a house. With no conscious effort we immediately recognise
the car as a car and the house as a house despite the fact that part of the car is
obscured by the tree and part of the house is obscured by the tree and the car.
Not only can we recognise a whole object or pattern from a sub-set of its
parts but, within wide limits, it normally does not matter very much which
parts we see and which are obscured. We can also cope with other kinds of
distortion in things that we recognise. Even if the car had an extra wheel at the
front or back, we would probably still recognise it as a car provided it retained
a reasonable number of car-like features. And we would still recognise a tree as
a tree even if some of the branches had been replaced by balloons. In short, we
have a robust ability to recognise things in a ‘fuzzy’ manner that can cope with
errors of omission, commission or substitution.
This process of recognising objects in a scene using information that is incom-
plete or distorted—so familiar and so apparently effortless—may be interpreted
in terms of multiple alignment. Figure 6.1 shows a multiple alignment which
represents, schematically, how the scene described above is recognised.
0 h h x h h c c c t t t c c c c h x h h h 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | t t t | | | | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
2 | | | | c c c c c c c c c c | | | | 2
| | | | | | | |
3 h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h h 3
Figure 6.1: A multiple alignment illustrating schematically the recognition of a
house, car and tree. The top row represents the scene as it is projected onto the
retina of one eye. Row 1 (‘t’) represents a record in memory for the appearance
of a tree. Rows 2 and 3 represent similar records for a car (‘c’) and a house
(‘h’). The two instances of ‘x’ in the figure represent errors of addition and
substitution.
The symbols ‘t’, ‘c’ and ‘h’ represent elements of the tree, car and house,
respectively. The top row represents an image of the scene as it appears on
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the retina of one eye. The three rows below represent three stored patterns
corresponding to the three types of object. The two instances of ‘x’ represent
errors of addition and substitution. There is also an error of omission on the
right.
There is, of course, much more to the recognition process than is conveyed by
the figure. But, for recognition to occur, there must be a mapping between ele-
ments of the image and elements of the stored patterns. The multiple alignment
shown in Figure 6.1 captures the overall structure of that mapping.
Current computer models of the SP system are restricted to one-dimensional
patterns. For applications like scene analysis, the SP concepts would need to
be generalised to patterns in two dimensions with corresponding developments
in the computer models. This is something for the future (see Chapter 13).
Fuzzy recognition of words
Given a dictionary of correctly-spelled words, SP61 is able to recognise
incorrectly-spelled words in fuzzy manner much like a system for spelling check-
ing and correction. However, by contrast with most spelling checkers, the model
can bridge arbitrarily large sequences of unmatched letters.
In the example shown here, words are treated as simple flat patterns without
any internal structure. This is not strictly correct (many words may be seen to
contain more or less discrete ‘morphemes’ and there are always smaller struc-
tures such as ‘phonemes’) but for a preliminary illustration of fuzzy pattern
recognition in the SP system, it is convenient to treat words as simple patterns.
There are many examples throughout this book (starting with the examples in
Section 3.4) that demonstrate how the system can accommodate patterns with
rich internal structure.
SP61 has been run using the thoroughly mis-spelled ‘word’, ‘e p e r i m a n
t a t x p i u n’ as New and, as Old, a small dictionary of words that vary in
their similarity with that pattern. Each word in Old was assigned a notional
frequency of occurrence so that relative values corresponded roughly with their
subjective rate of use in ordinary English.
Figure 6.2 shows a selection of the multiple alignments formed by SP61
in order of their compression scores (calculated as described in Section 3.5).
Notice that the system is able to find good matches between patterns despite
the omission, addition or substitution of symbols.
It is pertinent to point out that, in the small dictionary of words which was
used as Old, the words ‘e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n’ and ‘c o m p u t a t i o
n’ were assigned the same notional frequency of occurrence (10,000). Thus the
relatively high CD of multiple alignment (a) compared with multiple alignment
(c) is not due to differences in frequency between the two words from Old. It
is due to the fact that the best multiple alignment encodes more symbols from
New than the other multiple alignment.
In general, these results accord with our intuition that the ‘correct’ form of
‘e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n’ is ‘e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n’, that ‘c o m p u t
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0 e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n 0
| | | | | | | | | | | |
1 < E3 e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n > 1
(a) CD = 926.18
0 e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < E3 e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n > 1
(b) CD = 573.08
0 e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n 0
| | | | | |
1 < C1 c o m p u t a t i o n > 1
(c) CD = 467.21
0 e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n 0
| | | | | |
1 < I3 i n f o r m a t i o n > 1
(d) CD = 434.59
0 e p e r i m a n t a t x p i u n 0
| |
1 < U1 u n t a n g l e s > 1
(e) CD = 182.38
Figure 6.2: The best four multiple alignments formed by SP61 between ‘e p e
r i m a n t a t x p i u n’ and words in a small dictionary. The CD for each
multiple alignment is shown below the multiple alignment.
a t i o n’ and ‘i n f o r m a t i o n’ are similar in some respects, and that ‘u n t
a n g l e s’ is much less similar.
6.3 Best-match information retrieval
SP61 can also be used for the retrieval of information from a ‘database’ in
the manner of query-by-example. Figure 6.3 shows the best three multiple
alignments found with a ‘query’ pattern in New (‘Name John Jones #Name
Address New #Address’) and patterns in Old that are analogous to records in
a database.
As in a conventional database, retrieval of a complete record from an incom-
plete query enables one to read off information that was not in the query. From
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0 1 0 1 0 1
Name ----- Name Name ----- Name Name ----- Name
John ----- John John ----- John John Mary
Jones ---- Jones Jones Smith Jones ---- Jones
#Name ---- #Name #Name ---- #Name #Name ---- #Name
Address -- Address Address -- Address Address -- Address
54 6 New 20
New ------ New New ------ New Old
Road Street Street
#Address - #Address #Address - #Address #Address - #Address
Town Town Town
Anytown Oldsville Countytown
#Town #Town #Town
County County County
Coastshire Ruralshire Urbanshire
#County #County #County
Telephone Telephone Telephone
05718 01234 09876
638945 567890 543210
#Telephone #Telephone #Telephone
0 1 0 1 0 1
(a) CD = 558.41 (b) CD = 470.11 (c) CD = 381.81
Figure 6.3: The three best multiple alignments found by SP61 between the New
pattern ‘Name John Jones #Name Address New #Address’ in column 0 (the
‘query’ pattern) and three different Old patterns in column 1 (‘records’ in a
‘database’). The CD for each multiple alignment is shown at the bottom.
the first multiple alignment in the figure, we can obtain the full street address
for John Jones, his home town and county, and his telephone number.
Indirection in information retrieval
A common problem with the simpler kinds of system for information retrieval is
that relevant material will not be found if, in the query which is used to initiate
the search, the query term (or terms) does not appear in the index, title or body
of that relevant material. For example, the focus of interest may be ‘parallel
processing’, but this term will not retrieve relevant material if that material is
indexed by or uses the term ‘concurrency’ instead of ‘parallel processing’.
Figure 6.4 shows a small knowledge base in which the first four patterns
represent bodies of information about ‘sleep’, ‘theory of knowledge’, ‘luggage’
and ‘concurrency’. At the bottom is shown four patterns from a thesaurus where
each pattern contains one of the four terms just mentioned, together with one
or more synonyms for that term.
The best multiple alignment formed with this knowledge base in Old and
the pattern ‘parallel processing’ in New is shown at the top of Figure 6.5. Below
it is the one other multiple alignment in the reference set of multiple alignments
for the best multiple alignment. The relative probabilities of the two multiple
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sleep ... information_about_sleep ... #sl (500)
theory of knowledge ... information_about_TOK ... #tk (800)
luggage ... information_about_luggage ... #lg (200)
concurrency ... information_about_concurrency ... #cy (400)
...
sleep #sl nap #np kip #kp (1)
epistemology #ey theory of knowledge #tk (1)
luggage #lg baggage #bg (1)
concurrency #cy parallel processing #pp (1)
Figure 6.4: A small knowledge base, including patterns representing entries in
a thesaurus.
alignments are 0.9878 and 0.0122 respectively.
0 parallel processing 0
| |
1 concurrency #cy parallel processing 1
(a)
0 parallel processing 0
| |
1 concurrency #cy parallel processing 1
| |
2 concurrency ... info_about_concurrency ... #cy 2
(b)
Figure 6.5: The best multiple alignment and the one other multiple alignment
in its reference set formed by SP61 with the patterns from Figure 6.4 in Old
and the pattern ‘parallel processing’ in New.
The best multiple alignment shows that ‘concurrency’ is associated with
‘parallel processing’. This is not entirely without interest or usefulness but
it does not tell us anything about the technical or other aspects of parallel
processing. However, the second multiple alignment in Figure 6.5 contains a
pattern with ‘information about concurrency’ which, we may suppose is much
closer to what we are looking for.
Although the relative probability of the second multiple align-
ment is only 0.0122 (and likewise for the the pattern ‘concurrency
... information about concurrency ... #cy’ and the symbol ‘informa-
tion about concurrency’), this is the best of the ‘sub-optimal’ inferences made
by the system.
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6.4 Class-inclusion relations, part-whole
relations and inheritance of attributes
Figure 6.6 shows some patterns representing a hierarchy of classes from ‘animal’
at the top level through the classes ‘mammal’ and ‘bird’ to relatively low-level
classes such as ‘cat’ and ‘robin’. At the lowest level are the individual animals
‘Tibs’ and ‘Tweety’.
As in object-oriented computer languages, each class in the figure is linked
to its parent class (if any) by including the relevant symbol or symbols for
the parent class in the definition of the child class. The pattern for ‘mammal’
contains the symbols ‘A’ and ‘#A’. These match the ID-symbols for the pattern
that describes the class ‘animal’ and they express the fact that a mammal is
an animal. Likewise, the pattern for ‘cat’ contains the symbols ‘M’ and ‘#M’
showing that a cat is a mammal. And the pattern for ‘Tibs’ contains the symbols
‘C’ and ‘#C’ showing that it is a cat.
Apart from symbols of that kind, each pattern contains symbols representing
attributes of the corresponding class. An animal (in this simplified scheme) has
a head, body and legs and it eats, breathes and has senses. Apart from being an
animal, a mammal is furry and warm-blooded and, apart from being a mammal,
a cat has such attributes as carnassial teeth and retractile claws. Three dots in
each pattern (‘...’) show that there are other attributes that have been omitted
to avoid cluttering the example unnecessarily.
!A animal head #head body #body legs #legs eats
breathes has-senses ... !#A
!M mammal A #A furry warm-blooded ... !#M
!C cat M !head carnassial-teeth !#head !legs
retractile-claws !#legs #M purrs ... !#C
!T Tibs C !body white-bib !#body #C tabby ... !#T
!R reptile A #A cold-blooded scaly-skin ... !#R
!B bird A body wings feathers #body #A can-fly ... !#B
!Rb robin B #B red-breast ... !#Rb
!Tw Tweety R #R ... !#Tw
Figure 6.6: Patterns representing the class ‘animal’ with some of its sub-classes,
including individual animals ‘Tibs’ and ‘Tweety’.
Class-inclusion relations, part-whole relations and
multiple alignment
Figure 6.7 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 between the pattern
‘white-bib eats furry purrs’ in New with the patterns from Figure 6.6 in Old.
A multiple alignment like this may be interpreted as the result of a process of
recognition. An unknown entity with the attributes ‘white-bib eats furry purrs’
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0 1 2 3 4
T
Tibs
C ---------------- C
cat
M ------------ M
mammal
A ---------- A
animal
head ---------------------- head
carnassial-teeth
#head --------------------- #head
body ----------------------------------------- body
white-bib ------------------------------------------------ white-bib
#body ---------------------------------------- #body
legs ---------------------- legs
retractile-claws
#legs --------------------- #legs
eats ------ eats
breathes
has-senses
...
#A --------- #A
furry ------------------ furry
warm-blooded
...
#M ----------- #M
purrs --------------------------------- purrs
...
#C --------------- #C
tabby
...
#T
0 1 2 3 4
Figure 6.7: The best multiple alignment found by SP61, between the pattern
‘white-bib eats furry purrs’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 6.6 in Old.
has been recognised as ‘Tibs’ (column 4). At the same time, it is recognised as
a cat (column 3), as a mammal (column 2), and as an animal (column 1).
Inheritance of attributes
From a multiple alignment like the one shown in Figure 6.7, it is possible to
infer that the entity that has been recognised has a tabby colouration (from
the pattern for ‘Tibs’) and retractile claws (from the pattern for ‘cat’), that
it is warm-blooded (from the pattern for ‘mammal’) and that it breathes and
has senses (from the pattern for ‘animal’). In short, the process of recognition
achieves the effect of inheritance of attributes in the manner of object-oriented
design.
This kind of inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy is a simple but
important form of inference or reasoning—part of the recognition-retrieval-and-
reasoning constellation mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. In Chapter
7, we shall see how several other kinds of probabilistic reasoning may be mod-
elled in the SP framework. And Chapter 10 discusses how similar principles
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may provide an interpretation for the ‘exact’ forms of reasoning associated with
mathematics and logic.
Integration of class-inclusion relations and part-whole relations
The multiple alignment in Figure 6.7 not only shows a hierarchy of classes
with ‘animal’ at the highest level and ‘Tibs’ at the bottom but it also shows
the division of the recognised entity into parts and sub-parts. At the level of
‘animal’, it has a ‘head’, a ‘body’ and some ‘legs’. Additional information about
the structure of those parts is provided at lower levels in the class hierarchy. At
the level of ‘cat’, the head contains ‘carnassial-teeth’ and associated with the
legs are the ‘retractile-claws’. At the level of ‘Tibs’ the body has a white bib.
It should be clear that the breakdown of an entity into its parts and sub-parts
may be elaborated in much more detail than is shown in this simple example.
Notice that there is no artificial distinction between ‘class’ and ‘object’ or
between the ‘attribute’ of a class and a ‘part’ of an object, as described in
Section 1.3. The multiple alignment scheme allows the integration of class-
inclusion relations with part-whole relations as envisaged at the outset of this
project (see also Section 6.4, below).
Cross classification and multiple inheritance
‘Natural’ objects and classes that we recognise in everyday speaking and think-
ing often have more than one parent class: one person may be both a ‘woman’
and a ‘doctor’, another person may be both a ‘man’ and a ‘footballer’, and so
on. In this kind of ‘cross classification’ or ‘multiple inheritance’, the parent
classes overlap each other without one being a sub-class of the other.
The SP system can accommodate this kind of relationship between classes
quite simply. If an entity or class belongs in two or more parent classes, it is
merely necessary for the corresponding pattern to include references to those
parent classes. This can be seen in Figure 6.8 where someone called ‘John’ is
recognised as being a member of the class ‘doctor’ and also a member of the
class ‘male’.
As with our previous example, various attributes can be inferred from the
multiple alignment that were not directly observed as ‘New’. We can infer that
John has the qualifications and other attributes of his profession (represented
only by ‘...’ in this multiple alignment) and that he has male attributes such
as a beard and a deep voice (no attempt has been made here to model the
possibility that John might be a child).
Notice how the attribute ‘beard’ has been tied in to the ‘chin’ part of ‘head’
(column 2), while the attribute ‘deep’ is linked to ‘voice’ in the pattern for
‘person’ (column 4). Notice also how John’s male gender (column 5) has, in
effect, been inferred from the association between the name ‘John’ and the
attribute ‘male’ (column 6).
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
john1
person -- person
name ---- name
John -------- John ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- John
Smith
#name --- #name
gender ------------------------------------------------------------- gender
male ---- male
...
#gender ------------------------------------------------------------ #gender
profession -- profession
doctor
stethoscope ------------------------- stethoscope
black-bag ...
#profession - #profession
head ------------------------------------------------------ head
hair -------------- hair
hcolour --- hcolour
fair-hair ----------------------------------------- fair-hair
#hcolour -- #hcolour
length
#length
#hair ------------- #hair
eyes --- eyes
pupil
iris --------------------------------------------------------------------- iris
whites
#eyes -- #eyes
nose
#nose
mouth
#mouth
chin --- chin
beard
#chin -- #chin
...
#head ----------------------------------------------------- #head
body
#body
legs
#legs
voice -------------------------------------------------------------- voice
deep
#voice ------------------------------------------------------------- #voice
town ---- town
Dorking ----- Dorking
#town --- #town
...
#person - #person
#john1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 6.8: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with patterns representing
classes related to ‘person’ in Old and the pattern ‘John stethoscope black-bag fair-hair
iris Dorking’ in New.
Polythetic or ‘family resemblance’ classes
It is widely recognised that many of the ‘natural’ categories that we use in
everyday thinking are ‘polythetic’ meaning that, for each such category, no
single attribute is necessarily present in every member of the given category
and there need be no single attribute that is exclusive to that category (Sokal
and Sneath, 1973). In Wittgenstein’s phrase, members of this type of category
have a ‘family resemblance’ to each other.
The SP system can accommodate this type of category in two different ways
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that may operate individually or together:
• As we saw in Section 6.2, the dynamic programming that is built into
the system (Appendix A) enables it to recognise patterns despite errors of
omission, commission or substitution. This means that recognition does
not depend on the presence (or absence) of any one feature. Because the
system looks for the best overall match between patterns, recognition does
not require that any one category should have any feature that is exclusive
to that category.
• As we saw in Section 3.4, SP patterns can function in a manner that is
equivalent to a context-free phrase-structure grammar. Any system with
that capability (or more) can be used to define categories in which no single
attribute need be found in all members of the category and no attribute
need be exclusive to that category.
To illustrate this last point, consider the following simple grammar:
S → 1 2
1 → A
1 → B
2 → C
2 → D
This defines the set of two-letter strings {AC, AD, BC, BD}. Notice that no
single attribute (letter) is found in all the members of this category. And none
of the letters need be exclusive to this category. Since the SP system can model
this type of grammar, it can model polythetic categories.
In this connection, it is pertinent to say that, while the system can accom-
modate categories of that kind, it is not constrained to operate only in that
way. It is easy enough within the SP system to create categories in which one
or more features (or combination of features) are necessary for the recognition
of a category or sufficient for that recognition or both these things.
Objects, classes and metaclasses
By contrast with most object-oriented systems, the SP system makes no formal
distinction between ‘class’ and ‘object’. This accords with the observation that
what we perceive to be an individual object, such as ‘Tibs’, can itself be seen
to represent a variety of possibilities: ‘Tibs playing with a ball’, ‘Tibs catching
a mouse’, ‘Tibs when he is sleeping’, and so on. A pattern like the one shown
in column 4 of Figure 6.7 could easily function as a class with vacant slots to
be filled at a more specific level by details of the activity that Tibs is engaged
in, whether he is well-fed or hungry, happy or sad, and so on. This flexibility is
lost in systems that do make a formal distinction between classes and objects.
Making a formal distinction between objects and classes points to the need
for the concept of a ‘metaclass’:
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“If each object is an instance of a class, and a class is an object,
the [object-oriented] model should provide the notion of metaclass.
A metaclass is the class of a class.” (Bertino et al., 2001, p. 43).
This construct has been introduced in some AI systems so that classes can be
derived from metaclasses in the same way that objects are derived from classes.
Of course, this logic points to the need for ‘metametaclasses’, ‘metametameta-
classes’, and so on without limit. Because the SP system makes no distinction
between ‘object’ and ‘class’, there is no need for the concept of ‘metaclass’ or
anything beyond it. All these constructs are represented by patterns.
6.5 Medical diagnosis
The problem of providing computational support for medical diagnosis has been
approached from many directions including logical reasoning, set theory, rough
set theory, if-then rules, Bayesian networks, artificial neural networks, case-
based reasoning, possibility theory, and others. This section describes how
medical diagnosis, viewed as a problem of pattern recognition, may be modelled
in the SP system.
In the SP scheme, knowledge about diseases may be stored as patterns in Old
and the signs and symptoms for an individual patient (abbreviated hereinafter
as ‘symptoms’) may be represented as a New pattern. A pattern in Old may
represent one disease and its associated symptoms or it may represent a cluster
of symptoms that tend to occur together in two or more different diseases (see
Section 6.5, below). In addition, Old may include patterns that play supporting
roˆles (see Section 6.5, below).
Associated with each pattern in Old is an integer value reflecting the fre-
quency with which a given disease or cluster of symptoms is found in a given
population. These figures may be derived from population surveys or they may
be estimated by medical experts.
The process of diagnosis may be modelled by the building of one or more
multiple alignments. Figure 6.9 shows the best multiple alignment created by
SP61 with a New pattern describing a fictional ‘John Smith’ and his symptoms
and a set of patterns in Old, provided by the user, that represent diseases or
aspects of diseases.
A multiple alignment like this may be interpreted as the result of a process
of recognition. In this case, the symptoms that have been recognised are those
of influenza, as shown in column 1. The following subsections discuss aspects
of the multiple alignment and of this interpretation.
Ordering of symptoms
As noted in Section 3.4, there are some applications where one might wish
to treat New information as an unordered set of patterns or as an unordered
or partially-ordered set of symbols. Medical diagnosis seems to be one such
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application because it is not obvious that there is any intrinsic order to the
symptoms of a disease: ‘high temperature’ may precede ‘runny nose’ but, equally
well, it might come after.
Given that a patient’s symptoms are specified in a single pattern in New,
and given that that pattern represents a sequence of symbols, one can achieve
the effect of unordered symptoms by using a ‘framework’ pattern (mentioned in
Section 3.4) that defines an arbitrary order for disjunctive classes of symptom
that may be found across the range of diseases described by the patterns in
Old. An example of such a framework pattern is shown in Figure 6.9, column
2. Within that pattern, a pair of symbols such as ‘ap #ap’ provides a slot for
alternative states of a patient’s appetite. Likewise, the pair of symbols ‘br #br’
provides a slot for different kinds of breathing—‘rapid’, ‘laboured’, ‘normal’ and
so on. Provided that corresponding pairs of symbols are used in other patterns
in Old, and provided that classes of symptoms are always specified in the defined
order, appropriate multiple alignments can be built.
Clusters of symptoms
It is quite usual in medicine for a cluster of two or more symptoms that occur in
two or more different diseases to be given a name. For example, the name ‘fever’
provides a conveniently brief shorthand for the symptoms ‘high temperature’,
‘flushed face’ and ‘rapid breathing’ that feature in several different diseases.
Two such clusters are shown in Figure 6.9. The symptoms of fever are
shown in column 4 while column 3 shows a cluster of symptoms associated with
influenza and other diseases such as smallpox (see below). Notice that fever is
itself part of the influenza cluster.
Notice also how the provision of a named cluster saves the need to specify
the corresponding symptoms redundantly in each of the diseases where that
cluster appears.
Uncertainties in diagnosis
Diagnosis is not an exact process. Although some symptoms may be necessary
or sufficient for the diagnosis of a given disease, the majority are merely ‘charac-
teristic’ in the sense that they are associated with the disease but any one such
symptom need not be present in every case and any of them may be associated
with other diseases. There may also be errors in the observation or recording of
symptoms.
In broad terms, SP61 can accommodate this kind of uncertainty in diagnosis.
This is because it looks for a global best match amongst patterns and does not
depend on the presence or absence of any particular symptom. At the same
time, particular symptoms can have a major impact on diagnosis, as described
in Section 7.8, below.
Within the SP system, it is not necessary for every symptom of a disease
to be recorded as a specific value. In column 4 of the multiple alignment in
Figure 6.9, the pair of symbols ‘tclass1 #tclass1’ represents a set of alternative
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values for the temperature associated with fever. In this case, there are just
two values, represented in Old by the patterns ‘tclass1 t37-39 #tclass1’ (high
temperature) and ‘tclass1 t39+ #tclass1’ (very high temperature). The first of
these patterns is shown in column 5 of the multiple alignment, matched to the
temperature of the patient shown in column 0.
Weighing alternative hypotheses
In medical diagnosis, it is quite usual for the physician to consider alterna-
tive hypotheses about what disease or diseases the patient may be suffering
from. The SP system provides a model for this process in the way the system
builds alternative multiple alignments for any given pattern in New, each with
a compression score calculated as described in Section 3.5. Notice that the com-
pression score depends in part on the frequency values for patterns mentioned
at the beginning of Section 6.5.
As described in Section 3.7, each multiple alignment has an absolute prob-
ability. And for each multiple alignment in a set of alternative multiple align-
ments that encode the same symbols from New, a relative probability (pREL)
may also be calculated.
Where alternative multiple alignments encode different subsets of the sym-
bols in New, CD seems to be the most appropriate measure for the purpose of
comparison. Where two or more multiple alignments encode exactly the same
symbols from New, they may be compared using relative probabilities.
When SP61 formed the multiple alignment shown in Figure 6.9, it also
formed a similar multiple alignment, matching exactly the same symbols in
New, in which column 2 contained a pattern representing the symptoms of
smallpox, instead of the pattern for influenza. The pREL values calculated in
this case were 0.99950 for influenza and 0.00049 for smallpox, reflecting the
relative frequencies of those two diseases in the world today.
‘Explaining away’
The symptoms of influenza and smallpox are quite similar, except for the very
distinctive rash and blisters that occur in smallpox. The example shown in
Figure 6.9 is silent about whether John Smith had a rash and blisters or not.1
Given this lack of information about those symptoms, the probabilities shown
above are reasonable.
If ‘rash with blisters’ is added to the symptoms recorded in New, and SP61
is run again, the best multiple alignment found by the system is similar to that
shown in Figure 6.9 but with the pattern for smallpox in column 2 and with a
match shown for the two instances of ‘rash with blisters’. However, in this case
there is no other multiple alignment that matches the same symbols in New. So
the value of pREL for the best multiple alignment is 1.0.
1If a rash and blisters had been seen to be absent, this would be represented as ‘nor-
mal skin’.
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From this result, we may conclude that the patient certainly has smallpox
and that his aching muscles and runny nose are due to smallpox, not influenza.
This is the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’ discussed in Section 7.8.
A patient may suffer from two or more diseases at the same time
It is entirely possible, of course, for a patient to suffer from two or more diseases
at the same time. In the SP system, a combination of diseases may be treated
as a single disease, represented as a pattern in Old. The pattern may be con-
structed economically as references to the component diseases, as described in
Section 6.5.
As with single diseases, frequency values for a combinations of diseases may
be obtained from population surveys or by the judgement of experts. Where
diseases are statistically independent, these values will of course be very low.
But they can be used for the calculation of CD values and probabilities in
exactly the same way as for single diseases.
Inference and diagnosis
Hypotheses formed in the course of diagnosis often lead to inferences about the
condition of the patient. These inferences may suggest the need to gather more
information from blood tests, X rays or the like. Or they may provide the basis
for prescription, treatment or advice to the patient.
In a multiple alignment like the one shown in Figure 6.9, any symbol within
an Old pattern that is not matched to a symbol in New represents an inference
that may be drawn from the multiple alignment. In this example, we may
infer from the multiple alignment inter alia that the patient is likely to have a
cough and a headache and that the standard treatment for influenza is required.
Probabilities of these inferences can be calculated as described in Section 3.7.
Causal reasoning
Apart from the kinds of inference just described, medical diagnosis often seems
to involve a ‘deeper’ kind of reasoning about the causes of symptoms and dis-
eases, using knowledge of anatomy and physiology.
No attempt has yet been made with the SP system to model this kind of
medical reasoning. However, as we shall see in Section 7.9, the SP system can
be used to model causal diagnosis in other contexts and there seems no reason
in principle why it should not also be applied to reasoning about the causes of
medical conditions.
6.6 Conclusion
As we have seen, the SP system allows the recognition or retrieval of patterns
despite errors of omission, commission or substitution. It also allows recog-
nition or retrieval with class-inclusion relations (and cross-classification) and
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their integration with part-whole relations. The system can model polythetic
categories and it supports indirection in information retrieval. An example has
been presented showing how the system may provide computational support for
medical diagnosis, viewed as a problem of pattern recognition.
We have noted the close recognition-retrieval-and-reasoning connection be-
tween recognition, retrieval and reasoning and we have touched briefly on the
last of these three in Sections 6.5, 6.5 and 6.5. In the next chapter, we look in
more detail at the ways in which the SP system supports probabilistic reasoning.
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0 1 2 3 4 5
disease
D ------------------- D
flu
: ------------------- :
patient ---------------------------------- patient
john_smith
#patient --------------------------------- #patient
diagnosis ----------- diagnosis
poor_appetite influenza
#diagnosis ---------- #diagnosis
R1 ------------------ R1
flu_symptoms --------------------------- flu_symptoms
#R1 ----------------- #R1
R2 --------------- R2
fever -------- fever
#R2 -------------- #R2
ap ------------------ ap
normal_appetite
#ap ----------------- #ap
br ------------------------------ br
rapid_breathing ------------------------------------------------------------ rapid_breathing
#br ----------------------------- #br
chst ---------------- chst
normal_chest
#chst --------------- #chst
chl -------------- chl
has_chills -------------------------------------------------- has_chills
#chl ------------- #chl
cgh -------------- cgh
has_cough
#cgh ------------- #cgh
dh ------------------ dh
no_diarrhoea
#dh ----------------- #dh
fc ------------------------------ fc
flushed_face --------------------------------------------------------------- flushed_face
#fc ----------------------------- #fc
ftg ----------------- ftg
tired no_fatigue
#ftg ---------------- #ftg
hd --------------- hd
has_headache
#hd -------------- #hd
ln ------------------ ln
normal_lymph_nodes - normal_lymph_nodes
#ln ----------------- #ln
mls ----------------- mls
no_malaise --------- no_malaise
#mls ---------------- #mls
msl -------------- msl
muscle_aches ------------------------------------------------ muscle_aches
#msl ------------- #msl
ns --------------- ns
runny_nose -------------------------------------------------- runny_nose
#ns -------------- #ns
skn ----------------- skn
normal_skin
#skn ---------------- #skn
tmp ----------------------------- tmp
tclass1 --------- tclass1
t37-39 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- t37-39
#tclass1 -------- #tclass1
#tmp ---------------------------- #tmp
thr -------------- thr
sore_throat ------------------------------------------------- sore_throat
#thr ------------- #thr
wt ------------------ wt
no_weight_change
#wt ----------------- #wt
causative_agent ----- causative_agent
influenza_virus
#causative_agent ---- #causative_agent
treatment ----------- treatment
influenza_treatment
#treatment ---------- #treatment
#D ------------------ #D
#disease
0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6.9: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with a pattern de-
scribing a patient’s symptoms in New and a set of patterns in Old describing a
range of different diseases and named clusters of symptoms, together with the
‘framework’ pattern shown in column 2.
Chapter 7
Probabilistic Reasoning1
7.1 Introduction
Quoting Benjamin Franklin (“Nothing is certain but death and taxes”), Gins-
berg (1994) writes (p. 2) that: “The view that Franklin was expressing is that
virtually every conclusion we draw [in reasoning] is an uncertain one.” He goes
on to say: “This sort of reasoning in the face of uncertainty... has ... proved to
be remarkably difficult to formalise.”
This chapter shows how various kinds of probabilistic reasoning may be
performed within the SP system.
‘Reasoning’ and ‘inference’
Before we proceed, some clarification is necessary for the meanings of the terms
reasoning and inference as they will be used in this book.
‘Reasoning’ will be used to mean any process of “going beyond the informa-
tion given”. In most forms of ‘deductive’ reasoning, conclusions are either ‘true’
or ‘false’, whereas in ‘probabilistic reasoning’, conclusions have some kind of
‘probability’ or level of confidence attaching to them, e.g., “Black clouds mean
that it will probably rain”.
All-or-nothing deductive reasoning as it appears in logic will not be con-
sidered in this chapter, except in passing. Chapter 10 considers how logic and
mathematics may be understood in terms of information compression and, more
specifically, the SP theory.
As it is normally used, the term ‘inference’ has three distinct but related
meanings:
• It is sometimes used to mean a process of constructing a grammar or other
kind of knowledge structure by ‘induction’ from a body of ‘raw’ data.
1Based in part on Wolff (1999b).
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• It is also often used with essentially the same meaning as probabilistic
reasoning as described above.
• It may also be used to refer to the result or product of a process of prob-
abilistic reasoning.
Inference of the first kind is the main subject of Chapter 9. Only the second
and third of these notions of inference will be considered in this chapter.
Related research and novelty of the present proposals
There is now a huge literature on probabilistic reasoning and related ideas rang-
ing over ‘standard’ parametric and non-parametric statistics, ad hoc uncertainty
measures in early expert systems, Bayesian statistics, Bayesian/belief/causal
networks, Markov networks, Self-Organising Feature Maps, fuzzy set theory
and ‘soft’ computing’, the Dempster-Shaffer theory, abductive reasoning, non-
monotonic reasoning and reasoning with default values, autoepistemic logic,
defeasible logic, possibilistic and other kinds of logic designed to accommodate
uncertainty, MLE, algorithmic probability and algorithmic complexity theory,
truth maintenance systems, decision analysis, utility theory, and more.
A well-known and authoritative survey of the field, with an emphasis on
Bayesian networks, is provided by Pearl (1988) although this book is now, per-
haps, in need of some updating (but see Pearl, 2000). A relatively short but use-
ful review of “uncertainty handling formalisms” appears in Parsons and Hunter
(1998). Regarding the application of different kinds of ‘logic’ to nonmonotonic
and uncertain reasoning, there is a mine of useful information in the articles
in Gabbay et al. (1994) covering such things as ‘default logic’, ‘autoepistemic
logic’, ‘circumscription’, ‘defeasible logic’, ‘uncertainty logics’ and ‘possibilistic
logic’. In that volume, the chapter by Ginsberg (1994) provides an excellent in-
troduction to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. Papers by Bondarenko
et al. (1997); Kern-Isberner (1998); Kohlas et al. (1998) are also relevant as are
the papers in Gammerman (1996).
Amongst these many approaches to probabilistic reasoning, the multiple
alignment concept—as it has been developed in the SP system—is distinctive.
Also distinctive is the attempt to integrate probabilistic reasoning with a wide
range of concepts in artificial intelligence, computing, logic and mathematics.
Information compression and probabilistic reasoning
Naturally enough, much of the literature on probabilistic reasoning deals di-
rectly with concepts of probability, especially conditional probability. Since,
however, there is a close connection between probability and compression (as
described in Section 2.2), concepts of probability imply corresponding concepts
of compression.
That said, a primary emphasis on compression rather than probability pro-
vides an alternative perspective on the subject which may prove useful. Relevant
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sources include Dagun and Luby (1997); Grunwald (1997); van der Gaag (1996);
Watanabe (1972).
7.2 Probabilistic reasoning, multiple alignment
and information compression
What connection is there between the formation of a multiple alignment and
probabilistic reasoning? This section describes the connection and the way in
which probabilities of inferences may be derived from multiple alignments.
In the simplest terms, probabilistic reasoning arises from partial pattern
recognition: if a pattern is recognised from a subset of its parts (something
that people and animals are very good at doing), then, in effect, an inference is
made that the unseen part or parts are ‘really’ there. We might, for example,
recognise a car from seeing only the front half because the rear half is hidden
behind another car or a building. The inference that the rear half is present is
probabilistic because there is always a possibility that the rear half is absent
or, in some surreal world, replaced by the front half of a horse, or something
equally bizarre.
In terms of multiple alignment, probabilistic reasoning may be understood
as the formation of a multiple alignment in which one or more symbols in the
Old patterns are not aligned with any matching symbol or symbols in the New
pattern. The probabilities of these symbols (and the inferences that they rep-
resent) are calculated as described in Section 3.7. As a working hypothesis, all
kinds of probabilistic reasoning may be understood in these terms.
Confidence in inferences
The formulae and calculations presented in Section 3.7 may suggest that, given
a system which is equipped with this mathematical machinery, we can calculate
precisely the level of confidence that should be placed in inferences that the
system makes.
This is, of course, nonsense. Any knowledge-based system (including human
brains!) is subject to the law “rubbish in means rubbish out”. In the case of
human experts, we do or should ask whether they were given all the relevant
information about a given case, how well-trained they are, how much experi-
ence they have, whether they have given full attention to the case, and so on.
Artificial systems are no different.
In general, the confidence which we may place in probabilistic inferences
made by a given system should be influenced by several factors including the
accuracy and coverage of the information supplied about a particular case, the
accuracy and coverage of the knowledge stored in the system, the effectiveness
of the search methods used by the system, and the thoroughness of the search
which has been made for a given set of data and inferences.
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A simple example
In order to illustrate the kinds of values that may be calculated for absolute
and relative probabilities, this subsection presents a very simple example: the
inference of ‘fire’ from ‘smoke’. Here, we shall extend the concept of ‘smoke’
to include anything, like mist or fog, which looks like smoke. Also, ‘fire’ has
been divided into three categories: the kind of fire used to heat a house or other
building, dangerous fires that need a fire extinguisher or more, and the kind of
fire inside a burning cigarette or pipe.
Given a New pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’ and the Old
patterns shown in Figure 7.1, SP61 forms the five obvious multiple alignments
of New with each of the patterns which contain the symbol ‘smoke’.
clouds black rain (15,000)
dangerous fire smoke (500)
heating fire smoke (7,000)
tobacco fire smoke (10,000)
fog smoke (2,000)
stage smoke (100)
thunder lightning (5,000)
strawberries cream (1,500)
Figure 7.1: A small knowledge base of associations. The numbers in brackets
show an imaginary frequency of occurrence of each pattern in some notional
reference environment.
The absolute and relative probabilities of the five multiple alignments, cal-
culated as described in Section 3.7, are shown in Table 7.1.
Alignment Absolute Relative
probability probability
smoke/tobacco fire smoke 0.08718 0.51020
smoke/heating fire smoke 0.06103 0.35714
smoke/fog smoke 0.01744 0.10204
smoke/dangerous fire smoke 0.00436 0.02551
smoke/stage smoke 0.00009 0.00510
Table 7.1: Absolute and relative probabilities of each of the five reference multi-
ple alignments formed between ‘smoke’ in New and the patterns shown in Table
7.1 in Old. In this example, the relative probability of each pattern from Old is
the same as the multiple alignment in which it appears.
In this very simple example, the relative probability of each pattern from
Old is the same as for the multiple alignment in which it appears. However, the
same cannot be said of individual symbol types. The relative probabilities of the
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symbol types that appear in any of the five reference multiple alignments are
shown in Table 7.2. The main points to notice about the relative probabilities
shown in this table are:
• The relative probability of ‘smoke’ is 1.0. This is because it is a ‘fact’
which appears in New, so there is no uncertainty attaching to it.
• Of the other symbol types from Old, the one with the highest probability
relative to the other symbols is ‘fire’, and this relative probability is higher
than the relative probability of any of the patterns from Old (Table 7.1).
This is because ‘fire’ appears in three of the reference multiple alignments.
Symbol Relative
probability
smoke 1.00000
fire 0.89286
tobacco 0.51020
heating 0.35714
fog 0.10204
dangerous 0.02551
stage 0.00510
Table 7.2: The relative probabilities of the symbol types from Old that appear
in any of the reference set of multiple alignments shown in Table 7.1.
In this example, we have ignored all the subtle cues that people would use
in practice to infer the origin of smoke: the smell, colour and volume of smoke,
associated noises, behaviour of other people, and so on. Allowing for this, and
allowing for the probable inaccuracy of the frequency values which have been
used, the relative probabilities of multiple alignments, patterns and symbols
seem to reflect the subjective probability which we might assign to the five
alternative sources of smoke-like matter in everyday situations.
7.3 One-step ‘deductive’ reasoning
Consider a ‘standard’ example of modus ponens syllogistic reasoning:
1. ∀x: bird(x) ⇒ canfly(x).
2. bird(Tweety).
3. ∴ canfly(Tweety).
which, in English, may be interpreted as:
1. If something is a bird then it can fly.
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2. Tweety is a bird.
3. Therefore, Tweety can fly.
In classical logic, a ‘material implication’ like (p⇒q) (“If something is a bird
then it can fly”) is equivalent to ¬(p ∧ ¬q) (“It is not true that something is a
bird and it cannot fly”) and to (¬q⇒ ¬p) (“If something cannot fly then it is
not a bird”) and also to (¬p∨q) (“Either something is not a bird or it can fly”).
However, there is a more relaxed, ‘everyday’ kind of ‘deduction’ which, in
terms of our example, may be expressed as: “If something is a bird then, prob-
ably, it can fly. Tweety is a bird. Therefore, probably, Tweety can fly.”
This kind of probabilistic ‘deduction’ differs from material implication be-
cause it does not have the same equivalencies as the classical form. If our focus
of interest is in describing and reasoning about the real world rather than ex-
ploring the properties of abstract systems of symbols, the probabilistic kind of
‘deduction’ seems to be more appropriate. With regard to birds, we know that
there are flightless birds, and for most other examples of a similar kind, an “all
or nothing” logical description would not be an accurate reflection of the facts.
With a pattern of symbols, we may record the fact that birds can fly and,
in a very natural way, we may record all the other attributes of a bird in the
same pattern. The pattern may look something like this:
Bd bird name #name canfly warm-blooded wings feathers ... #Bd,
or the attributes of a bird may be described in the more elaborate way described
in Section 6.4.
This pattern and others of a similar kind may be stored in ‘Old’, together
with patterns like ‘name Tweety #name’, ‘name George #name’, ‘name Susan
#name’ and so on which define the range of possible names. Also, the pattern,
‘bird Tweety’, corresponding to the proposition “Tweety is a bird” may be
supplied as New. Given patterns like these in New and Old, the best multiple
alignment found by SP61 is the one shown in Figure 7.2.
As before, the inferences which are expressed by this multiple alignment are
represented by the unmatched symbols in the multiple alignment. The fact that
Tweety is a bird allows us to infer that Tweety can fly but it also allows us to
infer that Tweety is warm-blooded, has wings and feathers and all the other
attributes of birds. These inferences arise directly from the pattern describing
the attributes of birds.
In this case, there is only one multiple alignment which encodes all the
symbols in New. Therefore, the relative probability of the multiple alignment
is 1.0, the relative probability of ‘canfly’ is 1.0, and likewise for all the other
symbols in the multiple alignment, both those which are matched to New and
those which are not.
At this point readers may wonder whether the SP scheme can handle non-
monotonic reasoning: the fact that additional information about penguins, kiwis
and other flightless birds would invalidate the inference that something being
a bird means that it can fly. The way in which the SP system can perform
nonmonotonic reasoning is described in Section 7.7, below.
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0 1 2
Bd
bird ------------ bird
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
canfly
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd
0 1 2
Figure 7.2: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘bird
Tweety’ in New and other patterns in Old as described in the text.
7.4 Abductive reasoning
In the SP system, any subsequence of a pattern may function as what is ‘given’
in reasoning, with the complementary subsequence functioning as the inference.
Thus, it is just as easy to reason in a ‘backwards’, abductive manner as it
is to reason in a ‘forwards’, deductive manner. We can also reason from the
middle of a pattern outwards, from the ends of a pattern to the middle, and
many other possibilities. In short, the SP system allows seamless integration of
probabilistic ‘deductive’ reasoning with abductive reasoning and other kinds of
reasoning which are not commonly recognised.
Figure 7.3 shows the best multiple alignment and the other member of its
reference set of multiple alignments which are formed by SP61 with the same
patterns in Old as were used in the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning (Section
7.3) and with the pattern ‘Tweety canfly’ in New.
By contrast with the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning, there are two mul-
tiple alignments in the reference set of multiple alignments that encode all the
symbols in New. These two multiple alignments represent two alternative sets
of abductive inferences that may be drawn from this combination of New and
Old.
With regard to the first multiple alignment (Figure 7.3 (a)), ‘Tweety’ could
be a bird with all the attributes of birds, including the ability to fly. The relative
probability of the multiple alignment is 0.74, as is the relative probability of the
pattern for ‘bird’ and every other symbol in that pattern (apart from the ‘name’
and ‘#name’ symbols where the relative probability is 1.0).
Alternatively, we may infer from the second multiple alignment (Figure 7.3
(b)) that ‘Tweety’ could be a bat. But in this case the relative probability of
the multiple alignment, the pattern for ‘bat’ and all the symbols in that pattern
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0 1 2
Bd
bird
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
canfly ---------- canfly
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd
0 1 2
(a)
0 1 2
Bt
bat
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
canfly ---------- canfly
furry
echo-sounding
...
#Bt
0 1 2
(b)
Figure 7.3: The best multiple alignment (a), and the other member of its ref-
erence set of multiple alignments (b), formed by SP61 with patterns in Old as
described in Section 7.3 and with ‘Tweety canfly’ in New.
(apart from the ‘name #name’ symbols) is only 0.26.
7.5 Reasoning with probabilistic decision
networks and decision trees
So far, we have considered examples of reasoning in a single step. One of the
simplest kinds of system that supports reasoning in more than one step (as well
as single step reasoning) is a ‘decision network’ or a ‘decision tree’. In such a
system, a path is traced through the network or tree from a start node to two
or more alternative destination nodes depending on the answers to multiple-
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choice questions at intermediate nodes. Any such network or tree may be given
a probabilistic dimension by attaching a value for probability or frequency to
each of the alternative answers to questions at the intermediate nodes.
Figure 7.4 shows a set of patterns, each of which represents a non-terminal
node of a decision network from a car maintenance manual for diagnosing faults
in a car engine. To save space, the text associated with each pattern has been
omitted. Terminal nodes have also been omitted because, without the text, each
one would contain nothing but a number symbol. Figure 7.5 shows a sample of
the patterns for non-terminal and terminal nodes of the network with the text
for each node included.
In Figure 7.4, each pattern except the pattern for the start node is identified
by the number symbol which appears at the beginning of the pattern, together
with the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question in the parent node. The number
at the end of each pattern identifies the two children of the node.
As usual with an SP knowledge base, each pattern in Figure 7.4 has a fre-
quency of occurrence, shown to the right of each pattern. In the present case,
each frequency is a guestimated frequency of a symptom or symptoms in the
domain of car repair.
Networks and trees: convergence and divergence of links
The patterns in the full network of non-terminal and terminal nodes represent a
network rather than a tree because there is both divergence and convergence of
links. Divergence appears when a node has two or more children while conver-
gence appears where a node has two or more parents (e.g., node 58). Clearly, a
decision tree can be represented by using simple patterns in the same manner as
this example of a decision network, except that there must not be any patterns
which have two or more parents.
Forming multiple alignments: sequential processing of
New
How can this network be used to diagnose a fault in a car engine? In principle,
this means putting the ‘Start’ symbol into New followed by a sequence of ‘yes’
and ‘no’ symbols, putting the patterns from Figure 7.4 into Old, and then
searching for the multiple alignment which represents the best encoding of New
in terms of Old.
This abstract description of how the system may be used is not very
practical—because it leads to inefficient searching (in terms both of speed and
success in finding the ‘correct’ multiple alignment) and because it does not al-
low the questions which are posed by the system to be answered in the kind of
progressive interactive way which is natural for this kind of system.
For these reasons, SP61 has been designed so that, where necessary or appro-
priate, it can be set to search for a good multiple alignment by processing any
pattern in New in sections or ‘windows’, one window at a time, in left-to-right
order, forming intermediate multiple alignments at each stage, as described in
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Start 43 (1202)
43 yes 44 (1043)
44 yes 19 (1009)
19 yes 59 (46)
19 no 1 (963)
1 yes 2 (691)
2 yes 4 (92)
4 yes 58 (36)
4 no 23 (56)
2 no 5 (599)
5 yes 58 (62)
5 no 27 (537)
27 yes 21 (293)
21 yes 61 (84)
21 no 22 (209)
22 yes 24 (24)
22 no 22a (87)
22a yes 35 (44)
35 yes 58 (19)
35 no 26 (25)
22a no 36 (43)
36 yes 58 (21)
36 no 26 (22)
27 no 60 (244)
1 no 3 (272)
3 yes 6 (36)
3 no 7 (236)
7 yes 8 (71)
8 yes 8a (55)
8 no 9 (16)
7 no 10 (165)
10 yes 11 (115)
11 yes 13 (14)
11 no 14 (101)
14 yes 15 (21)
14 no 16 (80)
10 no 12 (50)
44 no 51 (34)
51 yes 56 (14)
51 no 59 (20)
43 no 45 (159)
45 yes 46 (145)
46 yes 52 (120)
52 yes 53 (86)
52 no 54 (34)
54 yes 55 (22)
54 no 50 (12)
46 no 62 (25)
45 no 47 (14)
47 yes 48 (8)
47 no 49 (6)
Figure 7.4: A set of patterns representing the non-terminal nodes of a decision
tree for the diagnosis of faults in a car engine. To save space, the text associated
with each pattern has been omitted. The full version of some of these patterns
can be seen in Figure 7.5.
Section 3.10. The size of the window can vary from one symbol to the whole of
New.
In this mode of operation, with each window containing only one symbol, it
is possible to start the search with only the ‘Start’ symbol in New and then add
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Start 43 Does the starter turn the engine?
43 yes 44 Does starter turn the engine briskly?
44 yes 19 Slowly press throttle to floor, return
choke and try again. Does engine start?
19 yes 58 Problem is solved.
19 no 1 Is there a spark at the plug leads?
1 yes 2 Remove and examine plugs.
Are they black, oily or wet?
2 yes 4 Thoroughly clean and
dry [plugs], or renew, check
gap and refit. Try again.
Does engine start?
4 yes 58 Problem is solved.
4 no 23 Check for water in fuel.
Drain off to clear.
2 no 5 Clean, check gap and replace plugs.
Does engine start?
(etc)
Figure 7.5: A sample of the patterns representing nodes of the decision network
for diagnosing faults in car engines, including the text associated with each
pattern.
‘yes’ and ‘no’ symbols to it, one symbol at a time, in response to the questions
which are posed in each of the best intermediate multiple alignments.
Multiple alignment and engine fault diagnosis
Figure 7.6 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the patterns
from Figure 7.4 in Old and the pattern ‘Start yes yes no no no yes no’, supplied
symbol-by-symbol to New.
As usual, every symbol in a pattern from Old which does not form a hit with
a symbol in New represents an inference which can be drawn from the multiple
alignment. However, the most important of these is the last one, the symbol
‘9’ which represents a terminal node containing the text “There is an HT fault
or, possibly, a capacitor fault”. This is the diagnosis which the system offers
in response to the sequence of yes/no symbols in New representing answers to
questions posed by the system. All the other ‘inferences’—the symbols ‘43’,
‘44’, ‘19’ etc—merely represent the questions which have been answered by the
yes/no symbols in New.
Probabilities
What about probabilities? In this case, the reference set of multiple alignments
(which encode all and only the same symbols from New as the best multiple
alignment) contains only one member—the best multiple alignment itself. In
this case, the relative probability of the diagnosis is 1.0. In other words, this
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0 Start yes yes no no no yes no 0
| | | | | | | |
1 Start 43 | | | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | |
2 43 yes 44 | | | | | | 2
| | | | | | |
3 44 yes 19 | | | | | 3
| | | | | |
4 19 no 1 | | | | 4
| | | | |
5 1 no 3 | | | 5
| | | |
6 3 no 7 | | 6
| | |
7 7 yes 8 | 7
| |
8 8 no 9 8
Figure 7.6: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘Start
yes yes no no no yes no’ in New and the patterns from Figure 7.4 in Old. SP61
was set to operate in the progressive manner described in the text.
probabilistic version of the system provides an all-or-nothing answer in the same
manner as the non-probabilistic chart from which it was derived. Of course, this
probability value, like any other, is subject to the qualifications that were noted
in Section 7.2.
So what?
Regarding the example which has been discussed, readers may object that the
SP scheme is a long-winded way to achieve something which is done perfectly
adequately with a conventional expert system or even the original flow chart
on paper from which the example was derived. Has anything been gained by
re-casting the example in an unfamiliar form?
In this case, the answer is “probably not”. The main reason for including
the example in this chapter is to show that multiple alignment as it has been
developed in the SP system has a much broader scope than may, at first sight,
be assumed.
For any particular domain, a system with this kind of broad scope may not
have any particular advantage over a system which is dedicated to that domain
and can function effectively only in that domain. The benefits of using a generic
system rather than different systems for each area of application are described
in Section 4.4.
CHAPTER 7. PROBABILISTIC REASONING 166
Information which is incomplete
Another possible response to the “So what?” question, above, is that the SP
system, unlike most conventional systems, does not depend exclusively on input
which is both complete and accurate. One of the strengths of the SP system is
that it can bridge gaps in information supplied to it (as New) and can compen-
sate for symbols which have been added or substituted in the input, provided
there are not too many.
It is not immediately obvious why this kind of capability might be useful
for a diagnostic system like the example above but it is interesting to see that
SP61 can produce a plausible result even when parts of the input (in New) are
missing or when there is addition or substitution of ‘wrong’ symbols.
SP61 has been run in sequential processing mode with the patterns from
Figure 7.4 in Old and the pattern ‘Start 43 yes 44 7 yes no’ in New. Apart from
the addition of some ‘correct’ number symbols (for a reason which is given in
a moment), this pattern in New is the same as in Figure 7.6 except that the
middle sequence of yes/no symbols (‘yes no no no’) is missing. By contrast with
the example in Figure 7.6, it is necessary in this case to include in New some
of the number symbols from the relevant patterns in Old, otherwise there is too
much ambiguity about which questions are being answered by the symbols ‘yes’
and ‘no’.
Figure 7.7 shows the best multiple alignment produced by SP61 with Old and
New as just described. No other multiple alignment is produced which encodes
all the symbols in New. The multiple alignment in this figure successfully bridges
four steps in the multiple alignment where information from New is missing and
arrives at the same diagnostic conclusion as the multiple alignment in Figure
7.6. By bridging this gap in New, the multiple alignment has, in effect, inferred
what questions should have been asked in places where relevant information is
missing and what the answers to those questions should have been.
Information containing additions or substitutions
What about adding ‘wrong’ symbols to New or substituting ‘wrong’ symbols
for ‘correct’ symbols? With respect to the pattern in New shown in Figure 7.6,
adding ‘no’ or ‘yes’ at any point or substituting ‘no’ for ‘yes’ (or vice versa), will
either lead to a different conclusion which is correct in terms of the modified
version of New or, if the sequence of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ symbols does not corre-
spond to any possible sequence in the decision network, then the results are
unpredictable because of the many alternative ways in which partially ‘correct’
multiple alignments may be formed.
The kind of ‘errors’ that the system can cope with most easily are ones which
are clearly wrong such as, for example, the addition or substitution in New of
symbols which do not match any of the symbols in Old. Provided there not too
many of them, SP61 can bridge these kinds of error in much the same way as
we saw in the example of ‘spelling checking and correction’ in Section 6.2.
As noted above, bridging gaps in information or by-passing inaccurate infor-
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0 Start 43 yes 44 7 yes 8 no 0
| | | | | | | |
1 | | | | 7 yes 8 | 1
| | | | | | |
2 | | | | 3 no 7 | | 2
| | | | | | |
3 | | | | 1 no 3 | | 3
| | | | | | |
4 Start 43 | | | | | 4
| | | | | |
5 43 yes 44 | | | 5
| | | |
6 44 yes 19 | | | 6
| | | |
7 19 no 1 | | 7
| |
8 8 no 9 8
Figure 7.7: The best multiple alignment produced by SP61 with the patterns
from Figure 7.4 in Old and the pattern ‘Start 43 yes 44 7 yes no’ in New.
mation is not the kind of thing that conventional decision networks or decision
trees can do. Although this may be nothing more than a ‘party trick’ at present,
there may turn out to be situations where these kinds of capability would be
useful in a decision network or tree.
7.6 Reasoning with ‘rules’
The rules in a typical expert system express associations between things in the
form ‘IF condition THEN consequence (or action)’. As we saw with the example
in Section 7.2, we can express an association quite simply as a pattern like ‘fire
smoke’ without the need to make a formal distinction between the ‘condition’
and the ‘consequence’ or ‘action’. And, as we saw in Sections 7.3 and 7.4,
it is possible to use patterns like these quite freely in both a ‘forwards’ and
a ‘backwards’ direction. As was noted in Section 7.4, the SP system allows
inferences to be drawn from patterns in a totally flexible way: any subsequence
of the symbols in a pattern may function as a condition, with the complementary
subsequence as the corresponding inference.
It is easy to form a chain of inference like “If A then B, if B then C” from
patterns like ‘A B’ and ‘B C’. But if the patterns are ‘A B’ and ‘C B’, the
relative positions of ‘A’ and ‘C’ in the multiple alignment are undefined and
they form a ‘mismatch’ as described in Section 3.4. This means that, in the
SP61 model, the multiple alignment is treated as being illegal and is discarded.
A way round this problem which can be used with the current models is
to adopt a convention that the symbols in every pattern are arranged in some
arbitrary sequence, e.g., alphabetical, and to include a ‘framework’ pattern as
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described in Sections 3.4 and 6.5. This has the effect of ensuring that every
symbol type always has a column to itself. This avoids the kind of problem
described above and allows patterns to be treated as if they were unordered
associations of symbols.
Figure 7.8 shows a small set of patterns representing well-known
associations—such as the association of fire with smoke or the association of
black clouds with rain—together with one pattern (‘1 suspect 2 7 petrol 8’)
representing the fact that a ‘suspect’ person has been seen with petrol, another
pattern (‘4 destroy 5 11 the barn 12’) representing the fact that ‘the barn’ has
been destroy(ed) and a framework pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11’) as mentioned
above. In every pattern except the last, the alphabetic symbols are arranged
in alphabetical order. Every alphabetical symbol has its own slot in the frame-
work, e.g., ‘black clouds’ has been assigned to the position between the service
symbols ‘1’ and ‘2’. Every alphabetical symbol is flanked by the service symbols
representing its slot.
1 suspect 2 7 petrol 8 (1)
4 destroy 5 11 the_barn 12 (1)
5 fire 6 9 smoke 10 (500)
4 destroy 5 fire 6 (100)
5 fire 6 matches 7 petrol 8 (300)
2 black_clouds 3 8 rain 9 (2000)
2 black_clouds 3 cold 4 10 snow 11 (1000)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (7000)
Figure 7.8: Patterns in Old representing well-known associations, together with
two ‘facts’ (‘1 suspect 2 7 petrol 8’ and ‘4 destroy 5 11 the barn 12’) and a
‘framework’ pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11’) as described in the text.
Figure 7.9 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the pattern
‘suspect matches smoke the barn’ in New and the patterns from Figure 7.8 in
Old. The pattern in New may be taken to represent the key points in an
allegation that a person suspected of arson has been seen with petrol near
‘the barn’ (which has been destroyed) and that smoke was seen at the same
time.
The alleged facts about the suspect do not, in themselves, show that he/she
is guilty of arson. For the jury to find the suspected person guilty, they must un-
derstand the connections between the suspect, petrol, smoke and the destruction
of the barn. With this example, the inferences are so simple (for people) that
the prosecuting lawyer would hardly need to spell them out. But the inferences
still need to be made.
The multiple alignment shown in Figure 7.9 may be interpreted as a piecing
together of the argument that the suspect used matches to start a fire (which
was not witnessed by anyone), and that the fire explains why smoke was seen
and why the barn was destroyed. Part of the argument is that the suspect was
known to be in possession of petrol. Of course, in a more realistic example,
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0 1 2 3 4 5
1 ---------- 1
suspect -------------------------- suspect
2 ---------- 2
3
4 -------- 4 ------------------------------ 4
destroy ----------------------------------- destroy
5 -------- 5 -- 5 --------------- 5 ------- 5
fire ------------ fire ---- fire
6 -- 6 --------------- 6 ------- 6
matches ------------------------------------ matches
7 ---------- 7 ------- 7
petrol -- petrol
8 ---------- 8 ------- 8
9 -- 9
smoke -------------------- smoke
10 - 10
11 ------- 11
the_barn - the_barn
12 ------- 12
0 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 7.9: The best multiple alignment formed by SP61 with a pattern in New
representing allegations about someone suspected of arson and patterns in Old
as shown in Figure 7.8.
there would be many other clues to the existence of a fire (e.g., charred wood)
but the example, as shown, gives an indication of the way in which evidence
and inferences may be connected together in the SP paradigm.
7.7 Nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning
with default values
The concepts of monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning are well explained by
Ginsberg (1994). In brief, conventional deductive inference ismonotonic because
deductions made on the strength of current knowledge cannot be invalidated
by new knowledge. The conclusion that “Socrates is mortal”, deduced from
“All humans are mortal” and “Socrates is human” remains true for all time,
regardless of anything we learn later. By contrast, the inference that “Tweety
can probably fly” from the propositions that “Most birds fly” and “Tweety is a
bird” is nonmonotonic because it may be changed if, for example, we learn that
Tweety is a penguin (unless he/she is an astonishing new kind of penguin that
can fly).
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This section presents some simple examples which show how the SP system
can accommodate nonmonotonic reasoning.
Typically, birds fly
In Sections 7.3 and 7.4, the idea that (all) birds can fly was expressed with the
pattern ‘Bd bird name #name canfly warm-blooded wings feathers ... #Bd’.
This, of course, is an oversimplification of the real-world facts because, while it
true that the majority of birds fly, we know that there are also flightless birds
like ostriches, penguins and kiwis.
In order to model these facts more closely, we need to modify the pattern
that describes birds to be something like this:
Bd bird name #name f #f warm-blooded wings feathers ... #Bd.
And, to our database of Old patterns, we need to add patterns like this:
Default Bd f canfly #f #Bd #Default
P penguin Bd f cannotfly #f #Bd ... #P
O ostrich Bd f cannotfly #f #Bd ... #O.
Now, the pair of symbols ‘f #f’ in ‘Bd bird name #name f #f warm-blooded
wings feathers ... #Bd’ functions like a ‘variable’ that may take the value
‘canfly’ if a given class of birds can fly and ‘cannotfly’ when a type of bird
cannot fly. The pattern ‘P penguin Bd f cannotfly #f #Bd ... #P’ shows that
penguins cannot fly and, likewise, the pattern ‘O ostrich Bd f cannotfly #f #Bd
... #O’ shows that ostriches cannot fly. The pattern ‘Default Bd f canfly #f
#Bd #Default’, which has a substantially higher frequency than the other two
patterns, represents the default value for the variable which is ‘canfly’. Notice
that all three of these patterns contains the pair of symbols ‘Bd ... #Bd’ showing
that the corresponding classes are all subclasses of birds.
Tweety is a bird so, probably, Tweety can fly
When SP61 is run with ‘bird Tweety’ in New and the same patterns in Old as
before, modified as just described, the three best multiple alignments found are
those shown in Figure 7.10. The first multiple alignment, which has a relative
probability of 0.66, confirms that Tweety is a bird and tells us that he or she
can fly.
The second multiple alignment, with a relative probability of 0.22, tells us
that Tweety might be an ostrich and, as such, he or she would not be able to fly.
Likewise, the third multiple alignment tells us that, with a relative probability
of 0.12, Tweety might be a penguin and would not be able to fly. The values
for probabilities in this simple example are derived from frequencies that are,
almost certainly, not ornithologically correct.
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0 1 2 3
Default
Bd ----------- Bd
bird ------------ bird
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
f ------------ f
canfly
#f ----------- #f
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd ---------- #Bd
#Default
0 1 2 3
(a)
0 1 2 3
O
ostrich
Bd ----------- Bd
bird ------------ bird
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
f ------------ f
cannotfly
#f ----------- #f
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd ---------- #Bd
...
#O
0 1 2 3
(b)
0 1 2 3
P
penguin
Bd ----------- Bd
bird ------------ bird
name --- name
Tweety - Tweety
#name -- #name
f ------------ f
cannotfly
#f ----------- #f
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd ---------- #Bd
...
#P
0 1 2 3
(c)
Figure 7.10: The best three multiple alignments formed by SP61 with ‘bird
Tweety’ in New and patterns in Old as described in the text. The relative
probabilities of (a), (b) and (c) are 0.66, 0.22 and 0.12, respectively.
Tweety is a penguin, so Tweety cannot fly
Figure 7.11 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 when it is run
again, with ‘penguin Tweety’ in New instead of ‘bird Tweety’. This time, there
is only one multiple alignment in the reference set and its relative probability
is 1.0. Correspondingly, all inferences that we can draw from this multiple
alignment have a probability of 1.0. In particular, we can be confident, within
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the limits of the available knowledge, that Tweety cannot fly.
0 1 2 3
P
penguin ------------------------- penguin
Bd ----------- Bd
bird
name --- name
Tweety -- Tweety
#name -- #name
f ------------ f
cannotfly
#f ----------- #f
warm-blooded
wings
feathers
...
#Bd ---------- #Bd
...
#P
0 1 2 3
Figure 7.11: The best multiple alignment formed by SP61 with ‘penguin Tweety’
in New and patterns in Old as described in the text. The relative probability
of this multiple alignment is 1.0.
7.8 Explaining away ‘explaining away’: the SP
system as an alternative to Bayesian
networks
In recent years, Bayesian networks (otherwise known as causal nets, influence
diagrams, probabilistic networks and other names) have become popular as a
means of representing probabilistic knowledge and for probabilistic reasoning
(see Pearl, 1988).
A Bayesian network is a directed, acyclic graph like the one shown in Figure
7.12 (below) where each node has zero or more ‘inputs’ (connections with nodes
that can influence the given node) and one or more ‘outputs’ (connections to
other nodes that the given node can influence).
Each node contains a set of conditional probability values, each one the prob-
ability of a given output value for a given input value. With this information,
conditional probabilities of alternative outputs for any node may be computed
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for any given combination of inputs. By combining these calculations for se-
quences of nodes, probabilities may be propagated through the network from
one or more ‘start’ nodes to one or more ‘finishing’ nodes.
This section shows how the SP system provides alternative to the Bayesian
network explanation of the phenomenon of “explaining away”.
A Bayesian network explanation of “explaining away”
In the words of Judea Pearl (1988, p. 7), the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’
may be characterised as: “If A implies B, C implies B, and B is true, then
finding that C is true makes A less credible. In other words, finding a second
explanation for an item of data makes the first explanation less credible.” (his
italics). Here is an example:
“Normally an alarm sound alerts us to the possibility of a bur-
glary. If somebody calls you at the office and tells you that your
alarm went off, you will surely rush home in a hurry, even though
there could be other causes for the alarm sound. If you hear a radio
announcement that there was an earthquake nearby, and if the last
false alarm you recall was triggered by an earthquake, then your
certainty of a burglary will diminish.” (Pearl, 1988, pp. 8-9).
Although it is not normally presented as an example of nonmonotonic rea-
soning, this kind of effect in the way we react to new information is similar to
the example we considered in Section 7.7 because new information has an im-
pact on inferences that we formed on the basis of information that was available
earlier.
The causal relationships in the example just described may be captured in
a Bayesian network like the one shown in Figure 7.12.
Pearl argues that, with appropriate values for conditional probabilities, the
phenomenon of “explaining away” can be explained in terms of this network
(representing the case where there is a radio announcement of an earthquake)
compared with the same network without the node for “radio announcement”
(representing the situation where there is no radio announcement of an earth-
quake).
Representing contingencies with patterns and frequencies
To see how this phenomenon may be understood in terms of the SP theory,
consider, first, the set of patterns shown in Figure 7.13, which are to be stored
in Old. The first four patterns in the figure show events which occur together in
some notional sample of the ‘World’ together with their frequencies of occurrence
in the sample.
Like other knowledge-based systems, an SP system would normally be used
with a ‘closed-world’ assumption that, for some particular domain, the knowl-
edge stored in the knowledge base is comprehensive. Thus, for example, a travel
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Figure 7.12: A Bayesian network representing causal relationships discussed in
the text. In this diagram, “Phone call” means “a phone call about the alarm
going off” and “Radio announcement” means “a radio announcement about an
earthquake”.
booking clerk using a database of all flights between cities will assume that, if
no flight is shown between, say, Edinburgh and Paris, then no such flight exists.
Of course, the domain may be only ‘flights provided by one particular airline’,
in which case the booking clerk would need to check databases for other airlines.
In systems like Prolog, the closed-world assumption is the basis of ‘negation as
failure’: if a proposition cannot be proved with the clauses provided in a Prolog
program then, in terms of that store of knowledge, the proposition is assumed
to be false.
In the present case, we shall assume that the closed-world assumption applies
so that the absence of any pattern may be taken to mean that the corresponding
pattern of events did not occur, at least not with a frequency greater than one
would expect by chance.
alarm phone_alarm_call (980)
earthquake alarm (20)
earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement (40)
burglary alarm (1000)
e1 earthquake e2 (40)
Figure 7.13: A set of patterns to be stored in Old in an example of ‘explain-
ing away’. The symbol ‘phone alarm call’ is intended to represent a phone
call conveying news that the alarm sounded; ‘radio earthquake announcement’
represents an announcement on the radio that there has been an earthquake.
The symbols ‘e1’ and ‘e2’ represent other contexts for ‘earthquake’ besides the
contexts ‘alarm’ and ‘radio earthquake announcement’.
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The fourth pattern shows that there were 1000 occasions when there was a
burglary and the alarm went off and the second pattern shows just 20 occasions
when there was an earthquake and the alarm went off (presumably triggered
by the earthquake). Thus we have assumed that burglaries are much more
common than earthquakes. Since there is no pattern showing the simultaneous
occurrence of an earthquake, burglary and alarm, we shall infer from the closed-
world assumption that this constellation of events was not recorded during the
sampling period.
The first pattern shows that, out of the 1020 cases when the alarm went
off, there were 980 cases where a telephone call about the alarm was made.
Since there is no pattern showing telephone calls (about the alarm) in any other
context, the closed-world assumption allows us to assume that there were no
false positives (including hoaxes): telephone calls about the alarm when no
alarm had sounded.
Some of the frequencies shown in Figure 7.13 are intended to reflect the two
probabilities suggested for this example in Pearl (1988, p. 49): “... the [alarm]
is sensitive to earthquakes and can be accidentally (P = 0.20) triggered by one.
... if an earthquake had occurred, it surely (P = 0.40) would be on the [radio]
news.”
In our example, the frequency of ‘earthquake alarm’ is 20, the fre-
quency of ‘earthquake radio earthquake announcement’ is 40 and the fre-
quency of ‘earthquake’ in other contexts is 40. Since there is no pattern
like ‘earthquake alarm radio earthquake announcement’ or ‘earthquake ra-
dio earthquake announcement alarm’ representing cases where an earthquake
triggers the alarm and also leads to a radio announcement, we may assume that
cases of that kind have not occurred. As before, this assumption is based on the
closed-world assumption that the set of patterns is a reasonably comprehensive
representation of non-random associations in this small world.
The pattern at the bottom, with its frequency, shows that an earthquake
has occurred on 40 occasions in contexts where the alarm did not ring and there
was no radio announcement.
Approximating the temporal order of events
In these patterns and in the multiple alignments shown below, the left-to-right
order of symbols may be regarded as an approximation to the order of events
in time. Thus, in the first pattern, ‘phone alarm call’ (a phone call to say the
alarm has gone off) follows ‘alarm’ (the alarm itself); in the second pattern,
‘alarm’ follows ‘earthquake’ (the earthquake which, we may guess, triggered the
alarm); and so on. A single dimension can only approximate the order of events
in time because it cannot represent events which overlap in time or which occur
simultaneously. However, this kind of approximation has little or no bearing on
the points to be illustrated here.
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Other considerations
Other points relating to the patterns shown in Figure 7.13 include:
• No attempt has been made to represent the idea that “the last false alarm
you recall was triggered by an earthquake” (Pearl, 1988, p. 9). At some
stage in the development of the SP system, there will be a need to take
account of recency (see Section 13.2).
• With these imaginary frequency values, it has been assumed that burglar-
ies (with a total frequency of occurrence of 1160) are much more common
than earthquakes (with a total frequency of 100). As we shall see, this
difference reinforces the belief that there has been a burglary when it is
known that the alarm has gone off (but without additional knowledge of
an earthquake).
• In accordance with Pearl’s example (p. 49) (but contrary to the phe-
nomenon of looting during earthquakes), it has been assumed that earth-
quakes and burglaries are independent. If there was some association be-
tween them, then, in accordance with the closed-world assumption, there
should be a pattern in Figure 7.13 representing the association.
Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has sounded
Receiving a phone call to say that one’s house alarm has gone off may be rep-
resented by placing the symbol ‘phone alarm call’ in New. Figure 7.14 shows,
at the top, the best multiple alignment formed by SP61 in this case with the
patterns from Figure 7.13 in Old. The other two multiple alignments in the
reference set are shown below the best multiple alignment, in order of CD value
and relative probability. The actual values for CD and relative probability are
given in the caption to Figure 7.13.
The unmatched symbols in these multiple alignments represent inferences
made by the system. The probabilities for these inferences which are calculated
by SP61 (using the method described in Section 3.7) are shown in Table 7.3.
These probabilities do not add up to 1 and we should not expect them to because
any given multiple alignment can contain two or more of these symbols.
The most probable inference is the rather trivial inference that the alarm
has indeed sounded. This reflects the fact that there is no pattern in Figure 7.13
representing false positives for telephone calls about the alarm. Apart from the
inference that the alarm has sounded, the most probable inference (p = 0.3281)
is that there has been a burglary. However, there is a distinct possibility that
there has been an earthquake—but the probability in this case (p = 0.0156) is
much lower than the probability of a burglary.
These inferences and their relative probabilities seem to accord quite well
with what one would naturally think following a telephone call to say that the
burglar alarm at one’s house has gone off (given that one was living in a part
of the world where earthquakes were not vanishingly rare).
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0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 burglary alarm 2
(b)
0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 earthquake alarm 2
(c)
Figure 7.14: The best multiple alignment (at the top) and the other three
multiple alignments in its reference set formed by SP61 with the pattern
‘phone alarm call’ in New and the patterns from Figure 7.13 in Old. In or-
der from the top, the values for CD with relative probabilities in brackets are:
19.91 (0.6563), 18.91 (0.3281), 14.52 (0.0156).
Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has sounded
and there is a radio announcement of an earthquake
In this example, the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’ occurs when you learn
not only that the burglar alarm has sounded but that there has been an an-
nouncement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. In terms of the SP
model, the two events (the phone call about the alarm and the announcement
about the earthquake) can be represented in New by a pattern like this:
phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement
or ‘radio earthquake announcement phone alarm call’. The order of the two
symbols does not matter because it makes no difference to the result, except for
the order in which columns appear in the best multiple alignment.
In this case, there is only one multiple alignment (shown at the top of Figure
7.15) that can ‘explain’ all the information in New. Since there is only this one
multiple alignment in the reference set for the best multiple alignment, the
associated probabilities of the inferences that can be read from the multiple
alignment (‘alarm’ and ‘earthquake’) are 1.0.
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Symbol Probability
alarm 1.0
burglary 0.3281
earthquake 0.0156
Table 7.3: The probabilities of unmatched symbols, calculated by SP61
for the four multiple alignments shown in Figure 7.14. The probability of
‘phone alarm call’ is 1.0 because it is supplied as a ‘fact’ in New.
These results show broadly how ‘explaining away’ may be explained in terms
of the SP theory. The main point is that the multiple alignment or multiple
alignments that provide the best ‘explanation’ of a telephone call to say that
one’s burglar alarm has sounded is different from the multiple alignment or
multiple alignments that best explain the same telephone call coupled with an
announcement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. In the latter
case, the best explanation is that the earthquake triggered the alarm. Other
possible explanations have lower probabilities.
Other possible alignments
The foregoing account of ‘explaining away’ in terms of the SP theory is not
entirely satisfactory because it does not say enough about alternative explana-
tions of what has been observed. This subsection tries to plug this gap. What
is missing from the account of ‘explaining away’ in the previous subsection is
any consideration of such other possibilities as, for example:
• A burglary (which triggered the alarm) and, at the same time, an earth-
quake (which led to a radio announcement), or
• An earthquake that triggered the alarm and led to a radio announcement
and, at the same time, a burglary that did not trigger the alarm.
• And many other unlikely possibilities of a similar kind.
Alternatives of this kind may be created by combining multiple alignments
shown in Figure 7.15 with each other, or with patterns or symbols from Old, or
both these things. The two examples just mentioned are shown in Figure 7.16.
Any multiple alignment created by combining multiple alignments as just
described may be evaluated in exactly the same way as the multiple alignments
formed directly by SP61. CDs and absolute probabilities for the two example
multiple alignments are shown in the caption to Figure 7.16.
Given the existence of multiple alignments like those shown in Figure 7.16,
values for relative probabilities of multiple alignments will change. The best
multiple alignment from Figure 7.15 and the two multiple alignments from Fig-
ure 7.16 constitute a reference set because they all ‘encode’ the same symbols
from New. However, there are probably several other multiple alignments that
one could construct that would belong in the same reference set.
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0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 earthquake alarm | 2
| |
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 1
(b)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
(c)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 burglary alarm 2
(d)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 earthquake alarm 2
(e)
Figure 7.15: At the top, the best multiple alignment formed by SP61 with
the pattern ‘phone alarm call radio earthquake announcement’ in New and the
patterns from Figure 7.13 in Old. Other multiple alignments formed by SP61
are shown below. From the top, the CD values are: 74.64, 54.72, 19.92, 18.92,
and 14.52.
Given a reference set containing the first multiple alignment in Figure 7.15
and the two multiple alignments in Figure 7.16, values for relative probabilities
are shown in Table 7.4, together with the absolute probabilities from which
they were derived. Whichever measure is used, the multiple alignment which
was originally judged to represent the best interpretation of the available facts
has not been dislodged from this position.
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0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 burglary alarm | 2
|
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 earthquake alarm | 2
| |
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
4 burglary 4
(b)
Figure 7.16: Two multiple alignments discussed in the text. (a) A multiple
alignment created by combining the second and fourth multiple alignment from
Figure 7.15. CD = 73.64, Absolute P = 5.5391e-5. (b) A multiple alignment
created from the first multiple alignment in Figure 7.15 and the symbol ‘bur-
glary’. CD = 72.57, Absolute P = 2.6384e-5.
7.9 Causal diagnosis
As we saw in Section 6.5, medical diagnosis may be viewed as a process of
pattern recognition but the diagnostic process may also involve reasoning about
the causes of a patient’s symptoms (Section 6.5). Causal reasoning is, perhaps,
even more prominent in the process of diagnosing faults in artificial systems
(cars, televisions etc), probably because these systems are simpler than the
human body and better understood.
In this section, we consider a simple example of fault diagnosis in an elec-
tronic circuit—described by Pearl (1988, pp. 263–272). Figure 7.17 shows the
circuit with inputs on the left, outputs on the right and, in between, three mul-
Alignment Absolute Relative
probability probability
(a) in Figure 7.15 1.1052e-4 0.5775
(a) in Figure 7.16 5.5391e-5 0.2881
(b) in Figure 7.16 2.6384e-5 0.1372
Table 7.4: Values for absolute and relative probability for the best multiple alignment
in Figure 7.15 and the two multiple alignments in Figure 7.16.
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tipliers (M1, M2, and M3) and two adders (M4 and M5). For the given inputs
on the left, it is clear that output F is false and output G is correct.
Figure 7.17: An electronic circuit containing three multipliers, M1, M2, and
M3, and two adders, M4 and M5 (Redrawn from Pearl (1988, p. 263)).
Figure 7.18 shows a causal network derived from the electronic circuit in
Figure 7.17 (from Pearl (1988, p. 264)). In this diagram, each of the nodes
X , Y , Z, F and G represent the outputs of components M1, M2, M3, M4 and
M5, respectively. In each case, there are three causal influences on the output:
the two inputs to the component and the state of the component which may be
‘good’ or ‘bad’. These influences are shown by lines with arrows connecting the
source of the influence to the target node. Thus, for example, the two inputs
of component M1 are represented by A and C in Figure 7.18, the good or bad
state of componentM1 is represented by the node labelled M1, and their causal
influences on node X are shown by the three arrows pointing at that node.
Given a causal analysis like this, and given appropriate information about
conditional probabilities, it is possible to derive one or more alternative diag-
noses of which components are good and which are bad. In Pearl’s example, it
is assumed that components of the same type have the same prior probability
of failure and that the probability of failure of multipliers is greater than for
adders. Given these and some subsidiary assumptions together with the inputs
and outputs (but not the intermediate values) shown in Figure 7.17, the best
diagnosis derived from the causal network is that the M1 component is bad and
the second best diagnosis is that M4 is bad. Pearl indicates that some third-
best interpretations may be retrievable (e.g., M2 and M5 are bad) “... but in
general, it is not guaranteed that interpretations beyond the second-best will be
retrievable.” (p. 272).
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Figure 7.18: A causal network derived from the electronic circuit in Figure 7.17
(Redrawn from Pearl (1988, p. 264)).
An SP approach to causal diagnosis
The main elements of the SP analysis presented here are as follows:
• The input-output relations of any component may be represented as a set
of patterns, each one with a measured or estimated frequency of occur-
rence.
• With suitable extensions, these patterns may serve to transfer the output
of one component to the input of another.
• A framework pattern (as described in Sections 3.4 and elsewhere) is needed
to ensure that appropriate multiple alignments can be built.
Figure 7.19 shows a set of patterns for the circuit shown in Figure 7.17. In
the figure, the patterns that start with the symbol ‘M1’ represent I/O relations
for componentM1, those that start with ‘M2’ represent I/O relations for theM2
component and likewise for the other patterns except the last one (starting with
the symbol ‘frame’) which is the framework pattern mentioned above. For each
initial symbol there is a corresponding ‘terminating’ symbol with an initial ‘#’
character. For reasons explained shortly, there may be other symbols following
the ‘terminating’ symbol.
Let us now consider the first pattern in the figure (‘M1 M1GOOD TM1I1
TM1I2 TM1O #M1 TM4I2’) representing I/O relations for componentM1 when
that component is good, as indicated by the symbol ‘M1GOOD’. In this pattern,
the symbols ‘TM1I1’, ‘TM1I2’ and ‘TM1O’ represent the two inputs and the
output of the component, ‘#M1’ is the terminating symbol, and ‘TM4I2’ serves
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M1 M1GOOD TM1I1 TM1I2 TM1O #M1 TM4I2 (500000)
M1 M1BAD TM1I1 TM1I2 TM1O #M1 TM4I2 (4)
M1 M1BAD TM1I1 TM1I2 FM1O #M1 FM4I2 (96)
M2 M2GOOD TM2I1 TM2I2 TM2O #M2 TM4I1 TM5I2 (500000)
M2 M2BAD TM2I1 TM2I2 TM2O #M2 TM4I1 TM5I2 (4)
M2 M2BAD TM2I1 TM2I2 FM2O #M2 FM4I1 FM5I2 (96)
M3 M3GOOD TM3I1 TM3I2 TM3O #M3 TM5I1 (500000)
M3 M3BAD TM3I1 TM3I2 TM3O #M3 TM5I1 (4)
M3 M3BAD TM3I1 TM3I2 FM3O #M3 FM5I1 (96)
M4 M4GOOD TM4I1 TM4I2 TM4O #M4 (250000)
M4 M4GOOD TM4I1 FM4I2 FM4O #M4 (250000)
M4 M4GOOD FM4I1 TM4I2 FM4O #M4 (250000)
M4 M4GOOD FM4I1 FM4I2 FM4O #M4 (250000)
M4 M4BAD TM4I1 TM4I2 FM4O #M4 (24)
M4 M4BAD TM4I1 FM4I2 FM4O #M4 (24)
M4 M4BAD FM4I1 TM4I2 FM4O #M4 (24)
M4 M4BAD FM4I1 FM4I2 FM4O #M4 (24)
M4 M4BAD TM4I1 TM4I2 TM4O #M4 (1)
M4 M4BAD TM4I1 FM4I2 TM4O #M4 (1)
M4 M4BAD FM4I1 TM4I2 TM4O #M4 (1)
M4 M4BAD FM4I1 FM4I2 TM4O #M4 (1)
M5 M5GOOD TM5I1 TM5I2 TM5O #M5 (250000)
M5 M5GOOD TM5I1 FM5I2 FM5O #M5 (250000)
M5 M5GOOD FM5I1 TM5I2 FM5O #M5 (250000)
M5 M5GOOD FM5I1 FM5I2 FM5O #M5 (250000)
M5 M5BAD TM5I1 TM5I2 FM5O #M5 (24)
M5 M5BAD TM5I1 FM5I2 FM5O #M5 (24)
M5 M5BAD FM5I1 TM5I2 FM5O #M5 (24)
M5 M5BAD FM5I1 FM5I2 FM5O #M5 (24)
M5 M5BAD TM5I1 TM5I2 TM5O #M5 (1)
M5 M5BAD TM5I1 FM5I2 TM5O #M5 (1)
M5 M5BAD FM5I1 TM5I2 TM5O #M5 (1)
M5 M5BAD FM5I1 FM5I2 TM5O #M5 (1)
frame M1 #M1 M2 #M2 M3 #M3 M4 #M4 M5 #M5 #frame (1)
Figure 7.19: A set of SP patterns modelling I/O relations in the electronic
circuit shown in Figure 7.17. They were supplied as Old patterns to SP61 for
the building of the multiple alignment shown in Figure 7.20. Key: T = true
(information is correct); F = false (information is incorrect); M1, M2, M3, M4,
M5 = components of the circuit; GOOD, BAD indicates whether a component
is good or bad; I1, I2 = First and second inputs of a component; O = Output
of a component.
to transfer the output of M1 to the second input of component M4 as will be
explained. In a symbol like ‘TM1I1’, ‘T’ indicates that the input is true, ‘M1’
identifies the component, and ‘I1’ indicates that this is the first input of the
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component. Other symbols may be interpreted in a similar way, following the
key given in the caption of Figure 7.19. In effect, this pattern says that, when
the component is working correctly, true inputs yield a true output. The pattern
has a relatively high frequency of occurrence (500000) reflecting the idea that
the component will normally work correctly.
The other two patterns for component M1 (‘M1 M1BAD TM1I1 TM1I2
TM1O #M1 TM4I2’ and ‘M1 M1BAD TM1I1 TM1I2 FM1O #M1 FM4I2’)
describe I/O relations when the component is bad. The first one describes the
situation where true inputs to a faulty component yield a true result, a possi-
bility noted by Pearl (p. 265). The second pattern—with a higher frequency—
describes the more usual situation where true inputs to a faulty component yield
a false result. Both these bad patterns have much lower frequencies than the
good pattern.
The other patterns in Figure 7.19 may be interpreted in a similar way. Com-
ponents M1, M2 and M3 have only three patterns each because it is assumed
that inputs to the circuit will always be true so it is not necessary to include
patterns describing what happens when one or both of the inputs are false. By
contrast, there are 4 good patterns and 8 bad patterns for each of M4 and M5
because either of these components may receive faulty input.
For each of the five components, the frequencies of the bad patterns sum to
100. However, for each of the components M1, M2, andM3, the total frequency
of the good patterns is 500,000 compared with 1,000,000 for the set of good
patterns associated with each of the component M4 and M5. These figures
accord with the assumptions in Pearl’s example that components of the same
type have the same probability of failure and that the probability of failure of
multipliers (M1,M2, andM3) is greater than the probability of failure of adders
(M4 and M5).
Multiple alignments in causal diagnosis
Given appropriate patterns, SP61 constructs multiple alignments from which
diagnoses may be obtained. Figure 7.20 shows the best multiple alignment
created by SP61 with the Old patterns shown in Figure 7.19 and ‘TM1I1 TM1I2
TM2I1 TM2I2 TM3I1 TM3I2 FM4O TM5O’ as the New pattern. The first six
symbols in this pattern express the idea that all the inputs for components M1,
M2 andM3 are true. The penultimate symbol (‘FM4O’) shows that the output
of M4 is false and the last symbol (‘TM5O’) shows that the output of M5 is
true—in accordance with the outputs shown in Figure 7.17.
From the multiple alignment in Figure 7.20 it can be inferred that component
M1 is bad and all the other components are good. A total of seven alternative
diagnoses can be derived from those multiple alignments created by SP61 that
encode all the symbols in New. These diagnoses are shown in Table 7.5, each
with its relative probability.
It is interesting to see that the best diagnosis derived by SP61 (M1 is bad)
and the second best diagnosis (M4 is bad) are in accordance with first two
diagnoses obtained by Pearl’s method. The remaining five diagnoses derived by
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
frame
M1 ----------------------- M1
M1BAD
TM1I1 ------------------------------------- TM1I1
TM1I2 ------------------------------------- TM1I2
FM1O
#M1 ---------------------- #M1
M2 ------------------------------- M2
M2GOOD
TM2I1 --------------------------------------------- TM2I1
TM2I2 --------------------------------------------- TM2I2
TM2O
#M2 ------------------------------ #M2
M3 ----- M3
M3GOOD
TM3I1 ------------------- TM3I1
TM3I2 ------------------- TM3I2
TM3O
#M3 ---- #M3
M4 -------------- M4
M4GOOD
TM4I1 ---------- TM4I1
FM4I2 -- FM4I2
FM4O ----------------------------- FM4O
#M4 ------------- #M4
M5 ----- M5
M5GOOD
TM5I1 ----------- TM5I1
TM5I2 ------------------------------------- TM5I2
TM5O -- TM5O
#M5 ---- #M5
#frame
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 7.20: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘TM1I1 TM1I2
TM2I1 TM2I2 TM3I1 TM3I2 FM4O TM5O’ in New and the patterns shown in
Figure 7.19 in Old.
SP61 are different from the one obtained by Pearl’s method (M2 and M5 are
bad) but this is not altogether surprising because detailed figures are different
from Pearl’s example and there are differences in assumptions that have been
made.
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Bad Component(s) Relative Probability
M1 0.6664
M4 0.3332
M1, M3 0.00013
M1, M2 0.00013
M1, M4 6.664e-5
M3, M4 6.664e-5
M1, M2, M3 2.666e-8
Table 7.5: Seven alternative diagnoses of faults in the circuit shown in Figure
7.17, derived from multiple alignments created by SP61 with ‘TM1I1 TM1I2
TM2I1 TM2I2 TM3I1 TM3I2 FM4O TM5O’ in New and the patterns from
Figure 7.19 in Old. The relative probability of each diagnosis is shown in the
second column.
7.10 Reasoning which is not supported by
evidence
In Section 7.1, ‘reasoning’, including ‘probabilistic reasoning’, was characterised
as a process of “going beyond the information given”. All the examples of
reasoning in the SP framework that we have considered thus far have exhibited
this feature in the form of symbols and sequences of symbols from Old that are
not matched to anything in New.
What happens if there is little or no information in New or if the process of
‘reasoning’ goes so far beyond the information in New that alternative lines of
reasoning lose their support? Something like this seems to happen in ordinary
thinking when, in considering alternative scenarios in the future, we think and
sometimes worry about possibilities which are very unlikely to occur (winning
the lottery and what we might do with the ‘loot’, falling under the proverbial
bus, etc). Hence the patronising advice, “Don’t worry, it may never happen!”
or, a little more helpfully, “Let’s climb that mountain [or ‘cross that bridge’]
when we get to it”—the problem may never arise.
Figure 7.21 shows the first seven multiple alignments formed by SP61 with
the patterns from Figure 7.4 in Old and only the symbol ‘Start’ in New. If it
is allowed to proceed without any check that the multiple alignments formed
are actually or potentially useful, the program would carry on creating multiple
alignments corresponding to the large number of possible multiple alignments
which are implicit in the patterns in Old.
Out of all these many multiple alignments, the first one (at the top of Fig-
ure 7.21) has the highest CD because it encodes New completely and contains
the fewest patterns from Old. Amongst the other multiple alignments, CD val-
ues decrease as the number of patterns from Old in each multiple alignment
increases.
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0 Start 0 0 Start 0
| |
1 Start 43 1 1 Start 43 1
|
2 43 yes 44 2
(a) (b)
0 Start 0 0 Start 0
| |
1 Start 43 1 1 Start 43 1
| |
2 43 no 45 2 2 43 yes 44 2
|
3 44 yes 19 3
(c) (d)
0 Start 0 0 Start 0
| |
1 Start 43 1 1 Start 43 1
| |
2 43 no 45 2 2 43 yes 44 2
| |
3 45 yes 46 3 3 44 no 51 3
(e) (f)
0 Start 0
|
1 Start 43 1
|
2 43 no 45 2
|
3 45 no 47 3
(g)
Figure 7.21: Alignments formed by SP61 with the patterns from Figure 7.4 in
Old and only the symbol ‘Start’ in New. SP61 was set to stop searching when
two ‘unsupported’ inferential steps had been made. Without this check, many
more multiple alignments would be formed.
Escaping from ‘local peaks’ in the search space
Is there any use for this kind of ‘reasoning’ without supporting evidence? In
many cases, “no”, but in any kind of problem where there are ‘local peaks’ in
the search space (if we regard heuristic search as a form of ‘hill climbing’), the
program must be able to explore regions of the search space which are sub-
optimal from a local perspective but which may provide the means of escaping
from a local peak and finding a result elsewhere which is better from a broader
perspective (a higher ‘peak’).
The example described in Section 7.5 (Figure 7.7) illustrates this kind of
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reasoning. Compared with in Figure 7.6, the example contains a gap in New
because the substring ‘yes no no no’ is missing. Working left-to-right in sequen-
tial mode, SP61 is able to bridge this gap in New because, after it has found a
good multiple alignment for the first part of New, it is able to continue forming
relatively poor multiple alignments until it finds one which bridges the gap and
allows the right-hand section of New can be included. The multiple alignment
shown in Figure 7.7 has a higher CD than any of the earlier multiple alignments,
including the best of the multiple alignments for the left-hand section of New.
7.11 Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen how probabilistic inferences can be drawn from
any multiple alignment which contains one or more Old symbols that are not
matched to any symbol in New. Probabilities can be derived using the method
described in Section 3.7. The versatility of the SP system has been seen in
examples showing how the system can model one-step ‘deductive’ reasoning,
abductive reasoning, reasoning with probabilistic networks and trees, reason-
ing with ‘rules’, and nonmonotonic reasoning with default values. The system
provides an alternative to causal networks in modelling the phenomenon of ‘ex-
plaining away’ and in the diagnosis of faults in electronic circuits and similar
systems. The system can also model kinds of conceptual exploration that are
not constrained by empirical evidence.
It is in the nature of the SP system that it blurs many distinctions that
are prevalent in computing and artificial intelligence. In particular, there is no
clear boundary in the SP scheme between fuzzy pattern recognition, information
retrieval and probabilistic reasoning. As we see in chapters that follow, much
the same can be said about the boundary between this recognition-retrieval-
and-reasoning amalgam and other areas of artificial intelligence.
Chapter 8
Planning and Problem
Solving
8.1 Introduction
Although ‘planning’ and ‘problem solving’ are often linked in artificial intelli-
gence, it is not entirely obvious that they are any more closely related than
several other pairs of artificial intelligence topics. Nevertheless, the tradition
will be maintained in this chapter with two relatively brief sections showing
how the SP system may be applied in these two areas. As in other chapters,
the aim is to show the broad scope of the SP theory rather than demonstrating
the bells and whistles of a completed product.
8.2 Planning
The example that we shall consider in this section is how to work out a flying
route from one city to another using information about flights that are available
between pairs of cities. It is generally accepted (at least in artificial intelligence)
that this kind of operation is a form of ‘planning’ but this is no guarantee that
methods for solving this kind of problem will transfer without modification to
other kinds of ‘planning’ such as deciding what to do on holiday or planning a
major construction project.
In its essentials, an available flight between two cities may be represented by
a pattern containing the names of the two cities. Thus, in our first example, an
available flight from Delhi to Cape Town is represented with the pattern ‘Delhi
15a Cape Town’ and a flight from Cape Town to Paris is represented with the
pattern ‘Cape Town 14 Paris’. The symbol in the middle of each pattern is an
ID-symbol needed for the purpose of scoring multiple alignments. No attempt
has been made in this example to represent other information about flights such
as times, distances, costs, and so on (see Section 8.2, below).
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SP61 may be used to find one or more routes between two cities if Old
contains the set of patterns representing available flights and New contains a
pattern that specifies the cities at the beginning and end of the journey. Figure
8.1 shows a selection of five of the routes found by SP61 with ‘Beijing New York’
in New and a set of patterns about available flights in Old. The program also
forms multiple alignments that do not represent sensible routes between Beijing
and New York. All these other multiple alignments have lower CD values than
the ones that represent plausible routes, as discussed below.
Evaluation of alignments
In the example just described, all three symbols in each pattern has the status
of ID-symbol. This means that in a multiple alignment like this:
0 1 2 3 4
Beijing -- Beijing
0
Delhi --- Delhi
17
Paris - Paris
27
New_York ------------------- New_York - New_York
25
Paris
0 1 2 3 4
the unmatched symbol ‘Paris’ has the effect of increasing the value of BE for
the multiple alignment and thus reducing the value of CD (Section 3.5). This
means that multiple alignments of this kind, that do not represent sensible
routes between Beijing and New York, have lower CDs than those in which all
the names of cities in Old patterns have been matched.
In a multiple alignment like this:
0 1 2 3
Beijing Bombay
3
Cape_Town - Cape_Town
14
Paris ---- Paris
25a
New_York - New_York
0 1 2 3
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0 1 2 3
Beijing -- Beijing
0
Delhi --- Delhi
15a
Cape_Town - Cape_Town
13
New_York ----------------------- New_York
0 1 2 3
(a)
0 1 2 3
Beijing -- Beijing
0
Delhi --- Delhi
17
Paris - Paris
27
New_York ------------------- New_York
0 1 2 3
(b)
0 1 2 3
Beijing -- Beijing
1
Melbourne - Melbourne
22
Zurich ---- Zurich
23a
New_York ------------------------- New_York
0 1 2 3
(c)
0 1 2 3 4
Beijing -- Beijing
0
Delhi --- Delhi
15a
Cape_Town ------------ Cape_Town
14
Paris ---- Paris
25a
New_York ----------------------- New_York
0 1 2 3 4
(d)
0 1 2 3 4
Beijing ------------------------- Beijing
1
Melbourne - Melbourne
10a
Cape_Town ------------- Cape_Town
14
Paris ---- Paris
25a
New_York - New_York
0 1 2 3 4
(e)
Figure 8.1: A selection of routes between Beijing and New York found by SP61
with ‘Beijing New York’ in New and patterns showing one-way air links between
individual cities as described in the text.
the unmatched symbol ‘Beijing’ in the New pattern lowers the value of BN for
the multiple alignment and this lowers the value of CD. So, in general, multiple
alignments that do not connect the start and end cities of the route have lower
CD than those that do.
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As we have noted already, the second symbol in each Old pattern is also an
ID-symbol. Since these symbols are never matched to any other symbol, they
always add to BE for each multiple alignment and lower the corresponding CD
value. This means that multiple alignments with many columns (representing
routes with many links) have lower CDs than those with few columns (repre-
senting routes with few links). Thus, for example, each of the first three multiple
alignments in Figure 8.1 have CD = 140.18, while each of the last two multiple
alignments have CD = 133.76.
In general, when SP61 has been supplied with patterns like those that have
been described, the best multiple alignments created by the program are those
that represent coherent routes that link the start and end cities. And, in general,
multiple alignments representing routes with few connections have higher CDs
than those representing routes with many connections.
One-way and two-way connections
In the scheme that has been described, each pattern represents a one-way con-
nection between two cities with the left-to-right order of the cities corresponding
to the direction of travel. This means that, for every pair of cities with two-way
connections, it is necessary to include two patterns in the flights database: one
from A to B and the other from B to A.
If there are many cases where it is possible to fly from A to B but not from B
to A, then this scheme makes good sense. But if all the connections are two-way,
or even the majority, then there is redundancy. This would be reduced if each
two-way connection could be represented by a single pattern.
If we are to adopt this idea then, for much the same reasons as were described
in Section 6.5, it is necessary with SP61 to provide a framework pattern in
addition to the patterns representing connections between cities and to adapt
those patterns so that they can be aligned with the framework pattern. Figure
8.2 shows an example of a multiple alignment formed with patterns that have
been adapted in this way. From this multiple alignment we can see that a
possible route between Beijing and New York is via Melbourne and Zurich,
in that order. Notice that this ordering of cities in the route can be derived
unambiguously from the multiple alignment despite the fact that the order of
the symbols in the multiple alignment is different.
Times, distances and costs
There is, of course, a lot more to any practical system for route planning than
what has been described. Normally, there would be a need to take account of
departure and arrival times, the duration of each flight and intervals between
flights, distances travelled and the costs of flights. This subsection offers a
few remarks about whether or how these aspects of route planning may be
accommodated in the SP system.
In conventional systems, information about departure and arrival times, time
intervals, distances and costs would all be expressed as numbers. Although the
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0 1 2 3 4
frame
b1 ------------------------------- b1
1
Beijing -- Beijing
#b1 ------------------------------ #b1
b2
#b2
b3
#b3
c1
#c1
c2
#c2
d1
#d1
l1
#l1
m1 -------- m1 ------------------- m1
22
Melbourne - Melbourne
#m1 ------- #m1 ------------------ #m1
n1 ------- n1
23
New_York ------------------------- New_York
#n1 ------ #n1
p1
#p1
s1
#s1
t1
#t1
z1 -------- z1 ------- z1
Zurich ---- Zurich
#z1 ------- #z1 ------ #z1
#frame
0 1 2 3 4
Figure 8.2: An example of a route between Beijing and New York found by
SP61 with ‘Beijing New York’ in New and, in Old, a framework pattern and
patterns showing two-way air links between individual cities as described in the
text.
SP system can, in principle, support the representation and use of numbers,
current models are weak in this area (Section 3.3). One can either attempt
to work around this weakness or wait until the system has been more fully
developed for mathematics (Section 13.3).
In planning a flying route, it is of course necessary to ensure that the time
of arrival for one leg of the journey comes before the time of departure for the
next leg, and that the time between arrival and departure is adequate to allow
transfers. These things mean comparisons such as ‘greater than’ or ‘less than’
and such comparisons seem to demand proper definitions of numbers and the
operations for comparing them.
If one is wishing to minimise the overall flying time, or the distance flown,
or the cost of the journey, there is a possible work around that takes advantage
of the fact that the SP system is designed to look for multiple alignments that
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allow the New pattern to be encoded with as little redundancy as possible. For
each pattern like ‘Delhi 15a Cape Town’, the second symbol may be assigned a
number of bits that represents the duration or cost of the flight or the distance
flown. Then multiple alignments delivered by the system would represent routes
that tend to minimise whichever of those measures has been chosen. No account
would be taken of waiting times between flights.
This work around is really nothing but a fudge, without any theoretical
foundation. In terms of practicalities, it is probably better to develop the system
for mathematical operations.
8.3 Solving geometric analogy problems
Figure 8.3 shows an example of a well-known type of simple puzzle—a geometric
analogy problem. The task is to complete the relationship “A is to B as C is
to ?” using one of the figures ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’ or ‘G’ in the position marked with
‘?’. For this example, the ‘correct’ answer is clearly ‘E’. Quote marks have been
used for the word ‘correct’ because in many problems of this type, there may
be two or even more alternative answers for which cases can be made and there
is a corresponding uncertainty about which answer is the right one.
Computer-based methods for solving this kind of problem have existed for
some time (e.g., Evans’ (1968) well-known heuristic algorithm). In more recent
work (Belloti and Gammerman, 1996; Gammerman, 1991), minimum length
encoding principles have been applied to good effect. The proposal here is that,
within the general framework of minimum length encoding, this kind of problem
may be understood in terms of the SP concepts.
As in some previous work (Belloti and Gammerman, 1996; Gammerman,
1991), the proposed solution assumes that some mechanism is available which
can translate the geometric forms in each problem into patterns of alpha-numeric
symbols like the patterns in other examples in this article. For example, item
‘A’ in Figure 8.3 may be described as ‘small circle inside large triangle’.
How this kind of translation may be done is not part of the present proposals
(one such translation mechanism is described in Evans (1968)). As noted else-
where (Gammerman, 1991), successful solutions for this kind of problem require
consistency in the way the translation is done. For this example, it would be
unhelpful if item ‘A’ in Figure 8.3 were described as ‘large triangle outside small
circle’ while item ‘C’ were described as ‘small square inside large ellipse’. For
any one puzzle, the description needs to stick to one or other of “X outside Y”
or “Y inside X”—and likewise for ‘above/below’ and ‘left-of/right-of’.
Given that the diagrammatic form of the problem has been translated into
patterns as just described, this kind of problem can be cast as a problem of
partial matching, well within the scope of SP61. To do this, symbolic repre-
sentations of item A and item B in Figure 8.3 are treated as a single pattern,
thus:
small circle inside large triangle ;
large circle above small triangle
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Figure 8.3: A geometric analogy problem.
and this pattern is placed in New. Four other patterns are constructed by pairing
a symbolic representation of item C (on the left) with symbolic representations
of each of D, E, F and G (on the right), thus:
C1 small square inside large ellipse ;
D small square inside large circle #C1
C2 small square inside large ellipse ;
E large square above small ellipse #C2
C3 small square inside large ellipse ;
F small circle left-of large square #C3
C4 small square inside large ellipse ;
G small ellipse above large rectangle #C4.
These four patterns are placed in Old, each with an arbitrary frequency value
of 1.
Figure 8.4 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 with New and
Old as just described. The multiple alignment is a partial match between the
pattern in New and the second of the four patterns in Old. This corresponds
with the ‘correct’ result (item E) as noted above.
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C2
small ---- small
circle square
inside --- inside
large ---- large
triangle ellipse
; -------- ;
E
large ---- large
circle square
above ---- above
small ---- small
triangle ellipse
#C2
Figure 8.4: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 for the patterns in New
and Old as described in the text.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter has given a brief description of the ways in which the SP system
might support one kind of planning and one kind of problem solving. There are
many other kinds of planning and problem solving that have not been examined
and plenty of scope for further development of the applications that have been
described.
Chapter 9
Unsupervised Learning
9.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, this entire programme of research grew out of an
earlier programme of research on grammar induction and language learning
(Wolff, 1988, 1982, 1980, 1977, 1975). Until relatively recently, the focus has
been on the development of a framework that could integrate aspects of artificial
intelligence other than learning, bearing in mind that learning should eventually
form part of the picture. Now, in the SP70 model, this goal has been realised,
bring the research full circle to learning again but with a new and much broader
perspective than the earlier research, focussed as it was specifically on learning.
Given the new broad perspective, the goal has been to develop the SP system
as a generalised system for the unsupervised learning of any kind of knowledge,
in keeping with the working hypothesis that any kind of knowledge may be
represented in the SP system as patterns of symbols in one or more dimensions
(Section 3.3). That said, the examples in this chapter have a ‘linguistic’ flavour
and the automatic learning of realistic grammars for natural languages provides
a challenging goal for this phase of the research and a touchstone of success.
Relationship to other research on unsupervised learning
In terms of broad categories of research in machine learning, development of the
SP system for learning is more closely related to research on grammar induction
using PSGs (augmented or otherwise) than it is to research on the learning of
finite-state grammars, n-grams or Markov models—which are known to be less
adequate for representing the structure of natural languages (Chomsky, 1957).
Here, learning is conceived as a process of optimisation using minimum length
encoding principles, by contrast with research on language learning conceived as
“language identification in the limit” (Gold, 1967) (Section 2.2). The research is
closer in spirit to other research on unsupervised learning than it is to research
on learning with external error correction or negative samples or the grading
of language samples from simple to complex (cf. Gold, 1967). And there is
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a stronger affinity with systems that are designed to learn explicit symbolic
structures that are readable and comprehensible than with systems—like most
artificial neural networks—that learn knowledge in an implicit form.
Compared with other work on unsupervised learning of grammar-like struc-
tures, the most distinctive features of this approach to machine learning are:
• The integration of learning with other areas of artificial intelligence and
computation.
• The multiple alignment concept as it has been developed in the SP system.
With respect to the second point, there is an affinity with recent work by van
Zaanen (2002a,b); Solan et al. (2002) in which learning is based on the alignment
of pairs of patterns. Otherwise, studies that are, perhaps, most closely related to
the present research include: Adriaans et al. (2000); Allison et al. (1992); Clark
(2001); Denis (2001); Henrichsen (2002); Johnson and Riezler (2002); Klein and
Manning (2001); Nevill-Manning and Witten (1997); Oliveira and Sangiovanni-
Vincentelli (1996); Rapp et al. (1994); S.Watkinson and Manandhar (2001).
9.2 SP70
All the main components of the SP system outlined in Section 3.2 are now
realised within the SP70 software model (version 9.2).
The model gives results in the area of unsupervised learning that are good
enough to show that the framework is sound. As we shall see, the model is
able to abstract plausible grammars1 from sets of simple sentences without
prior knowledge of word segments or the classes to which they belong (Section
9.4) and the computational complexity of the model appears to be acceptable
(Section 9.3).
However, in its current form, the model has at least two significant short-
comings and some other deficiencies. A programme of further development,
experimentation and refinement is still needed to realise the full potential of the
model for unsupervised learning.
This model is governed by mathematical principles—explained at pertinent
points below—but these are remarkably simple and in accordance with estab-
lished theory. The main focus in what follows is on the organisation of the
model and the computational techniques employed within it.
Objectives
The main problems addressed in the development of this model have been:
• How to identify significant segments in the ‘corpus’ of data which is the
basis of learning, given that the boundary between one segment and the
next is not marked explicitly.
1In accordance with the remarks in Section 3.4, the term grammar will be used for sets of
SP patterns that function like a grammar cast in more conventional form.
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• How to identify disjunctive classes of syntactically-equivalent segments
(e.g., parts of speech such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ or ‘adjective’).
• How to combine the learning of segmental structure with the learning of
disjunctive classes.
• How to achieve the learning of segments and classes through two or more
levels of abstraction. In a linguistic context, this means how to learn ab-
stract structures representing phrases, clauses and sentences—and classes
of these entities—as well as lower-level segments such as words.
• How to generalise grammatical rules beyond the data and how to correct
over-generalisations without feedback from a ‘teacher’ or the provision of
‘negative’ samples or the grading of the data from ‘easy’ to ‘hard’.2
Solutions to these problems were found in the SNPR model (Wolff, 1988,
1982) and in the MK10 model (Wolff, 1980, 1977, 1975) but, as noted earlier,
the organisation of these models is quite unsuited to the wider goals of the
present research: integration of diverse functions within one framework. Finding
new solutions to these problems within the SP system has been a significant
challenge.
The SP70 model (v. 9.2) provides solutions to the first three problems and
partial solutions to the fourth and fifth problems. Further development will
be required to achieve robust learning of structures with more than two levels
of abstraction and more work is required on the generalisation of grammatical
rules and the correction of overgeneralisations (see Sections 2.2 and 9.5).
Overall structure of the model
Figure 9.1 shows the high-level organisation of the SP70 model. The program
starts with a set of New patterns and with a repository of Old patterns that is
initially empty.
In broad terms, the model comprises two main phases:
• Create a set of patterns that may be used to encode the patterns from
New in an economical manner (operations 1 to 3 in Figure 9.1).
• From the patterns created in the first phase, compile one or more alter-
native grammars for the patterns in New in accordance with minimum
length encoding principles (operation 4 in Figure 9.1).
After reading a set of patterns into New, the system compiles an ‘alphabet’
of the different types of symbols appearing in those patterns, counts their fre-
quencies of occurrence and calculates encoding costs as described below. These
2In the learning framework considered by Gold (1967), learning is not possible without some
kind of feedback or negative samples or grading of samples. The minimum length encoding
framework circumvents the need for these sources of information but it is still necessary to
consider exactly how the generalisation of rules and the correction of over-generalisations is
to be achieved.
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values will be needed for the evaluation of multiple alignments. As was noted
in Section 3.3, the term symbol type is used to mean a representative template
or example of a set of identical symbols.
SP70()
{
1 Read a set of patterns into New. Old is initially empty.
2 Compile an alphabet of symbol types in New and, for each type,
find its frequency of occurrence and the number of bits
required to encode it.
3 While (there are unprocessed patterns in New)
{
3.1 Identify the first or next pattern from New as the
‘current pattern from New’.
3.2 Apply the function CREATE_MULTIPLE_ALIGNMENTS() to
create multiple alignments, each one between the
current pattern from New and one or more patterns from Old.
3.3 During 3.2, the current pattern from New is copied into Old,
one symbol at a time, in such a way that the current pattern
from New can be aligned with its copy but that any one
symbol in the current pattern from New cannot be aligned
with the corresponding symbol in the copy.
3.4 Sort the multiple alignments formed by this function in order
of their compression scores and select the best
few for further processing.
3.5 Process the selected multiple alignments with the function
DERIVE_PATTERNS(). This function derives encoded
patterns from multiple alignments and adds them to Old.
}
4 Apply the function SIFTING_AND_SORTING() to create one or
more alternative grammars for the patterns in New, each
one scored in terms of minimum length encoding principles.
Each grammar is a subset of the patterns in Old.
}
Figure 9.1: The organisation of SP70. The workings of the functions cre-
ate multiple alignments(), derive patterns() and sifting and sorting() are ex-
plained in Sections 9.2, 9.2 and 9.2, respectively.
Next (operation 3), each pattern from New is processed by searching for
multiple alignments that allow the given pattern to be encoded economically in
terms of patterns in Old (as outlined in Section 3.4). From a selection of the
best multiple alignments found, the program ‘learns’ new patterns, as explained
below, and adds them to Old. A copy of each pattern from New is also added
to Old, marked with new ID-symbols as will be explained.
When all the patterns from New have been processed in this way, there is
a process of sifting and sorting to create one or more alternative grammars for
the patterns from New (operation 4). Each grammar comprises a subset of the
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patterns in Old and each one is scored in terms of minimum length encoding
principles.
Creating multiple alignments
The function create multiple alignments() referred to in Figure 9.1 creates zero
or more multiple alignments, each one comprising the current pattern from New
and one or more patterns from Old. Apart from some minor modifications and
improvements, this function is essentially the same as the main component of
the SP61 model, described in Sections 3.9 and 3.10.
Calculation of compression scores
The compression score for an multiple alignment is calculated as described in
Section 3.5, except for an approximation that is needed because the contents of
Old changes.
As learning proceeds, patterns are added to Old (operation 3.5 in Figure
9.1). Within those patterns, some of the symbols are derived from New and
their encoding costs are already known. However, other symbols—ID-symbols
and copies of them—are created by the system in operation 3.5 (Figure 9.1) and
the variety of types of these symbols and their frequencies of occurrence are con-
stantly changing. For this reason, it is difficult at this stage to calculate encoding
costs using the Shannon-Fano-Elias method. Accordingly, the encoding costs of
symbols created by the system are initially set at a fixed arbitrary value. As we
shall see, more precise values are calculated in the sifting and sorting() phase
of processing. The approximation at this stage does not seem to be a serious
impediment to learning, perhaps because the selection of multiple alignments
depends on relative values for compression scores, not absolute values.
Minimum length encoding principles in the formation of multiple
alignments
The search for multiple alignments that maximise CD conforms with minimum
length encoding principles as described in Section 2.2. The repository of Old
patterns may be taken to be the current grammar for encoding the current
pattern from New and, for any given pattern from New, the size of this grammar,
G, is constant.3 Since G is constant, the goal of minimising T is equivalent to
a goal of minimising E. For any given pattern from New, E is the same as BE
(Equation 3.4). Thus, since BN is constant for any given pattern from New,
seeking to minimise E is equivalent to the attempt to maximise CD.
3As indicated in operation 3.3 of Figure 9.1 and described in Section 9.2, below, a copy
of the current pattern from New is added to Old during the process of building multiple
alignments. However, for the purpose of encoding the current pattern from New, the entire
copy (with ID-symbols that are added to the copy) counts as part of Old and thus, for any
given pattern from New, G is indeed constant.
CHAPTER 9. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING 202
Copying the current pattern from New into Old
In its bare essentials, ‘learning’ in SP70 is achieved by the addition of patterns
to Old. This occurs in two ways: by copying each pattern from New into Old
(operation 3.3 in Figure 9.1) and by deriving patterns from multiple alignments
in the function derive patterns() (operation 3.5 in the same figure). The first of
these is described here and the second is described in the next subsection.
During the matching process in the first cycle of the cre-
ate multiple alignments() function, the current pattern from New is copied, one
symbol at a time, into Old in such a way that any symbol in the current pattern
from New can be matched with any earlier symbol in the copy but it cannot be
matched with the corresponding symbol in the copy or any subsequent symbol.
When the transfer is complete, ID-symbols are added to the copy to provide a
‘code’ for the pattern, as described below.
The aim here is to detect any redundancy that may exist within each pattern
from New (e.g., the repetition that can be seen in the pattern ‘a b c d x y z a
b c d’) but to avoid detecting the redundancy resulting from the fact that the
current pattern from New has been copied into Old. This constraint is imposed
for very much the same reason as the constraint (described in Section 3.4) which
prevents any one symbol within an multiple alignment being matched with itself.
The reason for copying each pattern from New into Old rather than simply
moving it is that each such pattern (with its ID-symbols) is a candidate for in-
clusion in one or more of the best grammars selected by the sifting and sorting()
function and it cannot be evaluated properly unless it is a copy of the corre-
sponding pattern from New, not the pattern itself (see Section 9.2, below).
The ID-symbols that are added to the copy of each pattern from New com-
prise left and right brackets (‘<’ and ‘>’) at each end of the pattern together
with symbols immediately after the left bracket that serve to identify the pat-
tern uniquely amongst the patterns in Old. For the sake of consistency with
the derive patterns() function (see Section 9.2, next), two ID-symbols follow the
left bracket. Thus, for example, a pattern from New like ‘t h a t b o y r u n
s’ might become ‘< %1 9 t h a t b o y r u n s >’ when ID-symbols have been
added.
Deriving patterns from alignments
In operation 3.5 in Figure 9.1, the derive patterns() function is applied to a
selection of the best multiple alignments formed and, in each case, it looks
for sequences of unmatched symbols within the multiple alignment and also
sequences of matched symbols.
Consider the multiple alignment shown in Figure 9.2. From an multiple
alignment like that, the function finds the unmatched sequences ‘g i r l’ and ‘b
o y’ and, within row 1, it also finds the matched sequences ‘t h a t’ and ‘r u n
s’. With respect to row 1, the focus of interest is the matched and unmatched
sequences of C-symbols—ID-symbols are ignored.
A copy of each of the four sequences is made, ID-symbols are added to
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0 t h a t g i r l r u n s 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < %1 9 t h a t b o y r u n s > 1
Figure 9.2: A simple multiple alignment from which other patterns may be
derived.
each copy (as described in Section 9.2, below) and the copy is added to Old.
In addition, another ‘abstract’ pattern is made that records the sequence of
matched and unmatched patterns within the multiple alignment. The result in
this case is five patterns like those shown in Figure 9.3.
< %7 12 t h a t >
< %9 14 b o y >
< %9 15 g i r l >
< %8 13 r u n s >
< %10 16 < %7 > < %9 > < %8 > >
Figure 9.3: Patterns derived from the multiple alignment shown in Figure 9.2.
It should be clear that the set of patterns in Figure 9.3 is, in effect, a simple
grammar for the two sentences in Figure 9.2, with patterns representing gram-
matical rules in much the same style as those shown in Figure 3.4 (b). The
abstract pattern ‘< %10 220 < %7 > < %9 > < %8 > >’ describes the overall
structure of this kind of sentence with slots that may receive individual words
at appropriate points in the pattern.
Notice how the symbol ‘%9’ serves to mark ‘b o y’ and ‘g i r l’ as alternatives
in the middle of the sentence. This is a grammatical class in the tradition of
distributional or structural linguistics (see, for example, Fries, 1952; Harris,
1951).
With multiple alignments like this:
0 t h e g r e e n a p p l e 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < %1 2 t h e a p p l e > 1
or this:
0 t h e a p p l e 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < %1 2 t h e g r e e n a p p l e > 1
the system derives patterns very much as before except that the unmatched
sequence (‘g r e e n’) is assigned to a class by itself, without any alternative
pattern that may appear in the same context. Arguably, there should be some
kind of ‘null’ alternative to ‘g r e e n’ in cases like this in order to capture the
idea that “the apple” and “the green apple” are acceptable variants of the same
phrase. This is a possible refinement of the model in the future.
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Readers may wonder why the grammar shown in Figure 9.3 was not simpli-
fied to something like this:
< %9 14 b o y >
< %9 15 g i r l >
< %10 16 t h a t < %9 > r u n s >
The main reason for adopting the style shown in Figure 9.3 is that the
overall organisation of the model is simpler if each newly-derived pattern is
automatically referenced from the contexts or contexts in which it may appear.
Another reason is that it is anticipated that, with realistically large corpora,
most of the patterns that will ultimately turn out to be significant in terms of
minimum length encoding principles will appear in two or more contexts and,
in that case, minimum length encoding principles are likely to dictate that each
pattern should be referenced from each of its contexts rather than written out
redundantly in each of the two or more places where it appears.
Assignment of identification symbols
Apart from the terminating brackets, each pattern in Figure 9.3 has two ID-
symbols:
• A ‘class’ symbol (e.g., ‘%7’ or ‘%9’) that normally starts with the ‘%’
character. The class symbol is, in effect, a reference to the context or
contexts in which the given pattern may appear. Thus, for example, the
symbol ‘%7’ in the first pattern in Figure 9.3 shows that that pattern may
appear where the matching symbol occurs in the pattern ‘< %10 220 <
%7 > < %9 > < %8 > >’. Any one pattern may belong in more than one
class and should contain a class symbol for each of the classes it belongs
to (see Section 9.2).
• A ‘discrimination’ symbol (e.g., ‘12’, ‘14’) that serves to distinguish the
pattern from any others that may belong in the same class. At this stage,
the discrimination symbol is simply a unique identifier for the given pat-
tern amongst the other patterns and multiple alignments created by the
program.
While multiple alignments are being built and patterns are being added
to Old, new class symbols and new discrimination symbols are created quite
liberally. However, many of these symbols are weeded out during the sift-
ing and sorting() phase of processing and those that remain are renamed in
a tidy manner.
Avoiding duplication
In the course of deriving patterns from multiple alignments and adding them to
Old, it can easily happen that a newly-derived pattern has the same C-symbols
as one that is already in Old. For this reason, each newly-derived pattern is
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checked against patterns already stored in Old and it is discarded if an existing
pattern is found with the same C-symbols.
Although the discarded pattern has the same C-symbols as a pre-existing
pattern, it comes from a different context. So a new symbol type is created to
represent that context, a copy of the symbol type is added to the pre-existing
pattern, and another copy of the symbol type is added to the abstract pat-
tern in the appropriate position. In this way, any one sequence of C-symbols
may appear in a pattern containing several different class symbols, each one
representing one of the contexts where the C-symbols may appear.
As the program stands, there is a one-to-one relation between contexts and
classes. But it can easily happen that the set of patterns that may appear in
one context is the same as the set of patterns that may appear in another. At
some stage, it is intended that the program will be augmented to check for this
kind of redundancy and to merge classes that turn out to be equivalent.
Deriving patterns from alignments containing three or more rows
For any given multiple alignment, the derive patterns() function works by look-
ing for one or more unmatched sequences of symbols in the current pattern from
New, or one or more sequences of unmatched C-symbols in a pattern from Old,
or both these things. What happens if an multiple alignment contains two or
more patterns from Old?
Consider the multiple alignment shown in Figure 9.4. In a case like this, it
is necessary to identify one of the patterns from Old for the purpose of deriving
patterns from the multiple alignment. The pattern that is chosen is the one that
is deemed to be the most ‘abstract’ pattern amongst those in the rows below
the top row.
0 t h e r e d a p p l e f a l l s 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | | | | | < %4 5 f a l l s > 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 < %5 7 < %1 | | | > < %2 > < %3 | | | | | > < %4 > > 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 | | | | | | < %3 3 a p p l e > 3
| | | | | |
4 < %1 0 t h e > 4
Figure 9.4: An multiple alignment (between a pattern from New and four pat-
terns from Old) from which other patterns may be derived.
The most abstract row in any multiple alignment is the row below the top
row that starts furthest to the left within the multiple alignment, e.g., row 2 in
Figure 9.4. Typically, this is also the row that finishes furthest to the right. In
general, this is the row within any multiple alignment that, directly or indirectly,
encodes the largest number of symbols from the current pattern from New. Of
course, if an multiple alignment contains only two rows, then row 1 is the most
abstract row.
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To be a suitable candidate for processing by the derive patterns() function,
the only row below the top row that may contain unmatched C-symbols is
the most abstract row. Also, there must be at least one unmatched C-symbol
somewhere within the current pattern from New and the most abstract row.
Any multiple alignment that does not meet these conditions is discarded for the
purpose of deriving new patterns.
From the multiple alignment shown in Figure 9.4, the function creates pat-
terns like those shown in Figure 9.5 and adds them to Old.
< %2 9 r e d >
< %7 10 < %3 > < %4 > >
< %8 11 < %1 > < %2 > < %7 > >
Figure 9.5: A set of patterns derived from the multiple alignment shown in
Figure 9.4.
Here, the unmatched sequence ‘r e d’ from the current pattern from New
has been converted into the pattern ‘< %2 9 r e d >’. The system recognises
that ‘r e d’ lies opposite the sequence ‘< %2 >’ within row 2 of Figure 9.4 and
that this sequence is a reference to the class ‘%2’. Accordingly, the pattern ‘r e
d’ has been assigned to that class. If the unmatched sequence opposite ‘r e d’
could not be recognised as a reference to a class, or if there was no unmatched
sequence opposite ‘r e d’, then the system would create a new class and new
patterns in the same manner as we saw in the examples at the beginning of
Section 9.2.
The second pattern in Figure 9.5 (‘< %7 10 < %3 > < %4 > >’) is derived
from the sequence ‘< %3 > < %4 >’ within the abstract pattern in row 2 of
Figure 9.4. The third pattern (‘< %8 11 < %1 > < %2 > < %7 > >’) is a new
version of that abstract pattern that references the class of the second pattern
(‘%7’).
Redundancy in Old
Given that the system is dedicated to information compression, it may seem
strange that, at this stage of processing, there may be considerable replication
of information (redundancy) amongst the patterns in Old. Patterns are added
to Old but, at this stage, nothing is removed from Old. In the example just
considered, the pattern ‘< %7 10 < %3 > < %4 > >’ coexists with the pattern
‘< %5 7 < %1 > < %2 > < %3 > < %4 > >’ even though they both contain
the sequence ‘< %3 > < %4 >’. In the example from Figures 9.2 and 9.3, the
patterns ‘< %7 12 t h a t >’, ‘< %9 14 b o y >’ and ‘< %8 13 r u n s > coexist
with the pattern ‘< %1 9 t h a t b o y r u n s >’ despite the obvious duplication
of information amongst these patterns.
The reason for designing the system in this way is that there is no guarantee
that any given pattern derived from an multiple alignment will ultimately turn
out to be ‘correct’ in terms of minimum length encoding principles or one’s
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intuitions about what the correct grammar should be. Indeed, many of the
patterns abstracted by the system are clearly ‘wrong’ in these terms. Retention
of older patterns in the store alongside patterns that have been derived from
them leaves the door open for the system to create ‘correct’ patterns at later
stages regardless of whether ‘wrong’ patterns had been created earlier. In effect,
the system is able to explore alternative paths through the abstract space of
possible patterns.
Sifting and sorting of patterns
Identification of ‘wrong’ patterns occurs in the sifting and sorting() stage of
processing (operation 4 in Figure 9.1), where the system develops one or more
alternative grammars for the patterns in New in accordance with minimum
length encoding principles. Figure 9.6 shows the overall structure of the sift-
ing and sorting() function.
Each pattern in Old has an associated frequency of occurrence and, at the
start of the function, all these values are set to zero. Then, all the patterns
in New are reprocessed with the create multiple alignments() function, building
multiple alignments as before, each one between one pattern from New and one
or more patterns in Old.
The difference on this occasion is that, for each pattern from New, the best
multiple alignments are filtered to remove any that contain unmatched symbols
in the current pattern from New or unmatched C-symbols in any pattern from
Old. The remaining ‘full’ multiple alignments provide the basis for further
processing.
In this phase of the program, we can be confident of finding at least one full
multiple alignment for each pattern from New because, in the previous phase,
each unmatched portion of the given pattern from New led to the creation of
patterns in Old that would provide an appropriate match in the future.
When all the patterns from New have been processed in this way, there is a
set A of full multiple alignments, divided into b1...bm disjoint subsets, one for
each pattern from New. From these multiple alignments, the function computes
the frequency of occurrence of each of the p1...pn patterns in Old as:
fi =
j=m∑
j=1
max(pi, bj) (9.1)
where max(pi, bj) is the maximum number of times that pi appears in any one
multiple alignment in subset bj . Using the maximum value for any one multi-
ple alignment for a given pattern from New is necessary because the multiple
alignments in each bj are alternative analyses of the corresponding pattern from
New. If we simply counted the number of times each pattern appeared in all the
multiple alignments for a given pattern from New, the frequency values would
be too high.
The function also compiles an alphabet of the symbol types, s1...sr, in the
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SIFTING_AND_SORTING()
{
1 For each pattern in Old, set its frequency of occurrence to 0.
2 While (there are still unprocessed patterns in New)
{
2.1 Identify the first or next pattern from New as the
current pattern from New.
2.2 Apply the function CREATE_MULTIPLE_ALIGNMENTS() to
create multiple alignments, each one between the
current pattern from New and one or more patterns
from Old.
2.3 From amongst the best of the multiple alignments
formed, select ‘full’ multiple alignments in which
all the symbols of the current pattern from New are
matched and all the C-symbols are matched in each
pattern from Old.
2.4 For each pattern from Old, count the maximum number of
times it appears in any one of the full multiple
alignments selected in operation 2.3. Add this count
to the frequency of occurrence of the given pattern.
}
3 Compute frequencies of symbol types and their encoding costs.
From these values, compute encoding costs of patterns in
Old and new compression scores for each of the full
multiple alignments created in operation 2.
4 Using the multiple alignments created in 2 and the values computed in
operation 3, COMPILE_ALTERNATIVE_GRAMMARS().
}
Figure 9.6: The organisation of the sifting and sorting() function. The com-
pile alternative grammars() function is described in Section 9.2.
patterns in Old and, following the principles just described, computes the fre-
quency of occurrence of each symbol type as:
Fi =
j=m∑
j=1
max(si, bj) (9.2)
where max(si, bj) is the maximum number of times that si appears in any one
multiple alignment in subset bj.
From these values, the encoding cost of each symbol type is computed us-
ing the Shannon-Fano-Elias method as before (Cover and Thomas, 1991). As
usual (Section 3.5), the encoding cost of each of the ‘data’ symbol types (those
that appears in New) is weighted so that data symbols behave as if they were
relatively large chunks of information.
Each symbol in each pattern in New and Old is then assigned the frequency
and encoding cost of its type. With these values in place, the compression score
of each multiple alignment in the set of full multiple alignments is recalculated.
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Finally, in operation 4 of Figure 9.6, a set of one or more alternative gram-
mars is compiled, as described in Section 9.2.
As the program stands, these alternative grammars are simply presented to
the user for inspection. However, it is intended that the patterns in Old should
be purged of all its patterns except those in the best grammar that has been
found. It is anticipated that the program will be developed so that patterns
from New will be processed in batches and that this kind of purging of Old will
occur at the end of each batch to remove the ‘rubbish’ and retain only those
patterns that have proved useful in encoding the cumulative set of patterns from
New.
Compiling a set of alternative grammars
The set of alternative grammars for the patterns in New are derived (in the com-
pile alternative grammars() function) from the full multiple alignments created
in operation 2 of Figure 9.6.
For any given pattern from New, a grammar for that pattern can be derived
from one of its full multiple alignments by simply listing the patterns from Old
that appear in that multiple alignment, counting multiple appearances of any
pattern as one. Any such grammar may be augmented to cover an additional
pattern from New by selecting one of the full multiple alignments for the second
pattern from New and adding patterns from Old that appear within that mul-
tiple alignment and are not already present in the grammar (counting multiple
appearances as one, as before). In this way, taking one pattern from New at a
time, a grammar may be compiled for all the patterns from New.
A complication, of course, is that there are often two or more full multiple
alignments for any given pattern from New. This means that, for a given set
of patterns from New, one can generate a tree of alternative grammars with
branching occurring wherever there are two or more alternative multiple align-
ments for a given pattern from New. Without some constraints, this tree can
become unmanageably large.
In the compile alternative grammars() function, the tree of alternative gram-
mars is pruned periodically to keep it within reasonable bounds. The tree is
grown in successive stages, at each stage processing the multiple alignments
for one of the patterns from New and, for each grammar, processing only one
multiple alignment for each pattern from New. Values for G, E and T are cal-
culated for each grammar and, at each stage, grammars with high values for T
are eliminated.
For a given grammar comprising patterns p1...pg, the value of G is calculated
as:
G =
i=g∑
i=1
(
j=Li∑
j=1
sj) (9.3)
where Li is the number of symbols in the ith pattern and sj is the encoding
cost of the jth symbol in that pattern.
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Given that each grammar is derived from a set a1...an of multiple alignments
(one multiple alignment for each pattern from New), the value of E for the
grammar is calculated as:
E =
i=n∑
i=1
ei (9.4)
where ei is the size, in bits, of the code string derived from the ith multiple
alignment (Section 3.5).
When the set of alternative grammars has been completed, each grammar is
‘cleaned up’ by removing code symbols that have no function in the grammar
and by renaming code symbols in a tidy manner (see Section 9.4, below).
Before leaving this section, it is worth pointing out a minor anomaly in the
way values for G and E are calculated. These values depend on the encoding
costs of symbols which themselves depend on frequencies of symbol types. At
present, these frequencies are derived from the entire set of patterns in Old but
it would probably be more appropriate if frequency values were derived from
each grammar individually at each stage in the process of compiling grammars.
The results are likely to be similar in both cases since encoding costs depend
on relative frequency values, not absolute values and, for the symbol types
appearing in any one grammar, it is likely that the ranking of frequency values
derived from the grammar would be similar to the ranking derived from the
entire set of patterns in Old.
9.3 Evaluation of the model
Criteria that may be used to evaluate a learning model like SP70 include:
• If applications are scaled up to realistic size, is the model likely to make
unreasonable demands for processing power or computer memory?
• Does it produce knowledge structures that look ‘natural’ or ‘reasonable’?
• Can the model discover the grammar that was used to create the data
from which it has learned?
• Given that the system aims to find grammars with relatively small values
for T , does it succeed in this regard?
• Does it produce knowledge structures that successfully support other op-
erations such as reasoning, making ‘expert’ judgements, playing chess, and
so on?
The evaluation of SP70 in terms of the first of these criteria is discussed in
the next subsection. The second and third criteria are discussed in Section 9.3
and at various points in Sections 9.4 and 9.5. Evidence bearing on the fourth
criterion is presented in Section 9.4, below. No attempt has yet been made to
evaluate SP70 in terms of the fifth criterion.
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Computational complexity
In common with other programs for unsupervised learning (and, indeed, other
programs for finding good multiple alignments), SP70 does not attempt to find
theoretically ideal solutions. This is because the abstract space of possible
grammars (and the abstract space of possible multiple alignments) is, normally,
too large to be searched exhaustively. In general, heuristic techniques like hill
climbing, genetic algorithms, simulated annealing etc must be used. By using
these techniques, one can normally convert an intractable computation into one
with computational complexity that is within acceptable limits.
In SP70, the critical operation is the formation of multiple alignments (cre-
ate multiple alignments()). Other operations (e.g., the derive patterns() func-
tion) are, in comparison, quite trivial in their computational demands.
In a serial processing environment, the time complexity of the cre-
ate multiple alignments() function has been estimated (Wolff, 1998) to be ap-
proximately O(log2 n × nm), where n is the size of the pattern from New (in
bits) and m is the sum of the lengths of the patterns in Old (in bits). In a par-
allel processing environment, the time complexity may approach O(log2 n× n),
depending on how well the parallel processing is applied. In serial and parallel
environments, the space complexity should be O(m).
In SP70, the function is applied (twice) to the set of patterns in New so we
need to take account of how many patterns there are in New. It seems reasonable
to assume that the sizes of patterns in New are approximately constant.4
Old is initially empty and grows as learning proceeds. The size of Old
(before purging) is, approximately, a linear function of the size of New. Given
this growth in the size of Old, the time required to create multiple alignments
for any given pattern from New will grow as learning proceeds. Again, the
relationship is approximately linear.
So if we ignore operations other than the create multiple alignments() func-
tion, we may estimate the time complexity of the program (in a serial environ-
ment) to be O(N2) where N is the number of patterns in New. In a parallel
processing environment, the time complexity may approach O(N), depending
on how well the parallel processing is applied. In serial or parallel environments,
the space complexity should be O(N).
Learning plausible structures
One way to assess a learning system is to look at the rules that it creates or the
way it parses its corpus of raw data and to make a judgement of whether the
rules or the parsings look natural. This ‘looks-good-to-me’ approach (van Zaa-
nen, 2002a) may seem crude but we should remember that the human brain is
currently the best learning system in existence so human judgements of whether
a grammar or a parsing are well-structured should not be dismissed too readily.
4There is no requirement in the model that patterns in New should, for example, be
complete sentences. They may equally well be arbitrary portions of incoming data, perhaps
measured off by some kind of input buffer.
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This approach can be formalised. For example, in Wolff (1977), the parsings
of an natural language text produced by the MK10 model are compared with the
segmentation into words that would be approved by an editor or printer. Using
the Chi Square test it was found that the correspondence was highly significant
and very unlikely to have been obtained by random processes. Likewise, in Wolff
(1980), the phrase-structure parsings obtained by MK10 were found to have a
statistically-significant correspondence with parsings produced independently
by an expert in linguistics.
A related approach to the evaluation of grammar learning systems is to
create an artificial grammar, use it to produce a sample of artificial language,
and then see whether the learning system, using the sample, is able to discover
or infer the original grammar. This may seem more rigorous than an informal
judgement of whether the system has produced a plausible set of rules or a
plausible parsing but it should not be forgotten that the artificial grammar is
itself the product of human judgement. In many respects, the two approaches
are equivalent.
As we shall see in the next section, SP70 can learn simple grammars that
look plausible but further work will be needed before it will be appropriate to
assess the system in a more formal way with statistical tests or the like.
9.4 Examples
This section presents two examples to illustrate how SP70 works and what it
can do. The examples are fairly simple, partly for the sake of clarity and partly
because of shortcomings in the model (discussed in Section 9.5, below).
Example 1
The four short sentences supplied to SP70 as New for this first example are
shown in Figure 9.7.
j o h n r u n s
m a r y r u n s
j o h n w a l k s
m a r y w a l k s
Figure 9.7: Four patterns supplied to SP70 as New.
The two best grammars found by the program for these sentences (with 10
as the cost factor) are shown in Figure 9.8. In (a) the best grammar is shown
in the form that it is first compiled and in (b) the same grammar is shown after
it has been cleaned up. Figure 9.8 (c) shows the second-best grammar after it
has been cleaned up.
Cleaning up grammars means removing class symbols that have no referents
(e.g., ‘%7’ and ‘%11’ in the second pattern in Figure 9.8 (a)) and renumbering
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< %4 15 s >
< %7 %9 %11 152 m a r y >
< %9 %14 162 j o h n >
< %24 406 r u n >
< %24 %27 407 w a l k >
< %25 412 < %9 > < %24 > < %4 > >
(a)
< %2 1 s >
< %3 2 m a r y >
< %3 3 j o h n >
< %1 4 r u n >
< %1 5 w a l k >
< 6 < %3 > < %1 > < %2 > >
(b)
< %2 2 m a r y >
< %2 3 j o h n >
< %1 1 r u n s >
< %1 5 w a l k s >
< 4 < %2 > < %1 > >
(c)
Figure 9.8: Grammars found by SP70 with the four patterns shown in Figure
9.7 supplied as New. (a) The best grammar without cleaning up. (b) The same
grammar after cleaning up. (c) The second best grammar after cleaning up.
the class symbols and the discrimination symbols, starting from 1 for each set.
The renumbering is a purely cosmetic matter and makes no difference to the
encoding cost calculated for each symbol.
The two grammars shown in Figure 9.8 are both reasonably plausible gram-
mars for the four original sentences. In the best grammar ‘m a r y’ and ‘j o h
n’ are picked out as discrete words and assigned to the same grammatical class
(‘%3’). In a similar way, ‘r u n’ and ‘w a l k’ are each picked out as a discrete
entity—corresponding to the ‘stem’ of a verb—and both are assigned to the
class ‘%1’. The suffix for these verb stems (‘s’) is picked out as a distinct entity
and the overall sentence structure is captured in the pattern ‘< 6 < %3 > <
%1 > < %2 > >’. The second best grammar is the same except that the suffix
of each verb is not separated from the stem.
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Intermediate results
The simplicity of the results shown in Figure 9.8 disguises what the program
has done to achieve them. The flavour of this processing may be seen from the
selection of intermediate results presented here.
When the first pattern from New is processed, Old is empty except for a
copy of that first pattern that is added to Old, one symbol at a time, as the
pattern is processed. The only multiple alignment formed at this stage is shown
in Figure 9.9. Remember that the symbols in the pattern from New (‘j o h n r u
n s’) must not be aligned with the corresponding symbols in the pattern in Old
because, in effect, this would mean matching each symbol with itself (Section
9.2).
0 j o h n r u n s 0
|
1 < %1 5 j o h n r u n s > 1
Figure 9.9: The only multiple alignment formed when the first pattern from
New is processed.
It is evident that, at this stage, opportunities to gain any useful insights
into the overall structure of the patterns in New are quite limited. From the
‘bad’ multiple alignment shown in Figure 9.9 the program abstracts the ‘bad’
patterns ‘< %2 7 n >’, ‘< %3 10 j o h >’, ‘< %3 11 j o h n r u >’, ‘< %4 14 r
u n s >’, ‘< %4 15 s >’ and ‘< %5 19 < %3 > < %2 > < %4 > >’.
When the next pattern from New (‘m a r y r u n s’) is processed, the program
is able to form more sensible multiple alignments like
0 m a r y r u n s 0
| | | |
1 < %4 14 r u n s > 1
and
0 m a r y r u n s 0
| | | |
1 < %1 5 j o h n r u n s > 1.
The first of these multiple alignments yields the patterns ‘< %7 152 m a r y
>’ and ‘< %8 157 < %7 > < %4 > >’. It would have created a pattern for ‘r
u n s’ but this is suppressed because the program detects that a pattern with
those C-symbols already exists (‘< %4 14 r u n s >’).
From the second multiple alignment, the system derives the pattern ‘< %9
162 j o h n >’ (assigned to the class ‘%9’) and it would create a pattern for
‘m a r y’ but it detects that a pattern with these C-symbols already exists (‘<
%7 152 m a r y >’). However, since ‘j o h n’ and ‘m a r y’ occur in the same
context (‘—r u n s’), they should be assigned to the same context-defined class.
Accordingly, the program adds the class symbol ‘%9’ to the pattern ‘< %7 152
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m a r y >’ so that it becomes ‘< %7 %9 152 m a r y >’ and it creates the
abstract pattern ‘< %10 168 < %9 > < %4 > >’, tying the whole structure
together.
As processing proceeds in the pattern-generation phase (operation 3 in Fig-
ure 9.1), the program forms good multiple alignments like
0 j o h n w a l k s 0
| | | | |
1 < %1 5 j o h n r u n s > 1
and relatively bad ones like
0 j o h n w a l k s 0
| | | | |
1 < %1 5 j o h n r u n s > 1.
From multiple alignments like these it derives correspondingly good and bad
patterns.
By the time the last pattern from New is processed (‘m a r y w a l k s’)
there are enough good patterns in Old for the program to start forming quite
plausible multiple alignments like
0 m a r y w a l k s 0
| | | | | | | | |
1 | | | | < %22 %29 %4 %31 394 w a l k s > 1
| | | | | | |
2 < %8 157 < %7 | | | | > < %4 > > 2
| | | | | | |
3 < %7 %9 %11 152 m a r y > 3.
At the end of this phase of processing, Old contains a variety of patterns
including several good ones and quite a lot of bad ones.
In the second sifting and sorting() phase of the program (operation 4 in
Figure 9.1) the program compiles a set of alternative grammars the best of
which are shown in Figure 9.8.
Example 2
When New contains the eight sentences shown in Figure 9.10, the best grammar
found by SP70 (after cleaning up) is the one shown in Figure 9.11.
This result looks reasonable but, in the light of the best grammar found in
Example 1, one may wonder why the terminal ‘s’ of ‘r u n s’ and ‘w a l k s’ has
not been identified as a discrete entity, separate from the verb stems ‘r u n’ and
‘w a l k’.
In the pattern-generation phase of processing, SP70 does form multiple align-
ments like this
0 t h a t b o y w a l k s 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < %1 9 t h a t b o y r u n s > 1
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t h a t b o y r u n s
t h a t g i r l r u n s
t h a t b o y w a l k s
t h a t g i r l w a l k s
s o m e b o y r u n s
s o m e g i r l r u n s
s o m e b o y w a l k s
s o m e g i r l w a l k s
Figure 9.10: Eight sentences supplied to SP70 as New.
< %2 2 s o m e >
< %2 3 t h a t >
< %1 5 b o y >
< %1 6 g i r l >
< %3 4 r u n s >
< %3 7 w a l k s >
< 1 < %2 > < %1 > < %3 > >
Figure 9.11: The best grammar found by SP70 (after cleaning up) when New
contains the eight sentences shown in Figure 9.10.
which clearly recognises the verb stems and ‘s’ as distinct entities. But for
reasons that are still not entirely clear, the program does not build these entities
into plausible versions of the full sentence structure. The program isolates the
pattern ‘< %25 599 t h a t b o y >’ from the multiple alignment just shown but
for some reason it fails to find internal structure within that pattern—although
it recognises ‘t h a t’ and ‘b o y’ in other contexts. This issue is discussed in
Section 9.5, below.
Plotting values for G, E and T
The value of T for the best grammar is 18695 bits before cleaning up and 18515
bits after cleaning up. By contrast, the total number of bits in the original 8
patterns is 69172.
Figure 9.12 shows how the values ofG, E and T change as successive patterns
from New in Example 2 are processed when the set of alternative grammars is
compiled. Each point on each of the lower three graphs represents the relevant
value (on the scale at the left) from the best grammar found after the full
multiple alignments for a given pattern from New have been processed. The
graph labelled ‘O’ shows cumulative values on the scale at the left for the original
patterns from New. The graph labelled ‘T/O’ shows the amount of compression
achieved (on the scale to the right).
Notice how the value of G does not change for the last 4 points. This is
because the grammar developed for the first four sentences provides an efficient
of encoding of the remaining sentences.
CHAPTER 9. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING 217
Figure 9.12: The lower three curves show values of G, E and T (on the scale to
the left) for the best grammar found (before cleaning up) as successive patterns
from New are processed in compile alternative grammars() with Example 2. The
curve marked ‘O’ shows cumulative values (on the left scale) for the numbers
of bits in the original patterns from New. The curve marked ‘T/O’ plots the
ratio of T to O, representing the amount of compression achieved (on the scale
to the right).
9.5 Discussion
This section discusses a selection of issues relating to the SP70 model, especially
shortcomings of the current version and how they may be overcome.
Finding internal structure
The failure of the model to find some of the internal structure within a sentence
in Example 2 seems to be a manifestation of a more general shortcoming. Al-
though the model in its current form can isolate basic segments and tie them
together in an overall abstract structure, it is not good at finding intermediate
levels of abstraction.
One possible solution is some kind of additional reprocessing of the patterns
in Old, including the abstract patterns that have been added to Old, to discover
partial matches not detected in the initial processing of the patterns from New.
This should allow the system to detect intermediate levels of structure such
as phrases or clauses or structures that may exist within smaller units such as
words.
Another possible solution is to modify the process of building multiple align-
ments so that, instead of discarding multiple alignments containing mismatches
between Old patterns, the system derives new patterns from the mismatches
and adds them to Old, much as described in Section 9.2. This should avoid
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the awkwardness involved in deriving new patterns from multiple alignments
containing three or more rows (Section 9.2) and should also allow a closer inte-
gration between parsing and learning.
Finding discontinuous dependencies
In the development of the model to date, no attempt has been made to enable
the system to detect discontinuous dependencies in syntax such as the number
and gender dependencies discussed in Section 5.3 (and, perhaps, intra-word
dependencies in Arabic and some other languages).
Although this kind of capability may seem like a refinement that we can
afford to do without at this stage of development, a deficiency in this area
seems to have an impact on the program’s performance at an elementary level.
Even in quite simple structures, dependencies can exist that bridge intervening
structure and, in its current form, the program does not encode this kind of
information in a satisfactory manner.
There do not seem to be any insuperable obstacles to solving this problem
within the SP system:
• The format for representing knowledge accommodates these kinds of struc-
ture quite naturally.
• Finding partial matches that bridge intervening structure is bread-and-
butter for the create multiple alignments() function.
What seems to be required is some revision of the way in which patterns are
derived from multiple alignments so that the system creates patterns containing
breaks as well as coherent substrings.
Generalisation of grammatical rules and the correction of
overgeneralisations
As we noted in Section 2.2, a well-documented phenomenon in the way young
children learn language is that they say things like “The ball was hitted” or
“Look at the gooses”, apparently applying general rules for constructing words
but applying them too generally. How is it that children eventually learn to
avoid these kinds of overgeneralisations? It is tempting to suppose that children
are corrected by parents or other adults but the weight of empirical evidence is
that, while such corrections may be helpful, they are not actually necessary for
language learning.
Minimum length encoding principles provide an elegant solution to this puz-
zle. Without the kind of feedback or supplementary information postulated
by Gold (1967), it is possible to search for grammars that are good in min-
imum length encoding terms and these are normally ones that steer a path
between generalisations that are, intuitively, ‘correct’ and others that appear to
be ‘wrong’. This kind of effect has been demonstrated with the SNPR model
(Wolff, 1982).
CHAPTER 9. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING 219
When SP70 is run on the first three of the four patterns shown in Figure 9.7,
the best grammar found is exactly the same as before (Figure 9.8 (b)). This
grammar generates the missing sentence (‘m a r y w a l k s’) as well as the other
three sentences, but it does not generate anything else.
In this example, the model generalises in a way that seems intuitively to be
correct and avoids creating overgeneralisations that are glaringly wrong. How-
ever, relatively little attention has so far been given to this aspect of the model
and further work is required. In particular, a better understanding is needed of
alternative ways in which grammatical rules may be generalised.
Learning recursive structures
Recursive structures are prominent in natural languages (Section 5.2) and many
other kinds of knowledge. As we saw in Section 2.2, recursive functions provide
a convenient means of achieving ‘run-length coding’, one of our three basic
techniques for information compression.
As we have seen in Sections 4.3 and 5.2 and elsewhere in this book, recursive
structures and functions fit comfortably in the SP framework because they can
be modelled using exactly the same mechanisms as are provided for encoding
other kinds of knowledge. It is anticipated that such structures may be learned
using the same principles and processes are required for the learning of other
kinds of knowledge, without the need for any special or ad hoc mechanisms.
That said, it will be necessary to ensure that future versions of the SP70 model
can indeed learn recursive structures in an appropriate manner using the same
mechanisms as are provided for the learning of non-recursive structures.
Symmetry and mirror images
A form of redundancy that is prominent in many kinds of knowledge is that
represented by symmetrical structures and mirror images. It is clear that signif-
icant compression can be achieved if this kind of redundancy can be recognised
and extracted when it is found. This is outside the scope of SP61 and SP70
but at some stage in the future this issue will need to be addressed. With 1-D
patterns, this means developing an ability to match patterns in two directions
instead of one and it also means developing an appropriate method for encoding
symmetry wherever it is found.
Learning other kinds of knowledge
The emphasis in this chapter and in the development of SP70 has been on the
learning of grammar-like structures from language-like input. The reason for
this emphasis is partly my long-standing interest in language learning (Wolff,
1988, and earlier papers) and partly because grammar induction, as one of the
most challenging kinds of learning, is likely to yield insights and solutions that
may be applied to other kinds of learning. If an SP model can be developed with
robust capabilities for grammar induction, it seems likely that it may be applied
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with little or no modification to the learning of other kinds of knowledge such as
if-then rules, class hierarchies, part-whole hierarchies, and associations between
syntactic structures and the non-linguistic ‘meanings’ of those structures (see
next section).
In all cases, the patterns to be learned reflect redundancies in the data.
The associations amongst the elements of a coherent or discontinuous syntactic
pattern are similar to the associations in an if-then rule. The way in which a
sentence may be broken into parts and sub-parts is essentially the same as the
way in which a car, house or other non-syntactic entity may be described in
terms of a hierarchy of components. And the levels of abstraction in a typical
grammar are essentially the same as the levels of abstraction in a hierarchy of
classes and subclasses.
At some stage, it will be interesting to try to generalise the concepts that
have been developed for 1-D patterns to the learning of structures in a two-
dimensional environment. Some possibilities are sketched in Section 13.2.
Learning associations between words and meanings
Learning associations between syntactic forms such as words and their corre-
sponding meanings seems puzzling because, in any given situation, there is a
large number of possibilities. If, for example, a child hears “look there is a cat”
as a cat goes by, this could refer to the colour of the cat’s paw, the act of walk-
ing, the time of day, or any other aspect of what the child would see. Quine
(1960) has called this problem “the scandal of induction”.
Although this seems puzzling at first sight, an association between a word
and any one of its meanings is no different in principle from any other kind of
association, including the kinds of association embodied in the syntax of any
language. Notwithstanding the huge numbers of possibilities, the use of heuristic
techniques should make it feasible to search successfully for associations that are
good in minimum length encoding terms. This has been amply demonstrated
with the MK10 and SNPR models and also with SP70. In short, “the scandal
of induction” appears to be well within the scope of established principles.
Another problem that is potentially very challenging is that many meanings
are quite abstract. We may represent the meaning of ‘cat’ with some complex of
cat-like features. But representing the meaning of ‘justice’, ‘liberty’ or ‘democ-
racy’ is a much more slippery eel! Pending any serious attempt to apply the SP
theory to problems of this sort, I shall assume that abstract concepts like the
ones just mentioned may be accommodated in essentially the same way that
other kinds of abstractions may be represented, as described in Section 6.4.
In the context of the SP theory and its current state of development, a more
immediate problem may be that words and meanings appear to be in different
‘domains’: a word in spoken or written form may need to be associated with
a meaning that may be some complex of sound, vision, touch and so on that
does not fall neatly into the same auditory or visual stream as the given word.
This is similar to the problem of learning ‘spelling rules’—meaning associations
between letter combinations and their sound values (see Wolff, 1984).
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Given that current SP models are restricted to 1-D patterns, a way to imitate
the relationship between words and their potential meanings in New information
might be to create groupings in which several words and potential meanings can
appear and the potential meanings would be scattered randomly within each
group.
A possible snag here is that there are two possible orders for a word and
its meaning and this would dilute the association and lead to the creation of
two patterns for each word-meaning association, instead of the one that seems
preferable. There may be a similar snag with 2-D patterns because there are
many possible arrangements of ‘cat’ and ‘CAT’ (representing the meaning of
‘cat’) in a 2-D array and it is not clear how their association could be abstracted
from their specific arrangements.
A possible answer to this problem might be to generalise the matching pro-
cess in the SP models so that—in the case of 1-D patterns—any two patterns
may be compared in both of the two possible directions—and in the case of
2-D patterns—comparisons may be made in many possible orientations of the
patterns. Generalisations like these will, in any case, be needed to account for
our ability to recognise ‘n o i t a m r o f n i’ as being the same as ‘i n f o r m
a t i o n’, but reversed, and our ability to recognise someone in a photograph
even though the person, or the photograph, may be upside down.
Motivation and emotion
Although learning has been considered in this chapter primarily as an engineer-
ing problem, the theory that has been described may be viewed as a possible
theory of learning in people and other animals.
In the theory as it has been developed to date, compression of information is
the driving force in learning. But it is clear that motivational factors also have a
roˆle to play as “occurs in ‘flash-bulb memories,’ memories of emotionally charged
events that are recalled in detail, as if a complete picture had been instantly
and powerfully etched in the brain.” (Kandel, 2001, p. 1034). How would this
fit in with the kinds of learning mechanisms that have been described?
The tentative suggestion here is that motivations and emotions may have an
impact when patterns are purged from the system. Other things being equal,
we may suppose that minimum length encoding principles govern the choice
of which patterns should be retained and which should be discarded. But any
pattern that represents something that has special significance may be retained
by the system even if it does not score well in terms of minimum length encoding
measures.
Other developments
Other areas where further work is planned include:
• As was indicated in Section 9.2, it is anticipated that the program will be
developed so that it processes patterns from New in batches, purging bad
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patterns from Old at the end of each batch.
• As was noted in Section 9.2, it is possible for two or more context-defined
classes to be the same. The program needs to check for this possibility
and merge identical classes whenever they are found.
• At present, the program applies the create multiple alignments() function
twice to each pattern from New, once as part of the process of generating
patterns to be added to Old and once in the sifting and sorting() phase.
It seems possible that the two phases could be integrated so that the
create multiple alignments() function need only be applied once to each
pattern from New.
• As was suggested in Section 9.2, there may be a case for introducing a
‘null’ pattern to allow for the encoding of optional elements in a syntactic
structure.
• Although the computational complexity of the model on a serial machine
is within acceptable limits, improvements in that area, and higher absolute
speeds, may be obtained by the application of parallel processing. If or
when residual problems in the model have been solved, it is envisaged that
the system will be developed as a software virtual machine on existing
high-parallel hardware or perhaps on new forms of hardware dedicated to
the needs of the model. It may be possible to exploit optical techniques
to achieve high-parallel matching of patterns in the core of the model (see
Chapter 13).
9.6 Conclusion
Although SP70 is still some way short of an ‘industrial strength’ system for
unsupervised learning, the results obtained so far are good enough to show that
the general approach is sound. Problems that have been identified appear to be
soluble.
A particular attraction of this approach to learning is that the SP system
provides a unified view of a variety of issues in artificial intelligence thus facili-
tating the integration of learning with other aspects of intelligence.
Chapter 10
Mathematics and Logic
10.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the conjecture that mathematics, logic and related disci-
plines may usefully be understood as information compression and, more specifi-
cally, as information-compression-by-multiple-alignment-unification-and-search.
Incidentally, the phrase ‘mathematics and logic and related disciplines’ will be
shortened to ‘mathematics and logic’.
Chapter 4, showed how the intuitive concept of ‘computing’ may be under-
stood in terms of the SP theory. If the arguments in that chapter are accepted,
and if ‘computing’ is seen to include mathematics and logic, then the present
chapter might be thought to be redundant. However, the purpose of the previ-
ous chapter was to show that the workings of a universal Turing machine and
the workings of a Post canonical system may be understood in terms of the
SP theory. By contrast, the purpose of this chapter is to show how aspects of
mathematics and logic other than universal Turing machines or Post canonical
systems may be understood in terms information compression or, more specifi-
cally, in terms of the SP theory.
There are no formal proofs in this chapter and indeed formal proofs in this
context are probably inappropriate since the argumentation depends on one’s
sense of analogy and what is or has potential to be intellectually fruitful. The
treatment of the proposals is very far from being exhaustive: the chapter merely
introduces some ideas in support of the proposals and presents a selection of
examples. Whether or how the ideas may be applied to the many areas of
mathematics and logic not discussed in this chapter are matters that readers
may like to consider.
Section 10.2, next, is a preparation for two main sections that follow. The
first of these (Section 10.3) discusses the conjecture in relation to ‘static’ forms
and structures in mathematics and logic, while the second (Section 10.4) dis-
cusses it in relation to the ‘dynamics’ of inferences in mathematics and logic:
‘calculation’, ‘proof’, ‘deduction’ etc. Section 10.5 briefly considers a range of
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issues that relate to the ideas that have been described.
10.2 Preliminaries
Representation, semantics and Platonism
In mathematics and logic, it is often convenient to make a distinction between
the representation of an entity and the thing itself (the meaning or ‘semantics’
associated with the representation). Thus the concept four may be represented
by ‘four’, ‘4’, ‘IV’, ‘1111’ (in unary arithmetic), ‘100’ (in binary arithmetic),
and so on.
In mathematical Platonism, mathematical entities “are not merely formal
or quantitative structures imposed by the human mind on natural phenomena,
nor are they only mechanically present in phenomena as a brute fact of their
concrete being. Rather, they are numinous and transcendent entities, existing
independently of both the phenomena they order and the human mind that
perceives them.” (Hersh, 1997, pp. 95–96). Such ideas are “invisible, apprehen-
sible by intelligence only, and yet can be discovered to be the formative causes
and regulators of all empirical visible objects and processes.” (ibid. p. 95).
The view of mathematical (and logical) concepts that has been adopted here
is quite different. It is assumed that both the representations of mathematical
or logical concepts and the concepts themselves are ‘information’, as described
in Section 2.2. If it is accepted that brains and computers are valid vehicles for
mathematical and logical concepts and processes of calculation and inference,
it is difficult to resist the conclusion that such concepts must exist within those
systems in some relatively concrete form—arrays of binary digits in digital com-
puters or, in brains, something like ‘cell assemblies’, patterns of nerve impulses
or, perhaps, DNA or RNA sequences. There is no place for “numinous and
transcendent entities” in a Platonic world outside the brain or computer.
Do Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems pose a problem for this non-Platonist
view? Discussion of that issue would take us well beyond the scope of this
chapter. We can at least say that any such problem is neither more nor less
than it would be for any artificial computing system.
The proposals in relation to established ideas
The various ‘isms’ in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and logic—
foundationism, logicism, intuitionism (constructivism), formalism, Platonism,
neo-Fregeanism, humanism, structuralism and so on—are well described in var-
ious sources (see, for example, Potter (2000); Hersh (1997); Craig (1998); Hart
(1996); Barrow (1992); Eves (1990); Epstein and Carnielli (1989); Boolos and
Jeffrey (1980)) and there is no intention to describe them again here.
Insofar as the embryonic ideas to be presented constitute any kind of phi-
losophy of mathematics and logic, it seems that they do not fit easily into any
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of the existing isms or schools of thought about the philosophy and foundations
of mathematics and logic.
Possible connections
Devlin’s interesting ideas about logic and information (Devlin, 1991) might be
thought to be related to the present proposals because a concept of informa-
tion is fundamental in the SP theory. However, Devlin develops a concept of
information that is different from the ‘standard’ concepts of Hartley-Shannon
information theory and algorithmic information theory that have been adopted
in the present work. Perhaps more important is the fact that information com-
pression does not have any role in his proposals in contrast to the SP proposals
where information compression has a key significance.
Two books about mathematics suggest in their titles that mathematics is a
“science of patterns” (Devlin, 1997; Resnik, 1997). Given the use of the word
‘pattern’ in the present research, one might think that these two books give an
account of mathematics that is closely related to the SP concepts. However,
the word ‘pattern’ in the present work is merely a generic name for an array of
atomic symbols in one or more dimensions whereas in Devlin (1997) and Resnik
(1997), the word ‘pattern’ has more abstract meanings.
That said, Devlin’s book—which is intended as a ‘popular’ presentation of
mathematics rather than an academic treatise—gives a hint of a connection with
the present work because the term ‘pattern’ is used in a way that seems to be
roughly equivalent to ‘regularity’ and there is a connection between regularities
and information compression. Resnik uses the term ‘pattern’ to mean the same
as the abstract concept of ‘structure’ as it has been developed in the structuralist
view of mathematics (see also Shapiro, 2000). As with Devlin’s book, there is a
hint of a connection with the present work because of an apparent link between
structuralist concepts and the intuitive concept of structure which itself seems
to reflect redundancy.
Despite these possible links with the present work, neither of the books cited
develops any connection with established concepts of information, redundancy
or information compression and there is no mention of any concept of multiple
alignment. Readers may wish to view the present proposals as an extension
or development of structuralism. Alternatively, the proposals may be seen as
an application of an independent intellectual tradition—information theory—to
concepts in mathematics and logic, with some points of similarity with struc-
turalism.
Parsing in mathematics and logic
To bring us a little closer to the main themes of this chapter, this subsection
presents an example showing how expressions in logic and mathematics may be
parsed within the SP system. This, in itself, is not a process of mathematical
or logical inference such as addition or multiplication but some kind of parsing
is necessary for the interpretation of mathematical or logical symbols prior to
CHAPTER 10. MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC 226
the application of such processes. The example provides a bridge between the
‘linguistic’ examples shown in Section 3.4 and other examples presented later
in this chapter showing how mathematical and logical structures and processes
may be understood in terms of the SP theory.
Both mathematics and logic make frequent use of ‘expressions’ that need
to be analysed into their constituent parts before they can be evaluated. An
example from arithmetic is (((6 + 4)(16 − 4)) − 6). In logic one might write a
composite proposition like ∼ ((p∧ q)⇒ ((x∧y)∨ (s∧p))), where the letters are
simple ‘atomic propositions’ like “Today is Tuesday” or an equivalent ‘atomic
formula’ like ‘today(Tuesday)’ and the other symbols have their standard mean-
ings in logic (see the key to Figure 10.1). Any such analysis is essentially a form
of parsing in the same sense as was used in Section 3.4. And, like ‘linguistic’
kinds of parsing, it requires an appropriate grammar.
It may be objected that the examples are already parsed because they con-
tain the kinds of brackets that may be used to represent the structure of a
sequence of symbols. The reason that parsing is needed in examples like these
is that, until the constituent parts of a sequence are recognised by the sys-
tem, the sequence is merely a stream of symbols and the role of the brackets
in marking structures has not yet been recognised. Brackets are, in any case,
not a necessary part of the examples—they might equally well be presented in
Polish notation without the use of brackets.
Figure 10.1 shows part of a grammar for expressions in symbolic logic. Read-
ers will see that it contains three main rules (beginning with ‘F’). The first one
creates an ‘atomic formula’ like ‘today(Tuesday)’. In a fuller grammar there
would be rules for the creation of a variety of such atomic formulae. The sec-
ond rule is a recursive rule covering cases like ‘proposition implies proposition’,
where ‘proposition’ can be simple or complex. The third rule is also recursive,
covering all forms of ‘not proposition’. The patterns beginning with ‘R’ show
some of the symbols that may be put between two propositions in the second
rule in the grammar.
F → a
F → ( F R F )
F → ( ∼ F )
R → ⇒
R → ∧
R → ∨
etc
Figure 10.1: Part of a grammar for symbolic logic. Key: ‘a’ = ‘atomic formula’,
‘∼’ = ‘not’, ‘∧’ = ‘and’, ‘∨’ = ‘or’, ‘⇒’ = ‘implies’.
Figure 10.2 shows the same grammar as the one in Figure 10.1 but it is
recast into a form that is appropriate for the SP system. The main differences
are that the grammar in SP style leaves out the rewrite arrow, it uses numbers
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to differentiate the three ‘F’ rules and the three ‘R’ rules, and it puts in a
‘terminating’ symbol for each rule and each ‘call’ to a rule. Each ‘terminating’
symbol is formed by copying the initial symbol and adding ‘#’ to the front of
it.
F 1 a #F
F 2 ( F #F R #R F #F ) #F
F 3 ( ∼ F #F ) #F
R 1 ⇒ #R
R 2 ∧ #R
R 3 ∨ #R
Figure 10.2: The grammar shown in Figure 10.1 recast in ‘SP’ style.
Finally, Figure 10.3 shows the best multiple alignment that was found by
SP61 with the pattern ‘( ( ∼ ( a ⇒ a) ) ∧ a )’ in New and the patterns from
Figure 10.2 in Old. The multiple alignment may be interpreted as a parsing of
the logical expression in terms of the given grammar and, as such, appears to
be ‘correct’.
0 ( ( ~ ( a => a ) ) ^ a ) 0
| | | | | | | | | | | |
1 | F 3 ( ~ F | | | | | #F ) #F | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
2 F 2 ( F | | | | | | | #F R | #R F | #F ) #F 2
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
3 F 2 ( F | #F R | #R F | #F ) #F | | | | | | 3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
4 F 1 a #F | | | | | | | | | | | | 4
| | | | | | | | | | | |
5 R 1 => #R | | | | | | | | | 5
| | | | | | | | |
6 F 1 a #F | | | | | | 6
| | | | | |
7 | | | F 1 a #F 7
| | |
8 R 2 ^ #R 8
Figure 10.3: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the expression ‘(
( ∼ ( a ⇒ a) ) ∧ a )’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.2 in Old.
Mathematics, logic, information, redundancy and
structure
Before we proceed to the two main sections of this chapter, it may be useful
to take a ‘global’ view of mathematics and logic in terms of concepts that were
introduced in Section 2.2.
The concept of ‘information’, as previously described, is a highly abstract
concept with a very wide scope. Anything and everything of which we may
conceive, including mathematics, logic, brains, computers, trees, houses, and
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so on, may be seen as information. We cannot learn about the world without
absorbing information and any inborn knowledge that we may have may also
be seen as information.
Information that is totally random—without any detectable redundancy—is
totally lacking in structure. All persistent entities, concepts, laws, theorems
or regularities, including the concepts of mathematics and logic, represent re-
dundancy or structure in information. Any kind of repeatable calculation or
deduction is a manifestation of redundancy in the substance of mathematics
and logic. And information compression is the mechanism by which we detect
and manipulate these redundancies.
In short, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that concepts in math-
ematics and logic are intimately related at a fundamental level to concepts of
information, redundancy, structure and the compression of information.
10.3 Information compression and structures
in mathematics and logic
The preceding parts of this chapter have prepared the ground for what is really
the main substance of the chapter:
• This section describes the idea that notations and structures in mathemat-
ics and logic may be seen as a set of devices for representing information
in a compressed form.
• The next section presents the idea that processes of mathematical and
logical inference may also be understood in terms of information compres-
sion.
As was noted earlier, the arguments and examples to be presented are not
intended as any kind of proof of the proposition that mathematics and logic is
based on information compression. They are merely suggestive indications of
what may turn out to be a fruitful way to view mathematics, logic and related
disciplines—an avenue to new insights and understanding.
Within this main section, Section 10.3 considers some general features of
mathematics and logic that suggest that there is a close connection between
mathematics and logic and information compression. Next, we consider some
aspects of number systems that seem to relate to information compression. Then
in Sections 10.3, 10.3 and 10.3, we consider how the information compression
principles of chunking-with-codes, schema-plus-correction and run-length coding
may be seen to operate in the forms and structures of mathematics and logic.
Section 10.3 considers some of the ways in which these concepts may be modelled
in the SP system.
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Suggestive evidence
Considering, first, the idea that notations and structures in mathematics and
logic might be seen as devices for representing information in a compressed form,
a general indication that something like this might be true is provided by three
aspects of mathematics discussed in the next three subsections.
Mathematics as the “language of science”
In the context of science as a search for succinct descriptions of the world, it
is often remarked that mathematics provides a remarkably and ‘mysteriously’
convenient way to express scientific truths. Thus Penrose (1989), who takes a
Platonic view of mathematics, writes:
“It is remarkable that all the SUPERB theories of Nature have
proved to be extraordinarily fertile as sources of mathematical ideas.
There is a deep and beautiful mystery in this fact: that these su-
perbly accurate theories are also extraordinarily fruitful simply as
mathematics.” (pp. 225–226, emphasis as in the original).
In a similar vein, Barrow (1992) writes:
“For some mysterious reason mathematics has proved itself a reliable
guide to the world in which we live and of which we are a part.
Mathematics works: as a result we have been tempted to equate
understanding of the world with its mathematical encapsulization.
... Why is the world found to be so unerringly mathematical?.”
(Preface, p. vii).
This last question is partly answered later:
“Science is, at root, just the search for compression in the world.
... In short, the world is surprisingly compressible and the success
of mathematics in describing its workings is a manifestation of that
compressibility.” (ibid., p. 247).
Thus he recognises that mathematics provides a good medium for expressing
scientific observations in a compressed form but he stops short of making the
connection, which is the subject of this chapter, between mathematical concepts
and standard concepts of information and information compression.
The nature of mathematical ‘functions’
A mathematical ‘function’ is a mapping from one set (X) to another set (Y ) and,
in the ‘strict’ form of a function, each element of X is mapped to at most one
element of Y (Sudkamp, 1988, p. 7) although it is sometimes useful to consider
more ‘relaxed’ kinds of ‘function’ where each element of X may be mapped
to more than one element of Y . In essence, a function is a table with one or
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more columns representing the ‘input’ and one or more columns representing
the ‘output’. Thus an element of set X may be one or more cells from one row
of the table and the corresponding element of set Y is the complementary set
of one or more cells from the same row of the table.
Very simple functions, such as the exclusive-OR function, can be and often
are represented literally as a table. This and other examples will be considered
later. But, in the vast majority of cases, the definition of a function (the ‘body’
of the function in computer-science jargon) does not look anything like a table.
Nevertheless, whatever the definition of a function might look like, all functions
behave as if they were ‘look up’ tables that yield an output value or set of values
in response to an appropriate input.
The key point here is that, with regard to the more complex kinds of func-
tions that do not look like a table, they are almost invariably smaller than the
abstract table they represent and, in most cases, they are smaller by a large
factor.
This feature of the more complex kinds of functions means that they can
provide a very effective means of compressing information. Consider, for ex-
ample, a function relating the distance travelled by an object to the time since
the object was dropped from a high place and allowed to fall freely under the
influence of gravity (ignoring the effect of resistance from air). If the function is
represented as a table and if there is an entry in the table for each microsecond
or nanosecond, then for a fall of 100 metres, say, the table will be very large. By
comparison, Newton’s formula, s = (gt2)/2 (where s is the distance travelled, g
is the acceleration due to gravity and t is the time since the object was allowed
to fall), is extremely compact.
This feature of the more complex kinds of function goes a long way to ex-
plaining why mathematics is such an effective “language of science”. However,
as we shall see, there is more to be said than this about information compression
and the nature of functions.
The nature of counting
Given its close association with the number system, the process of counting
things is clearly central in mathematics.
A little reflection shows that it is not possible to count things without some
kind of process of recognition. If we are asked to count the number of apples
in a bowl of fruit, we need to be able to recognise each apple and distinguish
it from other fruits in the bowl—oranges, bananas and so on. Even if we are
asked to count the number of ‘things’ in some location, we need to recognise
each one as a ‘thing’ and distinguish it from the environment in which it lies.
Recognition is a complex process which can be applied at various levels of
abstraction. But notwithstanding this complexity it seems clear that it neces-
sarily involves a process of matching patterns. And, if the things to be counted
are all to be assimilated to a single concept (e.g., ‘apple’ or ‘thing’ or other
category), this implies the unification of matching patterns.
Given the connection between information compression and the matching
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and unification of patterns (described in Section 2.2), it seems that counting
involves a process of compressing information. Given the central importance of
counting in mathematics, this is one strand of evidence pointing to the impor-
tance of information compression in mathematics.
Chunking-with-codes
As we saw in Section 2.2, the idea of giving a name, ‘tag’, ‘code’ or ‘identifier’
to a relatively large chunk of information is a means of compressing information
that we use so often and that comes so naturally that we scarcely realise that
we are compressing information.
In mathematics and logic, as in many other areas, names are widespread.
We use names for mathematical and logical functions, for sets and members of
sets, for numbers, for variables, for matrices and for geometric forms. In com-
puter programming, names are used for functions and subroutines, for methods,
classes and objects (in object-oriented design), for arrays and variables, for ta-
bles and columns (in databases) and, in the bad old days of spaghetti program-
ming, names were used copiously for individual statements or lines where the
program could ‘go to’.
In almost every case, it seems that a name has the role of being a relatively
short code representing a relatively large chunk of information. As such, most
or all of these names contribute to the achievement of information compression.
In the following subsections we shall consider these ideas in a little more
detail.
The concept of a discrete object in mathematics and logic
Historically, it seems likely that the concept of number originated with the need
to keep a tally on concrete objects like sheep, goats, oranges etc. Arguably,
the earliest number system was the system of unary natural numbers where
1 = 01, 2 = 011, 3 = 0111 etc and other number systems were invented or
discovered later as a generalisation of that simple kind of counting.1
Whether or not that historical speculation is accepted, most people will
accept that there is a connection between the concept of natural numbers, es-
pecially unary numbers, and the concept of discrete objects in the world. The
latter do not depend on the former (because animals—and people without any
knowledge of numbers—can recognise discrete objects). But each stroke in a
unary number is itself recognised as a discrete entity and, even if we are using
numbers with bases higher than one, we know that it is often convenient to
make a one-to-one association between strokes in the underlying unary number
and objects in the real world.
In a similar way, the concept of a set, with elements of the set being discrete
entities (some of which may themselves be sets), provides a link with the way
we see the world as composed of discrete objects.
1A concept of zero was, historically, a relatively late development.
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Thus the concept of a discrete object has a significant role in both the
concept of number and of a set. And the concepts of number and set are
both key parts of mathematics and logic. Bearing in mind that seeing the
world in terms of discrete objects is almost certainly a reflection of the way our
perceptions and concepts are governed by information compression principles
(Section 2.3), it is apparent that information compression plays a significant
part in the foundations of mathematics and logic.
Chunking-with-codes in number systems?
With regard to names or codes as relatively short identifiers for chunks, let us
begin with a type of name which, at first sight, does not appear to have a role in
information compression. It can be argued that the names (words or numerals)
that we give to numbers merely serve to differentiate one number from another
and are not codes for relatively large chunks of information. We may argue that
this is true even for names like ‘one billion’ or ‘109’ that represent relatively
large numbers and would take a lot of space if they were written out using
unary arithmetic or even binary arithmetic. The reason we may give is that
the base of a number (unary, binary etc) is irrelevant to the calculation of the
amount of information it represents so that any number in any base is totally
equivalent to the same number in another base in terms of information, apart
from errors arising from any rounding of numbers that we may choose to make.
This line of reasoning is valid for conversions between two numbers both
of which have a base of 2 or more, but it appears to be wrong for conversions
between numbers where one of the two numbers is unary.
Although unary numbers are conventionally considered to have a base of 1,
there is a sense in which they have no base at all. Each stroke in a unary number
seems to be a primitive representation of a discrete entity and the stroke cannot
be analysed into anything simpler.
By contrast, any number that uses a base greater than 1 introduces a new
principle: the idea that groups of symbols may be given a relatively short name
or code, and that this may be done recursively through any number of levels.
In the decimal system, for example, 8 is a relatively short name for the unary
number ‘011111111’. At this point, a sceptic might object that, to accommodate
decimal digits from 0 to 9, each one must be assigned at least ⌈log2 10⌉ = 4 bits
of space in a computer memory and that this is equivalent to the amount of
information in the corresponding unary number.
In the case of the decimal digits from 0 to 9, this objection may carry some
force. But it appears not to be valid when we consider numbers of 10 or more.
The decimal number 100, for example, uses digits within the range 0 to 9 and
so, on the assumption that we are not needing to represent anything other than
numbers, we could accommodate the three digits in ‘100’ with only 3 × 4 = 12
bits (or, if we started counting from 0 and thus finished counting at 99, we
could accommodate the number with only 2 × 4 = 8 bits). This is very much
less than the number of strokes in the corresponding unary number and thus,
prima facie, seems to be a clear case of information compression.
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In Section 2.2 we saw that lossless compression of I is only possible if we
can detect redundancy in I. Where is the redundancy in unary arithmetic that
might allow us to use the chunking-with-codes technique as suggested above?
The answer seems to lie in the apparent need to provide a symbol (normally ‘0’)
to represent zero in the unary number system.2 If the symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ are
both provided in the unary number system then it is clear that in all the many
unary numbers where the number of ‘1’s is large, the probability of ‘1’ is very
much higher than ‘0’ and so, in accordance with Hartley-Shannon information
theory, these numbers generally contain considerable amounts of redundancy.
Thus the conversion of any unary number (except very small ones) into the
equivalent number using a base of 2 or more seems to be a genuine example of
chunking-with-codes and seems to achieve genuine information compression.
Grammars and re-write rules
As we saw in Section 2.3, the notational conventions that are used in grammars
may be regarded as a set of devices that may be used to encode information
in an economical form. The information on the right-hand side of a re-write
rule may be seen as a ‘chunk’ of information and the symbol or symbols on
the left-hand side may be seen as a relatively short label or identifier for that
information.
Named functions and operators
Again, as we saw in Section 2.3, the ‘body’ or definition of a ‘function’ or
‘operator’ in a computer program may be seen as a relatively large chunk of
information and its name may be seen as a relatively short identifier for the
chunk. Very much the same can be said about functions in mathematics and,
as was noted in Section 2.3, about clauses in logic programming.
Schema-plus-correction
This subsection considers some constructs in mathematics and logic that seem to
be examples of the information compression principle of schema-plus-correction.
Structures containing variables
The concept of a ‘variable’ is widespread in mathematics, logic, computer pro-
gramming and theoretical linguistics. In all its uses it is understood as some
kind of ‘receptacle’ that may receive a ‘value’ by ‘assignment’ or by ‘instantia-
tion’. In many systems, each variable has a ‘type’ with a ‘type definition’ that
defines the range of values that the variable may receive.
In the majority of cases, a variable has a name, although unnamed variables
are used sometimes in systems like Prolog. If the size of the value of a named
2Apart from the need to represent the concept of zero, a system containing nothing but
unary numbers would need some means of marking the beginnings and ends of numbers. This
can be achieved if every number starts with ‘0’.
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variable is relatively large compared with the name (and values in Prolog can
be very large, complex structures), then, in some cases, the name may be un-
derstood as a ‘code’ and the value may be seen as a corresponding chunk so
that the two together may be seen to make a contribution to information com-
pression via the chunking-with-codes technique. But in many cases, the value
and the name are similar in size or the value is smaller than the name. Surely,
in cases like these, or in cases where the variable has no name, there cannot be
any contribution to information compression?
The answer to this question seems to be much as was described in Section
2.3. A structure that contains variables may usually be seen as a schema, the
variables may be seen as ‘holes’ or ‘slots’ in the schema and the values may
be seen as ‘corrections’ or ‘completions’ of the schema. In cases like these,
the schema may often be seen as a unification of two or more patterns with a
corresponding gain in information compression. In short, the contribution that
variables can make to information compression is not normally a function of
the variables in themselves but because they form part of a larger structure—
a schema—that contributes to information compression. Some examples are
described in the subsections that follow.
Functions with arguments or parameters
As we noted in Section 10.3, a function need not be a monolithic chunk of
information: most functions allow for variations in the data to which they will
be applied by providing ‘arguments’ or ‘parameters’ that may take different
values on different invocations of the function.
This kind of function may be seen as a schema with holes or slots (the
arguments or parameters) that may be filled with a variety of ‘corrections’ or
‘completions’ on different occasions. Provided the function is called two or more
times in a mathematical or logical text, it can be seen as a means of avoiding
undue redundancy in that text.
Classes, subclasses and objects
As we saw in Section 2.3, any one ‘class’ in object-oriented programming or
object-oriented design may be seen as a schema and the additional details pro-
vided in subclasses of that class or objects derived from that class may be seen
as ‘corrections’ or completions of the schema. This organisation allows software
to be represented in a compressed form because the attributes of a class need
be recorded only once instead of being repeated in each member of the class.
Sets
Perhaps the closest relative of the OO concepts just described in mathematics
and logic is the concept of a set.
A set can be defined extensionally—by listing the elements in the set (e.g.,
{sun,wind, rain})—or it may be defined intensionally—by listing the defining
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characteristics of the class (e.g., {n|n is prime}). An intensionally-defined set is
similar to a class as described in Section 6.4 and, when one set includes one or
more other sets recursively through an arbitrary number of levels, the structure
is similar to a class hierarchy as described above. But, to my knowledge, little
or no attempt has been made to develop concepts like inheritance of attributes
or the instantiation of a class by one or more objects.
With regard to information compression, an intensionally defined set that
describes two or more elements may be regarded as a compressed representation
of the relevant attributes of those elements.
Propositions in logic with the universal quantifier
Here are two examples of propositions expressed in English and in logical nota-
tion:
• “All humans are mortal.”
∀x : human(x)⇒ mortal(x).
• “For any integer which is a member of the set of natural numbers (N)
and which is even, it is also true that the given integer with 1 added is
odd.”
∀i ǫ N · is even(i)⇒ is odd(i+ 1).
Each example is a proposition containing a universal quantifier and a variable
(all three instances of x refer to a single variable and likewise for i). The first
statement is a generalisation about what it is to be human and the second one
is a generalisation about natural numbers. Both of them represent repeating
(redundant) patterns. Each may be regarded as a schema rather than a chunk
because, notwithstanding its status as ‘bound’, the variable in each example can
receive a variety of values.
Run-length coding
When something repeats in a series of instances, each one contiguous with the
next, we find it very natural to find some way to reduce the repetition to a single
instance with something to mark the repetition. As noted previously, lossless
compression is achieved if the number of repetitions is marked; otherwise the
information compression is lossy.
This section identifies some examples of run-length coding and further ex-
amples will be described in Section 10.4.
Iteration and recursion in computer programming
In computer programming, repetition of a part of a program can be shown
using forms like a while loop or a for loop or a repeat ... until loop. Generally
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speaking, there is some change in the value of one or more variables on each
iteration of the block of program. So this kind of repetition may be regarded as
a combination of run-length coding and schema-plus-correction.
As we have seen earlier (Section 2.2), repetition can also be expressed with
recursion (in the sense understood in computer programming). Here is an ex-
ample (in the C programming language) of the factorial function:
int factorial(int x)
{
if (x == 1) return(1) ;
return(x * factorial(x - 1)) ;
}
Repetition in mathematics
Mathematics uses a variety of ways to show repetition in a succinct manner:
• Multiplication is a shorthand for repeated addition.
• The power notation (e.g., 109) is a shorthand for repeated multiplication.
• A factorial (e.g., 10!) is a shorthand for repeated multiplication and sub-
traction.
• The bounded summation notation (‘
∑
’) and the bounded power notation
(‘
∏
’) are shorthands for repeated addition and repeated multiplication,
respectively. In both cases, there is normally a change in the value of a
variable on each iteration, so these devices may be seen as a combination
of run-length coding and schema-plus-correction.
• As in our previous examples, repetition of a function may be achieved by
a direct or indirect ‘recursive’ call to the function.
As we noted previously (Section 2.2), the use of shorthands is so automatic
and ‘natural’ that it is easy to overlook the fact that they are examples of
information compression.
Modelling these concepts in the SP system
If it is accepted that our three basic techniques for information compression can
be modelled in the SP system (as outlined in Section 3.6) and if it is accepted
that many forms and structures in mathematics and logic may be understood
in terms of information compression (as described in the preceding parts of this
main section), then one might expect that many of the forms and structures of
mathematics and logic could be modelled in the SP system. The majority of
examples will be seen in Section 10.4. As a preparation for these later examples,
this subsection focuses on some basic structures in mathematics and logic and
how they may be modelled in the SP system.
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Variable, value and type definition
The basic idea of a named variable can be represented quite simply in the SP
system by a pair of symbols that are contiguous within a pattern. In principle,
any pair of symbols may be seen to function as a variable but in most examples
we shall be considering the left and right symbols will correspond to the initial
and terminal symbols of patterns. Thus, in Figure 3.4, each of the pairs of
symbols ‘N #N’ and ‘V #V’ in the pattern ‘S N #N V #V #S’ may be seen
to function as variables with the first symbol of each pair acting as a name for
the variable and the second serving to mark the end of whatever ‘value’ goes
between the two symbols. These ‘values’ are patterns representing a noun in the
case of ‘N #N’ and a verb between the symbols ‘V’ and ‘#V’. In a similar way
in Figure 10.3, each of the pairs of symbols ‘F #F’ and ‘R #R’ in the pattern ‘F
2 ( F #F R #R F #F ) #F’ function as a variable that can take other patterns
in the grammar as values.
In these examples, each variable may be seen to have a ‘type definition’ in
the form of the set of patterns that has initial and terminal symbols that match
the left and right symbols of the variable. For the variable ‘N #N’, the type
definition is the two ‘noun’ patterns that can fit in that slot and for the variable
‘V #V’ the type definition is the two patterns for verbs. Of course, in a realistic
system, those two types would have many more members.
Although the examples shown seem to capture the essentials of the concepts
of ‘variable’, ‘value’ and ‘type definition’, they lack two of the features that are
commonly found in computer systems:
• Scoping: In most computer systems, a variable can have a ‘scope’ meaning
a part of a program within which repeated instances of a variable name
refer to a single variable.
• Assignment of a type to a variable: In many computer systems, any vari-
able can be assigned a type that is independent of its name. This contrasts
with the examples given above where the name of the variable is also the
name of its type definition.
It seems likely that these two ideas can be modelled in the SP system but not
in the SP61 model in its current state of development.
10.4 Information compression and processes in
mathematics and logic
The previous section presented a range of examples showing that many notations
and forms in mathematics and logic may be seen as devices for representation
of mathematical or logical concepts in a succinct form. This section presents a
range of examples in support of the idea that, very often, the computational or
inferential processes in mathematics and logic may also be understood in terms
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of information compression. More specifically, it is suggested that, very often,
they may be understood in terms of the SP system.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the concept of ‘computing’, as defined by the
structure and functioning of the universal Turing machine and Post canonical
system, may be understood in terms of the SP system. Section 4.3 of that
chapter showed how the SP system may model a Post canonical system for the
creation and recognition of unary numbers. The arguments and examples here
may be seen as a further development of the theme in other areas of mathemat-
ics, logic and related disciplines.
Sets
This subsection considers briefly how some of the basic features of sets may be
understood in terms of the alignment and unification of patterns.
Creating a set from a bag or multiset
The concept of ‘New’ as it has been described in this chapter allows two or more
patterns within New to be identical and, in that respect, New is like a ‘bag’ or
‘multiset’ in logic.
If New were to contain a range of one-symbol patterns like this:
{(A)(B)(C)(D)(A)(D)(B)(A)(C)(C)(A)(C)} (or if New were to contain multi-
symbol patterns that repeated in a similar way) it is not hard to see how, with
Old initially empty, the alignment and unification of patterns in a process like
that outlined in Section 3.2 would reduce New to a set of patterns in Old some-
thing like this: {(A)(B)(C)(D)}.
Thus, the process of converting a bag into the corresponding set containing
a single example of each type of element in the bag may be seen as a process of
information compression by the alignment and unification of patterns.
Union and intersection of sets
If the set {(B)(C)(D)(F)(G)} were in New and the set {(A)(B)(C)(E)(F)} were
the entire contents of Old, it is not hard to see that, in much the same way
as just described, the result would be: {(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)}. This set is
the union of the first two sets and their intersection is the one-symbol patterns
show in bold type—the set {(B)(C)(F)}.
In general, we can see that the union and intersection of two sets may be seen
as information compression by alignment and unification amongst the elements
of the sets.
Intensionally-defined sets
An intensionally-defined set such as {x|x > 1} may be regarded as a represen-
tation of a set in compressed form. Unless the set has only a few members (or
is empty), this representation is clearly more economical than the extensional
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definition that itemises every element of the set. The process of deriving an in-
tensional definition from the corresponding extensional definition may be seen
as the alignment and unification of the defining attributes in the elements of
the set.
Execution of simple functions
The concept of a ‘function’, that we have already considered as an example of
chunking-with-codes (Sections 2.2 and 10.3) and as a mediator of information
compression (Section 10.3), is one of the most distinctive features of mathemat-
ics and logic, especially in mathematics and computer programming.
It is often convenient to think of a function as some kind of ‘black box’ that
can receive some kind of ‘input’ and, after some processing, will deliver some
‘output’. As we noted in Section 10.3, a function can, in principle, be regarded
as a lookup table and, in simple cases, functions can often be implemented
in that way. But in more complex cases, a simple lookup table would not be
appropriate, either because the size of the table would be finite but too large to
be practical or because the table would be infinitely large.
The remainder of this subsection describes with an example how the ex-
ecution of simple functions may be modelled in the SP system and the next
subsection considers how the execution of the more complicated kinds of func-
tions may be understood within the SP system.
A simple function as a look-up table: a one-bit adder
Where a simple function is structured as a table, it can be processed by searching
for a row in the table where the input matches the input side of the row and
then reading off the corresponding output.
In the SP system, a table may be represented with a set of patterns like those
shown in Figure 10.4. These patterns define the function for the addition of two
one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic. The two digits immediately following ‘A’
in each row are the two one-bit numbers to be added together, the bit following
‘S’ is the sum of the two input bits, and the bit following ‘C’ is the carry-out bit,
to be carried to the next column. Thus, reading the results in each pattern from
right to left and writing them in the usual manner, the four possible results are
‘1 0’, ‘0 1’, ‘0 1’ and ‘0 0’, in order from the top row to the bottom.
A 1 1 S 0 C 1
A 1 0 S 1 C 0
A 0 1 S 1 C 0
A 0 0 S 0 C 0
Figure 10.4: Four patterns representing a table to define the function for the
addition of two one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic, with provision for the
carrying out of one bit. The meanings of the letters are described in the text.
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Apart from their function in conveying the meanings of the bits to human
readers, service symbols (like ‘A’, ‘S’ and ‘C’) are needed to constrain the search
for possible multiple alignments and, in effect, to tell the system which digits
represent the ‘input’ digits and which are ‘output’.3
Figure 10.5 shows the best multiple alignment that has been found by SP61
with the pattern ‘A 0 1 S C’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.4 in
Old. (Notice that the first and last digit in each row is a row number, not part of
the pattern for that row.) Generally speaking, in the SP system the ‘result’ of a
multiple alignment is the symbols in patterns from Old in the multiple alignment
that have not been aligned with any symbols from New. The result in this case
is ‘1’ for the sum bit and ‘0’ for the carry-out bit. In a very straightforward
way, the matching process has functioned as a process of ‘table lookup’ and has
‘selected’ the pattern in Figure 10.4 that yields the ‘correct’ addition of ‘0’ and
‘1’ in binary arithmetic.
0 A 0 1 S C 0
| | | | |
1 A 0 1 S 1 C 0 1
Figure 10.5: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘A 0 1 S C’ in
New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.4 in Old. The first and last digit in
each row is a row number, not part of the pattern for that row.
In general, any function that can be represented as a look-up table can be
represented in the SP system as a set of patterns and processed in essentially
the same way as the example of one-bit addition shown here.
Composite functions and their execution
We saw in Section 10.3 that, although all functions in mathematics and logic are
defined abstractly as a table of inputs and outputs, many functions do not look
much like a table and are very much more compact than the table that they rep-
resent. In later parts of Section 10.3 we have seen that the succinctness of many
functions, and the succinctness of mathematics and logic in general, can often
be attributed to the exploitation of our three simple compression techniques:
chunking-with-codes, schema-plus-correction and run-length coding.
So far, all of this seems to be reasonably straightforward. A complication,
however, is that when two or more functions are part of a higher-level function,
or when there is a repetition of a function two or more times, it is often necessary
for the output of one function to become the input of another function or for
the output of a function to become the input for another invocation of the same
function. Does this passing of information between functions represent any kind
of information compression and, in particular, can it be modelled with the SP
3A distinction between ‘content’ symbols and ‘code’ symbols provides additional constraint
but the details are not relevant to the subject of this chapter and need not be spelled out
here.
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system?
The next subsection shows how, in a simple case, it can be modelled in the
SP system. And the following subsection considers this issue in more general
terms.
Adding two-bit numbers or larger
Conceptually, the simplest way to add together a pair of numbers containing
two or more bits is to apply the one-bit adder recursively to successive bits in
each of the two numbers which are to be added. And this means that it should
be possible for any carry-out bit from one application of the adder to become
the carry-in bit for the next application of the adder in the next higher column
of the addition.
In the jargon of computer engineering, a one-bit adder like the one shown in
Figure 10.4 is called a half adder (see Richards, 1955, pp. 83–89) because it lacks
any means of receiving a carry-in bit from the column immediately below. This
deficiency is made up in a full adder (see Richards, 1955, pp. 89–95), a version
of which is represented by the set of patterns shown in Figure 10.6. Here, the
‘C’ bit at the beginning of each pattern is the carry-in bit and all the other bits
are the same as in the half adder (Figure 10.4).
Notice that the pair of symbols ‘C ... #C’ marking the carry-in bit at the
beginning of each pattern is the same as the symbols ‘C ... #C’ that mark
the carry-out bit at the end of the pattern. Matching of these pairs of symbols
allows the carry-out bit at any one level to become the carry-in bit at the next
higher level so that values can, in effect, be passed from level to level. This can
be seen in the example described next.
Consider, for example, how we may add together two three-bit numbers like
‘1 1 0’ and ‘0 1 1’. The two numbers need to be arranged so that the bits for
each level lie together and are marked in the same way as in the New pattern
in Figure 10.5. The order needs to be reversed to take account of the way the
SP61 model searches for multiple alignments.4 Thus the sequence of symbols
for these two numbers should be: ‘A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1 S’. However, the
symbols ‘C 0 #C’ need to be added at the beginning of New to ensure that the
carry-in bit for the first addition is ‘0’. So the final result is ‘C 0 #C A 1 0 S A
1 1 S A 0 1 S’.
The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘C 0 #C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A
0 1 S’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.6 in Old is shown in Figure
10.7. Ignoring the ‘service’ symbols, the sum of the two numbers can be read
from this multiple alignment as the three ‘sum’ bits (each one between an ‘S’
and a ‘C’ column), with the order reversed, and preceded on the left by the last
carry-out bit on the right of the multiple alignment. The overall result is ‘1 0 0
4In principle, SP61 can search for good multiple alignments by processing all the symbols
in New together. But in practice, some types of good multiple alignment (including the ones
described here) are much easier to find if the symbols from New are processed one at a time
in left-to-right order. And, in addition, it is natural to process columns in sequence from the
lowest order to the highest.
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1’. Readers will verify easily enough that this is the correct sum of the binary
numbers ‘1 1 0’ and ‘0 1 1’.
C 1 #C A 1 1 S 1 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 0 1 S 0 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 1 0 S 0 C 1 #C
C 0 #C A 1 1 S 0 C 1 #C
C 1 #C A 0 0 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 0 1 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 1 0 S 1 C 0 #C
C 0 #C A 0 0 S 0 C 0 #C
Figure 10.6: Eight patterns representing a table to define the function for the
addition of two one-bit numbers in binary arithmetic, with provision for the
carrying in of a digit as well as the carrying out of a digit. The meanings of the
symbols are described in the text.
0 C 0 #C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1 S 0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
1 C 0 #C A 1 0 S 1 C 0 #C | | | | | | | | 1
| | | | | | | | | | |
2 C 0 #C A 1 1 S 0 C 1 #C | | | | 2
| | | | | | |
3 C 1 #C A 0 1 S 0 C 1 #C 3
Figure 10.7: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘C 0
#C A 1 0 S A 1 1 S A 0 1 S’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.6 in
Old.
Other composite functions
Compared with conventional systems, the method just shown for passing infor-
mation from one invocation of a function to another is somewhat inflexible. This
is because it requires the ‘output’ variable to have the same name as the ‘input’
variable. In conventional systems there is a variety of notations for showing that
the output of one function becomes the input to another and none of them are
restricted in this way.
Modelling these more flexible methods in the SP system probably requires
an ability to model ‘scoping’ of variables and, possibly, an ability for ‘learning’.
Both these things are beyond what the SP61 model can do as it has been
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Propositional logic and information compression
Figure 10.8 shows four patterns representing a ‘truth table’ for the ‘exclusive
OR’ logical proposition (p ∨ q. “Either p is true or q is true but they are not
both true”). Here, ‘1’ means TRUE and ‘0’ means FALSE, the first two digits in
each pattern are the truth values of p and q (individually) and, for each pattern,
the last digit, between the symbols ‘R .. #R’ , is the truth value of p ∨ q.
Readers will notice that the XOR truth table is very similar to the definition
of one-bit addition shown in Figure 10.4, not merely in the arrangement of the
digits but, more importantly, in the fact that both things can be represented as
a simple lookup table that can be represented by a set of patterns. It should be
no surprise that the XOR function can be evaluated by SP61 in essentially the
same way as with the function for one-bit addition.
XOR 1 1 R 0 #R
XOR 0 1 R 1 #R
XOR 1 0 R 1 #R
XOR 0 0 R 0 #R
Figure 10.8: Four patterns representing the ‘exclusive OR’ (XOR) truth table
as described in the text.
Again, one might expect to be able to evaluate combinations of simple propo-
sitions in the SP system in essentially the same way as was done for the addition
of numbers containing two or more bits (Section 10.4). As before, this can be
achieved with the SP61 model in its current stage of development if outputs
are made to match inputs. This can be seen in the definition of ‘NOTXOR’
shown in Figure 10.9. Here, the alternative ‘outputs’ of the XOR proposition
are contained in the field ‘A ... #A’ and the same two symbols are used to mark
the possible ‘inputs’ of the truth table for NOT (that changes ‘1’ to ‘0’ and vice
versa).
NOTXOR XOR NOT R #R #NX
XOR 1 1 A 0 #A
XOR 1 0 A 1 #A
XOR 0 1 A 1 #A
XOR 0 0 A 0 #A
A 1 #A NOT R 0 #R
A 0 #A NOT R 1 #R
Figure 10.9: A set of patterns defining the ‘not XOR’ proposition as described
in the text.
Figure 10.10 shows the best multiple alignment found by SP61 with the
pattern ‘NOTXOR 0 1 A #NX’ in New and the patterns from Figure 10.9 in
Old. In the multiple alignment, the digits ‘0’ and ‘1’ in New yield ‘A 1 #A’ as
the ‘result’ of the XOR component. These three symbols match the first three
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symbols in the first of the two ‘NOT’ patterns and this yields ‘R 0 #R as the
overall ‘result’ of the NOTXOR proposition.
0 NOTXOR 0 1 A #NX 0
| | | | |
1 | XOR 0 1 A 1 #A | 1
| | | | | |
2 | | A 1 #A NOT R 0 #R | 2
| | | | | |
3 NOTXOR XOR NOT R #R #NX 3
Figure 10.10: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘NOTXOR 0 1
A #NX’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10.9 in Old.
As in the case of adding numbers containing two or more digits, the SP
patterns that have been shown are somewhat contrived owing to the need to
make the output at one stage match the input at the next stage. It is anticipated
that more elegant solutions may be found when the SP61 model has been further
developed.
True and false in the SP system
Although readers may accept that, in broad terms, the matching and unification
of patterns in the SP system can model the kinds of inferences that can be made
in propositional logic, an objection may be raised that, in propositional logic
per se, every inference has only two values, TRUE or FALSE, whereas in the SP
system, there may be and often are alternative multiple alignments for a given
inference that suggests that there are uncertainties attaching to the inferences
that the system makes.
The SP concepts apply most naturally to probabilistic reasoning (Chapter
7) and this suggests that ‘exact’ reasoning may be seen as reasoning where
probabilities are very close to 0 or 1. In itself, this idea is not satisfactory owing
to uncertainties about the precise meaning of ‘close to’ in this context. A better
idea is to use explicit TRUE and FALSE values in ‘output’ fields (or ‘0’ and ‘1’
values as in the examples we have been considering), coupled with a focus always
on the ‘best’ multiple alignment for any set of patterns. If multiple alignments
are created and interpreted in this way then the effect of two-valued reasoning
can be achieved within the SP system without ambiguity. An example is shown
in the next subsection.
Syllogistic reasoning
Consider the following text book example of a modus ponens syllogism:
1. All humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is human.
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3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
In logical notation, this may be expressed as:
1. ∀x : human(x)⇒ mortal(x).
2. human(Socrates).
3. ∴ mortal(Socrates).
The classical interpretation in logic of syllogistic reasoning requires explicit
values (TRUE and FALSE) for propositions, in much the same style as the
‘output’ fields of the XOR, NOT and NOTXOR functions shown above.
In the SP system, the first of the propositions just shown may be expressed
with the pattern ‘X #X human true ⇒ mortal true’. In the manner of Skolem-
ization, the variable ‘X #X’ in the pattern represents anything at all and may
thus be seen to be universally quantified. The scope of the variable may be
seen to embrace the entire pattern, without the need for it to be repeated. The
symbol ‘⇒’ in the SP pattern serves simply as a separator between ‘human true’
and ‘mortal true’.
If this pattern is included (with other patterns) in Old and if New contains
the pattern ‘Socrates human true ⇒’ (corresponding to ‘human(Socrates)’ and,
in effect, a request to discover what that proposition implies), SP61 finds one
multiple alignment (shown in Figure 10.11) that encodes all the symbols in
New. After unification to form the pattern ‘X Socrates #X human true ⇒
mortal true’, we may read the multiple alignment as a statement that because
it is true that Socrates is human it is also true that Socrates is mortal. In this
reading, we ignore the ‘service’ symbols, ‘X’ and ‘#X’.
0 Socrates human true => 0
| | | |
1 X | #X human true => mortal true 1
| | |
2 X Socrates #X 2
Figure 10.11: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with ‘Socrates human
true ⇒’ in New and patterns in Old that include ‘X #X human true ⇒ mortal
true’.
Notwithstanding the probabilistic nature of the SP system, there is no ambi-
guity in a multiple alignment like this because it is the only multiple alignment
formed that encodes all the symbols in New. Given that we restrict our attention
to multiple alignments of this kind, it is entirely possible for the framework to
yield deductions that are either TRUE or FALSE and not something in between.
Probabilistic ‘deduction’
Apart from the interpretation of examples like the one above in terms of classical
logic, there is, as we saw in Chapter 7, a more relaxed ‘everyday’ interpretation
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that allows statements and inferences to have levels of confidence or ‘probabil-
ities’. This kind of interpretation would view a proposition like “All humans
are mortal” to be an inductive generalisation about the world which, like all
inductive generalisations, might turn out to be wrong. In the same vein, we
may not be totally confident that Socrates is human. As a consequence of un-
certainties like these, the proposition that “Socrates is mortal” may have some
doubt attaching to it.
Chains of reasoning
A prominent feature of classical systems for logical reasoning is that we can
develop ‘chains’ of reasons: if A then B, if B then C, and so on. In the context
of probabilistic reasoning, we have seen how this can be done in the SP system in
Section 7.5—and Section 7.6 showed how probabilistic rules could be combined
in the SP system to reach a conclusion. In this chapter, we have also seen how
chains of additions can be modelled in the SP system (Section 10.4) and how
propositions with explicit TRUE or FALSE answers can be combined (Section
10.4). So, although detailed work in this area has not yet been done, we have
reason to be confident that the system will accommodate more complex kinds
of composite reasoning with explicit values for TRUE and FALSE.
10.5 Discussion
Before concluding this chapter, let us consider briefly a few issues that relate to
the ideas that have been presented. There is insufficient space to discuss these
issues fully—this section merely flags their relevance and indicates some lines of
thinking.
Could information compression be a foundation for
mathematics and logic?
Rather than suppose that mathematics is founded on logic or vice versa, this
chapter has suggested that mathematics, logic and related disciplines may be
seen to be founded on information compression, itself the product of primitive
operations of matching and unification of patterns.
Possible objections to this thesis are that:
• Concepts of information that are the basis of methods for information
compression are couched in mathematical terms and
• Mathematics is used in methods for information compression, including
the SP model.
A possible answer to the first point is that the Hartley-Shannon and algo-
rithmic information theory concepts of information are themselves founded on a
more primitive idea of discriminable changes (patterns of variation) across one
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or more dimensions and that, while mathematics provides useful precision, it
is not the only way in which information may be expressed or measured (see
below).
In a similar vein, an answer to the second point is that mathematics can
be useful in methods for information compression but that the core operations
of matching and unifying patterns do not, in themselves, use mathematical
constructs.
Rather less certainly, it may be said that, although a concept like ‘frequency’
(which has an important role in discriminating amongst alternative ways in
which patterns may be matched and unified) may conveniently be expressed
in the form of numbers (and these are clearly mathematical) the concept may
equally well be expressed as a non-numeric ‘strength’ of some kind of chemical
or physical variable in a brain or computer. Much depends, of course, on what
does or does not count as being ‘mathematical’.
In general, there are alternatives to mathematics in the expression or mea-
surement of information, in compression of information and in the measurement
of frequencies of occurrence. The proof of these assertions is that all of these
things can be and often are done by brains and nervous systems in humans and
other animals without the assistance of mathematical knowledge. It would be
perverse to say that a fox’s ability to learn where rabbits are most likely to
be found is a mathematical ability. Capabilities of this sort may be less accu-
rate than those that exploit mathematical techniques but they are useful for
everyday living and probably essential for survival of species through millions
of years.
Mathematics, logic and human psychology
Chapter 2 reviewed some of the writings and research relating to the idea that
information compression is fundamental in many aspects of perception and cog-
nition in humans and animals. Given this evidence, and given that mathematics
and logic is a product of human cognition, it should not be altogether surpris-
ing if we find that information compression is fundamental in mathematics and
logic. This is tangential evidence that points in the same direction as the more
direct evidence reviewed in this chapter that mathematics, logic and related
disciplines may usefully be understood as information compression.
Here we simply note this suggestion as a matter for further consideration in
the future. There are, no doubt, many implications and ramifications that may
be explored.
Mathematics and its applicability
The arguments and examples in this chapter may provide some solution to the
‘mystery’ of why mathematics is such a good “language of science”. As Barrow
says (1992, p. 247), “Science is, at root, just the search for compression in
the world”. If the arguments in this chapter are accepted, then mathematics is
a good medium for the expression of laws and other regularities in the world
CHAPTER 10. MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC 248
because mathematics provides the kinds of mechanisms that are standardly used
for information compression, with matching and unification of patterns at their
core.
Notice that the usefulness of information compression in this connection is
not merely in reducing the volume of scientific information (which may facili-
tate storage or transmission of that information). At least as important is the
intimate connection that appears to exist between information compression and
the inductive prediction of the future from the past (Section 2.2).
The world is compressible
Barrow goes on to say “... the world is surprisingly compressible and the success
of mathematics in describing its workings is a manifestation of that compress-
ibility.” (ibid., p. 247).
It is interesting to reflect on what things would be like if the world (and the
universe) were not compressible. In accordance with algorithmic information
theory principles, such a world would be totally random. This would mean that
there would be no ‘structure’ of any kind, including the world itself, people,
brains, computers and, indeed, the structures of mathematics, logic and related
disciplines. So all of the things we have been discussing, including mathematics
and science, would not exist. Science and the expression of scientific truths in
mathematics can only exist because the world is compressible!
It is true that, out of all the possible patterns of information, compressible
patterns (containing regularities) are relatively rare (Li and Vita´nyi, 1997). If
surprisingness depends on rarity, then it is surprising that the world is compress-
ible. But since, in accordance with the anthropic principle, we can only exist in
a compressible world that accommodates persistent structures like ourselves, it
is not surprising that the world is compressible!
The scope of mathematics in science
Mathematics is useful in many areas of science but it has limitations. The the-
ory of evolution by natural selection, which is by any standards a SUPERB
theory (to use Penrose’s word and emphasis) is not, fundamentally, mathemat-
ical. Mathematics can certainly be used to analyse aspects of evolution but the
theory in itself does not use any mathematical constructs (unless one adopts a
definition of mathematics that is so wide that it becomes meaningless). Again,
there are many aspects of the world—like distributions of plants and animals
or patterns of political beliefs—that seem to be fundamentally ‘messy’ and not
amenable to ‘neat’ compression into mathematical formulae.
In short, mathematics is a good language of science but it is not the only
language for expressing regularities in the world. And there are many aspects
of the world that have not yet been compressed into compact formulae or any
other succinct representation and seem unlikely to yield to that treatment in
the future.
CHAPTER 10. MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC 249
Mathematics, logic and the inductive prediction of the
future from the past
If the main thesis of this chapter is accepted, then it is accepted that mathemat-
ics and logic is founded on the same principles that appear to underlie concepts
of probability and probabilistic inductive inference. As we saw in Section 2.2,
there is a very close connection between information compression and concepts
of probability. The SP system is based on minimum length encoding princi-
ples. And Solomonoff (1986) has argued that the great majority of problems in
science and mathematics can be seen as either ‘machine inversion’ problems or
‘time limited optimization’ problems, and that both kinds of problems can be
solved by inductive inference using the minimum length encoding principle.
Of course, there are parts of mathematics to do with probability and there
are types of logic that are probabilistic. But, for many mathematicians and
logicians, the idea that mathematics or logic are founded on the same principles
that underlie concepts of probability and probabilistic inductive inference may
be hard to accept. It is, after all, the highly predictable ‘clockwork’ nature of
these disciplines that gives them their appeal.
There is no space here to discuss these issues fully. Five points are noted
here briefly:
• Non-determinism and associated uncertainties can appear in the Turing
model itself, depending on the transition function built into the model.
Likewise, the Post canonical system can exhibit non-determinism, depend-
ing on the productions provided in the model (see Minsky, 1967, chapters
10 to 14).
• Section 10.4 described briefly how the effect of two-valued logic might be
obtained in a system that is otherwise geared to probabilistic reasoning.
• As we saw in Section 10.4, some kinds of syllogistic argument can be seen
to have inductive origins.
• That mathematics may not, fundamentally, be quite as ‘clockwork’ as
is commonly supposed has been suggested by Chaitin (1988, p. 80): “I
have recently been able to take a further step along the path laid out by
Go¨del and Turing. By translating a particular computer program into an
algebraic equation of a type that was familiar even to the ancient Greeks,
I have shown that there is randomness in the branch of pure mathematics
known as number theory. My work indicates that—to borrow Einstein’s
metaphor—God sometimes plays dice with whole numbers.”
• The idea that we can only exist in a compressible world (Section 10.5,
above) seems to provide an answer to the problem of finding a rational
basis for inductive reasoning. Of course, we cannot justify such reasoning
by saying that it has always worked in the past—because this simply
invokes the principle we are trying to justify. A better answer seems to be
as follows:
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– The assumption that the future will repeat the past is equivalent to
the assumption that there is information redundancy between past
and future.
– If we make that assumption and it turns out to be true, then we will
reap the benefits of inductive reasoning—remembering where food or
shelter can be found, avoiding dangers, and so on.
– If we make that assumption and it turns out to be false, the universe
will have exploded into total randomness (or exploded and reformed
into totally unrecognisable patterns) and we are dead anyway!
– In short, there is no downside risk to the assumption that the past
is a guide to the future and a very substantial upside if it turns out
to be true. Hence, it is a rational assumption to make.
Reconciling the inevitability of mathematics with its
applicability
Potter (2000) writes that the chief philosophical problem posed by arithmetic
is “that of reconciling its inevitability—the impression we have that it is true
no matter what—with its applicability.” (p. 1). Presumably, the same can be
said about mathematics as a whole and, indeed, logic.
This section has already suggested a reason why mathematics and logic is so
applicable: because it is an embodiment of standard techniques for information
compression and, as such, it provides a convenient means of describing the world
in a succinct manner and, perhaps more importantly, it gives us a handle on
the inductive prediction of the future from the past.
What about the ‘inevitability’ of arithmetic and other aspects of mathemat-
ics and logic? The first point in this connection is that, as was noted above, the
work of Go¨del, Turing, Chaitin and others has shown that arithmetic, at least,
has a probabilistic aspect (“God sometimes plays dice with whole numbers”):
it may not be as true as is commonly assumed that 2 + 2 = 4, no matter what.
That said, any ‘fuzziness’ in arithmetic is not apparent in its everyday applica-
tions and it is still pertinent to ask why the laws of arithmetic are amongst the
most certain things that we can know.
The view of mathematics and logic that has been sketched in this chap-
ter suggests possible reasons for the certainties of arithmetic and, indeed, the
uncertainties too:
• With the simple kinds of patterns that seem to form the basis of natural
numbers (Section 4.3), the SP system often yields a multiple alignment
that stands out very clearly as better in terms of compression than any of
the alternative multiple alignments—because simple patterns impose rela-
tively tight constraints on the number of alternative ways in which symbols
may be matched and unified. This phenomenon may be responsible for
our subjective impression of the inevitability of arithmetic truths.
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• The uncertainties and paradoxes of mathematics and logic (Go¨del’s theo-
rems, the Halting Problem, Chaitin’s work, Russell’s paradox, etc) seem
all to arise from the infinite regress of recursion that can occur in math-
ematical or logical systems. This sits comfortably with the SP view of
mathematics and logic because recursion can easily arise in the matching
and unification of patterns (as we saw in Section 4.3).
10.6 Conclusion
The view of mathematics and logic that is presented in this chapter does not
prove that mathematics and logic is based on information compression but it
may provide a perspective that stimulates new thinking about the nature of
mathematics, logic and related disciplines, and new insights into those disci-
plines.
Chapter 11
Neural Mechanisms
11.1 Introduction
As we saw in Chapter 2 (mainly Sections 2.3, 2.3, 2.3, 2.3 and 2.3), there
is a wealth of evidence for the significance of information compression in the
workings of brains and nervous systems. Although this evidence has formed
part of the motivation for developing the SP theory, the theory has to a large
extent been developed in purely abstract terms without reference to the anatomy
or physiology of neural tissue. The main purpose of this chapter is to consider,
as far as current knowledge allows, possible ways in which the abstract concepts
described in Chapter 3 may be mapped on to structures and mechanisms in the
brain. It will be convenient to refer to these proposals as ‘SP-neural’.
The main focus of this chapter is on the storage of knowledge and the way
in which sensory data may connect with previously-learned knowledge in per-
ception and learning. These are areas where there is a relative paucity of neuro-
physiological evidence compared with what is now known about the processing
of sensory data in sense organs, thalamus and cortex. The SP system, together
with existing knowledge about the way in which neural tissue normally works,
is a source of hypotheses about the organisation and workings of the brain.
To anticipate a little, it is proposed that ‘patterns’ in the SP system are re-
alised with structures resembling Hebb’s (1949) concept of a ‘cell assembly’. By
contrast with that concept, it is proposed here that any one neuron can belong
in one assembly and only one assembly. However, any assembly may contain
neurons that serve as ‘references’, ‘codes’ or ‘identifiers’ for one or more other
assemblies. This mechanism allows information to be stored in a compressed
form, it provides a robust mechanism by which assemblies may be connected to
form hierarchies and other kinds of structure, it means that assemblies can ex-
press abstract concepts, and it provides solutions to some of the other problems
associated with cell assemblies.
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11.2 Global considerations: arguments from
biology and engineering
The immense difficulties in studying what is going on inside a living brain means
that there are enormous gaps in our knowledge. Trying to piece together a co-
herent theory is a bit like reconstructing an ancient document from a few charred
fragments of parchment or papyrus. Various kinds of inference are needed to
build understanding in the sea of ignorance that surrounds the scattered islands
of knowledge.
To the extent that the SP theory provides a coherent account of cognitive
phenomena, it may itself suggest predictions about what is going on in the brain.
If, as a working hypothesis, we assume that the theory is true, we may expect to
find correspondences between elements of the theory and structures or processes
in the brain.
The main aim in this chapter is to consider how the elements of the SP system
described in Chapter 3 may be realised in neural tissue. But before we examine
the nuts and bolts of the theory, there are some global considerations that have
a bearing on how the SP theory might relate to concepts in neurophysiology.
Given that brains and nervous systems are the product of evolutionary pro-
cesses of natural selection, we may evaluate the theory in these terms. Given
that biological systems must survive the rigours of the world, we need to consider
how the theory may relate to principles of engineering that govern all physical
systems, both natural and artificial.
Information compression and natural selection
We would expect natural selection to have favoured organisms that process in-
formation in an efficient manner, minimising an organism’s requirements for in-
formation storage (or maximising the amount of information that can be stored
for a given ‘cost’) and maximising the speed with which any given volume of
information can be transmitted from one place to another within the nervous
system (or minimising the biological cost of transmitting information at a given
speed). These considerations may increase our confidence in the long-standing
idea—incorporated in the SP theory—that information compression has a cen-
tral roˆle in perception and cognition (but see Section 11.7, below).
Another reason—perhaps even stronger—for believing that information com-
pression is a significant factor in the way nervous systems have evolved is the
intimate connection that exists between information compression and the in-
ductive prediction of the future from the past (Section 2.2). Arguably, this
kind of prediction—in the processes of finding food, avoiding predators and so
on—provides the entire raison d’eˆtre in biological terms for any kind of nervous
system. If that is accepted, then we should expect information compression to
have a central roˆle in the way neural tissues operate.
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Is the ‘cost’ of information compression significant?
It may be argued that the benefits of information compression may not always
justify the resources required to achieve it. May we not expect to find situations
where organisms use information without compressing it?
If storage costs or speed of transmission were the only consideration, this
kind of expectation would seem to be justified. But the very close connection
that exists between inductive prediction and information compression seems to
imply that we cannot have the former without the latter. If it is accepted that
prediction is indeed a fundamental function of nervous systems, it seems that
the costs of information compression cannot be avoided.
Compression of information may occur in ways that are not obvious. For ex-
ample, it may on occasions be useful to store information from the environment
in ‘raw’, uncompressed form and this may suggest that information compression
has no roˆle. But this stored information is of no use unless it can be related to
information that arrives later. And the process of relating the incoming infor-
mation to information that has been stored means matching and unification of
patterns—which are the elements of information compression.
Information compression and the benefits of redundancy
in the storage and processing of information
Although the SP theory sees information compression as fundamental in com-
puting and cognition, it should not be forgotten that redundancy in information
has a clear roˆle to play in information systems in guarding against loss of infor-
mation, in speeding up processing, or in the correction of errors that may occur
during the processing or transmission of information (Section 2.3).
It seems likely that exploitation of redundancies would be as important in
brains and nervous systems as it is in artificial systems. For example, it seems
very unlikely that evolution would have endowed us with information processing
systems that allow us to keep only a single copy of our hard-won knowledge.
And there is every reason to think that redundancies may be exploited to speed
things up or to reduce errors in neural processing of information.
As we saw in Section 2.3, there is no conflict between these uses of redun-
dancy in information processing and the idea that information compression is a
key part of the foundations of computing and cognition.
SP-neural and the modular structure of the brain
A last issue to consider briefly before we proceed to the main proposals is the
way in which the SP theory may relate to the structure of the brain.
The mammalian brain (and other parts of the nervous system) is divided into
clearly-defined modules, many of which have a clear association with particular
functions—Broca’s areas is concerned with language, the visual cortex deals
with vision, and so on. Furthermore, there are clear differences in anatomy and
physiology from one module to another.
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It might be thought that this modular structure—and the differences
amongst modules—rules out any global theory of brain function such as the
SP-neural proposals. An alternative view—which is the one adopted in this
research—is that the SP-neural theory describes general principles that may
seen to apply in a variety of different modules in different parts of the brain. It
is entirely possible that the same principles may apply in different modules and,
at the same time, there may be differences in how they are applied. It is clear for
example, that two-dimensional visual images need to be handled in a way that
is rather different from the time-ordered and predominantly one-dimensional
patterns of hearing. And yet the matching and unification of patterns—and the
building of multiple alignments—are ideas that may be applied in both areas.
11.3 Neural mechanisms for the SP framework
This section presents an outline of how the SP concepts may be realised in
neural tissue, while the next section considers aspects of the outline in more
detail in the light of available evidence, highlighting areas of uncertainty and
issues that need to be resolved.
In broad-brush terms, the proposals are these:
1. An SP pattern in Old may be realised by a network of interconnected cells,
similar to Donald Hebb’s (1949) concept of a cell assembly (see also Hebb,
1958, pp. 103–107). Because there are significant differences between the
SP-neural proposals and Hebb’s original concept, the neural realisation of
an SP pattern in Old will be referred to as a pattern assembly.
2. An SP pattern in New may be represented in arrays of cells in the sensory
systems or elsewhere. In the case of vision for example, these may be in the
layers of the visual cortex concerned with early stages of processing (layers
3 and 6) or, perhaps, in the lateral geniculate body. Comparable structures
may be found in other parts of the sensory cortex or thalamus. In the
process of establishing long-term memories, the hippocampus appears to
be involved (Kandel, 2001).
Each such structure must be able to respond to a succession of different
patterns, as discussed below. In addition to its roˆle in processing infor-
mation, each such structure functions as a buffer within which a pattern
from New may be stored pending further processing. Any structure like
this that can receive a pattern and store it temporarily will be referred to
as a neural array. Anything that is either a pattern assembly or an neural
array may be referred to as a ‘neural pattern’.
3. Much of the discussion below will focus on the analysis of sensory data.
But it should not be forgotten that the roˆle of ‘New’ may, on occasion, also
be played by patterns that are in some sense ‘internal’ to the system. As
we saw in Section 3.8, an internally-generated code pattern for a sentence
or, perhaps, a semantic structure, may take the roˆle of New. We shall
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suppose that there is some kind of ‘internal’ neural array to store patterns
of that kind, distinct from neural arrays for sensory data that will be
referred to as ‘sensory’ neural arrays. It is conceivable, of course, that
sensory neural arrays may also serve as internal neural arrays.
4. Where an SP symbol represents a fine-grained detail, it may be realised as
a single neuron. Where a symbol represents something a bit larger, it may
be realised with a pattern assembly. It is envisaged that each such ‘neural
symbol’—a single cell or a small pattern assembly—will respond preferen-
tially to a particular pattern of stimulation received from elsewhere within
the nervous system.
5. A neuron within a pattern assembly that corresponds to a C-symbol within
an SP pattern will be referred to as a C-neuron. Likewise, a neuron that
represents an ID-symbol will be called an ID-neuron.
6. Although sensory information is received initially in analogue form, it is
widely accepted that the information is converted at an early stage into
something like David Marr’s (1982) concept of a ‘primal sketch’ in the
domain of vision or something equivalent in other domains. In vision, it
seems that sensory data is converted into the digital language of on-centre
cells, off-centre cells, cells that are sensitive to lines at particular angles,
cells that detect motion, and so on (see, for example, Nicholls et al., 2001;
Hubel, 2000). Other sensory modalities seem to be similar.
7. It is envisaged that, when the cells of a sensory neural array become active
as a result of sensory input, the pattern of excitation will be transmitted
to the C-neurons of a range of pattern assemblies. Through an interplay
of excitatory and inhibitory processes to be described below, activity will
spread to other pattern assemblies until sets of pattern assemblies have
become active in a manner comparable with multiple alignments in the
SP system.
8. In a similar way, cells of an internal neural array may broadcast excitation
to ID-neurons of a range of pattern assemblies. From that point on, the
spread of activity should achieve the formation of multiple alignments in
precisely the same way as if the excitation had originated from sensory
input.
9. In SP70, learning occurs by adding newly-created patterns to Old, includ-
ing some derived relatively directly from New patterns and others derived
from multiple alignments in which there is partial matching of patterns.
When a range of patterns have been added, there is a process of evaluation
to differentiate those that are good in terms of the economical encoding of
patterns from New from those that are bad. It is envisaged that, in future
versions of the model, bad patterns will be removed from Old, leaving only
the relatively good ones. This kind of evaluation and purging may occur
periodically as patterns from New are processed.
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There seems no reason in principle why a comparable kind of process
should not operate with pattern assemblies. It seems unlikely that cells
would be literally added or removed from within a brain but it seems
possible that groups of pre-existing cells could be brought into play as
pattern assemblies, or the reverse, according to need.
A schematic representation
In order to summarise the proposals as they have been developed so far and to
provide a focus for the discussion that follows, Figure 11.1 provides a diagram-
matic representation of the way in which the neural substrate for SP concepts
may be organised.
This example has a ‘linguistic’ flavour but it should be emphasised that
the proposals are intended to apply to all sensory modalities—vision, hearing,
touch etc—both individually and in concert. Thus each of the patterns shown
in the figure should be interpreted broadly as an analogue of information in any
modality (or combination of modalities), not merely as a textual representation
of some aspect of linguistic structure.
Neural arrays
The pattern ‘j o h n r u n s’ at the bottom of the figure represents raw sensory
data in analogue form. Each letter is intended to represent a low-level feature
of the sensory input that will be recognised by the system.
The pattern shown immediately above, with the same letters but with dots
in between them, is intended to represent a sensory neural array containing
detectors (neurons) for low-level features of the image—lines at various angles,
colours, luminances, elementary movements and the like. Physiologically, it
seems that different kinds of features are processed in different areas of the
visual cortex but conceptually they may be seen to belong to one neural array.
The entire alphabet of detectors is repeated many times across the neural ar-
ray so that it can respond to any feature at any position within the neural array.
The schematic representation in the figure is intended to convey the idea that,
at each position, an appropriate detector is responding to the corresponding
small portion of the sensory input.
Pattern assemblies
Each of the patterns shown in the figure above the neural array are intended to
represent pattern assemblies located somewhere in the brain, most probably in
the cortex. Each character within each pattern assembly represents a neuron.
Angle brackets (‘<’ and ‘>’) at the beginning and end of each pattern and
characters with an oblique angle represent ID-neurons. All other characters
represent C-neurons.
Although the pattern assemblies shown in the figure are all one dimensional,
it seems likely that many pattern assemblies (e.g., in the domain of vision) will
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Figure 11.1: Schematic representation of the proposed neural basis for SP con-
cepts. The conventions used and other aspects of this figure are explained in
the text.
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have two dimensions.
Contrary to what the figure may suggest, it is likely that the lowest-level
pattern assemblies correspond to features of the sensory input that are relatively
small (but larger than the features registered by detectors in the sensory neural
array). In vision, these might be corners, angles or other small motifs. In speech,
they may be structures such as vowels, consonants or diphthongs.
It seems likely that there will be many more ‘levels’ of pattern assemblies
than the few levels shown in Figure 11.1. As indicated above, it seems likely that
the higher-level pattern assemblies will represent associations bridging several
different sensory modalities.
It seems likely that each pattern assembly will contain many more cells than
is suggested by the examples in the figure.
Not shown in the figure are the connections envisaged between neurons
within each pattern assembly. Each neuron will have connections to its im-
mediate neighbours at least and, perhaps, beyond.
Connections between neural patterns
Each of the neurons within the sensory neural array is connected to zero or
more C-neurons representing the same low-level feature in zero or more pattern
assemblies. The figure shows only the connections from neurons within the
neural array that have become active as a result of sensory input. There will
be similar connections from each of the many neurons not shown within the
sensory neural array.
Each of the pattern assemblies are connected in a similar way to other pattern
assemblies. Each of the ID-neurons within each pattern assembly is connected
to zero or more C-neurons representing the same symbol in zero or more pattern
assemblies. It is possible for an ID-neuron within one pattern assembly to be
connected to a C-neuron within the same pattern assembly but this ‘recursive’
kind of connection is not shown in the figure.
The dotted arrows in the figure are included as an indication that any one
pattern assembly (‘< N 0 j o h n >’ in this example) may be connected to two
or more higher-level pattern assemblies. The dotted arrows might, for example,
connect with a higher-level pattern assembly representing the interrogative form
of a sentence.
Each connection comprises a single axon, or a chain of two or more neurons,
with branches where necessary. Contrary to what the figure suggests, axons do
not join together where they converge on one neuron. That kind of representa-
tion is a shorthand for two or more synapses onto the body or dendrites of the
given neuron.
No attempt has been made to show any kind of internal neural array in the
figure. It is envisaged that structures of that kind would have connections to
ID-neurons such as ‘0’ in ‘< N 0 j o h n >’ or ‘1’ in ‘< R 1 r u n >’.
Not shown in the figure are lateral connections between fibres, proposed and
discussed in Section 11.5, below.
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11.4 Representation of knowledge in the brain
The aim in this section and the ones that follow is to flesh out the proposals
outlined in the previous section, filling in detail, considering relevant evidence
and discussing associated issues.
The central idea—that knowledge is stored in the brain as SP-style assem-
blies of neurons—is broadly similar to Hebb’s proposals but there are important
differences, as we shall see.
The cells in a pattern assembly need not be physically contiguous although it
seems likely that, in most cases, they will be. Whatever the spatial arrangement
of the cells, they should be topologically equivalent to an array of cells in one
or two dimensions, or possibly more in some cases.
It is assumed in these proposals that pattern assemblies exist largely in the
cortex. It seems likely that those concerned with patterns in a particular sensory
modality will be in the corresponding area of the sensory cortex. But many
others, especially those concerned with a combination of sensory modalities, are
likely to be located in the ‘association’ areas of the cortex.
As in Hebb’s proposals, it is envisaged that each cell in a pattern assem-
bly is connected to other cells in the pattern assembly, at least its immediate
neighbours.
As noted above, an SP symbol may translate into neural terms as a neuron
or, if it represents a relatively large chunk of information, it may be realised as
a pattern assembly. In the latter case, it needs to be connected to the pattern
assembly representing the pattern in which the given symbol appears. This may
be done in exactly the same way as a pattern assembly may be linked to another
pattern assembly, as described below.
Hierarchical organisation of knowledge
Hebb (1949, p. 130) envisaged an hierarchical organisation for conceptual struc-
tures and the possibility of low-level concepts being shared by two or more
higher-level concepts (see also the paragraph from Hebb (1958, p. 105) quoted
in Section 11.7, below). Hebb’s descriptions imply that any one neuron may
belong in two or more cell assemblies and this is commonly assumed (see, for
example, Huyck (2001, p. 385), Pulvermu¨ller (1999, pp. 257–258) and Sakurai
(1998, p. 213)).
This kind of organisation is problematic. If, for example, the cell assembly
that recognises the letter ‘a’ is embedded in the cell assembly for each word
that contains that letter, it is hard to see how the cell assembly for ‘aardvark’
would be organised. It is also hard to see how one could represent the abstract
structure of a sentence, for example, where each ‘slot’ in the pattern may receive
a range of alternative elements.
These problems may be overcome by the use of references between assemblies
instead of the literal embedding of one assembly in another.
By contrast with the generally accepted view of cell assemblies, it is envisaged
in the SP-neural proposals that any one neuron may belong in one pattern
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assembly and only one pattern assembly. Hierarchical organisation and the
sharing of structures is achieved by connections between ID-neurons and C-
neurons that achieve the effect of pointers in software or references in books or
articles. There is further discussion in Section 11.7, below.
This kind of reference mechanism means that a given pattern assembly can
link widely-dispersed areas of the cortex without itself needing to be large (see
Section 11.4, below).
New information in brains and nervous systems
As indicated above, sensory information is received by ‘neural arrays’ such as
the visual cortex or areas of the cortex concerned with other sensory modalities.
Comparable structures may also exist within the thalamus. It is envisaged
that internally-generated patterns that play the roˆle of New information will be
stored in some kind of internal neural array.
A sensory neural array, unlike a pattern assembly, must be able to capture
any of a wide variety of patterns that arrive at the senses. As a rough generali-
sation, it seems that this is normally achieved by providing a range of different
types of receptor cells, each type tuned to some relatively small feature that
may be found in sensory data and the whole set repeated across the neural ar-
ray. In the visual cortex, for example, there are cells that respond selectively to
short line segments at different angles and the complete range of orientations
is repeated within each of a large number of fairly small ‘orientation columns’
(Barlow, 1982; Hubel, 2000). It seems likely that a similar organisation may
exist in the somatosensory cortex, mirroring the way in which receptors that
respond selectively to heat, cold, touch, pressure and so on are repeated across
areas of the skin (Nicholls et al., 2001, Chapter 18).
There are many complexities of course (e.g., ‘complex’ cells in vision that
can respond to a line at a given orientation in any of several different positions
(Hubel, 2000)1). But in general the overall effect seems to be to translate raw
analogue data into a digital language composed with an alphabet of sensory
features.
So far, we have assumed that a New pattern arrives all at once like an image
projected on to the retina. But it is clear that streams of sensory information
are being received in all sensory modalities throughout our lives and that we
are very sensitive to patterns in the temporal dimension within those streams of
information, especially in hearing. It is assumed here that temporal sequencing
in hearing, vision and other modalities is encoded spatially in arrays of cells,
probably in the cortex.
1If complex cells could accommodate large variations of position, this would mean that
useful information about the positions of visual entities would be lost at the level complex
cells. It has been suggested (Nicholls et al., 2001, p. 422) that the main roˆle of complex
cells is to cope with the relatively small changes in position caused by the small saccadic eye
movements that are continually made to prevent visual input being suppressed by adaptation
in the retina. However, Milner (personal communication) suggests that the receptive fields of
many complex cells are significantly bigger than would be needed for that function.
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Connections between neurons
As noted above, it is envisaged that, within each pattern assembly, neurons
will be interconnected, at least to their nearest neighbours. If, as suggested
above, the cells within any one pattern assembly lie close together, then lateral
connections between the cells within any one pattern assembly will normally be
quite short.
From each neuron with an neural array, there may be zero or more connec-
tions, each one to a corresponding C-neuron within a pattern assembly. And
from each ID-neuron within a pattern assembly there may be zero or more
connections, each one to a corresponding C-neuron within another pattern as-
sembly. In this context, the word ‘corresponding’ means that both neurons
represent the same SP symbol. We may suppose that the connections from any
one neuron (within an neural array or a pattern assembly) are formed from an
axon with as many branches as are required.
The volume of connections between neural patterns
There is a possible worry here that the number of connections might get out of
hand and that the volume of axons would be too big to fit inside anyone’s skull.
This might be true if everything was connected to everything else but that is
not necessary and seems an unlikely feature of the brain.
Consider, for example, how a neuron within an neural array may connect
to pattern assemblies representing sensory patterns. A neuron representing a
short line segment at a particular angle could, conceivably, make a connection to
each one of thousands of pattern assemblies representing objects or scenes that
contain that small feature. It seems more likely, however, that a neuron within
an neural array would connect only to a relatively small number of pattern
assemblies each one of which represents some relatively small ‘motif’—an angle
in some orientation or some other small detail. In a similar way, each of those
motifs may connect to a relatively small number of higher-level patterns and so
on through several different levels, much like the various levels of description
that are familiar in a linguistic context (illustrated in Section 3.4).
By breaking patterns down into parts and sub-parts in this kind of way, with
connections chiefly between one level and the next, the number of connections
that are required can be dramatically reduced.
As with SP patterns (or, indeed, the rules of a typical grammar), pattern
assemblies do not necessarily fall into a strict hierarchy. It would be more
accurate to call it a ‘loose heterarchy’, where any one pattern assembly may
receive connections from two or more lower-level pattern assemblies and may
also connect to two or more higher level pattern assemblies. Connections need
not always be to some strictly-defined ‘next level’ and, where there are recursive
relations, ID-neurons within a given pattern assembly may actually connect to
C-neurons of the same pattern assembly (examples of this kind of recursion may
be found in Wolff (1999a)).
Any untidiness of this kind makes no difference to the basic idea that any one
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neuron need only be connected to a small subset of all the pattern assemblies
and thus the volume of interconnections may be kept within reasonable bounds.
This economy in interconnections is, indirectly, a reflection of the economy that
can be achieved with an SP style of knowledge representation.
The lengths of connections between neural patterns
How long would the connections between neural patterns have to be? That
depends on what kinds of things are being connected.
pattern assemblies representing concepts within one domain—some aspect
of vision, for example—may all reside within one relatively small area of the
sensory cortex and their interconnections need not be very long. However, many
of our concepts involve associations across two or more modalities and this seems
to demand relatively long interconnections in most cases. Thus, for example,
Pulvermu¨ller (1999) has suggested that “most word representations consist of
two parts, a perisylvian part related to the word form and a part located mainly
outside the perisylvian areas representing semantic word properties.” (p. 275).
As another example, consider the concept of ‘our house’. This is likely to
include the visual appearance of the house (patterns of luminance, colour and
motion), sounds, smells and tactile aspects as well as emotional associations.
Although the corresponding pattern assembly may be quite compact and located
in one small part of the cortex (one of the ‘association’ areas, perhaps), it must
have connections to the areas of the brain concerned with each of the elements,
sensory or otherwise, from which the concept is built. Given that each modality
is typically processed in a localised area of the cortex and given that these
areas are widely dispersed (Nicholls et al., 2001), it seems that relatively long
connections will normally be needed.
This has some bearing on learning processes, as we shall see in Section 11.6.
Are there enough neurons in the brain?
The idea that the brain stores knowledge in the form of SP-style cell assemblies
raises the question “Are there enough neurons in the brain to support this style
of representation”? This is a difficult question to answer because of various un-
certainties. Here are some very rough estimates, made with rather conservative
assumptions:
• Estimates of the number of neurons in the human brain range from 1010
(Sholl, 1956) to 1011 (Williams and Herrup, 2001).
• If a neuron in the sensory cortex responds to some small feature of the
world—a line at a certain angle or a note of a given pitch—and if there
are, at a conservative estimate, about 30 different basic features across
all sensory modalities, then each neuron represents ⌈log2 30⌉ = 5 bits of
information. It seems reasonable to assume that other neurons in the
brain have a similar capacity. Erring on the side of caution, we shall make
the very conservative assumption here that each neuron represents only 1
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bit of information. On that basis, the ‘raw’ storage capacity of the brain is
between approximately 109 to 1010 bytes or between 1000 MB and 10,000
MB.
• Bearing in mind that stored knowledge will be heavily compressed using
SP-style mechanisms, the effective storage capacity of the brain will be
larger. With an ordinary Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm (e.g., PkZip
or WinZip) it is possible to compress English text to one third of its
original size (without loss of non-redundant information). This is probably
a rather conservative estimate of the amount of compression that may be
obtained across diverse kinds of knowledge:
– Lempel-Ziv algorithms are designed for speed on a conventional serial
computer rather than optimal compression. More compression can
be achieved when more processing power is available (as in the human
brain).
– Visual information typically contains more redundancy than English
text. For example, a good quality compressed JPEG version of a
typical photograph is about 5 times smaller than an uncompressed
bitmap version of the same image. It is true that JPEG is a lossy
compression technique but if the quality is good, the amount of non-
redundant information that is lost is relatively small.
– ‘Cinematic’ information normally contains very high levels of redun-
dancy because, in each sequence of frames from one cut to the next,
each frame is normally very similar to its predecessor. This redun-
dancy allows high levels of compression to be achieved.
If we adopt the conservative assumption that compression by a factor of 3
may be achieved across all kinds of knowledge, our estimates of the storage
capacity of the brain will range from about 3000 MB up to about 30,000
MB.
• Is this enough to accommodate what the average person knows? Any esti-
mate here can only be very approximate. Let us assume that the average
person knows only a relatively small proportion of what is contained in
the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Clearly, each person knows lots of things
that are not contained in that encyclopaedia—how to walk or ride a bicy-
cle, information about friends, relatives and acquaintances, how the local
football team is doing, and so on. If we assume that the ‘personal’ things
that we do know are very roughly equal to the things in the encyclopae-
dia that we do not know, then the size of the encyclopaedia provides an
estimate of the volume of information that the average person knows.
• The Encyclopaedia Britannica can be stored on two CDs in compressed
form. Assuming that most of the space is filled, this equates to 1300 MB
of compressed information or approximately 4000 MB of information in
uncompressed form. This estimate of what the average person knows is
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the same order of magnitude as our range of estimates of what the human
brain can store.
Even if the brain stores two or three copies of its compressed knowledge (to
guard against the risk of losing it, as discussed in Section 11.2), our estimate of
what needs to be stored (12,000 MB, say) lies within the range of our estimates
of what the brain can store. Bearing in mind the very conservative assumption
that was made about how much information each neuron represents and other
conservative assumptions that have been made, it seems that the proposals in
this chapter about how the brain stores information are not wildly inconsistent
with what is required.
Comparisons
In terms of the ‘static’ forms of knowledge in the brain (ignoring learning), the
SP-neural proposals extend or modify Hebb’s original concept in the following
ways:
• There is a distinction between neural arrays that, inter alia, serve as tem-
porary buffers for information (from the senses or elsewhere) and pattern
assemblies that provide for longer-term storage of information.
• Within each pattern assembly, it is envisaged that some cells (C-neurons)
represent the ‘contents’ or ‘substance’ of the pattern while others (ID-
neurons) will serve to identify the pattern assembly or otherwise define
how it relates to other pattern assemblies.
• Connections between ID-neurons and C-neurons provide a mechanism by
which one pattern assembly may be ‘referenced’ from another pattern
assembly. This is the key to the expressive power of the SP system.
• As noted above, any one neuron may not belong in more than one pattern
assembly.
• Information is transmitted through the network of pattern assemblies by
an interplay of excitatory and inhibitory processes as described in Section
11.5, next.
11.5 Neural processes for building multiple
alignments
Given a structure of pattern assemblies, neural arrays and interconnections as
described above, how may the system work to build structures that are com-
parable with the kinds of multiple alignments created by the SP61 and SP70
computer models? The focus here is mainly on the way in which sensory data
may connect with stored patterns, amplifying what was sketched in Section 11.3,
discussing relevant issues and filling in details.
CHAPTER 11. NEURAL MECHANISMS 266
In terms of the schematic representation shown in Figure 11.1, we are inter-
ested in the kind of neural processing that would yield something equivalent to
the multiple alignment shown in Figure 11.2. This is the best multiple alignment
found by SP61 with patterns that are comparable with the pattern assemblies
shown in Figure 11.1.
0 j o h n r u n s 0
| | | | | | | |
1 < N 0 j o h n > | | | | 1
| | | | | | |
2 S < N > < V | | | | > 2
| | | | | | |
3 | | < R 1 r u n > | | 3
| | | | | | |
4 < V < R > s > 4
Figure 11.2: The best multiple alignment found by SP61 with patterns that are
comparable to the pattern assemblies shown Figure 11.1.
Given a scarcity of direct evidence about what is going on in this area of
brain function, it has been assumed that the kinds of principles that have been
seen to operate elsewhere in nervous tissue will also apply here. In particular:
1. Contrary to what one might assume, neurons do not normally rest quietly
in the absence of stimulation. There is normally a background rate of firing
and this may be increased by excitatory input or decreased by inhibitory
input (see, for example, Ratliff and Hartline, 1959; Ratliff et al., 1963).
2. Inhibition seems to be a prominent part of the mechanism by which ner-
vous systems remove redundancy from information. For example, lateral
inhibition in the retina operates when neighbouring parts of a visual im-
age are the same—which means that there is redundancy in that part of
the image. In a similar vein, Barlow (1997) describes a ‘law of repul-
sion’: “when two stimuli frequently occur together their representations
discourage or inhibit each other so that each is weaker than it is when
each stimulus is presented alone.” (p. 1144). Since frequent recurrence of
two stimuli together is a manifestation of redundancy, this law seems to
be in keeping with the idea that a major roˆle of inhibition in neural tissue
is to reduce redundancy in information.
3. Lateral inhibition may, in some situations, be seen as a way of forcing a
decision amongst competing alternatives so that the ‘winner takes all’. In
the innervation of the Basilar membrane, where position along the length
of the membrane encodes the frequency of sound, lateral inhibition has
the effect of strengthening the response where the signal is strongest and
suppressing the response in neighbouring regions (von Be´ke´sy, 1967).
Mutual inhibition amongst competitors may also be seen as a means of
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reducing redundancy because some or all of the information expressed
by each element in the competition is also expressed by other elements.
Neighbouring regions of the Basilar membrane respond to sounds with
similar frequencies—which means that there is information in common
amongst those sounds.
4. Where there is a mapping from one part of the nervous system to another
(e.g., between the retina and each of the areas of the visual cortex), each
point in the origin normally projects to an area in the destination and there
is overlap between the projection areas of neighbouring points (Nicholls
et al., 2001).
What follows is an outline of two possible ways in which the system may
function, in keeping with the principles just described.
Outline of processing
When sensory input is received, this causes a subset of the neurons within
each sensory neural array to increase their rate of firing. These signals are
transmitted to corresponding C-neurons within a relatively small number of
‘low level’ pattern assemblies like ‘< N 0 j o h n >’ and ‘< R 1 r u n >’ in the
schematic representation in Figure 11.1. At this stage, there seem to be two
main possibilities, described in the next two subsections.
‘Excitatory’ scheme
In the first scheme, which is similar to Hebb’s original proposals, signals received
by the C-neurons of a pattern assembly would have the effect of increasing the
rate of firing of those neurons. This excitation would spread via the lateral
connections to all the other neurons in the pattern assembly, including the
ID-neurons and any C-neurons that had not received any stimulation on this
occasion.
When the rate of firing of ID-neurons is increased as a result of excitatory
input to the C-neurons of a pattern assembly, these signals will be transmitted
to C-neurons in other pattern assemblies. As before, the effect will be to increase
the rate of firing of those neurons. And, as before, when C-neurons within a
pattern assembly have become excited, this will have the effect of increasing the
rate of firing of ID-neurons within the pattern assembly and any C-neurons that
did not receive any input.
This process may be repeated so long as there are pattern assemblies that
can receive signals from other pattern assemblies in which the ID-neurons are
active.
Although the emphasis here is on the excitation of neurons, inhibition may
have a roˆle to play in preventing excitation getting out of control (Milner, 1957).
There might, for example, be inhibitory feedback between each C-neuron within
a pattern assembly and the fibres that bring excitatory signals to that neuron.
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This would have the effect of dampening down the excitatory signals once they
had been received.
This kind of inhibitory feedback may be seen to have the effect of reduc-
ing or eliminating redundancy in the temporal dimension corresponding to the
persistence of a given sensory input over a period of time.
‘Inhibitory’ scheme
Notwithstanding some evidence suggesting that the majority of nerve cells in
the cortex are excitatory (Pulvermu¨ller, 1999, p. 264) an alternative ‘inhibitory’
scheme is sketched here that is broadly consistent with the principles described
above.
The first of the three principles suggests that, in the absence of stimulation,
the neurons in each pattern assembly maintain a steady rate of firing.
Since each pattern assembly represents a repeating (redundant) pattern
in the environment, it is further assumed—in accordance with the second
principle—that there is mutual inhibition amongst the neurons of each pat-
tern assembly, mediated by the lateral connections between the neurons. There
will be a balance between the tendency of the neurons to fire spontaneously and
the inhibitory effect that they have on each other.
We may further suppose that, when a neuron within a pattern assembly
receives stimulation, the effect is inhibitory. Again, this seems to accord with
the second principle because the incoming stimulation and the neuron receiving
the stimulation represent the same small pattern or symbol, and this repetition
of information means redundancy.
If the rate of firing of C-neurons within a pattern assembly is inhibited, this
will have the effect of reducing the inhibitory signals which those neurons have
been sending to their neighbours. Hence, the effect of inhibitory input to the
C-neurons of a pattern assembly will be to increase the rate of firing of other
neurons in the pattern assembly that are not receiving input. The neurons
whose rate of firing will increase will be all of the ID-neurons (because they do
not receive any input) and any C-neurons that may not have received any input
on this occasion. The former will be the focus of attention here. The latter
may be seen as inferences that can be derived from the multiple alignment, as
described in Chapter 7.
When the rate of firing of ID-neurons is increased as a result of inhibitory
input to the C-neurons of a pattern assembly, these signals will be transmitted
to C-neurons in other pattern assemblies. As before, the effect will be to inhibit
the activity of those neurons. And, as before, when C-neurons within a pattern
assembly have been inhibited, this will have the effect of increasing the rate of
firing of ID-neurons within the pattern assembly and any C-neurons that did
not receive any input.
This process may be repeated so long as there are pattern assemblies that
can receive signals from other pattern assemblies in which the ID-neurons are
active.
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Discussion and elaboration
Neither of the schemes just described is sufficient in itself to achieve an effect
comparable with the building of multiple alignments in the SP system. This
subsection considers some other aspects of the proposals and fills in some details
that seem to be needed for the system to work as intended.
Inputs to pattern assemblies
In both of the schemes that have been outlined, it is natural to assume that
the effect of inputs to each pattern assembly would be related to the amount or
number of inputs received. If the pattern assembly ‘< N 0 j o h n >’ in Figure
11.1 were to receive inputs from only ‘j’ and ‘h’, one would expect the effect to
be less than when the pattern assembly receives signals from all of ‘j’, ‘o’, ‘h’
and ‘n’. Correspondingly, one would expect the increase in firing rate of the
ID-neurons to be larger in the second case than the former.
It seems reasonable to assume that the strength of the responses would
depend on the proportion of C-neurons in any pattern assembly that receive
stimulation rather than their absolute numbers.
Divergence
What happens when the signals from a given neuron or combination of neu-
rons in an neural array or a pattern assembly are transmitted to corresponding
C-neurons in two or more other pattern assemblies? In the absence of any disam-
biguating context (see Section 11.5, next), all of those pattern assemblies should
respond, and the strength of the response should be related to the proportion
of C-neurons in each pattern assembly that have received an input.
This kind of response would naturally accommodate the kind of ambiguity
described in Section 5.2.
Convergence
What happens where two or more sets of fibres converge on one set of C-neurons
in one pattern assembly? An example can be seen in Figure 11.1 where fibres
from ‘<, ‘N’ and ‘>’ in the pattern assembly ‘< N 0 j o h n >’ are connected to
‘< N >’ in the pattern assembly ‘S < N > < V >’, and similar connections are
made to the same three neurons from the pattern assembly ‘< N 1 s u s a n >’.
In this example, the pattern assemblies ‘< N 0 j o h n >’ and ‘< N 1 s u s a n
>’ are, in effect, competing for the roˆle of noun within the pattern assembly ‘S
< N > < V >’ representing the structure of a simple sentence. In the light of the
third principle mentioned above, we may suppose that a decision about which
of these two pattern assemblies should ‘win’ the competition may be decided by
inhibition.
Where fibres representing the same symbol converge on a single neuron,
we may suppose that there are lateral connections between them that carry
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inhibitory signals when the main fibres are excited. This should ensure that the
strongest signal gets through and weaker ones are suppressed.
At the highest levels in the hierarchy of pattern assemblies, we may suppose
that there is a similar competition for the roˆle of ‘best overall interpretation’ of
the sensory input. Where there is ambiguity of the kind mentioned earlier, a
disambiguating context may tilt the balance in favour of one interpretation or
the other.
Possible evidence in support of the proposed lateral connections between
fibres carrying rival signals is the discovery of lateral connections in the visual
cortex that connect columns in which the cells respond to edges or lines with
similar orientations (see Nicholls et al., 2001, p. 440). It is not clear whether or
not these connections are inhibitory.
Lateral connections are also broadly consistent with the fourth principle
described above (projection from neighbouring points to overlapping areas).
Keeping track of order in perception
As the system has been described so far, a stimulus like ‘b o y’ would produce
the same level of response in a pattern assembly like ‘< N 2 y o b >’ as it would
in a pattern assembly like ‘< N 3 b o y >’. In other words, there is nothing
in what has been proposed to keep track of the ordering or arrangement of
elements in a pattern.
Our ability to recognise patterns despite some jumbling of their elements
(e.g., solving anagrams) is consistent with the scheme that has been described.
But the fact that we can see the difference between an anagram and its solution
shows that something else is needed. Some kind of mechanism is required to
distinguish between two kinds of situation:
1. Fibres leave a pattern assembly or one portion of an neural array and
arrive together, in the same relative positions, at one portion of another
pattern assembly. Fibres that conform to this rule will be described as
coherent.
2. Fibres arrive at one portion of a pattern assembly from a variety of differ-
ent sources or, if they come from one source, their relative positions are
not preserved. This kind of arrangement may be described as incoherent.
When signals arrive at a pattern assembly, they should produce a stronger
response in the first case than in the second. A possible mechanism to ensure
that this happens would be lateral connections amongst the fibres of a coherent
bundle that would have the effect of increasing the rate of firing in the bundle
if the majority of them are firing together. When any one fibre in the bun-
dle is firing, then signals will be carried to neighbouring fibres via the lateral
connections and these signals should lower the threshold for firing and thus in-
crease the rate of firing in any of the neighbouring fibres that are already firing.
These kinds of lateral connections would be broadly consistent with the fourth
principle described above.
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If signals arrive in a temporal sequence, then other possible mechanisms
include ‘synfire chains’ and temporal ‘sequence detectors’, as described by Pul-
vermu¨ller (2002). However, these would not do for keeping track of order in
spatially-distributed patterns, seen in a single glance.
Keeping track of order in production
In speaking or writing or comparable activities not involving language, we need
to do things in the right order. The spatial arrangement of neurons in a pattern
assembly can provide information about that order but supplementary mecha-
nisms would be needed to control the timings of actions and the use of sensory
feedback to monitor progress.
Constancies
A possible objection to the SP-neural proposals is that they are inconsistent
with the ‘constancy’ phenomena in perception. These include:
• Size constancy. We can recognise an object despite wide variations in the
size of its image on the retina—and we judge its size to be constant despite
these variations.2
• Brightness constancy. We can recognise something despite wide variations
in the absolute brightness of the image on our retina (and, likewise, we
judge its intrinsic brightness to be constant).
• Colour constancy. In recognising the intrinsic colour of an object, we can
make allowances for wide variations in the colour of the light which falls
on the object and the consequent effect on the colour of the light that
leaves the object and enters our eyes.
If the pattern recorded in an neural array was merely a copy of sensory input
there would indeed be wide variations in the size of the visual pattern projected
by a given object and in brightness and colours. The mechanism described in the
previous subsection for detecting coherence would not work for patterns whose
elements were widely dispersed across the neural array. And recognising the
elements of a pattern would be more complicated if there were wide variations
in brightness or colour.
The suggestion here is that much of the variability of sensory input from a
given object has been eliminated at a stage before the information leaves the
neural array. As was noted in Section 2.3, lateral inhibition in the retina empha-
sises boundaries between relatively uniform areas. The redundant information
within each uniform area is largely eliminated which means that it is, in effect,
2Size constancy is similar to but distinct from ‘stimulus equivalence’—our ability to recog-
nise a triangle, for example, as a triangle despite variations in size. Size constancy compensates
for the effect of variations in distance while stimulus equivalence may be seen as a form of gen-
eralisation, comparable with our ability to recognise a triangle as a triangle despite variations
in each of its three angles.
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shrunk to the minimum size needed to record the attributes of that area. Since
this minimum will be the same regardless of the size of the original image, the
overall effect should be to reduce or eliminate variations in the sizes of images
from a given object (see also Sections 13.2 and 13.2).
In a similar way, the ‘primal sketch’ created by lateral inhibition should
be largely independent of the absolute brightness of the original image. And
adaptation in the early stages of visual processing should to a large extent
prevent variations in brightness having an effect on patterns reaching the neural
array.
Edwin Land’s ‘retinex’ theory suggests that colour constancy is achieved by
processing in the retina and in the visual cortex (see Nicholls et al., 2001, pp.
437–439). This is consistent with the idea that this source of variability has
been removed at a stage before sensory input is compared with stored patterns.
11.6 Neural mechanisms for learning
As we have seen in Chapter 9, SP70—like SP61—tries to encode New infor-
mation as economically as possible by encoding it in terms of Old information.
Like SP61, it does this by trying to encode New information economically in
terms of patterns stored in Old but, in addition, it builds the repository of Old
patterns by adding patterns to Old as described in Chapter 9.
Creation and storage of patterns
Patterns that are added to Old in the learning process would, of course, be
realised as pattern assemblies. The SP70 style of learning implies that pattern
assemblies may be created in response to patterns of incoming information that
have occurred only once. This contrasts with Hebb’s proposal that “Any fre-
quently repeated, particular stimulation will lead to the slow development of
a ‘cell-assembly’...” (1949, p. xix). This difference between the two views of
learning is discussed briefly in Section 11.6, below.
Another implication of the SP70 style of learning is that there is some kind
of mechanism that can add ID-neurons to each newly-created pattern assembly.
We need also to suppose that the system can create connections between pattern
assemblies of the kind described earlier.
It seems unlikely that the neurons of each newly-created pattern assembly
would be grown according to need. Although there is now evidence that new
nerve cells can grow in mature brains (Shors et al., 2001), it seems likely that
the bulk of neurons in the brain are present at birth and that the creation of
pattern assemblies is largely a process of adapting pre-existing neurons. We may
also suppose that the postulated lateral connections between neurons within
each pattern assembly are also largely present at birth. These suppositions
accord with the observation that learning occurs in the marine snail Aplysia
although the neural framework is largely fixed and essentially the same from
one individual to another (Kandel, 2001).
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It is possible that the boundaries of pattern assemblies may be established
by breaking pre-existing lateral connections. Something like this is suggested
by evidence for the progressive weakening of connections between cells that do
not normally fire at the same time (Pulvermu¨ller, 1999, pp. 254–255).
In a similar vein, it is not necessary to suppose that connections between
pattern assemblies are grown from scratch according to need. In many cases,
this would be a cumbersome process given that many of the connections between
different areas of the cortex are fairly long (see also Section 11.6, below). It is
now generally accepted that short-term memories are mediated by relatively
rapid changes in the ability of synapses to conduct nerve impulses and that
long-term memories are mediated by slower but more long-lasting changes in
synapses and also by the growth of new synapses (Kandel, 2001).
Finding good partial matches between patterns
A key part of the learning process in SP70 is the formation of partial matches
between patterns like the ones shown in Chapter 9. The kind of neural pro-
cessing described in Section 11.5 should be able to achieve this kind of partial
matching automatically, without the need for any supplementary mechanisms.
In the ‘inhibitory’ scheme, lateral inhibition should have the effect of marking
the boundaries between parts of a pattern assembly that are receiving signals
and parts that are not. And this marking of boundaries would presumably be
helpful in the process of creating new pattern assemblies, derived from matched
and unmatched parts of the given pattern assembly.
Counting
In the SP70 model, each pattern has an associated frequency of occurrence.
These frequency values are used periodically to adjust the numbers and sizes
of ID-symbols assigned to each pattern, in accordance with the Shannon-Fano-
Elias coding scheme (see Cover and Thomas, 1991).
It seems possible that information about the frequency of occurrence of
each pattern assembly may be recorded by the ‘strength’ of the intra-assembly
synapses (as in Hebbian cell assemblies) or, perhaps, by the predisposition of
cells to fire in response to incoming stimulation or by the strength of their re-
sponse when they do fire. It seems possible that this kind of information may
lead to adjustments in the numbers of ID-neurons assigned to each pattern
assembly.
Speed of learning
In Hebb’s theory of learning, cell assemblies are built up gradually by the pro-
gressive strengthening of connections between cells that regularly fire at the
same time. Although this seems to accord with the slow build up of knowledge
throughout childhood and beyond, it does not sit well with the undoubted fact
that we can remember things that we have experienced only once—what we had
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for lunch today, our first day at school, and so on. It is true that unique events
are probably encoded in terms of things we already know but we need to be
able to store that encoded representation without the need for repetition.
Because the slow growth of cell assemblies does not account for our ability
to remember things immediately after a single exposure, Hebb adopted a ‘rever-
beratory’ theory for this kind of memory. But, as Milner (1996) points out, it
is difficult to understand how this kind of mechanism could explain our ability
to assimilate a previously-unseen telephone number. Each digit in the number
may be stored in a reverberatory assembly but the way in which we remember
the sequence of the digits is unexplained.
In the learning scheme outlined above, new pattern assemblies can be created
in response to a single sensory input. This is consistent with our ability to
remember unique events and sequences of events.3 And, if we suppose that
synapses can be switched on or off according to need, we may be able to account
for the speed with which immediate memories can be established. But an ability
to lay down new pattern assemblies relatively quickly does not explain why it
takes several years to learn something like a language.
The principles on which SP70 is based suggest why learning a language,
and similar kinds of learning, take quite a lot of time. The abstract ‘space’ of
alternative grammars for any natural language is astronomically large and it
takes time to search. Although exhaustive search is not feasible, the kinds of
heuristic techniques used in the SP70 model—trading accuracy for speed—can
bring search times within the bounds of practicality. But finding a tolerably
good grammar is still a complex problem and it cannot be solved in an instant.
Empirical validation
Although SP70 is not well enough developed to be compared in detail with the
way children learn to talk, it is anticipated that, in the sphere of learning, it will
behave much like the earlier SNPR model (Wolff, 1988, 1982). This is because
both models are founded on MLE principles and it seems that these principles
can account for many features of the way children learn language:
• Unsupervised learning of conjunctive segmental structures (words, phrases
etc) from unsegmented linguistic input (see also Wolff, 1980, 1977, 1975).
• Unsupervised learning of disjunctive categories (nouns, verbs etc) from
unsegmented linguistic input.
• Unsupervised learning of hierarchical grammars with conjunctive and dis-
junctive structures at any level.
3It also suggests that our brains would soon become cluttered with thousands or millions or
pattern assemblies, created in response to specific observations and events. But an important
part of the learning process described in Chapter 9 is a mechanism for purging the system
of patterns that are not proving useful. This should prevent the growth of new patterns or
pattern assemblies getting out of hand.
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• generalisation of grammatical rules and unsupervised correction of over-
generalisations.
• The pattern of changes in the rate of acquisition of words as learning
proceeds. The slowing of language development in later years.
• The order of acquisition of words and morphemes.
• Brown’s (1973) Law of Cumulative Complexity.
• The S-P/episodic-semantic shift.
• The learning of ’correct’ forms despite the existence of errors in linguistic
data.
• The learning of non-linguistic cognitive structures.
• The word frequency effect.
These things are discussed quite fully in Wolff (1988).
11.7 Discussion
This section considers a selection of other issues, including some difficulties with
Hebb’s original proposals (described by Milner, 1996) and how, in the SP-neural
proposals, they may be overcome.
Stimulus equivalence and discrimination
An important motivation for the cell assembly concept was to explain the phe-
nomenon of ‘stimulus equivalence’ or ‘generalisation’—our ability to recognise
things despite variations in size, shape, position of the image on the retina, and
so on. However, Milner writes that “generalisation is certainly an important and
puzzling phenomenon, but discrimination is equally important and tends to be
ignored in theories of neural representation. Any theory of engram formation
must take into account the relationship between category and instance—the
ability we have to distinguish our own hat, house, and dog from hats, houses
and dogs in general.” (ibid., p. 70).
The SP-neural proposals account for generalisation in four main ways:
• As with the original cell assembly concept, a pattern assembly can respond
provided that a reasonably large subset of its neurons has received inputs.
This accommodates our ability to recognise things despite omissions, ad-
ditions or substitutions in the sensory input relative to the information
stored in the pattern assembly. The effect is similar to the dynamic pro-
gramming built into the SP models.
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• In the present scheme, each neuron or feature detector in an neural array is
connected to each one of the lowest level pattern assemblies that contain
the corresponding feature. Thus, each of these pattern assemblies may
respond to appropriate input regardless of the position of the input on the
neural array.
• The way in which perceptual constancies may be accommodated in the
present proposals was considered in Section 11.5.
• Owing to the provision of a ‘reference’ mechanism in the present proposals
(discussed in Section 11.4, above), it is possible to create pattern assem-
blies that represent abstractions from sensory input. An example from
Figure 11.1 is the pattern assembly ‘S < N > < V >’. This pattern as-
sembly represents the abstract structure of a simple sentence and it may
be activated by a range of alternative inputs: any sentence that conforms
to the noun-verb pattern.
The SP system provides a neat account of our ability to distinguish spe-
cific instances from the categories in which they belong. Given a pattern to
be recognised (in New) and appropriate patterns in Old, the SP61 model can
build multiple alignments which include several different levels of abstraction,
including a level that represents a specific instance (Section 6.4). The SP system
also accounts for the variability of individual objects: any specific object such
as ‘Tibs’ is, in effect, a class of even more specific observations as described in
Section 6.4.
If the SP concepts can be realised with neural mechanisms, we can account
in neural terms for recognition at multiple levels of abstraction, including the
levels corresponding to a specific instance and a specific instance in various
contexts.
Parts, wholes and associations
With respect to Hebbian concepts, Milner raises some other questions: “How
do associations between cell assemblies differ from internal associations that are
responsible for the assemblies properties? It does not seem likely that both these
processes can be the result of similar synaptic changes as is usually assumed.
If they were, the interassembly associations would soon become intraassembly
loops. A related puzzle is that parts are not submerged in the whole. Doors
and windows are integral parts of my concept of a house, but they are also
robust, stand-alone concepts.” (ibid., p. 71). Later on the same page he writes:
“Perhaps the toughest problem of all concerns the fact that we have many
associations with almost every engram....The brain must be a veritable rat’s
nest of tangled associations, yet for the most part we navigate through it with
ease.”
Hebb (1958, p. 105) provides a possible answer to the way in which parts
may be distinguished from wholes: “If two assemblies A and B are repeatedly
active at the same time they will tend to become ‘associated,’ so that A excites
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B and vice versa. If they are always active at the same time they will tend
to merge in a single systems—that is, form a single assembly—but if they are
also active at different times they will remain separate (but associated) systems.
(This means that exciting part of A, for example, has a very high probability
of exciting all of A, but a definitely lower probability of exciting a separate
assembly, B; A may be able to excite B only when some other assembly, C, also
facilitates activity in B).”
The reference mechanism in the SP-neural proposals provides a neater solu-
tion to this problem and the others raised by Milner:
• Associations between pattern assemblies may be encoded by building a
new pattern assembly containing references to the pattern assemblies that
are to be associated. These associations are then internal to the new
pattern assembly and the original pattern assemblies retain their identity.
• In the same way, there can be a stand-alone pattern assembly for each type
of component of a house while the pattern assembly for a house comprises
a collection of references to the components. In this way, the concept of a
house does not become muddled with concepts for doors, windows etc.
• It is true that most concepts have many associations but the reference
mechanism allows these to be encoded in a way that does not disturb the
integrity of each concept. The coherence of a web page is not affected by
links to that page from other pages and it makes no difference how many
such pointers there may be.
Direct and distributed neural representations
In the terms described by Gardner-Medwin and Barlow (2001), the SP-neural
scheme for representing knowledge may be classified as direct because each neu-
ron serves one representation and only one representation. In this respect it
contrasts with other distributed schemes in which any one cell may be involved
in two or more different representations.
Arguments that have been made in favour of distributed representations
include:
1. Large numbers of stimulus events may be distinguished with relatively few
cells.
2. Provided the representations are ‘sparse’ (only a small proportion of cells
are involved in each recognition event), they can function as content-
addressable memories that store and retrieve amounts of information ap-
proaching the maximum permitted by their numbers of modifiable ele-
ments.
3. Given that counting is needed for learning (see below), distributed rep-
resentations have the flexibility to represent and count recognition events
that have not been foreseen.
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Arguments in favour of direct representations include:
1. Starting from the reasonable premise that learning requires an ability to
count the frequencies of perceptual entities, Gardner-Medwin and Bar-
low argue that “compact distributed representations (i.e., ones with lit-
tle redundancy) enormously reduce the efficiency of counting and must
therefore slow reliable learning, but that this is not the case if they are
redundant, having many more cells than are required simply for represen-
tation.” (ibid., p. 480). This need for redundancy offsets the first of the
advantages listed for distributed representations. Gardner-Medwin and
Barlow also acknowledge that this kind of redundancy is not required to
achieve counting with direct representations.
2. As discussed in Sections 11.7 and 11.7, there are problems associated with
distributed representations but these can be overcome in the SP-neural
version of direct representation.
3. In the SP-neural scheme, compression mechanisms allow knowledge to be
represented in a direct manner with a minimum of redundancy.
4. In the SP-neural scheme, direct representations can function as content-
addressable memory.
5. As discussed in Section 11.6, it seems possible that pattern assemblies in
the SP-neural proposals may be created relatively quickly in response to
unforeseen events. And once created, they may count recognition events
as described in Section 11.6.
Compression revisited
With respect to the roˆle of information compression in neural functioning, Bar-
low (2001a) writes: “There has been one major change in my viewpoint. Initially
I thought that economy was the main benefit to be derived from exploiting re-
dundancy, as it is for AT & T and British Telecom. But ... the physiological and
anatomical facts do not fit the idea that the brain uses compressed, economical,
representations, and one can see that these would be highly inconvenient for
many of the tasks that it performs, such as detecting associations. Therefore I
now think the principle is redundancy exploitation, rather than reduction, since
performance can be improved by taking account of sensory redundancy in other
ways than by coding the information onto channels of reduced redundancy.” (p.
604).
Elsewhere (2001b), Barlow suggests that interest in the statistics of sensory
messages “was right in drawing attention to the importance of redundancy in
sensory messages because this can often lead to crucially important knowledge
of the environment, but it was wrong in emphasising the main technical use
for redundancy, which is compressive coding. The idea points to the enormous
importance of estimating probabilities for almost everything the brain does,
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from determining what is redundant to fuelling Bayesian calculations of near-
optimal courses of action in a complicated world.” (p. 242).
With respect to compressive coding (but not the importance of probabilistic
reasoning), this revised view is somewhat at odds with what has been proposed
in this chapter (apart from the suggested need for multiple copies of stored
information (Section 11.2)). There is insufficient space here to discuss these
issues fully but a few comments may be made:
• Barlow (2001a) writes that there is “more than a thousand times as many
neurons concerned with vision in the human cortex as there are ganglion
cells in the two retinas ... on any plausible assumptions the capacity of the
cortical representation is vastly greater than that of the retinal ganglion
cells, so redundancy appears to be increased, not reduced.” (p. 605). In
the SP-neural proposals, the cortex is the repository of most of our stored
knowledge. Even allowing for the compression that can be achieved using
reference mechanisms, we need all that space to store even a small fraction
of the huge amount of information that impinges on our senses (Section
11.4, above).
• As we saw in Section 10.3, counting, in itself, implies information com-
pression by the unification of matching patterns.
• As we saw in Section 11.7, the need for efficient counting seems to demand
the provision of redundancy in distributed representations. This may be
seen as an argument for redundancy in stored information but equally it
may be seen as an argument in favour of SP-style direct representation
where no such redundancy is required.
• Contrary to the suggestion that “compressed, economical, representations
... would be highly inconvenient for ... detecting associations”, such repre-
sentations in the SP-neural proposals provide a foundation for the detec-
tion of associations and they are indeed an expression of those associations.
• As was argued in Section 11.2, we would expect organisms that have
evolved by natural selection to exploit information compression as a means
of economising on the transmission or storage of information.
• There is a lot of other evidence for the importance of redundancy reduction
in brain function, some of which was reviewed in Chapter 2.
Motivation, intention and attention
The SP theory and the SP-neural proposals described in this chapter have little
to say about such things as motivation, intention or selective attention. These
things are clearly important in perception and learning (Milner, 1999) but, so
far, they have remained largely outside the scope of the SP theory apart from
the brief comments in Section 9.5.
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Each of the SP models processes New information in sections, one pattern
at a time. SP61 is also able to divide a New pattern into ‘windows’ and process
successive windows one at a time. Each of these things may be seen as a very
crude version of selective attention. Their main function in the models is to
provide a means of reducing the abstract ‘space’ of alternative solutions that
needs to be searched at any one time. This may indeed be one of the functions of
selective attention in humans and other animals but more work is clearly needed
to understand how concepts of motivation, intention and attention might relate
to current or future versions of the SP theory.
11.8 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show how the abstract concepts of the SP scheme
may be realised with neural structures and processes. The potential payoff from
this exercise is that the substantial explanatory power of the SP system may be
imported into neuroscience.
What has been proposed may be seen as an extension and development of
Hebb’s original ideas. By incorporating ideas from the SP system, especially
the mechanism which allows one pattern to ‘refer’ to another, many of the
weaknesses of the original cell assembly concept may be overcome.
These proposals offer an heuristic framework and a source of hypotheses for
further exploration and development.
Chapter 12
The SP Theory and
Cognitive Psychology1
12.1 Introduction
Research on language learning provided the original inspiration for the SP the-
ory and, as we saw in Chapter 2, psychological phenomena and aspects of the
workings of brains and nervous systems provides much of the motivation for the
theory. However, in most of the preceding chapters, the theory and its applica-
tions have been considered mainly from the perspective of computing and AI.
In this chapter, the SP theory is considered in relation to research that is more
explicitly concerned with cognitive psychology, excluding the neural dimension
discussed in the previous chapter.
Given the very broad scope of the theory, I have only attempted to exam-
ine a selection of the areas to which it is relevant. Section 12.2 is concerned
with how we recognise things as belonging to this or that concept or category.
Section 12.3 looks at psychological aspects of reasoning. Sections 12.4, 12.5
and 12.6 consider three aspects of learning: associative learning, experimental
studies of how people learn artificial grammars, and the way children learn a
first language. And Section 12.7 is an all-too-brief comparison between SP con-
cepts and concepts developed in research on analogies, ‘structure mapping’ and
related topics.
12.2 Recognition and Categorization
Broadly speaking, there are four influential approaches to understanding con-
cepts, classes or categories and the way in which we recognise things as belonging
1This chapter is based on a draft of a journal article prepared by Emmanuel Pothos of
Edinburgh University. I am very grateful to Emmanuel for this work and for giving me
permission to base this chapter on it. All errors and oversights are, of course, my responsibility.
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to this or that category (see reviews by Chater and Hahn, 1997; Komatsu, 1992):
1. According to the ‘classical’ view, each mental category comprises a defini-
tion of what kinds of object belong in that category (e.g., Katz, 1972; Katz
and Fodor, 1963). For example, my concept of a chair may be defined as
something like “A piece of furniture composed of a seat, legs, back, and
often arms, intended to seat a single person.” Using this kind of informa-
tion, I can decide whether or not any newly-observed object is a chair or
not.
2. According to the ‘prototype’ view, each concept is an abstract, summary
representation of all the exemplars of that concept that we have come
across. Thus, when I see a new object, I can decide whether it is a chair
or not by examining how similar it is to the average, prototypical, repre-
sentation I have for chairs (Homa et al., 1981; Reed, 1972).
3. For ‘exemplar’ models, each concept is just a collection of individual ex-
emplars: I label a subset of the instances in my experience as ‘chairs’ and
this is what my concept of a chair corresponds to. Assignment of a new
instance to a given concept depends on the similarity of that instance to
the exemplars of that concept and likewise for rival concepts to which the
instance may be assigned (e.g., Nosofsky, 1989, 1990).
4. ‘Explanation’ or ‘theory-based’ views question the centrality of similarity
in exemplar and prototype models and suggest that what drives the assign-
ment of a new instance to any given category is a complex process based
on general knowledge and na¨ive (as opposed to scientific) understanding
of the world. Thus, a chair is an object that has a certain functionality
in a particular context and a specific relation to objects of similar cate-
gories (such as tables, armchairs, sofas etc. (Murphy and Medin, 1985;
Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Medin and Wattenmaker, 1997). More gener-
ally, some categories will be psychologically more intuitive than others,
and the theory-based view of categorization has been the main theoretical
approach to understand such differences in category coherence (see also
Pothos and Chater, 2002).
Necessary, Sufficient and Characteristic Features—and
Polythetic Categories
In the definitional view of categorization and, to some extent in the other views,
concepts are seen to have ‘features’, meaning attributes or properties that have
a role to play in the recognition process.
In some cases, a feature can be seen to be a ‘necessary’ or ‘critical’ part of
a concept in the sense that the given feature must be present in every instance
of the given concept.
In other cases, a feature (or combination of features) may be seen to be
‘sufficient’ for assigning something to a given category in the sense that, if
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the feature is present in a given entity, then that entity must be a member of
the category—but not all members of the category have the given feature (or
combination of features).
More often, features of a concept are merely ‘characteristic’, meaning that
they are neither necessary nor sufficient but do have a role to play in the process
of categorization. For example, most birds can fly but some birds such as pen-
guins, ostriches and so on, cannot fly—and being able to fly is not an exclusive
attribute of birds.
It is widely recognised that many of the ‘natural’ categories that we use
in everyday thinking are ‘polythetic’ (Sokal and Sneath, 1973) or ‘family re-
semblance’ categories (attributed to Wittgenstein) meaning that, for each such
category, all its features are characteristic. This means that no single attribute
is necessarily present in every member of the given category and there need be
no single attribute that is exclusive to that category.
Empirical Evaluation
To date, the weight of evidence is against the definitional view of concepts as
originally stated. However, several researchers have suggested that the available
evidence is compatible with a modified version of the definitional view in which
features are mainly ‘characteristic’.
With regard to prototype and exemplar models, it has been shown that
while certain types of prototype models are identical to certain types of exem-
plar ones, this is far from the case more generally (see, for example, McKinley
and Nosofsky, 1995). Unlike exemplar models, the prototype view predicts that
experience with a set of instances leads to the creation of the prototype repre-
sentation. This prediction has received some support from the observation that
studying a set of exemplars apparently leads to a ‘memory’ for the prototype
of these exemplars, even if the prototype was not included among the training
stimuli (see the review by Komatsu, 1992). There is a corresponding predic-
tion for exemplar models, whereby exemplar effects implicate memory for the
corresponding instances (Nosofsky and Zaki, 1998).
What we wish to conclude from this research is that there are, apparently,
situations where the assignment of a new instance to a category is guided by
the similarity which it has to some kind of prototype, and there are other sit-
uations in which similarity to exemplars appears to be more important. While
these views have been traditionally presented as mutually exclusive, it is pos-
sible, as we shall see later, that they may reflect different aspects of a single
categorization process.
With respect to the theory-based view, there have been some attempts to
provide a principled computational model of the way in general knowledge may
influence the process of classification. However, the incorporation of general
knowledge into models of perception and cognition has been notoriously difficult
(Pylyshyn, 1980) and it is really only safe to conclude that classification of a
new instance will partly be affected by general knowledge relating to the given
instance and the categories to which it may be assigned.
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A further observation that has been the subject of intensive study is that
when people assign some entity to a category within a hierarchy of categories,
they are normally biased in favour of some kind of ‘basic’ or ‘default’ level in
the hierarchy (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Corter and Gluck, 1992; Jones, 1983;
Gosselin and Schyns, 1997). For example, when we see a cat on the street we
rarely think “Look there is a mammal!” or “Look there is a Siamese cat!” but
rather “Look there is a cat!”.
A variety of empirical evidence lends support to this idea of ‘basic-level’
categories. For example, pictures can be named relatively rapidly if the name
corresponds to a basic-level category and the process is slower if the required
name corresponds to a subordinate or a superordinate category. In a similar
vein, experimental subjects are less variable in their judgements of basic-level
categories than they are in making judgements about categories at higher or
lower levels (Rosch et al., 1976). Again, Mervis and Crisafi (1982) and Horton
and Markman (1980) showed that basic-level categories have a ‘privileged’ status
when children are asked to name things and likewise in other tasks that relate
to mental categories. In general, the weight of evidence seems to favour the
idea that each basic-level category describes the corresponding entities in a way
that is, in some sense, optimal—neither too general nor too specific (Corter and
Gluck, 1992; Gosselin and Schyns, 1997).
From the vast literature on categorization, some general conclusions emerge
that are fairly widely accepted:
1. Concepts may have features that are necessary or sufficient but in many
cases features are merely ‘characteristic’—and many of our ‘natural’ cat-
egories are polythetic.
2. Classification of new instances is guided in some cases by prototypes and
in other cases by similarity to category exemplars.
3. In many cases, general knowledge has an influence on the way classification
is done.
4. Our concepts are often organized into hierarchies and within each hier-
archy there is often a level that is in some sense more basic than other
levels.
In addition, the following features of human categorization are widely ac-
cepted:
1. There is often cross-classification in ‘natural’ categories (see below).
2. We don’t always recognise things unambiguously, as can be seen with the
well-known ‘wife and mother-in-law’ and ‘duck and rabbit’ pictures.
3. Recognising something as belonging in a given category allows us to infer
aspects of that thing that may not have been in our original observa-
tions. For example, recognising someone as a person enables us to make
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all sorts of inferences about what a surgeon would find inside if there was
an operation.
4. Notwithstanding the phenomenon of basic-level categories, we often recog-
nise things at two or more levels of abstraction simultaneously (see below).
The SP Theory and Categorization
The SP theory provides an approach to categorization that is distinct from any
of the views described above but, as we shall see, it exhibits features from all of
them.
In the early stages of learning, the SP system stores sensory patterns in es-
sentially the same form as they are received. This is because the repository of
Old patterns contains relatively little information and there are limited oppor-
tunities to find good matches between patterns, to encode New information in
an economical manner or to create any kind of abstract representation of the
world.
At this stage of learning, patterns that are stored are relatively direct copies
of patterns that have been observed in the world. At this stage, patterns may not
correspond neatly to the discrete ‘objects’ that we normally recognise because,
in the SP scheme, the segmentation of the world into discrete entities is a process
that depends on the matching and unification of patterns.
As Old accumulates raw patterns from the environment, there are increasing
opportunities for the system to find good matches between patterns. After the
early stages, the system begins to develop patterns in Old that represent a
relatively abstract view of the system’s sensory environment:
• It develops patterns (like ‘< %7 12 t h a t >’ and ‘< %8 13 r u n s >’ in
Figure 9.3), corresponding to words, objects or other discrete entities in
the world.
• It creates sets of patterns (like ‘< %9 14 b o y >’ and ‘< %9 15 g i r l >’ in
Figure 9.3) that are alternatives in a given context. For linguistic material,
these sets of alternatives correspond to syntactic ‘classes’ or ‘categories’
like ‘noun’, ‘verb’ or ‘adjective’.
• It creates patterns (like ‘< %10 16 < %7 > < %9 > < %8 > >’ in Figure
9.3) each one of which is an abstract representation of a set of patterns
that are similar to each other in the sense that they share certain features.
In this very simple example, only two patterns are described, ‘t h a t g i
r l r u n s’ and ‘t h a t b o y r u n s’. These are similar to each other
because they share the features ‘t h e’ and ‘t r e e’. A set of patterns like
this is essentially a concept, class or category of the kind we have been
considering.
How do these ideas relate to the views of categorization that were outlined
above? This is discussed in the subsections that follow.
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Exemplars
As we have seen, the SP system is able to store patterns that are relatively direct
copies of patterns that has been observed in the environment. Any such pattern
may be regarded as an ‘exemplar’ of the corresponding pattern in the world.
Furthermore, the SP system is able to recognise when a New pattern is ‘similar’
to an already-stored Old exemplar. This is because the system has an ability
to find fuzzy matches between patterns. Thus each exemplar pattern that is
stored in Old serves to define a set or category of patterns that are similar to
the given pattern.
Although the SP theory captures these elements of the exemplar view, it
differs from that view in one important respect. The system would not normally
store a set of similar exemplars as discrete patterns without any relationship to
each other. This is because the SP system is designed to look for redundancies
amongst its stored patterns and it would find them in any set of patterns that
are mutually similar. In this case, it would compress the set of patterns into an
abstract representation (as described above) and individual exemplars would be
encoded in terms of that abstract representation.
Definitions and Features
Regarding the ‘classical’ view of categorization, a pattern like ‘< %10 16 < %7
> < %9 > < %8 > >’, together with the other patterns in Figure 9.3, may
be regarded as a ‘definition’ of the category that comprises the two original
patterns. With regard to ‘features’ in the definitional view, the SP theory can
accommodate all of the notions described above:
• The system’s ability to find fuzzy matches between patterns means that,
in many cases, a category can be recognised from any reasonably large
subset of its features. In each of these cases, the category is, in effect,
polythetic and its attributes are characteristic rather than necessary or
sufficient.
• Even if the system were to be constrained to find only exact matches
between patterns, it would still be possible to model polythetic categories.
This is described in Section 6.4.
• Although the system can accommodate polythetic categories and charac-
teristic features, it can also model features that are necessary or sufficient
or both. These things depend entirely on the particulars of the patterns
that are stored in Old. To take an extreme example, if Old contains the
one-letter pattern ‘X’ and no other patterns contain the letter ‘X’, then
that letter is a feature that is both necessary and sufficient for the recog-
nition of the category represented by the pattern ‘X’.
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Prototypes
The pattern ‘< %10 16 < %7 > < %9 > < %8 > >’ in Figure 9.3, together
with the other patterns in the figure may be seen to be an abstract, summary
representation of the original exemplars. This abstract pattern may be regarded
not only as a definition of a concept (as discussed in Section 12.2) but also as a
prototype.
Readers may object that the small grammar in Figure 9.3 captures all the
non-redundant information in the original patterns and so it differs from the nor-
mal conception of a prototype in which there is significant loss of non-redundant
information compared with the original exemplars.
Although this objection may be valid for this particular example, it is not
a necessary feature of the SP system that it should always retain all the non-
redundant information in the exemplars to which it is exposed. Indeed, the
periodic purging from Old of patterns that are not proving useful in terms of
minimum length encoding principles is an important part of the theory. It is
entirely possible, within the SP system, to create an abstract representation of
a set of exemplars which does not encode every detail of the originals. Given
that a representation of this kind can be matched to New exemplars in a fuzzy
manner, it can function very much in the same way as a prototype as normally
understood.
General Knowledge
In the SP theory, ‘general’ knowledge does not differ in any fundamental way
from any other kind of knowledge. SP patterns can be used to express a wide
variety of different kinds of knowledge, including knowledge of ‘functions’, ‘pro-
cesses’, ‘events’ or the contexts in which things typically appear. In broad terms,
it appears that the SP theory is compatible with the kinds of observation that
have motivated ‘explanation’ or ‘theory-based’ views of categorization.
Hierarchies, Cross-Classification and Basic Levels in Categorization
A major strength of the SP theory is that it provides a powerful means of
representing class-inclusion hierarchies and their integration with part-whole
hierarchies (Section 6.4). In accordance with the organisation of ‘natural’ cat-
egories that we use in everyday thinking, the system can accommodate cross-
classification—meaning that any entity or category may belong in two or more
categories that are not themselves in a class-inclusion relationship. For example,
a given person may be a ‘woman’ and a ‘doctor’ but the first of these is not a
subclass of the second, or vice versa.
In the SP system, an unknown entity may be recognised at multiple levels
of abstraction. The system may recognise something as a cat but, at the same
time, it may recognise it as the lower-level category ‘my cat, Tibs’ and as a
member of the higher-level categories ‘mammal’ and ‘animal’.
At first sight, the ability of the system to recognise things at multiple levels of
abstraction seems to conflict the idea of basic-level categories considered above.
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However, the idea that, when we recognise things, there is a bias in favour of one
level in the relevant class hierarchy does not mean that we are totally unaware
of other levels. For example, when we recognise something as a cat, we will
infer without conscious effort that, if it is alive, the creature will be breathing,
that it is likely to be sensitive to various kinds of stimulation, that it is liable to
get hungry, and so on. Since these attributes are ones that would naturally be
recorded at the level of ‘animal’ and not ‘cat’, it is clear that our understanding
that something is a cat does not rule out a recognition of the other categories
in which the entity belongs.
It seems, then, that the SP theory is broadly consistent with the way in which
recognition may involve multiple levels in a hierarchy of categories. However,
given the empirical evidence in support of the concept of basic-level categories,
it is pertinent to ask whether there is a place in the SP system for that kind of
idea.
A tentative answer to this question is “yes”. In the SP system, the process
of recognition is modelled by the process of building multiple alignments, with
each level of the relevant class hierarchy represented by a corresponding pattern
in the multiple alignment. From each such multiple alignment, a code may be
derived (as described in Section 3.5) that represents a compressed version of the
pattern being recognised. Each level in the class hierarchy makes a contribution
to the code and the contributions made by different levels are rarely equal. It
seems possible that the level that makes the largest contribution—which means
that it is most informative about the nature of the unknown entity—might
correspond to the empirically-based concept of basic-level category. This idea
is similar to proposals that have been made in other computational approaches
to this issue (Corter and Gluck, 1992; Gosselin and Schyns, 1997).
Summary
The SP theory appears to be compatible with all the major features of human
categorization that have been established in empirical studies. It exhibits fea-
tures of all the main views of categorization that have been proposed. These
features are ‘emergent’ by-products of the way the SP system is organised, not
merely the result of a simple marriage of the several views.
Apart from the ‘integrated’ nature of the SP theory, the main differences
between this approach to categorization and the main alternatives are:
• By contrast with the ‘exemplar’ view, the system would not normally
store sets of similar patterns without any modification. It would normally
compress them in the kind of way that was outlined earlier.
• The SP theory predicts that, in the course of learning, there should be
a gradual transition from knowledge stored as exemplars of previously-
observed patterns to knowledge in the form of relatively abstract defini-
tions or prototypes.
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Without some means of examining directly what is stored inside someone’s
head, it is hard to see how the first of these predictions might be checked empir-
ically. However, there is some evidence that seems to lend support to the second
prediction. It has been known for some time that, when a child learns his or
her first language, irregular forms of verbs and irregular plural forms of nouns
are often correct when they are first learned but are then displaced incorrectly
by regular forms which themselves eventually give way to correct, adult forms
(Slobin, 1971). This accords with the idea that our knowledge of the world is
stored initially in essentially the same form that is received but may be broken
down later as the system seeks to encode the information in terms of regular
patterns. After regular patterns have been discovered, any over-regularisations
may be corrected.
12.3 Reasoning
For a long time it has been hypothesized that our everyday reasoning is mediated
by the principles of classical logic or classical probability theory. Thus we may
suppose that people draw logical ‘conclusions’ about things in a deterministic
manner from a set of ‘premises’ and one or more logical ‘rules’ that relate to
the particular problem at hand. If, for example, we know that Tower Bridge is
‘in’ London and that London is ‘in’ the United Kingdom, then we may conclude
that Tower Bridge is ‘in’ the United Kingdom. For other kinds of problem, it
is clear that some kind of probabilistic analysis is required. If, for example, we
see black clouds in the sky, we may reason probabilistically that rain is likely.
These kinds of reasoning have been considered to be the ‘correct’ or nor-
mative forms that distinguish rational cognitive agents (humans) from all other
kinds of beings capable of some thought. Much of the research into human
reasoning in the last hundred years has revolved around the issue of how the
principles of classical logic and probability could be incorporated in cognitive
structures (e.g., Evans, 1991; Evans et al., 1991; Braine et al., 1995; Rips, 1989,
1990).
The extent to which the reasoning process is indeed mediated by the rules of
logic has been extensively investigated in the context of reasoning problems such
as the Wason selection task and syllogistic reasoning (Wason, 1960; Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird et al., 1989). In the Wason task, there are four
cards and a conditional rule. The rule may say something like “If there is an
even number on one side of the card, then there must be a consonant on the
other.” The four cards are presented to participants in such a way that all the
possibilities associated with the rule are shown: one card has a vowel on the
side that is shown, another has a consonant, another an even number, and the
last one an odd number. The question is which card or cards need be selected
in order to check whether the rule is correct or not. Most participants select
the card showing an even number—which is correct in normatively terms, since
if there is a vowel on the other side of the card then the rule must be false. But
the same majority of subjects also choose the card showing a consonant—which
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is a poor choice in terms of classical logic, since if there is an even number on
the other side of the card then there is some confirmation of the rule, but there
is nothing we can conclude if there is an odd number. In summary, participants
fail to select the two cards (the even number card and the vowel card) that,
according to classical logic, would allow for unambiguous falsification of the
rule.
In probabilistic reasoning, the overall picture is somewhat similar. On the
whole, people are sensitive to the laws of probability, but investigators have
identified several examples where there are significant deviations from what
one would predict from these laws (Osherson, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky,
1972). A famous example is of the following form: Linda is described as a very
active, outgoing, dynamic woman. Having read Linda’s description, participants
are asked to evaluate the relative probability of a set of statements regarding
Linda. The critical comparisons concern the statements “Linda spends a lot
of time at home” and “Linda spends a lot of time at home and works at a
bank.” The description of Linda is clearly consistent with a person who might
be working at bank but not with someone who likes to stay at home a lot. Thus,
participants select the second statement as more probable for Linda compared to
the first. But, the rules of probability tell us that the probability of a conjunctive
statement will never be higher than the probability of either of the statement’s
constituents.
In summary, human reasoning appears to deviate significantly from what
one would expect if it conformed to the principles of classical logic or classical
probability theory. There are several ways in which investigators have attempted
to explain these deviations:
• One possibility is that reasoning is based overall on rules of logic and prob-
ability, but na¨ive participants comprehend reasoning problems in ways
different from that assumed by the experimenter. Thus, it is the case that
rules of logic are applied correctly to reach the normative conclusion, but
that this conclusion corresponds to a problem different to the one intended
by the experimenter.
• A second possibility is that, along with a reasoning faculty based on clas-
sical logic and probability, people have developed a set of ‘heuristics’ that
provide speedy shortcuts to everyday reasoning problems. The theory is
that these heuristics are developed to approximate the normative rules,
but they are not of course guaranteed to reach the normative solution in
all problems.
• It is also possible that the reasoning process could be influenced by in-
formation that is irrelevant to its logical structure. Such information is
described as ‘biases’. For example, the ‘belief bias’ suggests that people
would prefer to confirm a hypothesis rather than disprove it. General
knowledge is a likely source of such biases.
• Other investigators reject the relevance of classical logic and probability in
reasoning but postulate other kinds of rules instead. For example, Cheng
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and Holyoak (1985) suggest that people may create for themselves and
use ‘pragmatic reasoning schemas’, each one geared to the demands of a
particular domain.
• Some investigators have pointed out that the nature of everyday reason-
ing (defeasibility, non-monotonicity) cannot be addressed within a formal
system based on rules of logic. For example, Oaksford and Chater’s (1994)
information-theoretic proposal states that people examine a hypothesis in
terms of a prerogative to minimize uncertainty about the veracity of the
hypothesis.
• Models of reasoning based on exemplar similarity have been advocated
within another influential tradition (see, for example, Kolodner, 1992;
Smith et al., 1992). Here, it is hypothesised that if we have success-
fully solved a problem in the past then we would be able to address a new
similar problem by analogy to the previous one. Thus, if our solution to
a given problem involved rule X then on encountering a novel problem of
the same type we could solve it not because we have abstracted rule X but
because the two problems are similar (they both share the same overall
structure determined by rule X). Whether the reasoning process is based
on ‘similarity’ or ‘rules’ is a largely unresolved issue.
To summarise the foregoing, it seems that principles of classical logic and
probability are relevant in at least some everyday reasoning situations. But it
is also possible that other mechanisms and processes have a role to play such as
misunderstandings between experimenter and subject, heuristics, biases, general
knowledge, ‘pragmatic reasoning schemas’, minimization of uncertainty, and
similarities between problems.
The SP Theory and Reasoning
As we have seen in Chapter 7, the SP system provides a powerful means of
modelling several different kinds of probabilistic reasoning. And in Chapter 10,
it was suggested that the framework may also be applied to classical kinds of
reasoning with explicit values that are ‘true’ or ‘false’, with nothing in between.
How might the reasoning capabilities of the SP system relate to alternative
theories about human reasoning and available empirical data?
With regard to the range of ideas about human reasoning that were outlined
above, the SP theory is closest in spirit to the information-theoretic proposals
of Oaksford and Chater (1994). Both sets of proposals are founded on the
pioneering work of Solomonoff (1964); Wallace and Boulton (1968); Rissanen
(1978) and others but the multiple alignment concept, as it has been developed
in the SP theory, is a distinctive feature of the system, not proposed elsewhere.
An important part of the empirical support for the SP theory is that it
provides an account of several aspects of human reasoning that can be readily
observed without the need for any formal study. With the possible exception
of Bayesian networks (see, for example, Pearl, 1988), it appears that no other
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theory can match the explanatory range of the SP theory in the domain of
probabilistic reasoning.
It may be thought that the system’s ability to model classical kinds of logic
and mathematics is not relevant to the empirical validation of the theory. But
it should not be forgotten that, until the 1940s, a ‘computer’ was a person
who did computations and the human brain was the sole vehicle for all aspects
of logic and mathematics. Any theory of human reasoning should be able to
account for the fact that, when we make the necessary effort, we can reason in
accordance with established principles of logic and mathematics. Unlike some
of the alternatives, the SP theory appears to satisfy this requirement.
How might the SP theory account for the fact that people do not always
reason in ways that are strictly logical? In broad terms, this phenomenon may
be explained by the way in which the system searches for good matches and
unifications between patterns. For any realistically-large body of information,
the abstract ‘space’ of possible matches and unifications is far too large to be
searched exhaustively. To be practical, any system must constrain the search in
some way, using heuristic techniques or otherwise (the SP system uses a range
of heuristic techniques). Without these constraints, the system will get bogged
down and will achieve nothing. With the constraints, the system can often
deliver results that are useful—but the penalty is that theoretically ideal results
cannot be guaranteed and mistakes will be made. This seems to be the human
condition!
Without detailed study, it is not possible to say whether or how the SP
theory might account for the kinds of experimental results outlined above. To
make a precise comparison between any cognitive model and human experimen-
tal subjects, it is necessary for the model and the subjects to be using the same
knowledge. Herein lies a significant methodological problem: it is very hard
to know exactly what a given person has or has not got stored in their heads!
Notwithstanding this kind of difficulty, it may be possible to find ways of as-
sessing the detailed reasoning behaviour of the SP model in comparison with
people.
With regard to other ideas that have been proposed to account for human
styles of reasoning:
• The SP theory is entirely compatible with the idea that experimental
subjects might not fully comprehend what they are required to do. Any
system that has the ability to make mistakes may fail in that way.
• Given the way in which the SP system is designed to store recurrent
patterns in its experience, it seems reasonable to suppose that some of
these patterns might serve as ‘heuristics’, ‘biases’, ‘general knowledge’ or
‘pragmatic reasoning schemas’ with an influence on how reasoning is done.
• Given that the detection of good matches between patterns lies at the
heart of the SP system and that the system stores knowledge of recurrent
patterns, it is not hard to imagine that experience with certain kinds
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of problems would facilitate the solution of similar problems which are
encountered later.
Summary
In summary, the SP theory can model a wide range of different kinds of rea-
soning. Given that these different kinds of reasoning—including classical kinds
of logic and mathematics—are all part of the human repertoire, they provide
empirical support for the theory as a model of human reasoning.
Apart from its ability to model classical forms of reasoning, the theory sug-
gests in general terms why human reasoning is not always correct and the theory
is broadly compatible with other explanations that have been offered for the id-
iosyncrasies of human reasoning.
The empirical validity of the theory should, of course, be examined in more
detail but, in this area, there are some difficult methodological problems to be
solved.
12.4 Associative Learning
For many years, it has been recognized by psychologists that people have a
tendency to notice and remember ‘associations’ between objects and events. If
I see that the entities A and B occur together frequently, then eventually I am
likely to treat them as a single entity.
This tendency, which is a matter of observation, has led to the development
of ‘associative’ learning theories in which learning is achieved by connecting en-
tities or events in a pairwise manner. This kind of mechanism is the basis of
the MK10 computer model of the way in which children may learn the segmen-
tal structure of language (Wolff, 1975, 1977, 1980). Similar mechanisms have
been incorporated in the SNPR model of syntax learning (Wolff, 1982, 1988).
More recently, ideas of this sort have been proposed as a ‘competitive chunking’
hypothesis for learning (E., 1991; Servan-Schreiber and Anderson, 1990).
In theories of this kind, chunks are the elements of an hierarchical struc-
ture in long-term memory, with higher-level chunks constructed recursively in
a pairwise manner from lower-level chunks. For each node within such a hierar-
chy, there is some kind of measure of the strength of association, related to the
frequency of occurrence of the association and perhaps also to the recency with
which the association has been observed.
Some theories of associative learning embody a distinction between outcomes
and cues that allows for explicit teaching of certain associations. For exam-
ple, according to the Rescorla-Wagner model Rescorla and Wagner (1972); see
also Mackintosh (1975)), different events are characterized by an association
strength, which reflects how salient their relatedness is to an observer. For each
occurrence of a particular outcome following a cue, the outcome-cue association
is strengthened on the basis of a learning rule that is similar to the delta rule
common in connectionist models (e.g., Plunkett and Elman, 1996). The upshot
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of this process is that eventually some cues are more readily associated with
certain outcomes.
The SP Theory and Associative Learning
Part of the inspiration for the SP theory was the hierarchical chunking models
of language learning mentioned above. However, it was recognised at an early
stage in the development of the SP theory that the pairwise chunking technique
used in the earlier models would not provide a good model for such things as
fuzzy pattern recognition and probabilistic reasoning that the new theory aimed
to embrace. At the same time, it was intended that the new theory should be
compatible with the empirical fact that people do indeed have a tendency to
associate things that occur together frequently.
At the heart of the SP models is a mechanism for finding full and partial
matches between patterns that are good in terms of minimum length encoding
principles. This mechanism can form associations between any number of en-
tities, not just two. For example, if the system finds repeated occurrences of a
pattern like ‘p l a y’, it will normally unify them to form a single instance of
that pattern. This single instance represents an association amongst the four
letters of the pattern. It may also be seen as a ‘chunk’, as that term in normally
understood.
Clearly, this kind of mechanism can form associations in a pairwise manner
and it is thus compatible with the empirical observation that people do tend to
associate pairs of things that regularly occur together. But the mechanism is
not, in itself, a mechanism for forming pairwise associations—it is much more
general than that. Like any associative learning theory, the SP theory can build
hierarchical structures in a pairwise manner. But it can also build hierarchies in
which associations amongst three or more entities are identified in a relatively
direct manner. And the SP mechanisms for finding good full and partial matches
between patterns provide a basis for modelling several other phenomena that
are well beyond the scope of any associative learning theory.
Frequency and Size
Where does frequency fit into the picture? In associative learning theories, the
frequency of associations is the central driver. In the SP theory, by contrast,
the key principle is the amount of compression that can be achieved by the
unification of matching patterns. Clearly, more compression can be achieved
by unifying many instances of a pattern than by unifying only a few. And
the SP theory also incorporates the Huffman principle that compression can be
enhanced by using short identifiers for patterns that occur frequently and longer
identifiers for patterns that are relatively rare.
So the SP theory, and the minimum length encoding principles on which it is
based, are compatible with the observation that people tend to associate things
that occur together frequently—but frequency is only part of the picture. The
other major factor that affects the amount of compression that can be achieved
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is the sizes of patterns to be unified. Clearly, the unification of two or more
large patterns yields more compression than the unification of the same number
of small patterns.
For any given size of pattern, there is a minimum frequency below which
no compression can be achieved. This is because each unified chunk requires
some kind of label or identifier by which it can be referenced—and the infor-
mation ‘cost’ of these labels offsets the compression achieved by the unification
of matching patterns. Unless that compression is greater than the amount of
information required for the labels, there is no net saving in the number of bits
that are needed.
In this connection, there is a trade-off between sizes of patterns and the
minimum frequency that is needed for compression. With large patterns, useful
compression can be achieved when frequencies are as low as 2 or 3. With small
patterns, including patterns with only two elements, the minimum frequency
needed to achieve useful compression is normally much larger than 2 or 3.
Summary
In summary, the SP theory can be seen to be compatible with the observation
that people can form associations between pairs of entities and that frequently-
occurring pairs are most likely to be learned. But the SP theory is much more
general than any of the theories that propose that learning actually occurs in a
pairwise manner, with frequency as the central driver.
The SP theory makes predictions that are different from those made by
associative learning theories and, in principle at least, these predictions could
be tested experimentally:
• The main difference between the two views of learning is that the SP
theory predicts, with some qualification, that the amount of repetition
required to isolate a large pattern as a discrete chunk is less than would
be required for a small pattern, whereas associative learning theories make
no such prediction. The qualification is that there is a limit to the sizes of
patterns that can be matched in one operation. Patterns that are larger
than this maximum must be processed in stages—which would explain
why an actor takes longer to learn a large part than a small one. But for
patterns that fall within the scope of one ‘percept’, the isolation of large
chunks should require fewer repetitions than small ones.
• Another difference is that, in associative learning theories, large chunks
are always built up in a pairwise manner from smaller components whereas
the SP theory proposes that large chunks may be learned in a more direct
manner—although pairwise learning is still possible. As before, the pic-
ture is more complicated in the case of patterns that are too large to be
perceived in one operation.
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12.5 ‘Rules’, ‘Similarity’ and Artificial
Grammar Learning
In this section we focus on the issue of whether experience is coded primarily as
‘rules’ or in terms of ‘similarity’—an ‘opposition’ of the kind that was criticised
by Allen Newell (Section 1.3). We do this in the context of artificial grammar
learning since this is an experimental paradigm where many of the more popular
theories of learning have been applied and compared.
Artificial grammar learning is a learning task that typically uses stimuli de-
rived from a finite-state grammar. A finite-state grammar is a relatively simple
system for the creation and recognition of sequences of symbols. This kind of
system is quite widely used in computer applications but it was recognised many
years ago that it has less expressive ‘power’ than other systems such as PSG or
transformational grammar and that it is not adequate for describing the com-
plexity and subtleties of certain forms of knowledge such as natural language
syntax (Chomsky, 1957).
For any given finite-state grammar, symbol sequences that are consistent
with its rules are described as ‘grammatical’, while others that are not consistent
with the rules are classified as ‘nongrammatical’. As we read a grammatical
sequence from left to right, the range of symbols that we may see at any given
point in the sequence is constrained by what has gone before. For example, one
finite-state grammar might specify that the first symbol can only be ‘M’ or ‘V’,
that if ‘M’ is the first symbol then it must be followed by an ‘X’ or another ‘M’
or an ‘S’—and so on. Thus, while ‘MS’ would be a valid prefix for a grammatical
sequence for that finite-state grammar, ‘XM’ would not be.
In a typical artificial grammar learning task, participants are first presented
with a subset of the possible grammatical sequences, with instructions only to
observe them. They are not told any of the rules of the grammar or what will
be asked from them in the subsequent test phase. In the test phase, they are
presented with grammatical and non-grammatical sequences and their task is
to discriminate between the two. It has been found on repeated occasions that
participants can do this kind of task with an accuracy that is significantly better
than chance. The main focus of artificial grammar learning studies has been an
examination of alternative hypotheses about the kinds of knowledge that may
guide participants’ selections.
It was thought originally that if experimental subjects are sensitive to the
grammatical/non-grammatical distinction, then because that distinction is de-
fined by the rule structure of a finite state language, the subjects must have
learned something about those rules (Reber, 1967, 1989; Reber and Allen, 1978).
More specifically, it was assumed that participants develop an abstract, partial
representation of the rule structure of the finite state language, which can be
used to decide whether a given test sequence is grammatical or non-grammatical.
A variant of Reber’s account is the ‘microrules’ hypothesis (Dulany et al., 1984,
1985) which proposes that the knowledge acquired by experimental subjects
takes the form of heuristic-like tests of limited validity and scope. It is sup-
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posed that these tests can be used more or less independently of each other to
determine the grammaticality of different sequences.
Several investigators have challenged the claims of Reber and his associates
by showing that other types of knowledge covary with the grammatical/non-
grammatical distinction. This implies that, even if participants can success-
fully discriminate between grammatical and non-grammatical sequences, their
achievement may not necessarily be based on a knowledge of the grammatical
rules. Vokey and Brooks (1992; 1994) suggested that, in Reber’s original stud-
ies, grammatical items in the test part of his artificial grammar learning task
were similar to the training items and they argued that the results that Reber
obtained could be explained in terms of similarity rather than grammaticality.
Vokey and Brooks defined the similarity of a test item to a training item
in terms of the number of symbols that would need to be changed in order to
convert one into the other. Using this definition, they devised one set of test
sequences in which the grammatical and non-grammatical items were all similar
to the training sequences, and another set in which the grammatical and non-
grammatical items were all rather different from the training set. Using these
materials, they found that the performance of experimental subjects was affected
both by the grammatical status of the test sequences and by their similarity to
the training sequences.
Pothos and Bailey (2000) used a more general approach to similarity, one
based on empirically-derived similarity ratings between the items, consistent
with Nosofsky’s generalised Context Model of similarity (Nosofsky, 1989, 1990).
As in the studies by Vokey and Brooks, these investigators found that the per-
formance of experimental subjects was affected both by the grammatical status
of the test items and by their similarity to the training sequences. Similarity
seemed to have the strongest influence.
Results from artificial grammar learning experiments have also been inter-
preted in terms of associative theories of learning, discussed in the previous
section. In the training phase of an artificial grammar learning experiment,
it will normally happen that some pairs of symbols appear more frequently
than others. Associative learning theories suggest that any such pairs should
be recognised first as discrete ‘bigrams’ and that larger structures may then be
built in a pairwise manner with frequency as the driving heuristic.
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) showed that participants in artificial grammar
learning experiments were indeed sensitive to bigram information. Furthermore,
they showed that knowledge of bigrams was sufficient to account for the observed
levels of performance and they suggested that it was not necessary to postu-
late forms of knowledge such as ‘rules’. Knowlton and Squire (1996) presented
a more sophisticated ‘chunking’ model of artificial grammar learning based on
associative learning principles. They concluded that the performance of exper-
imental subjects could be accounted for by a hybrid of their chunking model
and the operation of ‘rules’. Some doubt has been expressed about whether
associative learning approaches to artificial grammar learning are really distinct
from rules or from concepts of similarity (Dickinson, 2001; Cheng, 1997).
Part of the appeal of artificial grammar learning is that the range of different
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hypotheses about learning can be compared with each other by applying them
to concrete examples. This has been done by Johnstone and Shanks (1999) and
also by Pothos and Bailey (2000). The main finding in both cases was that no
single form of knowledge is sufficient to explain the selections made by exper-
imental subjects in the test part of an artificial grammar learning experiment.
To account for all the observations, it seems necessary to invoke the operation
of rules and similarities and fragments of structure.
To complete this brief review of artificial grammar learning studies, mention
should be made of so-called ‘transfer’ artificial grammar learning experiments.
By contrast with the artificial grammar learning studies in which the same
symbols are used in the training phase and the testing phase, experiments in
the ‘transfer’ paradigm use different sets in the two phases, with a one-to-one
mapping between the two. This means that, at a superficial level, there is no
similarity at all between the materials used in the two phases of the experi-
ment. Consequently, when investigators discovered that experimental subjects
in these experiments displayed above chance sensitivity to the grammatical/non-
grammatical distinction, it seemed natural to conclude that they must be basing
their decisions on a knowledge of rules. However, it has been shown in later in-
vestigations that transfer performance could be guided by abstract analogies
amongst stimuli. Thus, for example, the stimulus “MSSSX” has the same ab-
stract structure as the stimulus “HJJJL” (Brooks and Vokey, 1991). In a similar
way, it can argued that experimental results may be explained by abstract rela-
tionships amongst fragments of stimuli (Redington and Chater, 1998). Clearly,
the transfer phenomenon is an interesting finding that needs to be considered
in any discussion of artificial grammar learning.
The SP Theory and Artificial Grammar Learning
What light might the SP theory throw on the issues and observations outlined
above? In this connection, there are two aspects of the theory that invite at-
tention:
• As was noted in Section 3.3, all kinds of knowledge in the system are
expressed as ‘patterns’. There is no formal distinction between ‘rules’ or
‘fragments’ or any other format for knowledge. That said, the system can
model a wide variety of representational schemes, including finite-state
grammars, context-free phrase-structure grammars and context-sensitive
grammars.
• Although ‘similarity’ has no formal status in the theory, concepts of that
sort are implicit in the way the system works:
– A method of finding full matches and good partial matches between
patterns lies at the heart of the system. In effect, the system is
dedicated to finding similarities amongst patterns.
– Abstract structures created by the system in the course of learning
can be seen to represent ‘polythetic’ concepts in which the constituent
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members have a ‘family resemblance’ to each other (Section 6.4). In
effect, the system is geared to the creation of knowledge structures
that express similarities amongst patterns.
Thus, from the perspective of the SP theory, it is a false antithesis to ask
whether experience is encoded in terms of ‘rules’ or ‘similarity’. In terms of the
theory, the answer is “both” and “neither”. Likewise, it does not make sense
to ask whether knowledge may be encoded in terms of ‘rules’ or ‘fragments’.
These ‘oppositions’ are a “form of conceptual structure [that] leads ... to an
ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but
never really settle.” (Newell, 1973, p. 289).
We should not forget that the systems people use for encoding knowledge
are certainly more sophisticated than any finite-state grammar. Although the
training stimuli in an artificial grammar learning experiment may have been
derived from a finite-state grammar, it is likely that participants would use any
or all of their repertoire of encoding techniques and it unlikely that the resulting
knowledge structures would fit neatly into any of the categories that have been
considered in the context of artificial grammar learning experiments.
Analysis of Experimental Results
Although there may be some doubt about assumptions that lie behind some of
the artificial grammar learning experiments, we may still ask whether or how
the SP theory might account for the results that have been obtained in these
experiments.
The theory looks promising in this connection because the SP70 model has
already demonstrated an ability to learn sets of patterns that are equivalent to
finite-state grammars. However, the SP70 model has recognised shortcomings
and we really need to consider how it might operate when it is more fully mature.
At this point, we make a plea for caution. The mature version of the SP70
model is, of course, not fully specified. Armchair speculations about how a pro-
posed mechanism is likely to behave are often falsified when it is implemented
and run as a computer program. Thus, at this stage, it is probably not sensi-
ble to try to make detailed predictions about what the mature version of the
SP70 model might do with the materials used in artificial grammar learning
experiments.
It is pertinent to point out that very much the same can be said about
any of the other ‘models’ that have been proposed to account for the results of
artificial grammar learning experiments. In general, these are verbal descrip-
tions of possible mechanisms. Thus, they are at least as under-specified as the
anticipated mature version of the SP70 model. And there is corresponding un-
certainty about how the models would process the artificial grammar learning
training stimuli.
CHAPTER 12. SP AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 300
Transfer Experiments
With regard to the ‘transfer’ artificial grammar learning experiments, Figure
12.1 shows one of several possible ways in which a mapping between two stim-
uli may be expressed as an SP multiple alignment. In this case, ‘MSSSX’ and
‘HJJJL’ of our earlier example are connected, symbol by symbol, via the ‘map-
ping’ patterns ‘: M H :’, ‘: S J :’ and ‘: X L :’. Another possibility is that people
see both patterns as something like “one letter, followed by three instances of a
different letter, followed by one letter that is different from any previous letters”.
0 M S S S X 0
| | | | |
1 : M H : | | | | 1
| | | | | |
2 | : S J : | | | 2
| | | | | |
3 | | | | : S J : | 3
| | | | | | | |
4 | | : S J : | | | 4
| | | | | |
5 | | | | : X L : 5
| | | | |
6 H J J J L 6
Figure 12.1: One possible way in which a mapping from ‘M S S S X’ to ‘H
J J J L’ may be expressed as a multiple alignment. This is the best multiple
alignment found by SP61 with ‘M S S S X’ in New and, in Old, the pattern ‘H
J J J L’ together with the ‘mapping’ patterns ‘: M H :’, ‘: S J :’ and ‘: X L :’.
SP70 can create multiple alignments like the one shown in Figure 12.1 but
only if the mapping patterns have been supplied to Old by the user. In its current
form, SP70 cannot create mapping patterns for itself. However, the model could
in principle be extended to incorporate that kind of learning. Given that the
mapping patterns have a clear role to play in the economical encoding of New
data, this extension of the model would be entirely in keeping with the overall
philosophy of the SP theory.
12.6 Language Learning
Although there has been substantial progress in understanding how a child
learns his or her first language, this area remains a significant challenge. There
is still no single model that can achieve the kind of learning that children demon-
strate in their first few years.
It is clear that children do not learn by ‘imitation’, simply storing portions
of language that they have heard like a tape recorder. A wealth of evidence
shows that acquiring ‘competence’ in any given language means the development
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of something equivalent to a grammar that can generate an infinite range of
utterances from the language, well beyond the finite sample of utterances that
any child has ever heard.
Significant questions in this area include:
• How is it possible for children to develop a knowledge of the segmental
structure of language (words, phrases etc) when people often talk in ‘rib-
bons’ of speech, without reliable physical clues to the boundaries between
one segment and the next?
• How can children learn disjunctive categories such as ‘nouns’, ‘verbs’ or
‘adjectives’?
• How can these things be combined in grammar-equivalent forms of knowl-
edge with the kind of hierarchical structure that appears to be necessary
in any adequate description of the structure of a natural language?
• How can children learn to distinguish ‘correct’ generalisations beyond the
finite sample that they have heard from ‘incorrect’ generalisations, given
that both kinds of generalisation, by definition, have zero frequency in the
child’s experience?
• A related question is how a child can develop an adult’s ability to distin-
guish sharply between utterances that they feel are ‘correct’ samples of
their native language and other utterances that they judge to be ‘wrong’,
given that the language that a child normally hears is by no means totally
correct. This problem is sometimes called the ‘dirty data’ problem.
• How can a child learn meanings for words and other grammatical forms
and how can this ‘semantic’ knowledge be integrated with the child’s de-
veloping knowledge of syntax?
It has of course been argued that natural languages are far too complex to be
learned from scratch by any kind of ‘empiricist’ mechanism (Chomsky, 1965).
According to this influential ‘nativist’ view, children are born with a knowledge
of the main structures of natural languages and that the language environment
into which any given child is born serves to set the parameters of this pre-
established knowledge so that the child develops an ability to understand and
speak the language that they are hearing. Given that a new-born baby has
the potential to learn any of the huge number of different languages in the
world, the challenge for the nativist school of thinking is to define the ‘linguistic
universals’ that are shared by all these different languages and that constitute
the innate knowledge that each child supposedly brings to the language learning
task. Despite much research, no satisfactory definition of linguistic universals
has yet been established.
Nativist thinking was motivated in part by the unsatisfactory nature of early
attempts to explain language learning in empiricist terms (see, for example,
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Chomsky, 1959). However, with the development of empiricist learning mecha-
nisms that are very much more sophisticated than any of those early pioneering
proposals, there has been a quiet revolution in our understanding (see, for ex-
ample, Harris, 1955; Kiss, 1972; Wolff, 1988, 1982, 1980, 1977, 1975; Redington
and Chater, 1998). There is now an increasing realisation that it may, after all,
be possible to explain language learning without the need to postulate the kind
of inborn knowledge envisaged in nativist proposals.
Learning to distinguish correct generalisations from incorrect ones would
not be a problem if adults and older children were systematically to correct the
errors that young children make or if there was some other source of evidence
about ‘wrong’ kinds of utterances. In the same vein, Gold (1967) proved that
grammatical inference conceived as “language identification in the limit” is not
possible without one or more of: error correction by a ‘teacher’, or the provision
of language samples that are marked as ‘wrong’, or the presentation of language
samples in ascending order of their complexity.
However, there is good evidence that, while children may take advantage of
corrections if they are available, they can learn language without the need for
them. The evidence comes chiefly from relatively rare cases of children who have
apparently learned their receptive knowledge of language at essentially normal
speed despite the fact that, because of cerebral palsy or other physical handicap,
they have not been able to speak intelligibly and have not, therefore, been able
to benefit from any kind of error correction by people around them (see, for
example, Brown, 1989). And it seems unlikely that, in these cases, there was
any significant grading of language samples from simple to complex.
Although this evidence appears to conflict with Gold’s conclusions, his proof
is only valid for a conception of grammatical inference in which there is a non-
stochastic ‘target’ grammar that the system may learn “in the limit”. As we
shall see, the concept of a target grammar is not a necessary part of the language
learning problem and, without it, Gold’s proofs do not apply. In addition, Gold’s
proofs do not apply to the learning of stochastic grammars and there is plenty
of evidence for the stochastic nature of human linguistic knowledge.
As we saw earlier (Section 9.5), the way in which we learn to attach mean-
ings to linguistic labels seems puzzling because every utterance could apply to a
multitude of aspects of the situation that the utterance describes (“the scandal
of induction”). To help explain how linguistic labels may be attached to mean-
ings, a number of ‘biases’ have been proposed. For example, Markman (1991)
suggested that, via a ‘principle of mutual exclusivity’, children avoid applying
the same two labels to the same referent. She also suggested that there is a
‘whole object bias’, meaning that labels are usually assumed to apply to whole
objects rather than any of their parts. Markman and Hutchinson (1984) and
Waxman (1990) found that labelling a set of objects has an effect on the way
in which children generalise about those objects that is different from the way
in which they generalise when no labels are used.
Doubt has been expressed about whether these kinds of biases are ‘universal’
or whether they may be restricted to the structural features of particular lan-
guages (see, for example, Gathercole et al., 1999). There has also been debate
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about whether such biases may be innately specified or whether they might arise
from the workings of some kind of mechanism for statistical induction.
The SP Theory and Language Learning
As we saw in Chapter 1, the immediate inspiration for the SP theory was an
earlier programme of research developing the MK10 and SNPR models of first
language learning. In developing the SP theory, the aim has been to capture
the insights gained from the earlier research and, at the same time, to extend
the scope of the theory to other areas. In what follows, we shall first briefly
review what was achieved with the MK10 and SNPR models and then, in the
subsections that follow, we shall assess the SP theory as a model of language
learning.
The MK10 and SNPR Models
The chief merit of the MK10 model is that it demonstrates how it is possible for
the segmental structure of language to be learned by purely ‘statistical’ means
without supervision and without the need for physical clues to the boundaries
between successive segments. This has been demonstrated both at the word
level (Wolff, 1977, 1975) and also at the level of phrases (Wolff, 1980). It is
interesting that hierarchical chunking mechanisms that are broadly similar to
the MK10 program have been have been re-invented on repeated occasions for
different purposes (see, for example, Dawkins, 1976; Rapp et al., 1994; Nevill-
Manning and Witten, 1997).
The SNPR model (Wolff, 1988, 1982) can learn plausible grammars for arti-
ficial languages by statistical means without supervision and without the need
for physical markers of boundaries between words, sentences or other segmental
structure. This model, which works largely in accordance with minimum length
encoding principles, has a bearing on several of the questions and issues outlined
above.
Like the MK10 model, it demonstrates how the segmental structure of lan-
guage can be learned without the need for physical markers. The model also
demonstrates how grammatical classes of words or other linguistic structure
may be learned by purely distributional means. And the model can form
hierarchically-structured grammars with conjunctive (segmental) structures and
disjunctive structures at any level.
Using purely ‘positive’ information and without any of the sources of evi-
dence postulated by Gold, the SNPR model can form plausible generalisations
of grammatical rules and eliminate all of the generalisations that appear, in-
tuitively, to be ‘incorrect’. The key to this discrimination appears to be the
application of minimum length encoding principles: a grammar containing only
‘correct’ generalisations and no ‘incorrect’ generalisations is more efficient in
minimum length encoding terms than any of the alternatives (see Section 2.2).
The SNPR model also provides an answer to the ‘dirty data’ problem. It
can learn ‘correct’ forms of grammars even when it is supplied with language
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samples containing a reasonable number of errors. As with the correction of
overgeneralisations, minimum length encoding principles are the key. Because
any one kind of error is relatively rare compared with the corresponding correct
form, errors of all kinds are simply filtered out by the system because they do
not make a big enough contribution to the economical encoding of the original
data.
The model also provides an account of empirical phenomena that were not
anticipated in the design of the model. These include:
• The pattern of changes in the rate of acquisition of words as learning
proceeds. The slowing of language development in later years.
• The order of acquisition of words and morphemes.
• Brown’s (1973) “Law of Cumulative Complexity”.
• The S-P/episodic-semantic shift.
• The observation, noted earlier, that children initially learn the correct
forms of irregular verbs and nouns, then regularise them incorrectly, and
eventually return to the correct forms again.
• The word-frequency effect.
These things are discussed quite fully in Wolff (1988).
SP70 and the SP Theory
To a large extent, SP70 can achieve the same kinds of things as the earlier
models. Like the MK10 and SNPR models, it expresses minimum length en-
coding principles but it uses multiple alignment as its core mechanism rather
than hierarchical chunking. A major strength of SP70 compared with the earlier
models is that it provides an account of a very much wider range of cognitive
phenomena, well beyond the relatively narrow sphere of language learning.
As we saw in Chapter 9, the SP70 model, like SNPR, can learn plausible
grammars from appropriate input without the need for error correction by a
‘teacher’ or ‘negative’ samples or samples that are graded from simple to com-
plex. As with the earlier model, it demonstrates how the segmental structure
of language may be learned by statistical means without the need for physical
markers of the boundaries between one segment and the next, and it demon-
strates how disjunctive categories may be learned by distributional means.
As it stands now, SP70 can develop grammars with two main levels of ab-
straction. It is not good at building grammars with three or more levels but it
is anticipated that, with some reorganisation of the model, this weakness can
be overcome.
The model has already demonstrated an ability to make ‘correct’ general-
isations whilst avoiding ‘incorrect’ generalisations—but more work is required
in this area. No attempt has yet been made to test how well the model can
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learn with corrupted data but, since it is founded on minimum length encoding
principles, it should perform at least as well as the earlier models.
It is too soon to say whether mature versions of the SP70 model will mimic
observed features of first language learning in the way that SNPR does. How-
ever, since many of these features appear to be by-products of the application
of minimum length encoding principles, it seems likely that successors to the
current model will behave in a similar way.
Do Children Learn a ‘Target’ Grammar?
One of the arguments in support of nativist proposals is that the grammars
that we learn are rather uniform, despite the variability of our experiences.
Thus Chomsky (1965) wrote:
“A consideration of the character of the grammar that is ac-
quired, the degenerate quality and narrowly limited scope of the
available data, the striking uniformity of the resulting grammars,
and their independence of intelligence, motivation, and emotional
state, over wide ranges of variation, leave little hope that much of
the structure of the language can be learned by an organism initially
uninformed as to its general character.” (p. 58, emphasis added).
If everyone in a given language community learns essentially the same gram-
mar, it is natural to assume that language learning is a process of discovering
what that ‘target’ grammar is. And this accords with the notion of a target
grammar employed in Gold’s proofs, mentioned above.
However, if language learning is viewed from an minimum length encoding
perspective, there is no target grammar, there is merely a search for one or more
grammars that are as good as possible in terms of the minimum length encoding
criteria. Because the abstract space of possible grammars is too large to be
searched exhaustively, one can never be sure that the best possible grammar
has been found.
How can this view be reconciled with the posited uniformity of the grammars
we learn? A search for good grammars should lead to a degree of uniformity but
we would expect some variations. It turns out that, if our tests of grammatical
knowledge are sufficiently sensitive, people are more variable in their knowledge
than was originally thought (See, for example, Carol Chomsky (1969)).
Learning Meanings
As we saw in Section 9.5, there are reasons to think that statistical principles
of the kind that are embodied in the MK10, SNPR and SP70 models, coupled
with the use of heuristic techniques such as hill climbing, should be able to sift
through the many alternatives that present themselves in the learning of word-
meaning associations. What is less clear at present is whether the SP system in
its current form would be able to accommodate this problem or whether some
adaptation would be required.
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12.7 Analogy and Structure Mapping
In the last two decades or so there has been a lively interest in the psychological
phenomenon of analogy and related topics such as metaphor, similarity, infer-
ence, and conceptual blending (see, for example, Gentner et al., 2001). In this
area of research, it is widely accepted that analogy involves a process of map-
ping one structure (the ‘source’) to another structure (the ‘target’), a process
known as ‘structure mapping’ or ‘structural alignment’.
This process and the results of the process are clearly related to the concept
of ‘multiple alignment’ which is so prominent in the SP theory and, as we saw
in Section 8.3, the SP system has at least some capability for processing analo-
gies. Although the relationship between these two areas of research deserves
a relatively full discussion, I shall here merely attempt a summary. The main
similarities and differences are discussed in the subsections that follow.
Flat patterns and Hierarchical Structures
In structure mapping, the things being mapped to each other can have an hierar-
chical structure (e.g., ‘greater(temperature(coffee), temperature(ice))’) whereas
the SP theory deals only in flat patterns.
Superficially, the fact that the SP system deals only with flat patterns seems
to be a disadvantage compared with structure mappings in which hierarchical
structures can be mapped. However, within the SP system, an hierarchical
structure can be represented as a flat pattern and it can be assigned an hier-
archical analysis in a multiple alignment parsing as shown in Figure 3.4 and
in many other examples in this book. As we have seen in earlier chapters, flat
patterns can be used within the SP system to represent a wide range of differ-
ent kinds of structure, a combination of simplicity and versatility that has no
counterpart in structure mapping theory.
Another potential advantage of adopting flat patterns as the basis for knowl-
edge rather than something more complex is that this relates quite neatly to
the way in which neural tissue appears to be organised into flat ‘sheets’ of neu-
rons in such structures as the retina, lateral geniculate body and the cortex (as
discussed in Chapter 11).
Matched and Unmatched Symbols
In a structure mapping, an element of one structure can be aligned with an
element of another even if they are not a match for each other, whereas in
multiple alignments, symbols are aligned only if they match each other. At
first sight, this difference may seem somewhat trivial because, within a multiple
alignment, there may be an implicit alignment of unmatched symbols as shown
in Figure 9.2. However, the question of whether symbols match or not is not
highlighted in structure mapping theory whereas it has a two-fold significance
in the SP theory:
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• The matching of symbols is the key to the compression of information that
is so central in the SP theory. Unmatched symbols within a multiple align-
ment do not contribute to information compression or to the compression
score for the multiple alignment.
• It is the contrast between matched symbols and unmatched symbols that
drives the process of learning in the SP theory (Chapter 9).
Alignment of Three or More Patterns
In structure mapping, there are only two things to be aligned: the source and
the target, somewhat like the alignment of a New pattern with one Old pattern.
There is nothing comparable with the alignment of one New pattern with two
or more Old patterns as is commonplace in multiple alignments.
This is, perhaps, the most significant difference between structure mappings
and multiple alignments. The possibility of creating multiple alignments con-
taining three or more patterns opens up a range of possibilities for multiple
alignments which appear to be closed for structure mappings:
• With multiple alignments, it is possible to model chains of reasoning or
inference with any number of steps.
• In a similar way, it is possible with multiple alignments to model inheri-
tance of attributes through multiple levels of a class hierarchy.
• With multiple alignments, it is possible to share patterns amongst mul-
tiple alignments in a way that cannot be done with structure mappings.
It is true that, with structure mappings, a given structure may appear
in several different alignments but this can be done at only one level or
possibly two. With multiple alignments, a pattern at any level in a hier-
archy of arbitrarily many levels may appear in several different multiple
alignments. This ability to share patterns at many different levels is the
key to compression and the economical representation of knowledge.
• With multiple alignments it is possible to model the workings of a uni-
versal Turing machine (Chapter 4), something that appears to be outside
the scope of structure mappings. Bearing in mind that the universal Tur-
ing machine is widely recognised as a definition of ‘computing’ and that
the ability to ‘compute’ is part of human cognition, multiple alignments
appear to have an explanatory edge over structure mappings in this area
of cognitive science.
• The ability to form multiple alignments with three or more patterns is the
key to modelling nonmonotonic reasoning (Section 7.7).
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Two or More Appearances of a Pattern within a Multiple
Alignment
Within one multiple alignment, a given Old pattern can appear two or more
times within the multiple alignment, not as a copy but as a specific instance,
with consequent constraints on matching as described in Section 3.4. There is
nothing comparable in structure mappings.
Perhaps the main significance of this feature of SP-style multiple alignments
is that it allows the system to model recursive structures, something that seems
to be outside the scope of structure mappings. Since recursion is a prominent
feature of many kinds of knowledge, this is another area where multiple align-
ments have an advantage compared with structure mappings.
Minimum Length Encoding Principles
Compression and minimum length encoding principles have a key roˆle in the
evaluation of multiple alignments in the SP theory whereas other criteria—
such as ‘systematicity’ and ‘structural consistency’—are used for the evaluation
of structure mappings. Possible advantages of the minimum length encoding
orientation include:
• It provides a single unifying criterion for the evaluation of knowledge struc-
tures rather than the diversity of criteria used in research on structure
mappings.
• It provides a unifying connection between research on multiple alignments
(and their applications) and the long tradition that recognises information
compression as a significant theme in the workings of brains and nervous
systems (Chapter 2).
• Likewise, it makes a connection with research on inductive inference and
its intimate connection with information compression (Section 2.2).
Discussion
The organisation of SP-style multiple alignments and the way they are created
and used within the SP theory appears to give them some advantages compared
with structure mappings as currently conceived. With multiple alignments it is
possible to model a range of things that appear to be beyond the scope of struc-
ture mappings, such as natural language parsing, inference through multiple
steps, inheritance of attributes through multiple levels, nonmonotonic reason-
ing, recursive structures, and the process of computing. There may also be
advantages for multiple alignments at more abstract levels such as the simplic-
ity of representing all knowledge with flat patterns, realisation of the theory in
terms of neural mechanisms, and integration of the theory with other theory in
cognitive science.
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However, the foci of interest in structure mapping research have been some-
what different from the main concerns in the SP programme and structure map-
ping ideas have been applied in areas such as metaphor and conceptual blending
which have not, so far, received attention in the SP research. Although the SP
system has been successful in processing one type of analogy, no attempt has yet
been made to examine how the system might be applied to those other aspects
of analogy that have been considered in the structure mapping programme. In
general, the relative merits of structure mappings and multiple alignments need
more evaluation across a range of different areas of application.
12.8 Conclusion
Only a selection of topics has been considered in this chapter and, in each area,
the discussion has been relatively brief. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the
SP theory provides a useful and distinctive perspective on a number of issues
in cognitive psychology.
Chapter 13
Future Developments and
Applications
13.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have described the SP theory as it has been developed
to date and some of its potential applications. In this chapter, I will describe
what further developments of the theory seem to be needed, how the theory
may be embodied in an ‘SP machine’, and ways in which the theory and the
machine may be applied in the future.
In looking into the future for these ideas, it is tempting to be drawn into
science fiction and to imagine how an SP system might mend your socks, make
you cups of tea and be your tennis partner as well. Although this might be
entertaining, I shall stick to the more humdrum possibilities that seem to me to
be reasonable and feasible.
13.2 Development of the theory
In the last few years, many of the issues that have arisen in the development
of the SP theory have been resolved and the framework has become relatively
stable and mature. However, there are certain areas where further development
seems to be needed. Two of them have been described in previous chapters:
• In Section 3.4, it was suggested that there might be a case for generalis-
ing the SP concept of multiple alignment to include multiple alignments
containing two or more patterns from New. This should be useful for ap-
plications like medical diagnosis where New information may need to be
treated as an unordered set of patterns or as an unordered or partially-
ordered set of symbols (see Section 6.5).
• A programme of work is needed to overcome weaknesses in the SP70 model
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(Section 9.5). It is anticipated that most of the current deficiencies can be
remedied by some reorganisation of the model within the overall frame-
work that has been developed.
Other planned developments are discussed in the subsections that follow.
Patterns in two dimensions
The main focus so far in the development of the SP theory has been on one-
dimensional patterns and on the modelling of those kinds of knowledge that
map straightforwardly on to 1-D patterns—such as natural language and gram-
matical rules for describing the structure of natural language. Relatively little
has been said about possible applications of the theory to the description and
processing of forms of knowledge that have a two-dimensional structure such as
maps, diagrams and pictures (which will be referred to as ‘images’).
In conventional computing, there is of course a well-developed tradition of
vector graphics and related techniques for describing 2-D images with 1-D math-
ematical notations. Since it is envisaged that mathematical structures and pro-
cesses may be modelled in the SP system (Chapter 10), this is a possible way
forward, within the SP system, for the representation and processing of images.
However, as previously noted (Section 3.3), it is envisaged that the concept
of pattern in the SP theory may be generalised to include patterns in two dimen-
sions (and possibly more)—and this may provide a more direct approach to the
modelling of images, with potential advantages over one that mimics established
techniques (see Section 13.4, below).
Matching, multiple alignment, learning and display
There is, of course, no intrinsic difficulty in representing 2-D patterns in a
successor to SP61 or SP70. All that is required is arrays of symbols in two
dimensions instead of one. The immediate difficulty lies in developing a process
for matching 2-D patterns with the same kind of flexibility as the matching
process for 1-D patterns described in Appendix A. This would, in effect, be a
2-D analogue of dynamic programming with the same advantages as the current
process: that it can be scaled up without excessive demands on processing time
or memory; the ability to deliver two or more alternative matches for a pair
of patterns; and scope for varying the ‘depth’ of searching according to need.
Although the development of such a matching process presents a significant
challenge, there seems no reason in principle why existing techniques should not
be generalised in this way.
Assuming that a 2-D analogue of dynamic programming could be devel-
oped, this would need to be incorporated within a process for building SP-style
multiple alignments with 2-D patterns. The learning processes in SP70, or an
improved successor to that program, would need to be generalised for 2-D pat-
terns.
Apart from these problems, there is a cosmetic-cum-practical problem of
displaying alignments of two or more 2-D patterns effectively. Alignments of
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that kind may be viewed from different angles using ‘virtual reality’ graphical
software—but some other technique would be needed to show these kinds of
multiple alignments clearly on the printed page.
Representation of two-dimensional patterns without encoding
As was described in Section 2.2, analogue information may be digitised ‘directly’,
by representing the amplitude of the analogue signal by the density of ‘0’s and
‘1’s. Using this scheme, a 2-D image that we would recognise as a white triangle
surrounded by black, may be represented digitally by a triangular area of ‘1’s
surrounded by an area of ‘0’s.
A ‘raw’ image like the one just described contains significant amounts of
redundancy. This may be reduced by the matching and unification of patterns
(or individual symbols) and by the use of identifying ‘codes’ as described in
Sections 2.2 and 2.2. When learning processes like those described in Chapter 9
have been further developed and then generalised for patterns in two dimensions,
the SP system should be able to compress any raw digitised image, as tentatively
sketched in the subsections that follow.
First stage of encoding: marking boundaries
In the original digitised image of a triangle, the most obvious form of redundancy
is that represented by the repetition of symbols in each of the uniform areas, one
inside the triangle and the other surrounding it. These areas may be compressed
by the unification of repeating symbols and by the use of ID-symbols.
In one-dimensional patterns, ID-symbols have a dual roˆle: marking the
left and right boundaries of the pattern and identifying each pattern uniquely
amongst the other patterns in Old. With 2-D patterns, it seems necessary to
provide ID-symbols to fulfil these two roˆles but, with respect to the marking of
boundaries, the entire outline of the pattern needs to be marked, not simply the
left and right ends of the pattern.
Figure 13.1 shows a simple scheme for representing a white triangle. Here,
‘TRIANGLE’ is an ID-symbol that may serve to distinguish the figure from
others, ‘*’ is an ID-symbol that serves as an anchor point for positioning the
figure in relation to other figures and the ‘b’ symbols are ID-symbols marking
the boundary of the figure (also, if you wish, mnemonic for a ‘black’ line around
the figure).
Inside the triangle in Figure 13.1 is the pattern ‘< X 1 < X > >’ and
outside the triangle is the pattern ‘< Y 0 < Y > >’. The first of these patterns
is intended as a schematic encoding of the repeating ‘1’s inside the original
‘raw’ triangle, and the second pattern is intended as a similar encoding of the
repeating ‘0’s that surround the triangle. Each pattern is a recursive structure
modelled on the recursive pattern described in Section 4.3. However, neither
pattern is entirely accurate in this application because it needs to be generalised
for two dimensions. How that generalisation may be done is a matter for future
investigation.
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Figure 13.1: A possible scheme for a first-stage encoding of a white triangle in
black surroundings. The meanings of the symbols are explained in the text.
Further encoding
The encoding shown in Figure 13.1 has removed much of the redundancy from
the original ‘raw’ data but some still remains. The straight lines marking the
three sides of the triangle each contain redundancy in the form of repeating
instances of ‘b’ and the uniform trajectory from one ‘b’ to the next. By contrast,
the angles at each corner of the triangle, where a line in one orientation joins a
line at another orientation, are places where there is non-redundant information
that largely defines the nature of a triangle (cf. Attneave’s (1954) example
showing how the form of a sleeping cat can be captured quite effectively with a
few lines and angles).
Figure 13.2 shows how the residual redundancy in Figure 13.1 may be re-
duced. Instead of marking each side by a succession of ‘b’ symbols, we may
suppose that the system has recognised the recursive nature of each line and
has created an encoding that is something like ‘< Z b < Z > >’, comparable
with the recursive patterns in the body of the triangle and in the surrounding
area. For each of the three corners of the triangle, we may suppose that the
system has created three new ID-symbols, one for the top corner and one for
each of the left and right lower corners. In the figure, the symbol ‘TRIANGLE’
serves to distinguish the pattern from other patterns in the system and ‘*’ serves
as an anchor point, as before.
CHAPTER 13. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 314
Figure 13.2: A possible further encoding of a white triangle in a black surround.
The interpretation of the figure is discussed in the text.
An encoded representation like the one in Figure 13.2 has three interesting
features:
• It goes some way to capturing John Locke’s idea of an abstract, generalised
concept of a triangle.1. Given an appropriate process for building 2-D
multiple alignments, the representation in Figure 13.2 should serve for the
recognition or construction of equilateral triangles of any size, not just the
specific triangle shown in Figure 13.1. With some further generalisation
of the concept of ‘angle’, a representation like this should serve for the
recognition or construction of a range of triangles with a variety of angles
at the corners.
• Because the representation is compatible with triangles of many different
sizes, it provides a possible solution to the problem of size constancy in
perception, mentioned in Sections 2.3 and 11.5.
• The representation in Figure 13.2 does not encode the absolute sizes of the
sides of the triangle but it does, in effect, encode the relative sizes of the
sides of the triangle—via the positions of the symbols marking each angle
and, perhaps, via the sizes of the angles encoded within those symbols.
Encoding of relative sizes is sufficient for many purposes and it accords
with a range of evidence showing that human perception is geared to
1“For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children... For, when we nicely reflect
upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that
carry difficulty with them... For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the
general idea of a triangle... for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral,
equicrural [i.e., isosceles], nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.” John Locke, Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 9.
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relative judgements rather than absolute ones. This kind of system can
make absolute judgments if a suitable reference is provided.
Hierarchical encoding of two dimensional patterns
While it is true that we can recognise a triangle as a triangle regardless of its
size or shape, it is also true that we can distinguish one triangle from another
by size, shape, colour or other attributes. There seems no reason in principle
why the recognition of images at two or more levels of abstraction should not
be achieved in the SP system in much the same way as for 1-D patterns, as
illustrated in Section 6.4.
The modelling of class hierarchies and part-whole hierarchies within the SP
system is achieved quite simply by the provision of C-symbols in some patterns
that serve as references to corresponding ID-symbols in other patterns. Figure
13.3 shows a schematic example of a pattern constructed as an assemblage of
references to ‘lower’ level patterns—a relationship that may be repeated recur-
sively through any number of levels. When these ideas are more fully worked
out, there will, no doubt, be a need for additional information to specify sizes,
colours and textures of component patterns and, perhaps, relationships such as
overlap between patterns.
Figure 13.3: A 2-D picture constructed as an assemblage of references to ‘lower’
level patterns.
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Developing the theory with patterns with three or more
dimensions?
Since we regularly deal with objects and spaces in three dimensions, it might
seem natural to model these things in the SP system with patterns in three
dimensions—and likewise for concepts with higher dimensions. Although this
may seem the logical way to go, my current thinking is that this would probably
be a mistake. Apart from the difficulty of imagining or representing alignments
amongst patterns of that kind, there are two main reasons for caution in this
area:
• There may be no particular need to develop the theory in this way. Pat-
terns in one or two dimensions may serve well enough to represent concepts
with three or more dimensions. There is a long tradition of representing
buildings and other engineering artefacts with two-dimensional plans and
elevations. To model concepts in four or more dimensions, there seems
little prospect of improving on established mathematical techniques.
• As we saw in Chapter 11, there are reasons to think that arrays of neurons
in one or two dimensions may provide the basis for our many kinds of
knowledge:
– Although the human brain is clearly a three-dimensional structure,
there is a distinct tendency for it to be organised into layers of cells
such as those found in the cortex and in the lateral geniculate body.
Although these are often folded into three dimensions, they are topo-
logically equivalent to two-dimensional sheets. As was suggested in
Chapter 11, these sheets of neurons would provide a natural home
for SP patterns.
– In a similar way, there is a clear tendency for sensory neurons to be
organised as arrays with two dimensions in the retina and in the skin
or with a predominant single dimension in the case of cochlea. It
seems possible that structures for the storage and retrieval of knowl-
edge evolved from sensory structures and this might explain the sim-
ilarities in their organisation. It is true that there is a temporal
dimension to vision as well as the two dimensions of each momentary
image but there seems no reason why these three dimensions should
not be represented in two dimensions like a succession of images in
a cinema film or video tape—but with high levels of encoding and
compression. Similar principles may apply to hearing.
Theoretical aspects of searching and constraints
Other aspects of the SP theory that need further exploration and development
are methods for searching the space of alternative multiple alignments, the kinds
of constraint that may be applied to the search, and inter-dependencies between
the two. It is not entirely clear at present whether these issues are purely
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theoretical or whether they are at least partly concerned with the ways in which
the SP theory may be implemented in a working system (next section). Insofar
as the distinction is sound, it seems likely that the issues straddle both areas.
In the context of the SP system, any generalised theory of searching would
need to say something useful about building multiple alignments with 2-D pat-
terns (Section 13.2, above) and it should also throw light on ways in which
parallel processing may be applied (Section 13.3, below).
It seems likely that, at some stage, the searching and matching processes
will need to be generalised so that 1-D pattern can be matched in both possible
directions and 2-D patterns can be matched in several possible orientations (see
Section 9.5).
With regard to constraints, an area that needs particular attention is the
kinds of constraints that are embodied in classical systems for logic and mathe-
matics. This is needed to improve our understanding of the ways in which those
classical systems may (or may not) be understood within the SP theory. And
it will also be needed in the design of a working system, as discussed in the
following section.
Recency in learning
When we learn from experience, it seems that recency of events is a factor in
our thinking as well as frequency. If we are asked to guess who will score the
most goals in a football match then, other things being equal, we are likely to
choose the player with the best scoring record. But if that player had, in recent
matches, failed to live up to his usual form, then we might choose a different
player.
As the SP system is developed more fully for learning, there will be a need
to take account of the effect of recency in learning. Of course, frequency and
recency are linked because any measure of frequency must be relative to a par-
ticular ‘window’ or time frame in which frequencies are measured, and those
windows can vary in size and also in recency. These ideas will need to be more
fully worked out in successors to the SP70 model.
13.3 Development of an ‘SP’ machine
The SP theory provides an interpretation for computation in existing systems
(Chapter 4) but it also suggests new designs for computers, with potential ad-
vantages over the von Neumann model that has dominated the digital scene
for so long. This section sketches some ideas for the development of an ‘SP’
computer (or ‘SP’ computer) that should, if required, be able to function like a
conventional computer but which should in addition have strengths in artificial
intelligence that are missing from the current generation of digital computers.
The ‘high level’ design of the SP machine would be a realisation of the SP
theory as it has been developed and expressed in software models. Although
further developments in the theory are still needed (as described in Section 13.2),
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the concepts embodied in the SP61 model have a range of potential applications
and could provide a basis for a preliminary version of the SP machine.
A key feature of the proposed new machine is that it would incorporate high
levels of parallel processing. This is because artificial intelligence applications
are intrinsically ‘hungry’ for computer power and because the SP theory of-
fers opportunities to by-pass the ‘busy bee’ style of conventional computing to
achieve good results in a reasonable time by the application of parallel process-
ing. Notice that the computational demands of artificial intelligence applications
are intrinsic to those applications and not a consequence of their interpretation
in terms of the SP theory.
Implementation aspects of searching and constraints
The central process in the SP61 and SP70 models is the building of multiple
alignments—and the core operation here is the process of searching for full
matches and good partial matches between patterns, as described in Appendix
A.
Finding good matches between patterns presents opportunities to apply par-
allel processing. This is because the process of ‘broadcasting’ symbols from one
pattern to make yes/no matches with symbols in other patterns (Section 3.10) is
an intrinsically parallel operation that could be done as a single step in an appro-
priate parallel environment (in contrast to the sequence of operations required
on an ordinary digital computer). There is also scope for matching sequences
of two or more symbols against each other in parallel and this may have a place
in the proposed new machine.
Heuristic constraints
Notwithstanding these opportunities for doing several things at the same time,
it seems necessary to do some things in sequence. As we saw in Section 2.2, the
constraints that are applied in heuristic search methods such as hill climbing
or genetic algorithms are applied in a succession of stages, with a progressive
narrowing of the search space at each stage. Although searching within each
stage may be done in parallel, there seems no escape from the need for the stages
of metrics-guided search to succeed each other in sequence.
In general, there is a need to explore a variety of methods for matching
patterns in parallel, including the kinds of heuristic constraints that are needed
to ensure that the process is tractable.
Absolute constraints
Apart from heuristic constraints, the SP machine should also support the appli-
cation of absolute constraints. It should, for example, be possible to specify the
maximum size of any sequence of unmatched symbols in a multiple alignment—
including zero if ‘exact’ matching of patterns is required. As in SP61 and SP70,
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it should be possible to enforce the rule that left and right brackets should be
matched in such a way that they are always ‘balanced’.
As with heuristic constraints, there is a need to explore how parallelism
can be applied to best effect in the matching of patterns and to combine this
efficiently with the application of constraints. As a general rule, constraints of
any kind should speed up processing by reducing the size of the search space.
But care is needed to avoid inefficiencies in the way constraints are combined
with searching, as seems to be the case with the ‘brackets’ constraint in SP61
and SP70 (Section 3.10).
Technological options
The SP machine does not necessarily have to be developed in silicon. One
futuristic possibility is to exploit the potential of organic molecules such as
DNA or proteins—in solution—to achieve the effect of high-parallel pattern
matching. This kind of ‘molecular computation’ is already the subject of much
research (see, for example, Adleman, 1994, 1998) and techniques of that kind
could, conceivably, form the basis of a high-parallel SP machine.
Another possibility is to use light for the kind of high-speed, high-parallel
pattern matching that is needed at the heart of the SP machine. Apart from its
speed, an attraction of light in this connection is that light rays can cross each
other without interfering with each other, eliminating the need to segregate one
stream of signals from another (see, for example, Cho and Colomb, 1998; Louri
and Hatch, 1994).
In the field of optical and opto-electronic computing as it has developed to
date, there is an apparent tendency for researchers to assume that the design
of optical computers should imitate the design of the current generation of elec-
tronic computers and to concentrate on building optical versions of logic gates
(see, for example, Lee and Dickson, 2003; Singh and Roy, 2003). The SP theory
provides an alternative approach to the development of optical computers, an
approach which is founded on pattern matching and may by-pass many of the
intricacies of computer design, as currently conceived.
On relatively short time scales, a silicon version of the SP machine would
probably be the easiest option and it may be developed in one or more of three
main ways:
• It should be feasible to design new hardware for the kind of high-parallel
pattern matching that is needed.
• Given that high-parallel machines are already in existence (in both ‘single
instruction, multiple data’ (SIMD) and ‘multiple instructions, multiple
data’ (MIMD) designs), an alternative strategy is to create the SP machine
as a software virtual machine running on one of these platforms.
• Systems like Google already provide high-parallel pattern matching of a
kind that may be adapted for use within a software implementation of the
SP machine.
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To some extent, the second and third options defeat the object of the exercise
because the von Neumann architecture and much of its associated complexity
would remain embedded in the system. However, these methods of developing
the SP machine would probably be relatively cheap, they would probably yield
useful insights into ways in which parallelism may be applied, and they should
yield a version of the machine that could be used in practical applications.
Other developments
Other aspects of the SP machine that would need to be developed include:
• Styles of Computation. It should be possible to modify the operations of
the machine to suite the needs of particular applications. For example,
it should be possible to control the ‘depth’ of searching as described in
Section 3.10. There may also be switches and parameters to control which
constraints are in force and how they are applied (Section 13.3).
• Mathematics. Although the system can, in principle, do arithmetic and
other kinds of mathematics (Chapters 4 and 10), its current strengths lie in
‘symbolic’ and non-mathematical kinds of computation. To do arithmetic,
the system would need to be equipped with an appropriate set of patterns
and the kinds of constraint mentioned in Section 13.2 would also need
to be developed. Pending these developments, there may be a case for
exploiting existing technologies within the SP machine, in much the same
way that ‘maths co-processors’ are provided in conventional computers.
• User Interface. A graphical user interface is needed to display data and
results and to facilitate browsing and searching within that information.
Since multiple alignments can grow very large, there is a need to be able to
zoom in or out and to scroll through a multiple alignment (horizontally and
vertically). It should be possible to see the unified version of any multiple
alignment when required and, when viewing a unified version of a multiple
alignment, it would probably be useful if ID-symbols could be concealed
from view or revealed, according to need. Some kind of graphical control
panel or dialogue box is needed so that switches and other parameters can
easily be set.
13.4 Applications of the SP theory and
machine
Given the broad scope of the SP theory, its potential applications are legion.
This section describes some of the possibilities, ranging from those that may be
realised on relatively short time scales using existing technologies to those that
depend on longer-term developments of the SP machine. The main emphasis
here is on engineering applications but it should not be forgotten that the theory
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may also have heuristic uses in research, perhaps leading to new insights or sug-
gesting new avenues of investigation in areas such as neuroscience, mathematics
or logic.
Information compression
Given the central importance of information compression in the SP theory, an
obvious application for the SP machine would be in the compression of infor-
mation. Possible arguments against that kind of development include:
• The capacities of computer memories and storage devices are increasing
all the time, with no sign of a ceiling, and this will make compression
irrelevant.
• Likewise, it may be argued that communication bandwidths are constantly
increasing and this will progressively reduce the need for information com-
pression.
• Information compression is already well-enough served by ZIP programs
and the like and there is no need for anything different.
• It may also be argued that too much compression is bad—that redundancy
in information is needed to guard against errors or loss of information and
to speed up processing.
Compression will not be needed
Considering the first and second of these arguments, similar things were said in
the 1970s2 and there is still a need for information compression, despite vast in-
creases in storage capacities and bandwidths. Streaming video over the internet
is still a significant challenge as is the repeated archiving, at regular intervals, of
the entire World Wide Web (http://www.archive.org/). Our demands for the
storage and transmission of information seem always to outpace the available
technologies.
Current technologies are good enough
Compression algorithms such as the Lempel-Ziv algorithms used in ZIP pro-
grams are designed for speed of compression and decompression on traditional
digital computers. This means that the search for repeating patterns that is
embodied in these algorithms is relatively simple and not designed to find as
much redundancy as possible. The patterns that are found are always coherent
substrings within the data and discontinuous subsequences are excluded. Pat-
terns can contain references to other patterns but there is nothing equivalent to
2These were the reasons given by the former National Research and Development Corpo-
ration (a United Kingdom government quango) for rejecting a proposal that I made at that
time to develop the MK10 model for compression applications.
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the multiple alignment concept and the scope that it offers for the encoding of
information at several different levels of abstraction.
By contrast, it is envisaged that the SP machine will be designed so that
it can, when required, do relatively thorough searches for redundancy in in-
formation, including redundancy in patterns that are both discontinuous and
coherent, and redundancies at multiple levels of abstraction. High levels of par-
allelism should allow this relatively thorough search for redundancy—and cor-
respondingly high levels of compression—to be achieved with reasonable speed.
Although compression in itself might not justify the use of an SP machine, its
capabilities in this area should be a welcome bonus on top of its other uses.
Too much compression is bad
The third argument should not detain us because, as we saw in Section 2.3,
there is no real conflict between information compression in information pro-
cessing and the ways in which redundancy can be exploited. Compression and
redundancy have different roˆles to play and they may co-exist in a single body
of information.
Representation and processing of graphical information
In the representation and processing of graphical information—maps, diagrams
and pictures (both still and moving)—there is a well-developed tradition of
object-oriented design and object-oriented programming. In the digital process-
ing of a map, for example, it is natural to use a software ‘object’ to represent
each entity such as a church or a historic monument and to exploit class hier-
archies with inheritance of attributes to achieve a clean and economical design
(Sections 2.3 and 2.3). In a similar way, each character in a computer game
would naturally be programmed as a software object, inheriting methods and
data structures from appropriate classes.
Although the main elements of object-oriented design flow naturally from the
SP system, this in itself does not provide anything that is not already available
in object-oriented languages such as Simula, Smalltalk or C++. The potential
of the SP system in this area lies in the way it may combine object-oriented
capabilities with others:
• Recognition and Scene Analysis. If the system can be developed as de-
scribed in Section 13.2, it should serve for ‘fuzzy’ recognition of 2-D images
at multiple levels of abstraction, with the flexibility to cope when parts
of an image are obscured or when there are variations in sizes. It may
also serve for the analysis of a scene into its component parts in a manner
that is comparable with the parsing of natural language (Section 3.4 and
Chapter 5) but with provision for overlap amongst the components of a
scene (Section 6.2). Although it is not yet clear how the system might
best be developed for the representation and processing of 3-D objects (or
2-D images of 3-D objects), there seems to be potential here too.
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• Unsupervised Learning of Objects and Classes. At some point in the future
it may be possible to use the system for the automatic or semi-automatic
learning of ‘natural’ objects and classes. It might, for example, be possible
to scan an existing map and derive a collection of patterns corresponding
to the kinds of entities and classes of entities that we would naturally
recognise there.
The Semantic Web
The ‘Semantic Web’ is envisaged as a successor to the current World Wide
Web in which web pages contain structured descriptions of their contents that
can be processed by computers to provide more ‘intelligence’ in the operation
of the web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001). One of the most popular approaches
to the representation and processing of this ‘ontological’ knowledge is a family
of languages based on the Resource Description Framework (RDF), such as
RDF Schema (RDFS), the Ontology Inference Layer (OIL) and DAML+OIL
(see, for example, (Broekstra et al., 2002; McGuinness et al., 2002; Horrocks,
2002; Fensel et al., 2001)). RDF provides a syntactic framework, RDFS adds
modelling primitives such as ‘instance-of’ and ‘subclass-of’, and DAML+OIL
provides a formal semantics and reasoning capabilities based on ‘description
logics’, themselves based on predicate logic. For the sake of brevity, RDF and
its associated languages will be referred to as ‘RDF+’.
Although RDF+ is popular, it has some shortcomings. Here, I will suggest
that the SP system is a possible alternative with advantages compared with
RDF+. In the spirit of ‘evolvability’ in the web, the two approaches may be
developed in parallel until their relative strengths and weaknesses are more fully
understood.
Figure 13.4 shows an example of how the class ‘herbivore’ may be described
with one version of RDF+ (Broekstra et al., 2002). In summary, this description
says that a herbivore is a subclass of the class ‘animal’ and that herbivores eat
plants or parts thereof. This sample of RDF+ may be compared with the
examples in Sections 6.2 and 6.4 showing how class hierarchies and part-whole
hierarchies may be represented in the SP scheme.
A point of similarity between RDF+ and SP is the use of start and end
markers such as ‘<oil:hasOperand> ... </oil:hasOperand>’ in RDF+ and ‘NP
... #NP’ or ‘< ... >’ in SP. In RDF+, these markers—which are part of the
XML foundations of RDF+—are universal, whereas in SP they are not always
required.
Perhaps the main point of difference between RDF+ and SP is that the SP
theory incorporates a theory of knowledge in which syntax and semantics are
integrated and many of the concepts associated with ontologies are implicit.
There is no need for the explicit provision of constructs such as ‘Class’, ‘sub-
ClassOf’, ‘hasPropertyRestriction’, and similar constructs shown in Figure 13.4,
or others such as ‘Type’, ‘hasPart’, ‘Property’, ‘subPropertyOf’, or ‘hasValue’
which are also used in RDF+. Classes of entity and specific instances, their
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<rdfs:Class rdf:ID-"herbivore">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource-"#animal"/>
<oil:hasPropertyRestriction>
<oil:ValueType>
<oil:onProperty rdf:resource-"#eats"/>
<oil:toClass>
<oil:Or>
<oil:hasOperand rdf:resource-"#plant"/>
<oil:hasOperand>
<oil:HasValue>
<oil:onProperty
rdf:resource-"#is-part-of"/>
<oil:toClass rdf:resource-"#plant"/>
</oil:HasValue>
</oil:hasOperand>
</oil:Or>
</oil:toClass>
</oil:ValueType>
</oil:hasPropertyRestriction>
</rdfs:Class>
Figure 13.4: How the class ‘herbivore’ may be described in one version of RDF+
(Broekstra et al., 2002).
component parts and properties, and values for properties, can be represented
and integrated in a very direct, transparent and intuitive way, as described in
Chapter 6. In short, the SP approach allows ontologies to be represented in a
manner that appears to be simpler and more comprehensible than RDF+, both
for people writing ontologies and for people reading them.
Reasoning in RDF+ is based on predicate logic and belongs in the classi-
cal tradition of monotonic deductive reasoning in which propositions are either
true or false. By contrast, the main strengths of the SP system are in proba-
bilistic ‘deduction’, abduction and nonmonotonic reasoning (Chapter 6). There
is certainly a place for classical styles of reasoning in the Semantic Web but
probabilistic kinds of reasoning are needed too.
As we saw in Chapter 6, the SP system copes easily with errors of omission,
commission and substitution in information. This kind of capability is outside
the scope of ‘standard’ reasoning systems for RDF+ (see, for example, Horrocks
(2002)). It has more affinity with ‘non-standard inferences’ for description log-
ics (see, for example, Baader et al. (1999); Brandt and Turhan (2001)). Given
the anarchical nature of the Web, there is a clear need for the kind of flexibility
provided in the SP system. It may be possible to construct ontologies in a rela-
tively disciplined way but ordinary users of the web are much less controllable.
The system needs to be able to respond to queries in the same flexible and
‘forgiving’ manner as current search engines. Although current search engines
are flexible, their responses are not very ‘intelligent’. The SP system may help
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to plug this gap.
Apart from these possible advantages of the SP system compared with
RDF+, the framework has potential in other areas—such as natural language
processing, planning and problem solving, and unsupervised learning—that may
prove useful in the future development of the Semantic Web.
Software Engineering3
In spite of ‘fourth generation’ languages and the slowly maturing CASE tools
and integrated project support environments, the process of developing new
software and maintaining or upgrading existing software still has problems:
• Software development is often slow. Delays can mean costs and inconve-
nience.
• Software development is labour-intensive and correspondingly expensive.
• Incompatibilities between machines, operating system and languages
means difficulties in re-using software in new contexts and difficulties in
integrating software systems. The resulting need to translate software or
adapt it, or develop interfaces to translate information from one system
to another, means complexity, delays, costs and new sources of bugs.
• Software developers need extensive (and expensive) training.
• Verification. Notwithstanding the use of formal methods in software de-
velopment, it is impossible to be sure that any significant piece of software
is correct in the sense that it does what its designers intended in all cir-
cumstances. Any significant body of software is likely to contain bugs.
• Validation. System designers can, and often do, fail to understand fully
what the users want and, consequently, fail to capture the users’ require-
ments in the system.
In the following sub-sections, I outline some of the causes of these problems
and how they may be solved or at least alleviated in the SP system.
Procedural and declarative programming
In software design, there is a long-established distinction between ‘what’ a soft-
ware system is about and ‘how’ the system will do what is required. The former
is knowledge about the world that is encoded in the system (e.g., relevant laws
and regulations for accountancy applications or knowledge about fonts, head-
ings, paragraphs and the like in a program for desk-top publishing), while the
latter is ‘lower level’ knowledge about how to store information or find it using
the underlying hardware.
3Based on part of Chapter 6 in Wolff (1991).
CHAPTER 13. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 326
With ‘procedural’ programming languages like Fortran, Cobol and C, pro-
grammers need to consider both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of software design. It
has been recognised for many years that the process of designing software would
be simplified if programmers could concentrate on what the system should be
able to do without having to worry about how the machine would do it. Al-
though this has been achieved to some extent with ‘declarative’ languages like
Prolog, it is still necessary to design software in a way that takes account of the
step-by-step procedures that the machine will follow.
According to the SP theory, the ‘how’ parts of computing are the processes
of searching for matching patterns, building multiple alignments and encoding
information economically that constitute the SP model. In conventional com-
puters, it appears that SP processes are provided partly in the ‘core’ of the
computer and partly in the software (see Section 4.4, especially Figure 4.7). By
increasing the generality and power of the SP processes that are provided in
the core—as is envisaged in the proposed SP machine—it should be possible to
eliminate the need for any ‘how’ programming in the software.
To the extent that this vision can be realised, SP patterns that are processed
by an SP computer would constitute a truly declarative language that may be
used to specify what is to be done without concerns about how the machine
will do it. This would mean a corresponding streamlining in the process of
developing new software.
One simple language and one model of computing for all purposes
There are several different computer languages, specification formalisms and
design notations in common use today—including diagrammatic notations and
formalisms—and there are many other systems that are less commonly used.
Associated with these various languages and notations are several different
perspectives or ‘philosophies’ about how software and related knowledge should
be organised: ‘entity-relationship models’, ‘data flow models’, ‘entity life his-
tories’, ‘object-oriented design’, ‘logic programming’, ‘functional programming’
and others.
Training software developers in these different languages, notations and per-
spectives takes time and money. The lack of clear guidelines about which for-
malism or perspective is appropriate in which contexts, and how they should be
related, if at all, causes confusion and wasted effort.
Given the ‘universal’ nature of SP patterns (Section 3.3), they may serve as a
‘wide spectrum’ language in software engineering with a wide range of potential
applications.
Using one simple language for all types of software would mean less training
and less confusion about how software development should be done. Carried
to its logical conclusion it may eliminate all problems of compatibility between
systems.
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No refinement, verification or compiling
In a typical development project, two, three or more different formalisms, lan-
guages or notations will be used in different stages of the development. There
may be two or three translations between formalisms—from analysts’ models to
formal specifications and from formal specifications to program code. There is
always some kind of compiling of the code into a form which the machine can
use. If proper standards of quality are to be maintained, it will be necessary
to check rigorously or ‘prove’ that each of these translations have been done
correctly. The correctness of compilers must also be verified.
The whole process of translating between formalisms and proving the cor-
rectness of translations is labour intensive and expensive. The complexity of
the process means there is plenty of scope for making mistakes and there are
corresponding problems in maintaining the quality of the final product.
The SP machine has the potential to simplify the process of developing soft-
ware dramatically. SP patterns may be used in all stages and phases of develop-
ment. An SP data model prepared during systems analysis may be incorporated
directly in a software system without modification. A formal specification of a
software system expressed as SP patterns may be run immediately without
translation into a programming language. All translations and all compiling
may be eliminated. Since SP patterns are intended to be executed ‘directly’
without translation or compiling, there should be no need for ‘verification’ or
proof that an implementation conforms to its specification.
Eliminating all translation between formalisms and all verification that
translations have been done correctly can bring four major benefits:
• It can save large amounts of labour-intensive work and corresponding ex-
pense.
• It can shorten the time needed to produce a working system. This is useful
in itself and it facilitates the use of iterative prototyping techniques, giving
prospective users good opportunities to validate the developing system and
ensure that it meets their needs.
• It should eliminate all errors arising from translation between formalisms
during refinement and verification. This is a major source of errors in
software and its total elimination would mean a dramatic improvement in
the quality of software products.
Software re-use
The variety of languages and systems that are currently in use and the fact
that, often, they do not integrate properly, one with another, means significant
difficulties in re-using software in more than one context. Significant resources
go into translating between languages, porting software between machines and
operating systems or simply re-writing functions from scratch. It should never
again be necessary to re-write the standard arithmetic functions but this does
still happen.
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The SP system may facilitate software re-use in four main ways:
• By supporting object-oriented class hierarchies with inheritance (Section
6.4): any new class may re-use an existing class by making the old class
into a super-class of the new class. In this way, all the information in the
old class is inherited by the new class.
• As in any ‘functional’ programming language, an SP ‘function’ can be
re-used by ‘calling’ it from two or more different contexts.
• A significant problem in re-using software is finding what is needed within
a library of existing modules, functions or classes. The use of meaningful
names for functions can help as can the indexing and cross-referencing of
functions. The SP system provides the additional facility of powerful pat-
tern matching and searching. This can mean flexible retrieval capabilities
comparable with what is provided in the best systems for bibliographic
search.
• The ‘universal’ nature of SP patterns (Section 3.3) should facilitate the
integration of diverse kinds of knowledge, making it easier to re-use soft-
ware in different contexts without the incompatibilities that plague current
systems.
Configuration management
A significant problem in system development is the ‘configuration management’
problem, meaning the problem of keeping track of and managing the several
versions of a software system which are typically produced in the course of
development. What gives the problem spice is that most systems of any size
come in parts, sub-parts and so on and each component at any level may come in
several versions. Furthermore, associations must be maintained between source
code, object code, requirements specifications, designs and other documentation
for all the versions and at all the different levels within each version.
The ability of the SP system to integrate class hierarchies with part-whole
hierarchies may serve for configuration management (Section 1.3). Versions of a
software system may be represented as classes as can the versions of its parts and
sub-parts. And different combinations of components or associations between
components can be tied together in a flexible manner according to need.
These capabilities should be useful in applications other than software en-
gineering, wherever documents are to be developed comprising diverse kinds of
knowledge divided into parts and sub-parts with one or more versions for each
part.
Automatic programming
There is a well-established principle in software engineering that a well-designed
software system should model the domain which it is designed to serve. This
principle was cogently argued by Jackson (1975) for data processing, it underpins
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the practice of using entity-relationship models, data-flow models and entity life
histories as a basis for software design and it is a key part of the philosophy of
object-oriented design.
The anticipated ability of the SP machine to learn new concepts from ex-
perience means that, given ‘raw’ data about a domain, the system should be
able to create a model of that domain automatically. Given a stream of data,
an SP machine should be able to derive a well-structured Jackson diagram or
grammar for the data. Information may also be organised into class hierarchies
with inheritance of attributes in the manner of object-oriented design.
If the modularisation and structuring of software can be automated or semi-
automated in this kind of way, this should greatly accelerate the process of
designing new software systems.
Modifiability
Most software is far too inflexible. Although most packages give the end-user
some scope to set parameters or tailor the package to their individual require-
ments, this flexibility is usually very limited. In general, a software package is a
take-it-or-leave-it item. Buying software can mean a lot of effort in evaluating
packages which are nearly but not exactly what one needs. Short cuts in evalua-
tion often mean discovering shortcomings after a package has been bought. The
same kinds of problem apply to bespoke software: it is too difficult to modify
software to meet changing needs even when that software was originally de-
signed to fit one’s specific requirements. All these problems would be reduced if
it were easier to modify software to meet one’s needs or changes in one’s needs.
It should be relatively easy to make changes to SP software for three main
reasons:
• Simplicity in use. As described earlier, the SP machine should eliminate
all processes of translation, compiling and verification. This should greatly
simplify the process of changing software.
• Minimal redundancy in software. The system should remove one of the
main difficulties in making changes to conventional programs: a change
made in one part of the program often means that corresponding changes
must be made in other parts; it can be troublesome finding all the parts
that must be kept in step and errors can easily creep in. As with other
object-oriented systems which support class hierarchies and inheritance,
the SP system should allow software to be designed with a minimum of
redundancy; this means that any given change to a program can be made
in only one part of the program without the risk of inconsistencies.
• If automatic programming can be developed as anticipated, this should
assist the process of modifying software. Any inefficiencies in a modified
software system may be corrected automatically.
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Expert systems and intelligent databases
One of the most promising areas of application for the SP machine is where
stored knowledge is used as a basis for various kinds of reasoning—like an ‘ex-
pert system’ or ‘intelligent database’ running on a conventional computer. We
have seen already how the system may be used in such applications as medi-
cal diagnosis (Section 6.5), fault-finding with a discrimination network (Section
7.5), reasoning in the context of a forensic investigation (Section 7.6), and causal
diagnosis (Section 7.9).
Compared with existing systems, the potential advantages of the SP machine
include:
• Seamless integration of different kinds of knowledge. In a forensic in-
vestigation, for example, knowledge about a crime and knowledge about
suspects may be expressed in the same format as ‘expert’ knowledge about
ways in which crimes are normally committed and ‘everyday’ knowledge
about the association between matches and fire, the need to keep dry
in wet weather, and so on. This should facilitate the process of finding
connections between different kinds of knowledge.
• Seamless integration of different styles of reasoning: probabilistic ‘deduc-
tion’, abductive reasoning, nonmonotonic reasoning, and others, as de-
scribed in Chapter 7, as well as classical kinds of logical reasoning consid-
ered in Chapter 10.
• The ability to calculate probabilities for inferences fully in accordance with
standard principles of probability theory.
• The ability to learn new knowledge from ‘raw’ data in the manner of ‘data
mining’, abstracting rules and organising knowledge into class hierarchies
and part-whole hierarchies without the need for human intervention. Of
course, there is still a substantial gap between these possibilities and what
the current model can do (Chapter 9) but there seems no reason in prin-
ciple why the system should not be developed along these lines.
The storage and retrieval of information and the
relational model
For applications where the emphasis is on the storage and retrieval of informa-
tion, the SP system could be an attractive alternative to the relational model
(Codd (1970), see also Connolly and Begg (2002)), which is currently the domi-
nant model for database applications (if we discount the network model and its
dramatic resurgence in the World Wide Web). This subsection compares the
two.
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Representation of tables
One of the attractions of the relational model has been the simplicity of the
idea of representing everything in tables. Although this idea is easy to grasp
and has proved very practical and successful in a host of applications, it is not
quite as simple as it may superficially appear. This is because a table in a
relational database is not merely an array of columns and rows as it appears on
the computer screen. In order to access individual cells efficiently, it is necessary
to mark cells and rows with appropriate tags. Normally, these tags are hidden
from view but they can be seen when a table is translated into something like
XML, designed to facilitate the inter-change of information between computer
systems in a form that can be read by people.
The difference can be seen by comparing Table 13.1—which shows two rows
of the periodic table—with Figure 13.5 in which the same two rows are repre-
sented using XML. In the latter representation, each cell needs to be marked
explicitly with tags like ‘<name> ... </name>’ or ‘<symbol> ... </symbol>’
corresponding to the column in which the cell appears. Tags like ‘<row> ...
</row>’ are also needed to mark each row as a distinct entity.
Name Symbol Atomic Atomic
Number Weight
Hydrogen H 1 1.00794
Helium He 2 4.0026
Table 13.1: Two rows of the periodic table.
<periodic_table>
<row>
<name>Hydrogen</name>
<symbol>H</symbol>
<atomic_number>1</atomic_number>
<atomic_weight>1.00794</atomic_weight>
</row>
<row>
<name>Helium</name>
<symbol>He</symbol>
<atomic_number>2</atomic_number>
<atomic_weight>4.0026</atomic_weight>
</row>
</periodic_table>
Figure 13.5: Table 13.1 represented using XML.4
Although there are differences in details, the way in which a table is rep-
CHAPTER 13. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 332
resented in XML—and more covertly in the implementation of a relational
database—is essentially the same as it would be represented in the SP sys-
tem. Thus, the SP system can represent information in the form of tables and
it can do so in a manner which matches the simplicity of relational databases,
neither more nor less.
Class hierarchies
Tables can be a convenient way to represent classes of entity. For example, in a
typical data processing application, one might use a table to represent the class
of employees, another table to represent the lorries that the company uses to
distribute its products, and so on. But if tables are used in an unthinking way,
they can lead to unwanted redundancies in a database. For example, the class
of employees and the class of customers would both normally have fields for
‘title’, ‘first name’, ‘second name’, ‘address’, ‘telephone number’ and, perhaps,
others.
It has been recognised for some time that redundancies of that kind can be
reduced by abstracting the repeated fields, putting them in a third table (which
would, in this case, be called something like ‘person’), and linking the super-
class with its subclasses by the use of reference numbers. In this kind of way,
relational databases have provided a basis for the use of ‘entity-relationship’
models in data processing applications (Chen, 1976), with hierarchies of classes
which are very much like the class hierarchies of object-oriented design.
Given that class hierarchies can also be represented in the SP system (Section
6.4), one might think that, with respect to class hierarchies, there was little to
choose between the relational model and the SP system. But in this area the
SP system has two advantages compared with the relational model:
• In the relational model, each attribute of a class—represented by a field
or column in a table—is a variable. There is no provision in the relational
model for representing the attributes of a class as literal values such as
‘furry’, ‘warm-blooded’, ‘has-backbone’ or the like. In the SP system, by
contrast, the attributes of a class can be any combination of literal values
and variables, the latter represented by pairs of ID-symbols such as ‘title
... #title’, ‘first name ... #first name’, and so on.
• In the SP system, the connection between a given class and any one sub-
class is made via matching symbols in a corresponding pair of patterns.
In the relational model, by contrast, the connection between a given class
and any one of its subclasses is made via matching reference numbers in
the tuples that represent individual instances of those classes. For ta-
bles containing hundreds or thousands of rows (which is not unusual in
data-processing applications), this system for connecting a class with any
one of its subclasses is considerably more clumsy than the comparative
simplicity of the SP scheme where classes can be connected to each other
directly and not via their individual instances.
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With respect to the first point, it may be argued that databases are all about
storing information that varies from one instance of a class to another and that
there is no need for any information about literal values. This may be true for
conventional data processing applications where there is no uncertainty about
what class a given entity belongs to. But in applications where one may wish
to recognise some unknown entity on the basis of fragmentary information (as
described in Chapter 6), then it is important to know as much as possible about
each class, including attributes that would most naturally be represented with
literal values, not variables.
Part-whole hierarchies
Very much the same can be said about part-whole hierarchies as has just been
said about class-inclusion hierarchies. Part-whole hierarchies can be represented
in a relational database but this is relatively awkward compared with the SP
system and does not allow for parts to be described in terms of literal attributes
as well as variables. With a relational database, part-whole relations cannot be
integrated with class-inclusion relations in the seamless manner that SP allows.
Retrieval of information
In the SP system, retrieval of information is achieved most naturally by the
use of a New pattern representing the kind of Old information that is to be
retrieved, with gaps where details are needed. This is essentially the same as
‘query-by-example’ in relational databases, except that the SP system does not
require the kind of ‘wild’ symbols that are required in some relational systems
(e.g., ‘?’ or ‘*’), and the SP system is more tolerant of extraneous information
than is the case in some implementations of relational databases.
Given appropriate patterns, the SP system allows information to be retrieved
indirectly via ‘meanings’ as well as via direct matches between the query and
stored data (Section 6.3). Relational databases do not lend themselves naturally
to this kind of information retrieval.
Although current SP models are geared mainly to the representation and
retrieval of symbolic information, it is envisaged that the SP machine will be de-
veloped to handle numeric information as effectively as conventional computers
(Section 13.3). In that case, it should be possible to store numeric information
and to retrieve it with operators such as ‘more than’ (‘>’), ‘less than’ (‘<’) and
so on.
There is nothing in current SP models equivalent to SQL or similar languages
for database retrieval. But if the system can cope with the syntax and semantics
of natural languages (Chapter 5), there seems no reason in principle why, with
appropriate patterns stored in Old, the SP system should not accommodate
relatively simple artificial languages like SQL.
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Organisation of knowledge
Currently, the organisation or ‘normalisation’ of knowledge in a database is done
by human judgement. Although the results are normally good, the process of
designing a database can be a significant task, especially where the domain of
application is complex.
In principle, some or all of this task may be automated. If learning processes
like those in the SP70 model can be developed to their full potential, it should be
possible to structure an SP database automatically when it is first established
and to restructure it at any stage. This should save effort and corresponding
expense, and it could conceivably overcome weaknesses in database structures
that are created ‘manually’.
Conclusion
With respect to the storage and retrieval of information, the SP system can
represent tables in essentially the same form as they are represented in rela-
tional databases, but the system has advantages over the relational model in
the representation of class hierarchies, part-whole hierarchies and in aspects of
information retrieval. If the SP machine can be developed as anticipated, it
should be able to do everything that a relational database can do and more
besides.
Since, in addition, the SP system can be applied in such areas as natural
language processing, probabilistic reasoning, planning and problem solving, it
has substantial attractions as an alternative to the relational model.
Other applications
Other areas where the SP machine may be applied include:
• Natural language processing. In Chapter 5, we saw how the SP system
lends itself to the representation of natural language syntax, to natural
language parsing and production and, more tentatively, to the integration
of syntax with semantic structures. On this evidence, the SP machine
should be a promising vehicle for such applications as understanding and
production of natural language in spoken or written form or translations
between natural languages.
• Automatic learning of natural language grammars. If the learning pro-
cesses described in Chapter 9 can be developed as anticipated, automatic
learning of natural language grammars, including semantics, may become
feasible.
• Planning and problem solving. With further work on planning and prob-
lem solving, as outlined in Chapter 8, a range of new applications should
open up.
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• Project management. On rather shorter timescales, an SP machine would
be a convenient vehicle for the storage and retrieval of information asso-
ciated with project management, as described in Wolff (1989).
13.5 Conclusion
Whether or not the SP system will be any good at mending socks remains
to be seen. Meanwhile, there is a range of possible applications that promise
to be useful on shortish to medium timescales. The SP theory provides a new
perspective on many issues in computing and cognition and should have heuristic
value in neurophysiology (Chapter 11), in cognitive psychology (Chapter 12),
and in mathematics and in logic (Chapter 10).
Chapter 14
Conclusion
It has been a long but interesting journey since the first germ of an idea for this
project about 1982 or 3. Serious work did not begin until about 1987 and for
quite a long time after that the few areas of insight were overwhelmed by the
many unanswered questions. A major step forward was the development of a
version of the multiple alignment concept, but a lot more work has been needed
to develop working models and to gain some understanding of ways in which
the theory may be applied.
14.1 Is the SP Theory a Good Theory?
Although the theory is not yet ‘complete’, it is pertinent to review its status in
terms of the criteria discussed in Section 1.3.
Falsifiability and the Making of Predictions
If an empirical theory is simply a compressed version of observational data, it
is not essential that it should make predictions that can be found to be ‘true’
or ‘false’. But it is difficult to achieve this kind of compression without, at the
same time, making predictions of one kind or another (as was noted in Section
1.3) and our willingness to believe a theory is certainly enhanced if it makes
predictions that are born out by observation.
As a theory of human cognition and brain function, the SP theory makes the
broad prediction that, if we could get a comprehensive and very detailed view of
what is going on inside a living human brain, we would find structures like the
‘pattern assemblies’ described in Chapter 11, we would be able to observe the
formation of associations amongst pattern assemblies that would be equivalent
to multiple alignments, and we would be able to relate the building of multiple
alignments to a person’s ability to analyse or create natural language, to reason
about things, to retrieve information from memory, to learn new knowledge,
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and so on. Clearly, the SP theory is not a vacuous catch-all theory and it can,
in principle, be falsified.
Of course, the major difficulty is that, for very obvious ethical and method-
ological reasons, we cannot see the workings of a living human brain in sufficient
detail to see immediately whether the SP theory is true or false. We are forced
to use indirect clues to what is going on such as reaction times, error rates,
measurements of brain waves, and so on. And this raises the further difficulty
that the SP theory, like many other theories in this area, does not (yet) spec-
ify precisely how the neural processing would be done. Without this detail,
it is very difficult to make sensible predictions of the kind that are needed to
test the theory experimentally. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Chapter 12
does contain some suggestions about ways in which the SP theory might be
differentiated experimentally from alternative theories in cognitive psychology.
It should not be forgotten that many of the topics in artificial intelligence—
including those that have been considered in previous chapters—are founded
on everyday observations of what people can and cannot do. To the extent
that the SP theory can accommodate them, these observations form part of the
empirical support for the theory even though they are not derived from formal
experiments.
The SP theory is not set in stone. As we saw in Section 5.5, the phenomenon
of cross-serial dependencies in language is a potential problem for the theory,
although it is not yet clear whether or how any adjustment to the theory is
required. As work proceeds in exploring the potential applications of the theory,
it is likely that changes will be made.
Breadth, Power, Depth and Simplicity
Assuming that explanatory ‘breadth’ or ‘power’ are equivalent, how does the
SP theory fair? As a theory of computing, mathematics and logic, which is also
a theory of perception and cognition, its scope is unusually wide.
A sceptic might object that Turing’s theory of computing and information
theory (Shannon’s version and algorithmic information theory) are theories re-
lating to information processing that also have very wide scope. Do we really
need the SP theory as well? In answer, the theory is an alternative to Turing’s
theory of computing with much more to say about the nature of intelligence
and with other advantages described in Chapter 4. The SP theory incorporates
significant insights from Shannon’s theory and algorithmic information theory
but says much more about the nature of information processing, especially the
kinds of human-like processing of information that have proved so challenging
to understand.
Apart from wide explanatory scope, a good theory needs to have sufficient
depth or substance to do what it purports to do and, at the same time, it needs
to be as simple as possible. With regard to depth, the use of computer models
in the development of the SP theory has ensured that it is far removed from the
kinds of sketchy descriptions that are sometimes dignified with the title ‘theory’
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when a more accurate appellation would be ‘proto-theory’ or ‘first tentative
thoughts’.
Is the theory simple? It is certainly more complex that the Turing theory
but, if we take into account the software that is needed to make a universal
Turing machine (or an ordinary computer) do anything sensible, then the SP
theory almost certainly yields an overall simplification, as discussed in Sections
4.4 and 4.4. This global simplification could be very substantial.
As we saw in the previous chapter, there are areas of the SP theory that are
still in need of development, especially in relation to unsupervised learning. But
the overall framework has now matured to the point where it should provide
a reasonably firm foundation for further work as described in that chapter. I
hope readers will feel inspired to pick up some of these threads and take the
ideas forward.
Appendix A
Finding Good Matches
Between Two Sequences of
Symbols
This appendix, based on part of Wolff (1994a), describes the process for finding
full matches and good partial matches between two sequences that lies at the
heart of the SP61 and SP70 models. This process was first implemented in SP21
(a precursor of SP61 and SP70) that was designed for best-match information
retrieval. Much of the discussion is couched in those terms.
A.1 The hit structure
Figure A.1 illustrates the main concepts introduced in the description that fol-
lows. In this description, the query and the database are both sequences of
atomic symbols, assumed to be characters in the discussion, and the database
may be divided into sections such as sentences or paragraphs. Here is the pro-
cess:
1. The query is processed left to right, one character at a time.
2. Each character in the query is, in effect, broadcast to every character in
the database to make a yes/no match in each case.
3. Every positive match (hit) between a character from the query and a
character in the database is recorded in a data structure which will be
referred to as the hit structure.
(a) The hit structure stores sequences of hits. In each such hit sequence,
the order of the matched query characters is the same as the order
of the matched database characters. But there may be unmatched
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Figure A.1: Concepts in pattern matching and search. A ‘query’ string and a
‘database’ string are shown at the top with the ordinal positions of characters
marked. Sequences of hits between the query and the database are shown in the
middle with corresponding values of pn (described in the text). Each node in
the hit structure shows the ordinal position of a query character and the ordinal
position of a matching database character. Each path from the root node to a
leaf node represents a hit sequence.
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query characters anywhere within the sequence of matched query
characters and there may be unmatched database characters any-
where within the sequence of matched database characters.
(b) The hit structure is implemented as a tree:
• Each path from the root of the tree to any other node records a
left-to-right hit sequence, one hit on each node.
• The root of the tree is a dummy node which does not record any
hit.
(c) Although a given query character may match two or more characters
in the database, only one of these hits is recorded in any one hit
sequence. Likewise for database characters.
(d) For each hit recorded in a node in the tree, there is a record of the
position of the character in the query, the position of the matching
character in the database, and a measure of probability of the se-
quence of hits up to and including the given hit (as described below).
(e) If the database is divided into sections, then it can be convenient
to apply a rule that all the hits recorded in one path must all come
from one section. If this rule is in force (and this may be a decision
made by the user) then the system will not attempt to find match
sequences which cross from one section to another.
4. The hit structure is updated every time a hit is found. One or more new
nodes for this hit (which will be referred to as the current hit) is added to
the hit structure in the following way:
• The tree is examined to identify each hit which immediately precedes
the current hit. In this context, the meaning of ‘precede’ is that the
database character for the given hit precedes the database character
for the current hit and likewise for the query characters. The meaning
of ‘immediately’ is that, if the node for the given hit has children, then
the hits in the child nodes do not precede the current hit. There may,
of course, be unmatched query characters or unmatched database
characters between the two hits.
• For each of the ‘immediately preceding’ hits identified in this way, a
probability is calculated for the sequence of hits comprising the path
up to and including the current hit.
• For each hit sequence or path which has been identified in this way
(if any), a new node for the current hit is added to the hit structure
as the leaf node for that path. In each case, the probability value for
the path is recorded in the new node.
• If there are no paths identified in this way then a new path is started
with a node for the current hit as a child of the root and an initial
probability value as described below.
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5. If the memory space allocated to the hit structure is exhausted at any
time then it is ‘purged’: the leaf nodes of the tree are sorted in reverse
order of their probability values and each leaf node in the bottom half of
the set is extracted from the hit structure, together with all nodes on its
path which are not shared with any other path. The recording of hits may
then continue using the space which has been released.
6. After the last query character has been processed, the paths from the root
to the leaf nodes are displayed in order of their probability in a convenient
form for inspection by the user.
A.2 Probabilities
The search process, just described, uses a measure of probability, pn, as its
metric. This metric provides a means of guiding the search which is effective
in practice and appears to have a sound theoretical basis. To define pn and to
justify it theoretically, it is necessary first to define the terms and variables on
which it is based:
• For each hit sequence h1...hn, there is a corresponding series of gaps,
g1...gn. For any one hit, the corresponding gap is g = gq + gd, where gq
is the number of unmatched characters in the query between the query
character for the given hit in the series and the query character for the
immediately preceding hit; and gd is the equivalent gap in the database,
g1 is taken to be 0.
• A is the size of the alphabet of character types used in the query and the
text.
• p1 is the probability of a match between any one character in the query
and any one character in the database on the null hypothesis that all
characters are equally probable at all locations. Its value is calculated as:
p1 = 1/A.
Using these definitions, the probability of any hit sequence of length n is
calculated as:
pn =
i=n∏
i=1
(1− (1− p1)
gi+1), g1 = 0
.
It should be clear from this formula that it is easy to calculate the probability
of the hit sequence up to and including any hit by using the stored value of the
hit sequence up to and including the immediately preceding hit.
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Justification
The thinking behind the formula is straightforward. In accordance with estab-
lished practice in statistics, the method aims to calculate the probability that
the observed distribution of hits, or better, could have occurred by chance on
the ‘null hypothesis’ that all the characters in the alphabet are equi-probable at
every location in the query and the database, i.e. that the distribution of char-
acters is random. In this context, a distribution of hits which is ‘better’ than
an observed distribution is one which has more hits within the same range, or
the hits fall into clumps, or both these things.
A hit sequence with a low probability is more ‘significant’ than one with a
high probability and may be taken as evidence that the null hypothesis should
be rejected. A hit sequence with a low probability is normally more interesting
to the user than a high probability hit sequence which could be merely the result
of chance.
It is important to stress that this approach to the analysis does not in any
way prejudge the statistical properties of the query or the database. It is, of
course, very well known that the distribution of characters in any natural lan-
guage (e.g. English) is not random and that such texts contain large amounts of
redundancy in the sense of Shannon’s information theory (Shannon and Weaver,
1949). The null hypothesis provides a reference point or baseline for measuring
how far an observed distribution of hits departs from randomness.
The probability measure that has been described is an inverse measure of
redundancy. In the case under discussion, where two strings are being compared,
pn measures the redundancy between the two strings. It says nothing about
redundancy that may exist within one string or the other. Under the null
hypothesis, the probability of an observed hit sequence or better depends on
three main factors:
• There is a better chance of finding a hit sequence which is at least as good
as the observed sequence if the query or the database or both of them are
large.
• If the n hits of a hit sequence are scattered across a relatively long part
of the query, or a relatively long part of the database, or both, then the
associated probability is higher than for a ‘closely packed’ hit sequence
which is confined to portions of the query and the database which are as
short as n or only a little longer.
• Other things being equal, the probability of an observed hit sequence or
better decreases as n increases.
For the purposes of information retrieval, the size of the query and the size
of the database should not be factors in deciding whether a given hit sequence
is significant. What is of interest is the probability of an observed hit sequence
after the effects of query size and database size have been abstracted. For
this purpose, hit sequences which are closely packed and relatively long are the
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most significant, independent of the sizes of the query and the database, and
independent of where the hit sequences occur within the query and the database.
On this basis, the probability of the first or only hit in a sequence (p1 = 1/A)
is the same as the probability that any given side of an A-sided unbiased die
will appear on any one throw of the die. This formula for the first or only hit
in a sequence can be derived from the main formula if n is 1 and g1 is 0. In
the main formula, (1 − p1) is the probability of a non-match between any one
character in the query and any one character in the database. If there are g
non-matches between one hit and the next, then the probability of finding one
or more hits over a distance of (g + 1) is (1 − (1 − p1)
g+1). This probability is
then multiplied by the probability for the hit sequence up to and including the
preceding hit, to give pn.
As an illustration, consider the fourth hit sequence shown in Figure A.1.
The size of the alphabet, A, is 6, so p1 is 1/6 which is 0.1666666, and (1− p1)
is 0.8333333. As with any other hit sequence, the first hit in the sequence has
g1 = 0 so that its probability is (1− (1 − p1)
0+1) which is the same as p1. For
the second hit, gq is 1 and gd is 0 so that g is 1. The corresponding value of
(1 − (1 − p1)
1+1) is 0.3055556. This is multiplied by the probability of the hit
sequence up to and including the previous hit giving an overall value for pn of
0.0509259.
The analysis which has been presented assumes an alphabet of fixed size.
This is plausible if the atomic symbols for yes/no matches are characters but
may seem less plausible with larger units such as words or phrases because of
their variety in natural languages. However, in any one combination of query
and database there is a finite (if large) number of different words or phrases.
This means that the analysis can be applied even with these larger units.
A.3 Discussion of the search technique
The technique which has been described incorporates the principles of metrics-
guided search like this:
• The hit structure plots a set of alternative paths through the search space.
• The probability metric is used (during purging) to prune leaves and
branches from the tree of paths.
• The method may be classified as beam search because the search proceeds
along several paths at once. This reduces the risk of getting stuck on a
local peak. Increasing the size of the hit structure increases the number
of paths and thus increases the chance of finding ‘good’ hit sequences.
If the database is divided into sections, and if a rule is applied that hits in
a sequence must all come from the same section, this has the effect of blocking
some paths through the search space, thus reducing the number of possibilities
which need to be considered and saving some processing time.
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There is a trade-off between the maximum size of the hit structure and
the ability of the system to find partial matches. When the maximum size of
the hit structure is small, processing times are short but the system may get
stuck on local peaks and miss partial matches that people can see. When the
maximum size of the hit structure is large, the system finds partial matches
more effectively but processing times are longer. It seems reasonable that, in
a fully-developed version of the system, this trade-off between search time and
level of performance should be under the control of the user.
The idea of broadcasting symbols is not in itself especially new and has
been described elsewhere (Carroll et al., 1988; Lee, 1986). The novelty of the
technique which has been described is in the way the broadcasting of symbols
is combined with a technique for keeping track of partial matches between the
query and the database and in how the system calculates probabilities and uses
this information to select amongst the many possible paths through the search
space.
In a serial processing environment, the broadcasting of symbols must be
done serially, but this kind of operation lends itself very well to the application
of parallel processing.
The advantages of this technique compared with the basic dynamic program-
ming method are:
• The space complexity of the process is O(D), better than O(Q ·D) for the
basic dynamic programming method.
• The method appears to be better suited to parallel processing although,
for the approximate string matching problem, an adaptation of dynamic
programming for parallel processing has been described (Bertossi et al.,
1992).
• The technique for pruning the search tree may be applied, however large
the search space may be. In general, the ‘depth’ or thoroughness of search-
ing can be controlled by specifying the maximum size of the hit structure.
• Unlike the standard dynamic programming method, this method can de-
liver two or more alternative alignments of two patterns.
A.4 Computational complexity
Given the ‘combinatorial explosion’ of possible matches which was described
earlier, a key question about any system of this kind is the demand which it
makes on processing time and computer memory when the quantities of data
are increased. This section describes analytic and empirical evidence on these
points.
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The best, worst and typical cases
The core of the search process is the broadcasting of characters from one string
(the query) to each of the characters in another string (the database). From the
perspective of absolute running times and computational complexity, the best
case is when none of the symbols in the query match any of the symbols in the
database. In this case, there are no hit sequences to be stored and the search is
completed very quickly.
The worst case is when all the symbols in the query and the database are
the same. In principle, this yields the largest possible number of hit sequences
although, in practice, SP61 will purge many of them from its hit structure.
The typical case, somewhere between the two extremes, is where the query
and the database both contain a range of symbol types distributed in the kind
of way that letters are distributed in natural languages.
Since the worst case is unlikely to occur in practice, the typical case has
been assumed in what follows.
Time complexity in a serial processing environment
In a serial processing environment, it is clear that the processing time for this
operation is proportional to the length of the query string and, independently,
it is proportional to the length of the database. In other words, the time com-
plexity for this operation is O(n ·m), where n is the number of characters in the
query and m is the number of characters in the database.
Updating the hit structure
The process of updating the hit structure includes the time required to search
the hit structure for the best hit sequences and the time required to add new
nodes. The time required to search the hit structure will vary, depending on
whether the hit structure is full or has recently been purged; but, apart from a
small effect at the start of processing as the space available for the hit structure
is filled, the time required for this operation should be independent of n or m.
Since the updating operation occurs only for hits, and since the proportion
of hits amongst the yes/no matches should be independent of n or m, we may
conclude, overall, that our initial assessment of the algorithm remains valid. In
short, an analysis of the algorithm shows that its time complexity in a serial
processing environment should be O(n ·m). This analysis is independent of the
size of the hit structure.
The foregoing analysis remains valid when the database is divided into sec-
tions with the exclusion of hit sequences from one section to another. This
kind of constraint can save overall processing time by reducing the variety of
hit sequences and thus reducing the number of purges of the hit structure; but
the constraint does not change the relationship between processing time and n
or m.
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Time complexity in a parallel processing environment
As previously noted, the search process lends itself well to parallel processing:
• The process of broadcasting a query character to every character in the
database is an intrinsically parallel operation.
• If the database is divided into parts, each part with its own small hit
structure, then updating of the hit structures may be performed in parallel.
If finding hits and updating the hit structure takes unit time independent of
the size of the database, as seems possible in a parallel processing environment,
then the time complexity of the process should be O(n).
Space complexity
The space required to store the database is independent of any retrieval mech-
anism and is therefore excluded from this analysis of the space complexity of
the search process. At this level of abstraction, there is no distinction between
‘main memory’ and ‘secondary storage’, both kinds of memory being assumed
to function as a unified ‘virtual memory’. The memory required specifically
for the search process is mainly the space required to store the hit structure.
Although the hit structure varies in size as the program runs, it never exceeds
a pre-defined limit because it is purged whenever the limit is reached. If the
user requires all hit sequences down to a fixed level of ‘quality’ then, for typical
data, the size of the hit structure should be increased in proportion to m and
the space complexity of the process would be O(m).
Empirical evidence
Running times for SP21 have been plotted to show the effect of varying the
size of the query (with a database of constant size) and also to show the effect
of varying the size of the database (with a query of constant size) (see Wolff
(1994a)). The queries and the databases were all samples of English.
In each case, the relationship is approximately linear. These results lend
support to the analytic conclusion that the time complexity of the SP21 process
in a serial processing environment is O(n ·m).
Appendix B
The SP Theory and Physics
This appendix is intended for some speculative thoughts about ways in which the
SP theory may suggest a reinterpretation of some concepts in physics, especially
in quantum theory.
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